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
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
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THE
NEW ENGLANDER.



1882.

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JANUARY, 1882.

ARTICLE I.—OLD TIMES IN CONNECTICUT.

[A paper read to the New Haven Colony Historical Society, March 8, 1879.]

It is not an uncommon device of authorship to introduce a fictitious narrative with an equally fictitious account of how a mysterious manuscript came into the possession of the author, who represents himself as deriving from it the materials of his story, or perhaps as being only the editor. Thus the author of *Waverly*, when as yet he was the Great Unknown, came into correspondence with Jedediah Cleishbotham, and in that way had the opportunity of introducing to the world the *Tales of My Landlord*. In like manner, Dr. Lawrence Templeton and Dr. Dryasdust figure in the introduction to *Ivanhoe*; and Captain Clutterbuck is the medium of communication between the Author of *Waverly* and a nameless and mysterious Benedictine monk, whose bundle of manuscripts is represented as the material out of which were constructed the Monastery, and the Abbot.

I propose to give in this paper some account of a manuscript nearly a hundred years old. But by way of introduction, I

must tell how the manuscript came to me,—though in so doing I may seem almost like the inventor of some ingenious fiction. I doubt whether any novel-writer has invented, by way of introduction to his novel, a more remarkable story, all things considered, than the story of how the manuscript, of which I am to give you some account, came into my possession.

Of those three sons of mine who wore the blue uniform in the great civil war, and who during those four years became pretty well acquainted with Virginia as well as with more distant regions, two were at the siege and taking of Richmond. After the war, one of them happened to have a share in redeeming and restoring to one of the oldest counties of that old commonwealth, a record-book which some soldier from Western New York had brought away, supposing it to be legitimate "spoils of war."* He was thus brought into friendly communication with gentlemen in Virginia; and at his request, I sent—not long ago—to the address of R. A. Brock, Esq., Richmond, a recent historical pamphlet, and with it an unbound copy of a historical volume published forty years earlier. Mr. Brock is secretary and librarian to the Virginia Historical Society—an institution which, as I learn from a Richmond directory, has "A library of nearly 10,000 volumes, a valuable gallery of historic portraits, important manuscripts, precious relics," etc., and which occupies, as the same authority informs me, "rooms over the State Law Library in the Court of Appeals building." He was kind enough to respond by sending me, from time to time, the *Richmond Standard*, a very respectable weekly journal, which contains, in every issue that comes to me, a communication of "Notes and Queries" from his pen—mostly concerning old families and historic localities in that State, but sometimes of much wider interest. That response was to me an entirely satisfactory acknowledgment; and I trust that the "Notes and Queries" which I am intending to preserve in a scrap book, will some day be a valuable addition to our library.

It was, therefore, not without surprise that I received after the lapse of several weeks, a very courteous letter from Mr. Brock, with abundant but unnecessary apology for not having

* An account of some things in that record book was published in the *New Englander* for July, 1876.

written at an earlier date. That letter brought me the manuscript which is the subject of this paper. "I enclose for your acceptance a soiled fragment of a diary found among the papers of a pious and beloved Presbyterian divine of this city, Rev. John D. Blair, who died in 1823. I know not the writer, but am assured by several circumstances that it was written between the years 1780-90, which indeed will be apparent to you by internal evidence, on inspection. There may be something of local record in it to interest you."

Who then was the Rev. John D. Blair, that "pious and beloved Presbyterian divine" of Richmond, who died fifty-seven years ago, and among whose papers was found this fragment of a diary, which Mr. Brock thought might be interesting to us in Connecticut? Was he in any way related to Connecticut or to New England. It will not be amiss to answer this question before proceeding to examine the diary itself.

Richmond became the seat of government for Virginia in the year 1779. It had been till that time little more than a petty village on the bank of the James River. The capitol—for in the magniloquence of Virginia and more recently of Connecticut, that Pagan name is given to what our Christian and English-speaking fathers called a State House—was built on a slightly hill at a distance from the old village; and the new city began to grow up around it. The hall of the House of Delegates was the only apartment in that distinguished neighborhood which could accommodate a worshipping assembly. So it came to pass that the hall of the House of Delegates in the Capitol was a place of worship for two partly different and partly identical congregations, which included not a few of the most eminent men of "the Old Dominion," and which were served on alternate Sundays by Parson Buchanan of the Episcopal Church, who was a born Scotchman, and by Parson Blair of the Presbyterian Church, who was born in Pennsylvania of that Scotch-Irish blood which is the glory and strength of Western Pennsylvania, and which (not to speak of New Hampshire) has given to Connecticut such names as McCurdy, McEwen, Murdock and Hillhouse. He acquired what passed for a liberal education, without coming even so far north as New Jersey, and doubtless one part of it was an orthodox prej-

udice against New England Divinity, and an old-time Pennsylvanian dislike of Yankees generally. He was well fitted to flourish in the Virginia of those times, for he was not only gentlemanly, scholarly, and eloquent in the pulpit, but was also admired in polished and fashionable society. The Episcopalian parson and the Presbyterian—"two parsons with ne'er a church"—were good friends; and there seems to have been no sectarian quarreling between their respective adherents. Mr. Blair supported himself in part by giving classical instruction to a few young gentlemen (for he had been the principal of a literary institution), and in consideration of his service in the ministry, there was a yearly subscription among his hearers. The subscription paper for 1796 is copied into one of Mr. Brock's communications to the *Richmond Standard*, and it shows such names as Bushrod Washington (nephew of President Washington and afterwards a justice of the Supreme Court), John Marshall (afterwards the renowned Chief Justice), Edmund Randolph (governor of Virginia), and others, many of them being names of known and eminent Episcopalians. That singular partnership (described as "two parsons with ne'er a church")—and the parsons of two rival denominations—continued till 1812, when the "Monumental Church," built to commemorate the terrible tragedy of the burning of the theater in 1811, became the property of an Episcopal parish, and the Presbyterian portion of the Capitol congregation built for their own use the First Presbyterian Church in Richmond. In that edifice Mr. Blair served as pastor till his death in 1823.*

It was among the papers of this Scotch-Irish Presbyterian minister, born and educated in Western Pennsylvania; and domiciled for thirty years or more in Virginia, that our manuscript was found. How it came there is a mystery, for Mr. Blair was in no way related to Connecticut or to New England. How it happened to remain there—why it was not taken for waste paper—why it did not go as a minister's old sermons ordinarily go after his decease—is another mystery.

So we come to the manuscript itself, in absolute ignorance of its history. The first leaf (if no more) is missing; and at the top of what I suppose to have been the third page, we find

* Sprague's *Annals of the American Pulpit*, III. 459-462.

the diarist recording that he "went to bed and slept luxuriously after supping plenteously on sweetmeats and cream pompon pie, and bridal kisses." Evidently, he had been at a wedding.

Then comes a date, "Friday 14th," with no mention of the month or the year, but with the record, "Slept late in the morning, on account of the wedding—made several morning calls—wished the bride more joy—got my horse shod, and set out for Norwalk, where I made a cousinly visit, and ate, drank, and slept for nothing. In the evening, called on Miss C—n, who treated me with friendly attention, unaffected smiles, and sprightly wine—the last she gave with 'good will.'"

The next day ("Saturday 15th") we find him setting out early in the morning. "Rode to Greenfield," he says, "and breakfasted with Mr. Dwight." None of us need to be told who that Mr. Dwight was. In the year 1787, the College of New Jersey honored itself by conferring the degree of Doctor in Divinity upon the Rev. Timothy Dwight of Greenfield, Conn., who was a grandson of its most illustrious President, Jonathan Edwards, and who was from 1795 to 1817 the light and the pride of New Haven. That breakfast, then, "with *Mr. Dwight*" was not only prior to 1795, but at the latest not long after 1787, or so early that the honorary prefix to his name was sometimes not remembered. This is our first clew to the date of the "diary"; but as yet we find no hint as to who was its author.

"Staid much longer than I intended to. I however forgave myself very readily when I considered the cause of my detention." Those who have heard Judge Daggett and other citizens of the same period tell about the charm of Dr. Dwight's conversation, need not be informed what it was that detained our tourist so long after breakfast. The pastor of Greenfield Hill was like Coleridge's Ancient Mariner in the power of fascinating even a wedding guest and holding him fast. Our wedding guest (for so we may call him) escaped in time to dine at Stratford, where he seems to have had friends but found nobody at home, and thence he "pushed on to New Haven." He makes no mention of the ferry across the Housatonic, but evidently the day was far spent before he was on the Milford side of the

river. "The last part of the ride," he says, "was solitary, as it was in the evening; but it was the better calculated for reflection. I was drawing nigh to the seat of my former pleasures; the recollection of a thousand happy circumstances . . . crowded round my heart and awakened some of its choicest emotions." . . . "In this way was the gloom of the evening forgotten, and the tediousness of ten long miles entirely lost." In this sentimental mood he arrives at New Haven, an hour perhaps after the Saturday sunset. "Unwilling to sit down and spend the remainder of the evening with strangers, grog-bruizers, etc.," he says, "I immediately went in pursuit of my old friend Leander, but he was, unfortunately for me, out of town on a tour of duty. Not satisfied with a single attempt, I repaired to Mr. H—s, and the very friendly reception I met with from every one secured me as a guest. My port-manteau was sent for; and I was made as happy as I wished to be. After answering all the questions that were asked me, in as satisfactory manner as I could, I retired to my couch and slept in peace."

Now that our traveler has brought us to New Haven, we are naturally curious to know more precisely where he is, and who the friends are that have so kindly greeted him. I can make no conjecture about his "old friend Leander," but thinking of the New Haven families whose names began with H,—such as Hotchkiss, Hayes, Hall, Hubbard, and others,—all the indications point toward one name, *Hillhouse*. At the head of Church street, stood the Hillhouse mansion; and there it stands now with large additions which have converted it into Grove Hall. That was the residence of a dignified old lady, the childless widow of the Hon. James Abraham Hillhouse; and near by, at what was then the head of Temple Street, her husband's nephew and adopted son, "Captain" James Hillhouse, had at that time his abode. Though still a young man, he was already eminent among his fellow citizens, and his house was always a center of hospitality. It was there, we may believe, that our traveler was sleeping that Saturday night.

His next day's record begins thus: "Sunday 16th. Attended Divine service in the forenoon at the Brick, and heard a solid discourse from Dr. Dana. In the afternoon, my old place

of worship, the Chapel was honored with my presence,—where I was highly entertained with a sermon from Dr. Edwards, from these words: ‘In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.’ The discourse was accompanied with good music.”

Thus far the diary has given us no mention of the month in which it was written, but, looking forward for dates, we find that “Sunday 30th” is followed by “Monday, Dec. 1st.” It is well known that in those days President Stiles was keeping a diary which is still extant in the College Library. Turning over the volumes of that diary with some patience, we find that “Nov. 16, 1788” was “Lord’s-day;”—that Mr. Morse who had been called to the Church in Charlestown, Mass., preached in the forenoon from Job xxviii., 28;—and that in the afternoon “Dr. Edwards, with whom Dr. Wales exchanged [preached from] Gen. ii., 27.” It is ninety-one years and four months lacking eight days (this March 8, 1880) since Dr. Edwards, Pastor of the White Haven Church in the Blue Meeting-house, exchanging pulpits with Dr. Wales, Professor of Divinity in Yale College, preached in the College Chapel from Gen. ii. 17, “In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.” It is something to know that in the forenoon of the same day, Dr. Dana, Pastor of the First Church, in the Brick Meeting-house, preached a “solid discourse,” though we do not know what his text was.*

Our traveler “spent the evening at Dr. Stiles’s,” whose house (his official residence) was on the spot now covered by the College Street Church. He seems not to have seen the President; and, opening the life of President Stiles, I happened to discover the reason why a former pupil would fail of seeing him at that hour. The venerable man lived very much by rule and method; and we are told that “he stately retired, for several years, every Sabbath day at sunset, to pray for a select number of Christian friends, with whom he privately agreed to observe this season for a mutual exercise of intercession at the throne of grace.” But our traveler had, nevertheless, a pleasant time that Sunday evening. His record is, “The ladies are the same as when I was last at New Haven,—Amelia somewhat in-

*The town records of Stamford show that on the 13th of November, 1788, David Holley and Martha Coggeshall were married by Col. Abraham Davenport.

disposed and consequently deprived of a part of her volubility. She was quite as agreeable, however, as she used to be. The circumstance of meeting Messrs. Fitch and Morse added considerably to the pleasures of the evening."

The Mr. Morse who had been morning preacher that day in the college chapel, and was making a Sunday evening call on the ladies at Dr. Stiles's, was Jedediah Morse, a graduate of 1783,—who had been well known in New Haven as a Divinity student, as teacher of a school for young ladies, and as a college tutor, and who, after a brief residence in Georgia, had already printed a volume which was the germ of great geographies and gazetteers. The famous "father of American Geography" was also the father (two and a half years later) of a son whose inventive genius has brought the ends of the earth into instantaneous mutual communication. The Mr. Fitch who contributed to the pleasantness of the evening visit, was one of the college tutors—a graduate of 1777, and afterwards the first President of Williams College. It is almost a round century since our traveler met those two gentlemen at the President's house; but the interview seems not so very long ago when I remember that with both of them I had a personal acquaintance, and especially with Dr. Morse, who was in his later years a parishioner of mine, and at whose funeral I officiated.

We are becoming acquainted with the writer of this dingy manuscript, though as yet we have no indication of what his name was. He employed himself the next day, "Monday, 17th," in visiting old friends, "feeling happy" himself, and "endeavoring to make others so." Evidently there was sunshine in his face all day; and his diary tells us how the day ended. "In the evening joined a party of about twenty couple at Mr. Mix's, and danced till about twelve." At Mr. Mix's; where was that? The house remains to this day in good condition, though of course not without some changes internal and external. Through a series of years it was my "own hired house;" and to this day I never pass by it without tender remembrance of those busy, anxious, and yet happy years. It is on Elm street, next below the First Methodist Church. Devout old ladies—as venerable as the "elect lady," to whom the Apostle John addressed one of his Epistles—have

told me how they, in the "auld lang syne," have danced in the ball-room there, which was at the eastern side of the house, on the second floor, and which in my day had been divided into two apartments. But where are the "twenty couple" who met there

"To chase the flying hours with glowing feet,"

Nov. 17, 1788? They seem to have had a lively time. Our genial friend records his own enjoyment of the evening: "I was never in a room before with so many good dancers—not an indifferent dancer in the room. Miss S——s, B——s, B——w, and E——s were alternately honored with my hand. I did my best to persuade them that I was a good partner. I retired to my couch with comfortable reflections and a good appetite for sleep."

Can we make out the four names which are indicated by initial and final letters? Miss S——s is evidently Miss Stiles, a daughter of the president. Miss B——s is probably Miss Beers, but I cannot identify her. Miss B——w was perhaps a stranger. Miss E——s is Miss Edwards. I knew her when her dancing days were over, and when the beauty of her youth had become the dignity of an honored matron. She was Mrs. Johnson, of Stratford, the elder sister of the late venerable Mrs. Whitney. Herself a grand-daughter of the world-famous theologian, Jonathan Edwards, who died president of a Presbyterian college at Princeton, her husband was a grandson of Samuel Johnson, the founder of the Episcopal Church in Connecticut, and president of King's (now Columbia) College in New York. Herself the daughter of the brilliant lawyer Pierpont Edwards, her husband was the son of a more illustrious lawyer, William Samuel Johnson.

The next day, "Tuesday, 18th," our traveler records that he "breakfasted with Samuel Broome, was treated with hospitality by the whole family, and set out for Hartford with him." The Triennial Catalogue of Yale College shows that Samuel Platt Broome graduated A. B. in the class of 1786; that he was admitted to the same degree in the college at Princeton the same year, and that he died in 1811. At the date then, of the journal before us, he was a graduate of two years' standing; and we may be sure that there was not in New Haven a young

man whose prospects in relation to wealth were so brilliant as his. For a considerable period, the firm of Broome & Platt was more conspicuous in the commerce of New Haven than any other. The two partners lived near each other in what we call East Water street, where one of their dwellings remains to this day; and in those two houses there was probably more of the luxury and display of wealth, more of "dash" and "fashion" than anywhere else this side of New York. There was between the two families some alliance by marriage, and Mrs. Platt, whether daughter or sister of Mr. Broome, was celebrated for her beauty. She was said to be the most beautiful woman in America; and if that was so she was certainly the most beautiful in the world. Both families have passed away from New Haven, and their memory is passing away. The last survivor here was a grand-daughter of Mr. Platt, who died in 1860. She had lived some years in a very humble dwelling at the corner of Crown and Temple streets, and as her old age had been sustained and cheered by the Christian brotherly kindness of the church in which she was a member, she bequeathed to that church for its poor members the little remnant of her worldly goods—the last of the wealth of that great house of Broome & Platt.

Samuel Platt Broome, no doubt, figured at the dancing party of Monday evening, November 17, 1788; and there (we may suppose), having learned that our traveler was going to Hartford the next day, he offered to go with him, and invited him to breakfast. Accordingly, our friend (for so we may call him), having packed his portmanteau and thrown it over his saddle, takes leave of Mr. Hillhouse's hospitable family, rides to Mr. Broome's mansion, enjoys a sumptuous breakfast, and the two fellow-travelers, instead of taking seats (as we do) in a railway carriage, mount their horses and set out for Hartford. The road in those days (for neither "the Hartford Turnpike," through Meriden, nor "the Middletown Turnpike" through Northford, had come into existence), was by Cedar Hill to North Haven and thence to Wallingford, where they halted for the night. The next day they breakfasted at Durham, dined at Middletown, and about sunset arrived at Hartford. There, if I may continue to mix up my personal recollections with my

commentary on the journal, they were on ground with which I began to be familiar about twenty-four years later, and there was my wife's birth-place. We were therefore, both of us, curious to know just where our friend (for we had already begun to feel a very friendly interest in him), would go in Hartford. The next words of the diary told us. "As soon as our horses were attended to we repaired to Col. Wadsworth's, Broome with his compliments, and I with my letters." "Col. Wadsworth's!" We knew very well where that was, for my wife's mother, then a young lady of fifteen years, was Col. Wadsworth's youngest daughter, and to my wife herself in her childhood that house was as familiar as our own house is to-day.

Col. Wadsworth's house was on the spot where the Wadsworth Atheneum now stands. It was the house in which he was born, and in which his father had lived and died—the Rev. Daniel Wadsworth who was pastor of the First Church in Hartford, from 1732 to 1747. In his boyhood, he was apprenticed by his widowed mother to Matthew Talcott, of Middletown, who was her brother, and to whom she felt that she could safely entrust the bringing up of her only son to the business of a merchant. Young Jeremiah Wadsworth learned that business well. He became a prosperous merchant in Middletown, trading largely with the West India Islands. Living with his uncle, whose wife was a daughter of Rev. William Russell and a grand daughter of Rev. James Pierpont, he married a younger sister of Mrs. Talcott, Mehitabel (otherwise called Mabel) Russell; and Middletown continued to be his home till after the beginning of the war for Independence. In 1777, he removed his family to the old homestead, and in that house in which he was born his children were brought up. By reason of his extraordinary ability as a business man, he became Commissary-General of the Continental army, and afterwards Commissary-General, in effect, of the French auxiliary army. In the last mentioned employment he continued till the end of the war; and thus instead of being beggared, as so many revolutionary officers were, by the bankruptcy of the Continental treasury, he found himself wealthy—perhaps the richest man in Connecticut, for as having been the purchaser of sup-

plies for the French army he had accounts to settle with a government that could pay.

The relation of Col. Wadsworth to those armies made his house on one occasion the scene of a memorable interview. In the summer of 1780, Washington, whose head-quarters were on the Hudson, proposed to the Count de Rochambeau, then at Newport in command of the recently arrived French army, an attack on New York. Letters were sent to the French Admiral in the West Indies, with a request for naval assistance from that quarter. Meanwhile a conference between Washington and the commanders of the welcome but as yet useless French fleet and army was necessary. Just then it was that Benedict Arnold, who had been entrusted with the command of the fortress at West Point, attempted to consummate his crime. On Thursday the 14th of September, 1780, Washington wrote from his head-quarters to Arnold at West Point, "I shall be at Peekskill on Sunday evening, on my way to Hartford to meet the French Admiral and General. You will be pleased to send down a guard of a captain and fifty men at that time, and direct the quartermaster to have a night's forage for about forty horses. You will keep this to yourself as I wish to make my journey a secret." Arnold was already in correspondence with Sir Henry Clinton at New York; and he saw that the time had come to attempt the execution of his design. Washington began his journey on Monday, September 18, and in his company were La Fayette, Knox and Hamilton. They could hardly have arrived at Hartford before Wednesday, Sept. 20. On their arrival in Hartford, they were received with military honors, the Governor's Guards and a company of artillery being on duty. Gov. Trumbull, Col. Wadsworth, and other distinguished men met the great Commander-in-chief, and conducted him to the house of Col. Wadsworth. The French General, Count de Rochambeau, and the French Admiral, the Chevalier de Ternay, with their suite, arrived soon afterward, and were received with appropriate honors at their landing; and then, in front of the old State house, Washington first grasped the hand of Rochambeau who had already achieved distinction in European campaigns and battles, and who was to share with him, a few months later, in the plans and movements which

compelled the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown, and made our Independence an established fact. The consultation (in 1780) was held at the house of Col. Wadsworth; and from that house, after a day of anxious conference, Washington set out on his return to the Highlands where, during his brief absence, Arnold's great treason had been exposed and baffled. This was only eight years and two months before the evening in which Samuel Broome and our friend who as yet is nameless, called at the same door, the one with his compliments, the other with his letters of introduction.

"We," says our friend, "were rather in our *dishabilles*; but 't was no matter, we were travelers, and they were none of them in the habit of regarding a powdered head and a pretty coat as the standard of excellence,—their tastes are formed upon better principles. After delivering our compliments and letters, we were about leaving them, but were prevented by their importunities to stay and spend the evening. We needed but little coaxing; we laid aside our hats and our whips and resolved to stay as long as they wanted us. The beautiful Miss H—s [Hopkins], the handsome Miss S—r [Seymour], and the pretty Miss B—ll [Bull], were of our party. Music, dancing, and sociality constituted our amusements. Miss B—ll sung the *Hermit* sweetly. I wished to accompany her with a flute, but I dared not tell them so. The bell rung much earlier than I wished, and I left them when I would willingly have staid longer."

The bell referred to was the nine o'clock bell, the old New England curfew, after which it was hardly good manners to prolong an evening call.

Under date of "Thursday 20th," the diarist records that, after breakfasting at his lodgings, he "sat half an hour under the hands of the *frisieur*" before going out to deliver his letters. He seems to have been a stranger in Hartford and desirous of making a favorable impression. So we see him, with his head nicely powdered and his *queue* newly tied in a black ribbon, walking along Main street, for in those days few Hartford people of mark and fashion lived on any other street. He "called on Mr. Strong, and was much disappointed in not seeing Mrs. Strong. My feelings," he adds, "were prepared to meet an old

friend, and to have them so suddenly checked by the information that she was so indisposed as to render her recovery doubtful, was painful." In November, 1788, Nathan Strong (afterwards Dr. Strong) had been for nearly fifteen years pastor of the First Church in Hartford, and was already one of the first men in Connecticut—the peer of Dr. Dwight as he had been his college class-mate. His ministry of forty-one years was terminated by his death, Dec. 25, 1816. I well remember the sensation which his death produced, and how that sensation was renewed and deepened by the death of President Dwight a few days later. Mrs. Strong was Anna McCurdy of Lyme. She had been married less than two years; and her life (as the diary intimates) was then coming to its close.

Mr. Strong's house was the next door to Col. Wadsworth's, and there, it seems, our traveler had been invited to dine. I will venture to transcribe from his record. "We were soon seated at the table; our company consisted of Mr. and Mrs. Wadsworth, Miss St. John, Misses Harriet and Caty, Messrs. D. Wadsworth, Samuel Broome, and myself. We were all cheerful: how could we be otherwise when the heads of the table were peculiarly so—*her* countenance as placid as a summer eve, and *his* full of benignity, equally expressive of the goodness of his heart and the greatness of his soul. After dinner the ladies retired to dress for a visit to Miss Bull, except Miss St. John, who was indisposed with a toothache. W——, B——, and myself amused ourselves in the parlor with music until tea-time, when we followed the ladies. I was pleased with Miss Bull yesterday, but more so to-day. I trow she is a good girl. Immediately after tea we returned to Col. Wadsworth's, and spent the evening in a manner that was to me delightfully instructive. A circle of only five—we did not wish it enlarged, and our good stars were uppermost. Not a single individual interrupted our converse until ten o'clock. Our subjects of conversation were various: we ran counter to all the rules of *modern politeness*; we did not, to my recollection, say a word about fashions or plays and such like matters, nor did we *scandalize* a single character through the whole course of the evening, but we acted in direct agreement with our feelings." After describing, in a somewhat effusive way, the course and

character of their talk the writer portrays the interlocutors in the dialogue. "Harriet has read a good deal and has reflected a good deal on what she has read. Hence she has many observations of her own—not eccentric, but pleasingly original. She has one of the happiest tempers in the world, and delights in making those happy who are around her. She speaks highly of many and ill of none. Add to these a happy talent of adapting her conversation to the company she is in, and it is not strange that she should be thought an agreeable girl. Although she is not a beauty, yet her countenance is beautifully expressive."

We will pause a moment before this pen-portrait. Among the Trumbull pictures in the School of Fine Arts, there are five miniatures of ladies in one frame, No. 22. The date is 1791, three years later than the date of this journal. The first of the five is Harriet Wadsworth, and the painter has made "her countenance"—I will not say an ideal beauty, but beautiful as well as "beautifully expressive." Perhaps affection added something of poetry to the likeness, for the family tradition is that the painter was her lover.

A monument in the parish church-yard of St. George, on the island of Bermuda, bears this inscription :

TO THE
MEMORY
OF
HARRIETT WADSWORTH
OF HARTFORD, CON., U. S. A.,
WHO DIED IN THIS ISLAND,
OF A CONSUMPTION,
APRIL 10, 1793.
AGED 24
YEARS.

In that lively and happy company at Col. Wadsworth's, Thursday evening, November 20, 1788, there was no thought of such a record to be made so soon.

"Man's want of foresight only fools deplore—
The wise thank Heaven that has bestowed no more."

We return to our admiring friend's pen-portraits of the company. "Caty is her younger sister, with a *face* as *indicative* of a good heart as a lamb's is of its meekness. She seems to pos-

sess all the virtues of her sister, but that they are of a younger growth. She wants a little of that grace which enables Harriet to do every thing to advantage; and a few more years will probably add to the list of her agreeables."

Here we pause again:—Catharine Wadsworth was at that time not quite fifteen years old. Her miniature is one of the five which I have mentioned, being directly under her sister's; and it shows that when she was in her eighteenth year her face, still indicative of a good heart, was in the full bloom of beauty; and on the wall of an apartment in my house is a portrait (copied from the original, by Sully), which shows what she was when "a few more years," without effacing the glow of maiden beauty, had blended with it the charm of matronly dignity and grace.

I proceed with our friend's record of his impressions:—"As for Daniel, he is a strange youth. *With his pockets full of money*, he had rather, at any time, sit down at home betwixt his two sisters, and by some new act of tenderness call forth their affection toward him, than to be in the *best* and most *fashionable* company [*best* and *fashionable* underscored as "wrote sarkastic"], at the gaming-table, or in any place where he can spend his money in an *honorable* and *polite* way. [*Honorable* and *polite* again "wrote sarkastic."] 'Tis true as it is strange; and furthermore he is warmly attached to the principles of virtue and morality, and *really* he is not ashamed of his God."

This "strange youth" was so eccentric through a long life, and his family affections, though he was childless, were so strong that in his old age he took the lead in building upon the site of what had been his father's and his grandfather's home, the WADSWORTH ATHENEUM,* devoted to public uses, one part of it to the Connecticut Historical Society, another part to the Hartford Young Men's Institute, and another part to a Gallery of Paintings. It is his filial tribute to the memory of his ancestors who were identified with Hartford from its beginning; and, designed as their monument, it is his also. I think I may say of the many who have inherited or are to inherit the

* Other citizens of Hartford, with the public spirit characteristic of that city, contributed liberally, but Mr. Wadsworth's gifts to the institution, including the site, were estimated at not less than \$20,000.

remainder of his wealth, there is not one who regrets that princely gift to Hartford, or is not proud of it. Nor can I refuse to say of that "strange youth," who loved his home so well, that the tender affection for his sisters which is portrayed in what I have just been telling, lived in him to the last. Though he survived for more than fifty years that elder sister whose decay and death he watched in lone Bermuda, he never seemed to lose the freshness of his grief.

Having interpolated so much about the Wadsworth family, I will add, before returning to our friend's description of that evening's pleasure, that Col. Wadsworth, having served as Representative in Congress for three successive terms, from the organization of the government in 1789, died in 1804 of premature decay, the result of hardships and exposures in the war for independence. Madam Wadsworth lived to extreme old age, and died in 1817. I saw her buried by the side of her husband, her grave being the last save one (or possibly two), that was made in the old burial ground behind the Center Church. As I stood there among the spectators that had been drawn together by the unwonted sight of a burial in that old place, I little thought that children of mine would trace their descent through her from James Pierpont and Thomas Hooker.

Returning now from this digression, and resuming our friend's description of the pleasant company that evening at Col. Wadsworth's, we are reminded that New Haven had a representative there in the person of "Sam^l Broome." Him the writer describes as "a lad of good sense but rather trifling at times," and then says, "He possesses a talent at punning, and by occasionally throwing in a remark he prevented us from becoming too seriously sentimental." So we may congratulate ourselves that New Haven did really, though indirectly contribute something toward completing and rounding out the enjoyment of the occasion. Even a trifle, and a punster, may sometimes be of use when the conversation is growing thoughtful and is in danger of becoming too serious or too "sentimental."

At a reasonable hour, our friend repaired to his lodgings; but he did not resign himself to sleep till he had read from "Elegant Extracts" (a volume which I remember though it is

now obsolete) several pathetic and descriptive pieces which the ladies had commended to his notice, and on which his critical judgment coincided with theirs.

The next morning, "Friday 21st," we find him immediately after breakfast mounting his "Rosinante" and "setting his face westward," with letters and whatever else he had "for the name of Talcott." He went out to the Talcott "family mansion on the hill," beyond where the American Asylum for the Deaf and Dumb now is. Approaching the house, he was met by "a venerable old gentleman" to whom he introduced himself as bringing "letters from New York"—which, by the way, is the first intimation we have had of where he came from. The "family mansion" was at that time held by a son of Gov. Talcott, Chief Magistrate of His Majesty's Colony of Connecticut from 1724 to his death in 1741,—a period of 17 years. A sister of his was the mother of Col. Wadsworth. Austin Talcott, Attorney General of the State of New York—one of the most brilliant names in the history of the legal profession in that great State—was his grandson, a great-grandson of Gov. T. In the conversation which ensues after our traveler has entered the house, and in which there is a hardly perceptible flavor of the medical profession, it comes out that his name is COGSWELL; and at last we know beyond a peradventure who he is.

Mason Fitch Cogswell was a graduate of Yale College in the class of 1780, and was honored as the foremost in that class. The war for Independence was then in progress; and he immediately began the study—and I may say, the practice—of medicine and surgery under an elder brother who was a surgeon in the army. He was stationed for a time in Stamford, where his brother had married into the Davenport family, and where he was at home in families of the highest position and culture. After the war, he resided, I know not how long, in New York; and he seems now to be making a journey from New York to keep Thanksgiving at his father's house.

His father was the Rev. James Cogswell,* who had been

* For a full account of Rev. James Cogswell, D.D., the reader may consult "Trumbull's History of Connecticut," ii., 178-184; "Miss Larned's History of Windham County," i., 411-427; and "Sprague's Annals," i., 445-448.

from 1744 to 1771 the pastor of the Church in Canterbury, but for the last six years had been pastor in Scotland, a parish of Windham. His mother was Alice Fitch of the great Fitch family in eastern Connecticut, and her mother was a descendant from the famous hero of the Pequot war, John Mason. Thus it came to pass that his name was Mason Fitch Cogswell. At the date of this journal he was apparently making his first acquaintance with Hartford; and in that day's ride to the Talcott mansion, he had passed—unconscious of the future—the site now occupied by a great institution which had its origin from the calamity of the daughter to whom he gave his mother's name, Alice Cogswell.

Having accompanied him, thus leisurely, from Stamford to Hartford, we must hasten through the remainder of his journey. The next day, "Saturday 22d," he was ferried across the Connecticut at an early hour, and arrived at his father's house in the evening. "The tear of pleasure glittered" in that father's eye as he embraced his son, and when the time for evening worship came, "the old gentleman," as the journal tells us, "prayed with unusual fervency and affection."

For "Sunday 21st," the record opens,—"Attended divine service, and was delighted both with the preaching and music. My feelings before I entered the house, were attuned to harmony, and the music which was uncommonly good, striking upon the already vibrating cords, prepared me in the best possible manner for the ensuing discourse from 'My son, keep thyself pure.' The filial hearer (evidently) confounded with the text the application of it which he made to himself and which he knew was in his father's thoughts. The text was from 1 Tim. vi., 22: "Keep thyself pure," said the apostle to the young preacher; but he did not in that connection say "My son."

Monday was a stormy day; and our traveler was all day at home. Tuesday he visited some old friends. Wednesday was stormy again, and cold; and he spent most of the day with his father who was indisposed. But "in the evening as a prelude to Thanksgiving"—so the journal tells us,—"I went up and drank a mug of flip with Esq. Devotion, and ate pompion pie with his wife." Then as he writes, he adds the explanation,

"How cold it grows! I am too dull to write in my journal . . . Perhaps the flip has run round my intellects, or, what is worse, the pompion pie."

I will abbreviate, as much as I can, his partly humorous record of Thanksgiving day, "Thursday, 27th." The duties of the day had been to him such as he had never encountered before. His father, being too ill to officiate in the Thanksgiving service, devolved on him the duty of reading to the congregation an appropriate discourse—or, as he called it, "preaching." His desire to please "a beloved parent overcame" his diffidence; and at the appointed hour, with the psalm-book in his pocket, and his printed or written sermon in his hand, he presented himself at church and told the elders what their pastor had commissioned him to do. His offer was thankfully acknowledged, and he seated himself in the minister's pew. But "a venerable sage" got up and led him into the deacon's seat. He was invited to go up higher; but the thought, "Humble thyself and thou shalt be exalted," kept him out of the too lofty pulpit. "A silence of about ten minutes followed. Several efforts were made to obtain a prayer, but in vain. *He* was honored with the first invitation; but, setting aside all other considerations, the respect he bore to gray hairs prevented his making the attempt. They were all so *graceless* or so full of *grace*, that they could not be prevailed on to pray for their preacher. He perceived that nothing would be done without him," and being "requested to proceed" he "pulled out his psalm-book, and his hand trembled but very little. 'Let us sing,' said he, 'the 97th Psalm,' and he read it with a very audible voice. The music was fine; it entirely dissipated his timidities, and as soon as it ceased he arose, and if he had had one on, he would probably have stroked his band; but as he had none, he wiped his face with his pocket handkerchief, named his text, and went on. Some people would have called it reading; but, really, he acted the preacher to admiration, as he was afterwards told by numbers of the congregation. The exercises were closed with an anthem from Isaiah 'Sing O ye heavens,' etc., which was most enchantingly sung.

"After church, he repaired to his friend Devotion's, and was treated with quite as much respect and attention as he desired.

He drank flip, ate turkeys, pigs, pompion pies, apple pies, tarts, &c., &c., till he was perfectly satisfied. After supper he went home, gave thanks with his father, smoked a pipe for company's sake, bade the old folks good night, went into the kitchen, sung a number of songs to Polly and Betsey [his sisters], ate apples and nuts with them, and went to bed well satisfied with the transactions of the day."

It occurs to me that among the hearers in the Scotland meeting-house that day, there must have been a certain bashful and studious boy ten years old, with a marvelous appetite for knowledge, and with a keen and quiet observation of men and things, who had already—two years earlier—picked up Latin enough to understand the Triennial Catalogue of Yale, and whose parents had been advised by Parson Cogswell (though they needed no persuasion) to give him a liberal education. That boy was James L. Kingsley; and it startles me to remember that more than a quarter of a century ago the venerable Professor Kingsley passed away from this living and dying world.

On "Friday, 28th," our friend rides to Windham—dines at Maj. Backus's, where he finds "pompion pies again in abundance"—then sets out for Lebanon "in search of a friend whom he has already mentioned more than once under the apparently fictitious name of "Orlands," but whom I cannot identify. He finds him—just where he wished to find him—at Mr. Porter's. There he had a delightful evening with Emily and Sophy, the daughters of Mr. Porter, and a charming sister of "Orlands," named Eliza. That Mr. Porter had been Gov. Trumbull's confidential secretary through all the war; and therefore we are not surprised to find our friend saying, "Miss Trumbull made us happy an hour or so with her company. Her person is elegant, though small; her countenance agreeably expressive and what is generally called handsome. Her first appearance is much in her favor. I will wait till I see her again before I say anything more about her."

Miss Trumbull was grand-daughter of the old war governor who had died three years before, and daughter of the second Jonathan who became governor ten years later.

The next day, "Saturday 29th," was one of those wet autumn

days that introduce the winter. But our friend says, "We walked or rather *waded* over to Col. Trumbull's, and sat and chatted an hour with him; Mrs. Trumbull and Faithy all agreeable, the former peculiarly so—and the appearance of the latter, tho' reserved, such as inspires you with a desire of becoming intimately acquainted." The miniatures of these two ladies are in the same group of five with the two daughters of Col. Wadsworth, Mrs. Trumbull in the center, Miss Faith Trumbull (afterwards Mrs. Daniel Wadsworth) in the right hand upper corner.

There is a great deal of history connected with old Lebanon—so much that I dare not begin to touch upon it. Our traveler was hindered by the rain from proceeding to Norwich that day, as he had intended, but at an early hour the next morning (Sunday, Nov. 30), he made the short ride. "About half past 8," he says, "I arrived at Gov. Huntington's, my former *home*, and the manner in which I was welcomed made it as much so as ever. Had I been an *own* brother, Mrs. Huntington could not have treated me with more tenderness and affection, and I never before saw the Governor so social and conversible."

Here are allusions which become intelligible when we learn that Rev. James Cogswell's wife, Alice Fitch, died in 1772, soon after his settlement in Scotland—that in 1773 he married the widow of his predecessor, Mr. Devotion, when Mason Fitch Cogswell was twelve years old—and that the boy was afterwards placed in the family of Mr. Huntington, at Norwich, where he was fitted for college. Samuel Huntington, whose name is subscribed to the Declaration of Independence, was born in that parish of Scotland. Like another subscriber to that Declaration, Roger Sherman, he was brought up a mechanic; and like Roger Sherman he made himself a great lawyer.* In his youth he won the heart and hand of the Parson's comely daughter, Martha Devotion. So when Mrs. Huntington's mother had become the wife of Mason F. Cogswell's father, they were in some figurative and step-sense an elder sister and a younger brother.

* Samuel Huntington was President of the Continental Congress in 1779 and 1780. In 1786, after the death of Gov. Matthew Griswold, he was chosen Governor, and was annually re-elected till his death in 1796.

Our traveler's ten miles ride that Sunday morning was not regarded as an excuse for absence from public worship. He "attended divine service both A. M. and P. M., and heard two metaphysical discourses from Mr. King,* and on the whole was well pleased with them—thought however, he was a little out of his latitude."

In the evening, the Sabbath having ended at sunset, our friend made a call at Mr. Woodbridge's, where Clara and Hannah were as glad to see him as he was to see them, and "paid more attention to" him "than to all the other gentlemen in the room." But in recording the fact, he checks the temptation to vanity by the consideration, "they see me once in three years, and then they see every day." Returning to his lodgings at the decorous hour of nine, he had time to "converse an hour with the Governor and his lady" before retiring to rest.

He remained in Norwich four days longer, visiting old friends with great enjoyment. Of Monday he records that though it was "a dull disagreeable day, 't was sunshine in the house." "Refused several invitations to dine out, that I might eat turkey with the Governor. Thanksgiving not gone yet, for we had flip and pompson pies both. Drank several glasses of port, and was much pleased with several musical anecdotes from the Governor." After visiting several old friends with much pleasure, and drinking tea with "Clara and Hannah," he returned "about 8, and the last of the evening was equal to the first. Sammy and Fanny,"† so runs the record, "have improved exceedingly since I last saw them, both in mind and manners." He was not aware that Sammy, of whom, a college graduate of three years' standing, he made mention so familiarly, was to be not many years later, Chief Justice and then Governor of Ohio—a state which in that year, 1788, had no existence even as a territory under territorial government, in which the earliest permanent settlement had just been made by a pioneer emigra-

* Rev. Walter King was pastor of the Second Church in Norwich (at "the Landing") from 1787 to 1811. He was contemporary in College with Dr. M. F. Cogswell, though in a later class, 1782.

† Samuel and Frances Huntington, children of Rev. Joseph Huntington, D.D., were the adopted children of his brother the Governor. The first, "Sammy," was a graduate of Yale College in the class of 1785. The latter, "Fanny," became the wife of Rev. Edward D. Griffin, D.D.

tion from New England, and which in 1802 was received into the Union, the first-born of the Ordinance of 1787. Thinking of what Ohio is to-day with its three millions of people, and with the illustrious names which it has given to our national history, we can hardly read this patronizing mention of "Sammy's" improvement in mind and manners without a feeling as if it came to us from a very remote antiquity. The convention about which our friend had a chat with the Governor was doubtless that which in the January preceding had given the ratification of Connecticut to the Constitution of the United States. Of that Convention, Gov. Huntington was a conspicuous member; and this reminds us that when the genial diarist sat there chatting and smoking the calumet with the Governor, the government of the United States had not come into being. Eleven of the Thirteen States had adopted the Constitution; electors of President were to be chosen in those eleven States on the first Wednesday in January; the electors were to meet in their several colleges on the first Wednesday in February; and on the fourth of March the First Congress was to meet in New York. In fact, for want of a quorum in the two houses, the organization of the national government was not completed till April 30, 1789.

Returning to the diary from which we have wandered, we find that on Tuesday our friend "breakfasted with Gen. Huntington,—dined at Dr. Lathrop's,—drank tea at Mr. Andrew Huntington's,—and supped with William Leffingwell," returning to lodge "at the Governor's." Without pausing on the other names here mentioned—some of them notable in history, we find our attention arrested by a New Haven name, William Leffingwell. Looking forward we read in the next day's record, "Dined at William Leffingwell's. Mr. L. was my classmate at New Haven. We chatted about old matters with much pleasure. Joa., sister to William, is a smart girl, or I am much out of my conjectures. She has a pleasing countenance, an expressive eye, and possesses good manners. Saml. Huntington and Dan. Lathrop were likewise of our party. A full grown turkey, and more pompion pie," etc., "everything in nice order."

Old people remember a time when Mr. Leffingwell, residing

in the old fashioned but stately mansion on Chapel street at the corner of Temple, with a terraced garden which extended half way up to College street, was recognized as the richest citizen of New Haven.* The last survivor of his immediate family is our old friend, a valued member and officer of this Historical Society, Dr. Edward H. Leffingwell. One of his daughters, Caroline Mary, was the wife of Augustus Russell Street; and the memory of her public spirit, as well as of his, is perpetuated in the edifice and the endowments of the School of Fine Arts. A grand daughter of William Leffingwell, Caroline Augusta Street, was the wife of Admiral Foote; and thus the old mansion, built by Jared Ingersoll before the revolution, and in later times the residence of Mr. Leffingwell, then of Mr. Street, and then of Admiral Foote, came to be known by the name of the gallant Admiral.

Those who knew Mrs. Leffingwell long afterward when she had become a grandmother, and especially those who were acquainted with her housekeeping, cannot but understand that the supper of Tuesday night, and the dinner of Wednesday were not only well got up, "every thing in nice order," but were enlivened and brightened by her sprightly talk. We may be

* William Leffingwell, born September, 1765; was the eldest son of Col. Christopher Leffingwell, a distinguished citizen of Norwich, as his ancestors had been from the beginning. The Triennial Catalogue of Yale College shows that he was graduated in the class of 1786. The discrepancy between that official record and the statement which makes him "classmate at New Haven," with Dr. Cogswell, is readily explained by the supposition that having entered the class of 1780 at a very immature age (which was what bright boys were permitted to do in those days), he withdrew for a time and afterwards took his place in the class of 1786, graduating A. B. at the age of twenty-one, instead of fifteen.

He seems to have chosen for himself a mercantile rather than a professional career. For several years after leaving college he resided at Norwich where he was post-master when Washington was president. He seems also to have had a business partnership with his father. About the year 1793 he removed to New York, where he became an active partner in mercantile business with Hezekiah Beers Pierpont, under the firm of Leffingwell & Pierpont. In 1809 he retired from business and established his home in New Haven. Here he died in 1834.

His wife was Sally Beers, daughter of Isaac Beers, and on her mother's side descended from the Mansfields. (I write her name Sally for such was her preference—not Sarah, certainly not Sallie.) William Leffingwell and Sally Beers were married by the bride's uncle, Rev. Achilles Mansfield, of Killingworth (now Clinton), in the evening before the commencement which was to make the bridegroom a Bachelor of Arts.

sure that she, the daughter of the famed New Haven bookseller Isaac Beers, and from her early girlhood conspicuous among the young ladies of the college town, which did not become a city even in name till 1784, had much to say in the pleasant conversation between her husband and her guest, about their college friends and college days. It could not but be a pleasant party,—six at the table, all young,—four gentlemen as well as the hostess overflowing with memories of Yale and of New Haven,—and that “smart girl,” Joanna Leffingwell, whose “pleasing countenance” retained something of its beauty, and whose “expressive eye” had not lost its expressiveness, when I knew her, almost half a century later, an honored “mother in Israel,” the widow of Charles (not Daniel) Lathrop.*

The next day (Thursday) was like the other days at Norwich;—breakfast with his “old friend and good friend Shubael;”—dinner “with the Governor and family” at Mr. Breed’s, where Shubael and his wife were also present, and where the inevitable “pompion pie” suggested the thought of how soon he would be beyond the reach of that New England dainty;—an after-dinner call at Mr. Coit’s,—tea at Mr. Moore’s;—and the evening at Mr. Leffingwell’s again “in a circle of no less than sixteen ladies, besides many other supernumeraries.” To the record of all this he adds, “About nine, went to my lodgings, proposed a *plan* to the Governor and received his approbation, ate supper, smoked the calumet for the last time, and bade them all a good night.”

On Friday, Dec. 5, our traveler, having taken leave of Norwich friends, journeyed toward his father’s home, by the somewhat meandering way of all his “uncles and aunts in Lisbon, Preston, and Canterbury;” and those uncles and aunts, with all the cousins, seem to have been the most loving and amiable people in the world. Arriving at the Scotland parsonage again on Saturday, he was detained there by a storm which gave him time for reading and writing, and for “receiving lessons of divine instruction from the lips of” his “affectionate parent.” Wednesday, Dec. 10, the weather having become propitious, he

* Mrs. Lathrop was the mother of Rev. Daniel W. Lathrop, long a resident of New Haven. Five of her daughters were wives of missionaries to the heathen of India and Ceylon. In 1788, any New England girl would as soon have thought of becoming the mother of five crowned queens.

went to Mansfield for the sake of visiting two more cousins, whose amiable qualities he sums up by saying, "In short, they are two Fitches, which is sufficiently explanatory to myself."

From Mansfield, the next day's travel brought him to Lebanon again, his solitary ride being cheered by the pleasant thought that all the relatives whom he had been visiting, and who had received him with kindest affection, were so well worth knowing. Those uncles, aunts and cousins seem to have been fair specimens of what I may venture to call the old Connecticut gentry,—well-to-do people, living comfortably and honestly on their own acres, working six days and resting on the seventh according to the commandment,—thinking people, whose intellectual life was nourished chiefly by the Bible and the doctrinal exposition of it from the pulpit,—men and women whose hereditary Puritanism had not vanished into Estheticism, and who were therefore characterized more by strength of opinions about right and wrong than by exquisiteness of taste,—plain people with no aristocratic pretensions, yet *gentry* as descended from ancestors whom they honored, and for whose sake they were ready to welcome every cousin who did not dishonor the stock (the *gens*) from which they came. All the kindred whom our traveling friend had visited in Preston, Lisbon, Canterbury, and Mansfield, were as he proudly calls them "Fitches," and they all knew their descent from James Fitch, the famous first minister of Norwich.

At Mrs. Tisdale's in Lebanon, he had "another charming evening with the ladies," and yet he took time for a call at "Col. Trumbull's," where he renewed his acquaintance with Daniel and Harriet Wadsworth who had just arrived from Hartford. The next morning (Friday, Dec. 12), after walking "over to Col. Trumbull's," where he had promised "to call for letters." The post office system of the United States was then in its infancy, and an opportunity of sending letters from Lebanon to Hartford by a friendly traveler was precious. After an hour of talk "with the ladies and with Daniel," and "some time with the Colonel," and much delight in "the paintings of his brother" whom *we* call Col. Trumbull, he set his face toward Hartford at about 11 o'clock, "in company," he says, "with a Mr. Pitkin from Farmington, with whom I was

so much pleased in the day time, that I went and tarried with him at his uncle's in East Hartford, Federal to a button, very civil and very hospitable. Crossed the ferry in the morning, and dined at Mr. Perkins' with Mr. Pitkin.* After dinner, called and delivered letters from Harriet and Daniel, and engaged to return and drink tea with smiling Cate, and so I did and was made very welcome and very happy."

The next day being Sunday, our traveler "attended divine service at the North Meeting," and was much impressed with the sermons, especially with the afternoon discourse from a text which he remembered as that from which the sermon was preached at his own mother's funeral, "I was dumb, I opened not my mouth, because thou didst it." Mr. Strong was just then passing through one of the great sorrows of his domestic life. Already he had been once a widower, and his second wife, Anna McCurdy, was then wasting with the disease of which she died three months later, at the age of 29. Naturally, the sermon from such a text, and in such circumstances, "flowed from the heart and reached the heart," especially of Mason F. Cogswell, to whom Ann McCurdy had been "an old friend." As evening came on, he recollected his "engagement to Mrs. Wadsworth and Caty," and had a pleasant hour with them.

On Monday, he was occupied through the morning with "how-do-you-do visits and some matters of business," but after dinner we find him paying his respects to Dr. Hopkins, and "chatting physic with him an hour or so,"—then "gallop-

*That agreeable fellow traveler was Timothy Pitkin, at that time a Yale graduate of three years standing,—afterwards for fourteen years a Representative in Congress from Connecticut,—and known in literature as the author of valuable works on the History of the United States. He was temporarily a resident of New Haven while his son Rev. Thomas Clap Pitkin was a minister in Trinity Church. His father, Rev. Timothy Pitkin, pastor of the Farmington church from 1752 to 1785, and a Fellow of Yale College from 1777 to 1804, was a son of William Pitkin of East Hartford, Governor of Connecticut from 1766 till his death in 1769, and was a son-in-law of Thomas Clap, President of Yale College.

It was natural for young Mr. Pitkin to rest for the night at his uncle's in East Hartford, and that he took his fellow traveler with him is an illustrative instance of the old-time hospitality.

Enoch Perkins was then a young lawyer in Hartford (A. B. Yale 1781), and his wife was a daughter of the Farmington pastor. Their daughter Emily was the wife of Roger Sherman Baldwin, Governor of Connecticut and Senator.

ing out to the hill" and rejoicing to find the invalids there (of the Talcott family) all better than when he saw them last. He "gallops back again and drinks tea with Mr. and Mrs. Wolcott,—a charming couple," whose happiness moves him to write, "I wish I was as well married, and anybody and everybody could say as much of me." The Dr. Hopkins with whom he talked on professional subjects, was in his day the foremost man of the medical profession not only in Hartford but, if I mistake not, in Connecticut,—one of "the Hartford wits," if not the most famous of them. We may assume—at least we may be permitted to conjecture that Dr. Cogswell, a young man not yet settled in life, had in his thoughts, while talking with Dr. Hopkins, the "plan" on which he had taken the advice of Gov. Huntington before leaving Norwich; and that his "plan" was to establish himself in his profession there at Hartford. The Mr. Wolcott whose domestic felicity he so admired, was Oliver Wolcott, afterwards Secretary of the Treasury under John Adams, and, in his latter years, Governor of Connecticut.

Just here the manuscript begins to be again imperfect. Some enterprising mouse seems to have meddled with it, and what remains of the last few pages is interspersed with many a *hiatus valde deflendus*. I can make out that after tea with Mr. and Mrs. Wolcott the diarist "spent a social hour with and Julia Seymour—certainly a pretty girl, and a good one too"—that he "called and took leave of at Col. Wadsworth's,"—that he was lodged that night at Mr. Strong's where he "attended particularly to Mrs. Strong's case," and had a long and most friendly conversation with her husband, pondering meanwhile (we may conjecture) the question of making his abode in Hartford. I find him proceeding the next day to Haddam, and there "welcomed very sincerely by Theodore and Parson May and family,"—thence, after a day's detention by a storm, he comes to New Haven again, and finds the same hospitality which he had found four weeks before.

The last date on these torn leaves is Saturday, Dec. 19. On that day, "after several morning visits"—additional to all the visits of the preceding day, he "rode to Greenfield *via* Stratford, Victory, etc." It was seven o'clock in the evening, when he arrived at the house of the pastor, who was also the poet of

"Greenfield Hill." He found himself "in the midst of a smiling circle;" and the talk by the winter evening fireside was "cheerful and instructive." I can make out concerning "the four young ladies under Mr. Dwight's tuition" that "the expression of each was uncommonly fine—a loveliness of disposition, a benevolence of heart, and a sprightliness of thought were clearly discernible in every eye." Here we come to a ragged edge. The *lacunæ* in the manuscript are not unlike those in a tablet recovered from the library of Assurbanipal. The last words are "If I can judge account given of them by Mrs. Dwight, and my own they are lovely girls, and on the high road to make husbands happy."

POSTSCRIPT.

A few months after the journey described in the foregoing pages, Dr. Mason F. Cogswell established himself at Hartford, where he continued to reside till his death, Dec. 17, 1830. He was eminent in his profession, especially as a surgeon; and no man was ever more worthy than he to be called "the beloved physician." The reader of these pages has seen chiefly one aspect of his character—his invariable kindness, his ready appreciation of whatever was admirable or good in everybody whom he met, his perfect urbanity. Those who knew him while he lived, knew much more than could reveal itself in a four weeks' diary written by way of amusement at the age of twenty-seven. They knew how much he was to be honored for his professional learning and skill, for his general intelligence and culture, for his public spirit, for the dignity of his life, for his religious fidelity in every relation.

The illness which ended his life was short—only five days, yet long enough for the whole city to be moved with anxiety. I am informed, by one who lived in the immediate neighborhood, that late in the evenings of the two days preceding his death, people stood in groups along the sidewalks of Prospect street, waiting for the physicians to come from his bedside, and asking in whispers for the latest indications.

His wife, Mary Austin, daughter of Austin Ledyard,—a woman worthy of him—survived him many years. His daughter Alice, beautiful and gifted, whose calamity led to the

founding of the American Asylum for the Deaf and Dumb, could not outlive him. She lingered, in suffering caused by grief, thirteen days, and died, Dec. 30, 1830. Of his other children, Mary, wife of Lewis Weld, Elizabeth, wife of John T. Norton, Mason F. Cogswell, M.D., of Albany, and Catherine Ledyard, wife of Cortlandt Van Rensselaer, D.D.,—the last-named is the only survivor.

An admirable tribute to the memory of Dr. Cogswell, by Prof. Knight, as characteristic of its author as of its subject, may be found in Williams' Medical Biography, pp. 100–109.

ARTICLE II.—DEMOCRITUS OF ABDERA.

AN HISTORICAL STUDY ON THE BEGINNINGS OF GREEK MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

From the German of F. KERN, Gymnasial Director at Stettin.

THE Greek philosophy of Plato gives us the wonderful example of a grander mental achievement, and a more rapid development than can be paralleled in any other land or any other age. Each thinker had his own original ideas, and many of those ideas were so profound and significant that the problems presented by them claim the attention of scientific thought even to this day. It is unfortunate for us that no perfect work by any author of this age is now extant. We must laboriously construct our picture of this age out of fragments and the incidental statements of later philosophers, especially those of Aristotle. The fragments that have come down to us from most of these writers are comparatively few, yet they afford us a glimpse into a world of thought as rich as that contained in the almost contemporaneous Greek lyric poetry. Either of these is an irreparable loss in the history of human culture. The statements of later writers, full of hostility as they are, must be taken with a far-sighted criticism, or else instead of completing and perfecting the outlines of doctrine contained in them, these, even now colorless and imperfect, will be rendered more indistinct and fragmentary. This is especially true of Aristotle, who is never a very reliable reporter. It is therefore not remarkable that a clear conception of this pre-Platonic thinker, Democritus, has only been obtained gradually, through unwearied scientific research, and that even to-day we have not attained to the perfect picture.

Now, more than ever before, we must free ourselves from the authority of Plato and Aristotle, who, through their own well deserved glory have cast an undeserved shadow upon earlier philosophical investigations, and it is indeed partly through their incorrect criticisms and their unintentional as well as their

intentional silence on sundry points, that the judgment of succeeding generations has in many directions and for a long time been unduly biased. Freed from Hegel's preconceived notion that the world is a progression, we must not be afraid to recognize the fact that under the grand upward impulse which philosophy received at the hands of Plato, there was also found a certain giving up of principles already established, or toward the establishment of which, at least earnest efforts had been made.

And so it must also be admitted from comprehensive and unprejudiced conclusions that the materialistic conception of the world (i. e. the view which seeks to account for everything by a purely physical cause), came in conflict especially at the hands of Plato with a moral-teleological view of nature (i. e. a view which regards the world from the side of purpose, design, or moral beauty); and so the one-sided regard of Nature which became allied to this latter view had the effect for the time to destroy the scientific value of natural philosophy; and so also many a very earnest and pertinent thought of the earlier philosophers was considered and treated, especially by Aristotle, as a singularity or eccentricity. Indeed Aristotle, by the great weight of his authority, has chiefly effected that these really deserving though imperfect beginnings of true speculation have passed back again into oblivion, because his pretended explanations of the problems proposed conformed more closely to the ideas of the ordinary superficial thinker.

A very peculiar fate, however, in some respects has befallen the pre-Platonic philosopher Democritus. That, on account of which he to-day in wide scientific circles is recognized and honored, is by no means his own original invention. In these matters he is by no means a discoverer or even a pioneer. On the other hand, his real merit, that which actually belongs to him is either entirely denied or else admitted but reluctantly, or with important and undeserved reservations. Democritus is mistakenly famous as the author of the atomical theory; but, although, in my opinion, he undoubtedly deserves to be called the first distinguished moral philosopher of Greece, his claim in this respect has not only been belittled but absolutely denied; and this not only in general scientific tradition, which oftentimes

only after long delays gives proper credit for genuine research, but even by eminent investigators in the department of Ancient Greek Philosophy.

These, however, all agree unanimously that not Democritus, but his somewhat elder contemporary, Leucippus, was the inventor of the atomistic theory. I should, however, hardly presume to call your attention further to this undoubted historical fact, were it not true that in Lange's "History of Materialism," a book, in which before all others we should expect reliable information, Democritus is only spoken of as the author of the atomistic theory. In Lange's "History of Philosophy," no mention is made at all of Leucippus, except in an incidental remark respecting some doctrine of Democritus that it had been doubtfully ascribed to Leucippus; and yet it is a very positive fact that the whole foundation, the essential thought of the atomical theory had been thought out by Leucippus alone.

And if we now consider the important relation which the atomistic theory bears to the natural science of to-day, and the philosophy of to-day also, since its remodeling into the doctrine of ultimate atoms as force centers, it seems so much the more unfair that the name of the man whose inventive thought first invented the theory, should be quite overshadowed by another, who, after the thought had been presented to him, only developed it farther, gave it position and a wider recognition. Wundt says that it is one of the most remarkable occurrences in the history of science, that in the very beginning of it we should come across an opinion concerning the existence and constitution of matter so nearly related to the prevalent opinions of to-day. The further profitable working out of an original idea is undoubtedly worthy of high honor; but it certainly does not deserve so high honor as the original inception of the idea. Real genius stands even higher than the fruit-bearing talent. "Towards the pioneer in science the public is too often less grateful than to the man who comes afterward, who is only a displayer of the treasures found. Before the brilliance of the men who follow—the supporters, the expanders, the multipliers of the light—the first Promethean spark is often relegated back to the darkness of regions unknown to history."

This truth is very clearly demonstrated by a close examina-

tion into the history of inventions in every branch of the arts or sciences. A parallel case can be readily found in the realm of science of which we are now treating. Everybody who knows anything about Neoplatonism is well acquainted, even familiar, with the name of Plotinus. But it is ordinarily known only by those who are accurately informed in Greek philosophy, that Ammonius Sakkas, and not Plotinus, was the author of Neoplatonism. Even so, also, to-day just as in the time of Aristotle, and that too among learned men, Parmenides has the credit of being the proper scientific founder of that important school of thought which we style the Eleatic philosophy. But, on the contrary, Parmenides, as compared with Xenophanes, his instructor, has scarcely a single independent thought to call his own. Of course Parmenides as well as Democritus must have clearly understood how much they owed to the highly-gifted authors of the doctrines they had received, and how dependent they were upon those authors; much more dependent than in these later times Kant was upon Hume. Yet Kant, in relation to his predecessor, made of himself the following modest, elegant remark: "If we begin with a thought well grounded but not fully developed, which some one else has left behind him, we ought reasonably to expect by earnest pondering to expand the same farther than did the man upon whom the idea first dawned."

So Democritus, the *atomic* philosopher, must at least divide his glory with Leucippus; and it is eminently proper always to mention the name of the latter whenever we speak of the atomistic theory as of a new and important discovery. On the other hand, up to this time (as I think), Democritus, the *moral* philosopher, has not been honored as fully as he deserves for the purity and noble discreetness of his moral conceptions. (Even such a work as Ritter's History of Philosophy, a work so much known and read, assumes to deny this characteristic in a very decided and even passionate sort of a way), and on account of his clear perception in the reduction of facts back to principles. This last excellence even Zeller does not recognize, although at another time he thoughtfully and successfully opposed Schleiermacher's and Ritter's confused and unjust judgment of Democritus. Indeed I do not hesitate to

accept the remark of Paradoxon, for I hope to be able to demonstrate the truth of it: "Democritus' moral teachings are purer and more circumspect and better founded philosophically than those of his great contemporary Socrates, though Socrates has always ranked higher on account of his influence, wonderful, quite incalculable, and although written up mostly by Plato, an influence almost personal over more than his own nation, and over more realms than that of philosophical thought."

Now, since we are treating of a moral philosopher, it will not be inconsistent for us to attempt to draw a picture of Democritus' person and character. By the hand of Plato in *Crito* in *Symposium*, and above all in the incomparable *Phædo*, we have a picture of Socrates, a picture perhaps here and there idealized, but on the whole one that is true to history, as it has been painfully wrought out by a master's hand.

Respecting the outward life of Democritus we have only the most meager sketches, and, whoever in these empty frames would hang up highly-colored pictures, must either elaborate them through fanciful dreaming, conceived and developed by the view of the man's life as it is known to us, and by his works; or else the histories composed and published hundreds of years after his death must be accepted without criticism as historical verity. Although, of course, in a scientific way both are equally worthless, a person in his own private thought can scarcely keep from giving some play to the imagination, while studying a character so full of interest as this must ever be to the scientific world. Wieland in his "*History of the Abderite*" undertook to do this for a wider circle of readers, with genius enough and with commendable zeal, but of course he did not reach to present attainments in historical investigation.

So much as this we know assuredly respecting Democritus and his habits of life. He was born in the year 460 B.C. or a little earlier, and thus was a younger cotemporary of Socrates. His birth-place was Abdera, in Thrace, a place of some political importance, and of some intellectual development, the native place and residence of famous men in various departments in science and art. He most probably enjoyed the privileges of

personal intercourse with Leucippus, to whom he was indebted for the ground plan of his system of natural philosophy. Leucippus is supposed to have been born at Abdera, although the statement is not absolutely established as fact. For the sake of acquiring knowledge Democritus traveled extensively, much more so than any of his contemporaries. This method of education was made possible to him by his great wealth. He certainly went to Babylon, Persia, and Egypt, perhaps further. On his return he seems to have made his home at Abdera, and busied himself with uninterrupted literary labor. After this time we only know of his making one visit abroad, and that was to Athens. His unusually rich literary activity was exercised over the whole range of the Greek culture of his day. He discussed questions in mathematics, natural science, ethics, æsthetics, grammar, and mechanics. About sixty different works are mentioned, and they are praised on account of their wonderful clearness of expression, and where the nature of the subject permitted it, are said to have assumed the poetical form, a statement which is confirmed by the fragments which have come down to us. He died at a very great age, the accounts of which vary from ninety to one hundred and nine years.

Respecting Democritus nothing further is known with definiteness; and especially has no description of his character been handed down from what we may call trustworthy historical sources. Later ages, however, are full of legendary stories respecting him; but no criterion remains by which we can decide on their trustworthiness. The internal improbability of the stories may only lie in a single phase, and yet we be totally unable to select out the kernels of truth with which they are filled. And that which appears probable in them, fitting the character of an earnest investigator, and harmonizing with what he himself has said, may well be suspected on good grounds as being of more modern invention. We must also refrain from culling out the possibly historic from these stories, and their main value, just as they are given, lies in showing us what a variable picture tradition will give of a scientific investigator who in real knowledge and penetration surpassed all his cotemporaries. They tell us things about him that are very sarcastic, and things that

are very foolish; things that are quite incredible, and others that are probable; things that are sometimes inspired by hate and superstitious dread of his great knowledge; sometimes the offspring of unbounded reverence for a life so thoroughly consecrated to scientific labor. These histories are like the ugly dusty spider-webs gathered in the garret upon the broken cast-off furniture; they are also like the grateful ivy vines climbing upon the venerable ruins of the past.

It may not be uninteresting to illustrate these contradictory traditions by example. So we are told that he did not acquire his vast stores of knowledge by his own personal investigation, but under the tuition of Persian magi. For Xerxes, on his expedition against Greece, was entertained, so the story goes, as a guest, at the house of Democritus' father—and even, we are told, the whole army of Xerxes,—we can hardly realize the unreasonableness of the statement—even the whole army of Xerxes was entertained there. And so out of gratitude the Persian king left some magi behind in Abdera, in order to unfold to the sprightly youth—unfortunately he was not born until twenty years afterwards—the deepest depths of knowledge. A similar play of fancy describes Democritus as taking up his abode from choice in the tombs in order to quiet his unappeasable thirst for knowledge. Another tells how he put out his own eyes, so that he might study out the truth undisturbed by the outside world. Again we are told he possessed such a deeply penetrating knowledge, that among other things he could tell that the milk set before him was the milk of a black goat, or that a girl whom a few days before he had greeted with “My compliments, Miss,” at an other time he greeted with “My compliments, Madame,” because he recognized from her looks the internal change that had taken place. In the same category belongs the later story, intrinsically foolish and of course unsupported by facts, about the ever-laughing or grinning philosopher; a story whose invention, as it has recently been shown with plausibility, is closely related to that other one, that the Abderites always, but of course wrongfully, considered him a fool and a simpleton. The ever-grinning face of Democritus, like that of Heraclitus ever streaming with tears, is a simple fancy sketch which after-generations

have as foolishly stereotyped as they foolishly invented. To confute such a story we only need remember what Democritus himself said: "As men it never becomes us to laugh over human sorrows, but rather to weep over them." And as to the subsequently invented story about the stupidity of the Abderites, we need only remember that Anacreon of his own accord took up his residence at Abdera, and that the city reckoned among her citizens the quick-witted Protagoras and many other important personages. The story of the stupidity of the Abderites is one of the most recently manufactured stories, dating probably about 300 A. D., and it lets Democritus and his foolish fellow-citizens fall under the suspicion, of an anachronism, since these citizens bring Democritus to the celebrated physician Hippocrates to be cured. These tales are very like the ones about his death. The idea of his caring little for earthly wealth which one gains so overweeningly from his ethical writings, has given rise to the story, that in a certain sickness, he sank into a sort of lethargy, and that he presently by his own power resumed life, with the words, "The love of life shall not deceive me." Still more surprising, and growing out of this same notion of his supernatural insight into the powers of nature is the following anecdote:—

When Democritus in his extreme old age felt that death was close at hand and had expressed to his near friends his conviction of the fact, his sister complained that by his death at that time she might be hindered from participating in the festival in honor of Demeter. Democritus quieted her fears by the assurance that his knowledge gave him the power even over death. And during the three days of the feast, he had fresh-baked bread brought to his bedside, and by inhaling the odors of the bread, he kept the breath of life in his body, and then on the fourth day quietly and painlessly gave up the ghost. Diogenes Laertius, from whom we get this history, expressed himself in the following verses:—

"Where is the man that has succeeded
As did Democritus—all know the fact—when needed
Three days hold back from dwelling with the dead
And dine on vapor from the fresh baked-bread."

This same wonderful story the well-known Byzantine scholar and poet, Tzetzes, towards the close of Greek literature, put into

rhyme. I have not troubled myself to find his version of it, and my reader of course will therefore not be troubled with it. Another story of his death, which simply excites indignation, is, that he died like Herod, eaten of worms.

This is the story of Democritus, as envy and hate, stupidity and superstition, have written it. There is another story of his life, far less highly colored, by the many as little credited, but one which to my mind has a far greater intrinsic probability. Here we see the growing youth in remote seclusion in a retired summer house, so absorbed in his studies that he forgets everything about him, and is only brought back to the living present by the voice of his father. Then we learn that being reproved because his studies were so unproductive in things which pertained to practical life, he showed the faultfinders how he could, if he would, make his knowledge of nature productive of the greatest material advantage. For by shrewd foresight of an unusually rich olive harvest he bought up all the oil presses far and near, and by this speculation amassed a large fortune. But this wealth he had won, he gave to the State, in order that his life might, with less disturbance, be devoted to science. Respecting his residence in Persia, a story is told on the authority of the Emperor Julian,—which is, however, a very late source of information—that when the dearly beloved wife of the Persian King Darius died, Democritus sought in vain to comfort him. Finally he told the king that he would bring the queen back to life again, if he would provide him with what he needed for the operation. Then when the king commanded that everything that he needed should be given to him, no matter what the expense, the philosopher told him, that he knew how to accomplish everything else, but that he was perplexed about one thing, which it would take the king of all Asia to get for him. For he would have to write on the grave of the queen the names of three men who had never in their lives known sorrow. Of course all searching after such men was in vain. Then Democritus turned to the king with these words: “And you, most foolish of all, do not hesitate to devote yourself to unending sorrow, because you have to share the common lot of all mortals.”

Further, it is told that through his travels he had exhausted

his fortune, and was in great danger of falling under the condemnation of that law of Abdera by which a spendthrift was denied burial. Then he called his fellow-citizens together and read to them his work on natural philosophy, and thereby so moved them that they gave him five hundred talents from the royal treasury, and honored him with statues of brass. The Abderites should have given him the honorable title *Sophia* (= wisdom), and should have had him buried sumptuously at public cost.

This is the story of his life from the side of affection, prompted by enthusiasm, and yet like the other we cannot decide respecting this, how much of historical truth may be contained in it. Our knowledge of his thought-world is, however, much more certain than our knowledge of his person. A great quantity of fragments, especially from his ethical writings, have come down to us. None of these, to be sure, are of any great length, but they are quite sufficient to give us a clear picture of his ethical principles, and his ideas of life founded upon them. This picture of him I will endeavor to reproduce. I shall find best success, perhaps, by presenting the substance of these doctrines, and by grouping kindred thoughts so as to build up into a harmonious picture the scattered fragments that we have actually in our hands. Here I remark that I shall take the material for this purpose from Mullach's "Collection of Fragments," admitting the possibility that some passages here and there (but certainly not many nor those important), may not be interpreted as Democritus would have had them understood.

The general consent of men is that our philosophy is an unhappy one. We look within us and, according to Democritus, we find in our hearts, as in a treasure-house, bad passions of many kinds lodged in gay confusion. These do not spring forth of themselves, but have their original fountains lying deep down in our natures. Sin opens these fountains, and the passions flow out in abundant widespread streams. And as we watch and judge others we cannot allow ourselves to be deceived by their glowing and fine sounding words. For many do the very worst things and yet amuse themselves with the finest speeches. Just so, also, how many friends we seem

to have, who are not so in fact, while others are our friends who do not seem so.

But the worldly possessions which stimulate within us that carnal appetite which exceeds the measure of natural necessities, are of no value. They are of brief duration, and always keep reproducing the painful longing which is only stilled by temporary gratification. Yielding to the appetite is thus productive of no permanent good. It only produces a brief enjoyment and a long craving of desire; a fact that is quite forgotten by the foolishness that goes weeping to the gods for health, which we have within our own reach, and which we have lost by our own unrestrained appetites. It is sad enough that the impersonal (the body), knows the proper limit of its necessities, while the desiring man (the soul), does not know this. What our bodily shell really needs is that everything should be done with less pains; but that which is only accomplished by force of necessity and pressure, the body does not long after, but rather the bad disposition of the spirit, the heated fancy. If the body, therefore, would once charge the soul with baseness, the body would win the suit. So many men do not know what to do with life. They would like always to be young. They do not know how to develop the power of youth, they fear death, and yet hasten his coming by their habits of life; or else by their avarice they deny themselves every joy, declaring their motive to be only a necessary care for the future. They are unhappy and dissatisfied with life, and yet want to live because they are afraid of Hades, and so by deliberate plan finish their days without joy.

But mankind no longer desire this condition so unhappy, scanty in joys, and void of peace, if they are awakened to a better view of things, for the cause of sin is the ignorance of the better way. This knowledge of the better shows itself as repentance, if men permit themselves to indulge in senseless actions. For this reason Democritus calls repentance the Life-healer.

But right knowledge consists only in right discrimination among the joys of life. For the end and aim of human life is to secure the highest possible amount of pleasure with the least possible amount of pain; or, what is the next thing to it, to gain the highest profit and shun all the losses we can.

Here, now, is the point where the opponents of Democritus cry out, "Behold, unvarnished utilitarianism! A baser form of Hedonism! A sentiment destitute of all ethical ideality!" But I might ask these zealous objectors to remember that we are treating of the historical estimate to be put upon a moral philosopher, and that too on the first one who ever developed a system. Exactly on this same system a little later does Socrates stand, and yet Democritus has treated it with a clearness that neither Plato, nor Aristotle, nor the Stoics have surpassed.

Indeed, I am inclined to think that the later philosophy, even though it denies his positions, has overthrown them only in word and not in fact, and probably never can overthrow them. Even the ascetic denies himself all sensual pleasures only for this reason, that the sacrifice brings him eventually higher enjoyment than these pleasures. He distinguishes and decides, in exactly the same way, with regard to possible pleasures; and if he voluntarily undergoes bodily suffering and painful privation, he does it because it is better for him than the fullness of the rejected sensuous enjoyment. The acute Lichtenberg was certainly correct when he said, "I am so thoroughly persuaded that man does everything for the sake of the advantage to be gained by the doing (using these words properly), that I believe this principle as necessary for the preservation of the world, as physical perception is for the preservation of the body. It is enough, that in so many cases we cannot secure our own advantage without making a thousand other people happy, and our first great cause knew how to combine the interest of one part so wisely with that of many others."

Lichtenberg is right in asking his reader to understand correctly this word advantage (*Vortheil*). Democritus might also well make this same demand; and he has taken great pains that we shall not have any uncertainty as to what he understands by profit, advantage, happiness, or good fortune.

He says: "The happiness of the soul does not dwell in real-estate, nor possessions. The soul itself is the dwelling place of the God-head. This happiness is nothing but the well ordered heart, the well regulated mind, the unshaken peace. Not through bodily excellencies nor by money are men made happy,

but by right doing and by wise discernment. He who aspires after riches of the soul, aspires after the divine: he who aspires after the wealth of the bodily shell, seeks the earthy. It is nobler to meditate on the soul than on the body, for a perfect soul extends powerful aid to the wretchedness and frailty of the body, while bodily vigor without insight is of utterly no avail to the soul. He whose soul is well regulated and full of peace, feels himself drawn towards that which is right and lawful, and, awake or asleep, is he full of joy. But peace flies from him who does wrong, who neglects duty, and he is full of fear, and all the time finding fault with himself."

Finally, in exact agreement with Plato, Democritus calls goodness and truth the holy thing and that which should be revered by all, as distinguished from pleasing things which may be grateful to one and not to another.

Sensual desires certainly do not seem to our philosopher a worthy goal for human striving. He expressly praises the noble aspiration which naturally turns to the contemplation of grand deeds. Yes, indeed, sensuous beauty seems valueless to him if it be not spiritualized. If not, he calls it heartless, and an attribute of beasts as well as men. And the learned scientist leaves us in no doubt but that he would rather discover the cause of any operation in nature than be king of Persia. Like Aristotle he considers it the most godlike of occupations, to be engaged in scientific research. In this he actually found his own joyful satisfaction.

So his personal ideal of life was built up in various directions, pure and noble indeed, but of course not so constructed that it could win the assent of every human soul. Desire for the truth, irrespective of temporal profit, indicates a spiritual endowment in which every one does not participate. We should be very much mistaken, however, if we thought the discreet thinker could ask, without meeting a reproof from anybody, what only a few can give, and only now and then one of those who can, will give.

Next to that peaceful happiness which is won through scientific labor in some realm of nature, and through passion for the beauty of poetic pictures, (we continue in the line of thought of our philosopher, who first speaks of that holy inspiration by

the Creator which breaths forth in the Homeric writings), he esteems as a happiness that which all men may have, which a man attains for himself by a voluntary doing of the right and lawful, associated through the rectitude of his whole life with moderation in every sensual desire.

So decidedly does Democritus esteem the spiritual aspirations above the bodily passions, that he stands far removed in the theory from the pains-taking gymnast. He permits the gratification of the body unquestionably, but only so far that, in accordance with his theory, the soul's peace, the heart's harmonic voice, shall not be disturbed by them. Indeed, in clear unprejudiced recognition of human nature he demands recreation as a kindly relaxation from labor. A life without holidays is like a long journey without the hospitalities of a kind host. He demands further; he demands that we shall enjoy pleasures to the full, since they are seldom our lot. Economy and hunger are good at the right time, and so also, is prodigality. The proper man recognizes the proper occasion. People may say that is very indefinite. But who can be expected to give here detailed directions by which to regulate everything in the personal relationship of each individual, especially with reference to property and health. But that duty should never be neglected, at any place or at any time for the sake of carnal enjoyment, follows, from the general moral principle that Democritus has laid down, and is besides most unequivocally declared in a fragment which has happily descended to us.

Many fragments speak of a reasonable moderation, and the right control of our desires for physical pleasure in exactly the same way that the Greek moral philosophy so often makes such utterances and lays down such laws. One should direct his thoughts, says Democritus, towards the possible, and enjoy present blessings, and not with busy fancy keep always picturing to the mind the things which are admired or envied in the relations of life. It is better for a person to think about the life of the poor and the wretched, that the soul may not by restless cravings lose its peace, and also, that this craving may not lead us to wrong doing.

So shall our conditions of life be noble and enviable, and we

shall crowd out of our lives many unhappy influences, disgust, envy, hateful feelings, and the like, and not be like the dog in Esop's fable, bartering a real good for a vain shadow. Poverty and wealth, rightly understood, are only other names for desire and satisfaction. The craving man is never rich, and he is not poor in whom is no craving. Happy is that soul who is rich in peace by the side of a moderate competence, and unhappy he who by the side of great wealth is without peace. The poor man is free from the worst evils, for these follow naturally in the train of the rich. He escapes hate and envy, and the fear of degradation. Unrestrained appetite is childish and not manly, and every excess converts a pleasure into a pain. Yet, to do this in deed, to hold a present sensible restraint upon the enjoyment of the present, requires an earnest war with the sensual. The brave man is not the hero on the battle field, but he who conquers his passions; and to get the victory over one's self is the grandest and noblest of all victories, even as it is the basest of all base things to yield to one's own passions. He, however, has not accomplished the whole victory, who does not do the bad thing, but he who no longer desires to do it. These alone are the beloved of God, by whom unrighteousness is hated in the inmost heart. Fear, then, and the compulsion of the law can no longer be the true motive for doing duty, and for leaving the wrong undone. Our very hearts are to be won over to the side of the good by internal conviction and careful education. Then we shall shun evil in our speech, and in our hours of solitude, when no watching eye is at hand, we shall neither say nor do the shameful thing; and further, we shall attain to such a plan of life that we shall stand more in awe of our own consciences than of other people.

The man who lives in this way will never lack from without the full requisites for life happiness. Human life indeed is frail and transitory, and exposed to many a want and accident; and stout-hearted sacrifice by no means implies glorious success. But on the other hand, destiny is often blamed for what is the result of a person's own stupidity. The gods give at all times the good and the useful in most abundant fulness, but men oftentimes by their own blindness and ignorance, out of these same good things work out their own destruction. Thus, deep

waters are good and useful in many ways; but he who will safely bathe in them must know how to swim. Our outward condition, therefore, corresponds to our character, and in our developed character lies the only nobility after which we rightly indulge aspiration.

In the foregoing the writer has confined himself substantially to the presentation of Democritus' views concerning the moral relation of man's life to the nature which encompasses him round. But still further in his writings there is no lack of reflections on the social relations of man and his duty as a citizen. We cannot make a mistake here as to the general principles that guided him.

According to his theory, evil dispositions only seem possible in a man who has no joy in himself. He says, "Whoever finds pleasure in his neighbor's woe, does not know that the results of fate are common to all, and he is void of inner joy of his own." Pity, the opposite sentiment, however, results in unspeakable good to men. Concerning pity he uses these words: "When those who have the opportunity decide to help the needy man and do him a kindness, then mercy has found a place, then are men no more left solitary; they are companions, they help one another, and civil agreement is hard by, and other blessings which cannot be expressed in words." He demands that we should make the cases of the sick our own, and the cases of such as suffer wrong, and not let things go as they do; and when we cannot hinder the wrong, at least we should never take part in it. But if we ourselves are called to suffer wrong, that is a noble disposition that can bear it with gentleness. He who does the wrong is more unblessed than he who suffers it, and it is better to make a full account of our own faults than of other people's. Does some one do us a kindness, we should most earnestly endeavor to repay it with a greater one. Our own good deeds only deserve so to be called when they do not spring from the hope of reward, but from a pure morality.

In another fragment he lays the foundation of well doing in a way which tallies better with the natural, selfish disposition. He says: "Share with the stranger and the needy whatsoever things you have; for if you do not give to the needy, neither

shall you receive when in want." To a philosopher of the olden time it was almost an axiom to say that Democritus had a high estimate of friendship. Respecting this virtue, one of his finest, strongest sentences is extant. "He does not deserve to live who has found no honest friend. In general it is better to be the object of love and kind regard than an object of fear: for the man whom everybody fears, has everybody to be afraid of."

Of the female sex Democritus had no high opinion. If he indulges in pleasantry at the expense of some men who govern States, and yet are themselves the slaves of women, or at the least are controlled by them, and says that this is a disgrace and in the highest degree unmanly; this might still be consistent with a high respect for woman in her own proper sphere. And further it need not be prejudicial to the sex when he calls paucity of words an ornament to women, but it is really malicious when he adds directly after, that in this same ornament extreme uniformity ought to be manifest. Another sentence sounds still worse. "Woman far exceeds man in passionate inclination toward evil." It is possible, however, that this is only one-half of a thought, and that we have lost another half which speaks of woman's passionate inclination toward the good, so that the unmutilated thought might be like that of Goethe in his "Iphigenia."

"A woman holds with earnest purpose to a thought
Which she has grasped. You may upon her firmness trust
More surely if the thought were virtuous than ill."

But I will leave the arguing of these possibilities to the advocates of the philosopher, and cease to be their reporter.

Democritus had peculiar ideas respecting marriage. Whether he himself was ever married we do not know. From his fragments we should draw a much more positive conclusion in favor of his celibacy than we should from an anecdote in the opposite direction, which comes to us from later times and is therefore more unreliable. According to this anecdote, some one was represented as having asked him why, being so large, he had married so small a wife. His answer was, "In choosing among evils, I took the least." On the other hand we gather as his own statement from his writings that he had declined to participate in the married state on account of the many disturbances and

hindrances connected with it which would keep him from more important matters. He could not possibly have mistaken the general principles of nature and necessity which underlie the rearing of children, but for his own personal life he preferred to deny himself, not only because the expense and care incident to the raising of children seemed to him to be greater and more certain than the pleasure to be gained from it, but also because the act of copulation itself seemed repulsive to him. He calls it in his peculiar nomenclature a sort of apoplexy. "But every person who is well to do in the world," so he says, "ought to adopt one of his neighbor's children." In such a case he might choose according to his own pleasure, while he would be bound to his own child, if it had the worst possible disposition. These two reasons for celibacy are very different in character. The first impels our old bachelors of to-day sometimes, but perhaps more often hinders. The other was called to mind by the pleasure-lovers of later days, and was indebted for its origin to the peculiar physical constitution of our philosopher. But both alike find their explanation in his moral principle of soul peace, which he here carries so far that it interferes with the noblest moral relationship. In any case we must agree with Zeller that the materialistic philosopher here discloses no crude materialistic way of thinking, for he here makes special objection to the sensual element of the marriage relation.

How deeply this scientist must have yearned after undisturbed repose, to thus entirely avoid the family life, or at farthest find a form of it which does not conform to nature, although it may best correspond to his highest happiness; yet all the while he does not seem to recognize the fact that he is indifferent or inimical to the interests of the state.

The origin of the state he finds in the effort of men to avoid the "*bellum omnium contra omnes*." Civil discord in the then existing, but distracted state, is shown to be equally destructive to the conquering as well as to the conquered, and great results of any kind are only possible through a powerful harmonizing by which the weakest help the strongest. Thus law and order are benefits to men, but of course only to those who will appropriate them. For this reason the interests of the state are paramount to every private interest. A good, well-

governed state is the highest blessing. In it is contained everything wholesome. Its continuance ensures ours, and its destruction brings everything to ruin with it. Consequently the citizen should not be satisfied with a passive, lawful keeping of the peace, but he should take upon himself an active, lively participation in the government of the state. Evidently the philosopher has the undisturbed welfare of the state more at heart than the quiet ease of the individual.

Of course to the Greeks the democratic form of state government seemed the best and worthiest. He considered indigent life under a popular government as much more desirable than what men ordinarily call good fortune at the hands of the powerful, as freedom is higher than slavery. Of course he had in his mind when he expressed his estimation of a free government, just as Socrates had, an ideal to which the actual fact by no means corresponded; namely, that the wisest and most efficient should have control.

A little fragment contains the following with reference to slavery: "The slaves, like members of the body, need each one to have his own business;" a thoughtful and peculiarly independent position, but not at all adapted as a foundation for moral law. So one should lay special emphasis on the general picture presented and conclude that he puts no impassable barrier between slaves and freemen. These and some other expressions, heretofore discussed, we are to interpret not too arbitrarily. He has very clearly expressed himself to the contrary on the rights of men with reference to animals. He permits to us kill only such as may be dangerous to us, only such as the consideration of our peace might require to be slain. If he has not modified his views in the last portion of his works he was a pronounced vegetarian. It is possibly so; he certainly was the first (though it has been wrongfully credited to Socrates), who gave expression to a world-wide thought in his famous dictum: "A wise man finds his way everywhere; a capable man's fatherland is the whole world."

After this presentation of the ethics of Democritus, his principles stand forth nowise inferior to those of Socrates, either in clearness, in noble moderation and discretion, in purity and depth. How much the views of the two men hold in common it is not my province at this time to show, but I very much

doubt whether Socrates has always made an advance in scientific knowledge in those points wherein he differs and in the novel points that meet us in his statements.

That men do badly through ignorance of the better way, Democritus teaches as well as Socrates. But that the knowledge of the right unconditionally insures right doing is a false deduction, and has only a sophistical foundation. Democritus knew human nature better, for he says that all strong passions in whatever direction make us blind toward other things. We must, therefore, construe the meaning of the word "knowing" in a very arbitrary sense if we accept the statement of Socrates, that the knowing can never be overpowered by the desiring. And also that other principal dictum of the Socratic ethics, that all virtue is one, rests, so far as it is true, upon the general substance of the moral philosophy of Democritus, even if we cannot show that the philosopher put that idea into exactly that form of words. For according to his theory all the virtues flow from one fountain, and that is, care for the soul's peace. For this reason the virtues are in fact only one, and not as according to Socrates, because they are all only another name for knowledge of the right, that is, of the truly useful. Knowledge, i. e. intelligent understanding, is for moral actions of men, of much less real importance than Socrates would make it.

The wonderful world-wide importance of the Socratic philosophy indeed remains an influence of such breadth and depth that I would dare attempt to present it in its fullness. On the other hand, the influence of the unsophisticated Democritic philosophy has been relatively unimportant. And besides, Epicurus, who owed everything to Democritus, has superadded his own ideas and deliberately vilified Democritus. This seems to demand justice, and it also seems that an impartial judgment founded on the original facts of historical relationship would compel us to acknowledge that at the time of Socrates, and independent of him, there was in Greece a moral philosophy already existing, which in purity, depth, and discreetness, is at least quite as worthy as the Socratic, and that this philosophy, as an original investigation should be credited to the philosopher of Abdera, rather than the atomistic theory which is only a more remote development from his views.

ARTICLE III.—THE SACRIFICES DEMANDED BY UNBELIEF.

THERE is a feeling abroad that within the last few decades our colleges have become more or less marked as places where boys lose their Christian faith. Fathers used to look forward to college as the place where an unconverted son would be likely to yield to the power of the Gospel. But now in sending even a converted son to college, they look forward with some anxiety to what they feel will be a severe test of his faith.

The case has become so urgent that the Magazine has been properly called in as an aid to the college pulpit in saying something to the students. The *North American Review* has contained during the last three years a series of four articles,* evidently written by the same person, the object of which appears to be to make students feel that a life without the Christian religion must be miserable. These remarkably able articles seem in some places to lack that tenderness with which the subject should be treated.† They have suggested to me the propriety of urging one or two points of the same case without the irony, more directly and plainly, not with the slightest intention of vying with them in piquancy or strength.

It will be safe to premise that mere thoughtlessness and self-conceit will account for a large share of the unbelief which exists at college. But that is not the whole story. Student

* An Advertisement for a New Religion.—By an Evolutionist. July–August, 1878.

Confessions of an Agnostic. Sept., 1879.

What Morality Have We left—By a New Light Moralist. May, 1881.

The Religious Conflicts of the Age. By a Yankee Farmer. July, 1881.

These have appeared in a book form, since the present article was put in type.
—*Ed. New Eng.*

† In the last article of the series, the writer indulges in the following chuckle at the way in which his irony had been misunderstood. "An editor of an able weekly paper wrote a reply to them" (the previous articles), "but was induced to withdraw it by a wiseacre who persuaded him that they were a sly defence of religion." This admitted slyness, which is perhaps the chief charm of the articles, is also capable of being turned into the chief objection to them.

communities, perhaps because their daily work is to form opinions on nearly every subject, are apt to be imbued with a quick sympathy for everything that may be said against gray tradition. So, the same tendency which makes the students in the Russian universities foremost among the Nihilists, gives scepticism a respectable amount of thoughtful following in American colleges. At a time too when distrust in what has been handed down from our fathers is in the very air that we breathe, teachers ought to allow that it is not strange that young men should be found who feel that they are as honest in their doubts as others are in their beliefs, and who cannot be laughed down by the remark that scepticism is a disease, that has to be gone through with once, just as children go through with the measles, and the sooner it is over the better. The demand which college scepticism makes is serious enough to be seriously answered. But this article is not such an answer. Its scope is humbler. It merely contains a few reasons why students ought to desire an answer.

In the first place those few students who only get as far as the stage of doubt, ought to be reminded that mere doubt is not a condition for a healthy mind to *stay* in. Time-honored as is the principle of suspension of the judgment, as the proper attitude of mind for ascertaining truth, to an active mind it can only be a transition stage. It is possible indeed to work one's self (perhaps work is the wrong term to use, for it is generally a matter of sheer indolence), into a state of mind which, as has been facetiously described, lets one awake every morning with the feeling that everything is an open question. Emil Girardin, it will be remembered, took this attitude in his motto, "From day to day;" and to a good many illustrious journalists, doubtless, the only very active conscience is a fear of contradiction by back numbers kept on file. These men, however, bear a sort of punishment, for while they may delight and strongly stir the public, the men whose influence abides are usually those who have laid away on file the largest number of great questions labeled "settled," which they propose never to reopen.

But in matters of religion, the more common experience is,

that, while a man is flattering himself that he is making no decisions at all, he is in reality drifting so rapidly to the negative side of all his questions that, unless he makes an effort to put the helm about, he will be astonished when he takes his bearings, to find how far he is from Christianity.

It takes resolution to accept positive positions which demand action of the one who receives them. Unbelief springs up of itself, like weeds in the garden of the sluggard.

Probably young men of Christian training would fight their doubts as "specters of the mind," rather than embrace them as life-long guests, were it not for the prevalent inattention to the close way in which life and character are bound up in belief. There is a wide spread feeling that almost any belief, in kind or degree, will do, provided only that one has generally kind intentions well directed by good sense. The loss of a hold on God is made a minor matter. If only the being a useful member of society were in question, that judgment might pass unchallenged. But every man who is on the point of resigning himself to a course of doubt or unbelief, ought to be warned to count the terrible cost to his own life.

A man's real wealth is, after all, his character. It goes with him across the sea. It will surely follow him into the world to come, if there is any world to come. With a good character fixed all is secured that can be secured. The ideas that spoil character when cherished, are poison to be avoided. This argument from expediency is not so contemptible as it sometimes appears to one in the heat of a first search after truth. "Follow the truth if it takes you over Niagara," may seem the more heroic principle. But if one were well assured that a certain course was really taking him over Niagara, he might be persuaded to listen to the more prudent advice which tells him to hug the shore, and warns him that the figure which he is following, with all its fair seeming, is not the truth. Concede to the student that the question of questions is, "What is the truth?" but tell him that since the actual conclusions of all men depend more on original bias than on direct argument, it is not a bad thing to start in the search after religious truth with a prejudice in favor of a saving system. Tell him that if he cuts loose from Christianity, whatever else

happens, he will have to meet certain losses, each of which, unless he is willing to live a merely sensual life, he will feel to be a tremendous bar to his living up to his own satisfaction. These losses are :

1. The loss of hope. The hope of heaven is only one item under hope. The loss of a hope of heaven may be endured. Many make a virtue of giving up such a hope as a spring of action. Many brave it out because others have done so before them ; and some in whom the elements are kindly mixed exult in repeating Goethe's confession of manhood.

" Ach, ihr Götter, grosse Götter
In dem weiten Himmel droben !
Gäbet ihr uns auf der Erde
Festen Sinn und guten Muth,
O wir liessen euch, ihr Guten,
Euren weiten Himmel droben."

But some of these advocates of earthly pluck and joy, who give up the hope of heaven for fear of being selfish, as they say, we often see soon hoping for other things that will not so well bear mentioning.

But the worst thing about this renunciation of hope is that the average man is not equal to it, and to the average man any world-saving system must be fitted. Take such an average man and deprive him of the hope of heaven after he has once had it, and then let his life become familiar with disappointments, and very likely he will commit suicide. The modern statistics of this kind of taking off are alarming. But there is no fear lest the statisticians should find one case of a man in whose breast the hope of heaven was burning who has come to this horrible end. The good old faith unquestionably works temporal salvation to that extent. A man ought to be willing to struggle a little before he lets go his hold on this hope, when he considers how many for lack of this anchor have been driven upon reefs. There is a class of persons to whose testimony not enough weight has been given, i. e. those who have spent some of their years with and others without this hope, perhaps, in some cases passing more than once from one condition to the other. Deep in the heart of such persons is imbedded the feeling that the years of hope have been years of power ; the others years of stagnation.

But the hope which it costs the severest pang to relinquish, is the hope for the life which now is. Before asking why the unbeliever must dispense with this hope, it is well to notice the fact that he does dispense with it. Liberty is the great word of the apostles of unbelief. Hope is almost crowded out of their vocabulary. The only use they make of it is to set a sort of halo on the man of the future, who is to shine forth in beauty when the man of the present, having lived his godless and hopeless life, shall have become a clod of the valley.

More men are pessimists than are willing to give themselves out for such; and some young men do not know that they are such, until they read a philosopher like Schoppenhauer, and find to their surprise and sorrow that they agree with him.

But it is not difficult to see why a life that leaves God out of the account must be hopeless. In that case who vouches for the success of good enterprises? Perhaps the good and great are playing a losing game. Then, too, we are so very individual in our cravings, and when one has cut loose from the idea that his individual soul is an object of care to a Heavenly Father, who brings about his successes, and makes his failures better than successes, he finds himself in the midst of all-powerful forces which have no regard for him. If he understands them they spare him perhaps, but make his life like that of the drudge in some great cotton-mill, who knows his work and hates it; but if he does not understand them, he is like the inexperienced visitor in the mill who walks among belts and machinery which fill him with terror. Something like the assurance that a wise and good power, to whom individual action is not indifferent is guiding all things, is necessary to give one a reasonable confidence in the successful issue of his work.

But a large part of life to most persons consists in enduring rather than acting. The prizes appear falsely distributed, and one has to endure "the spurns which patient merit of the unworthy takes." Without this trust in God, unless a man proposes to yield the whole struggle and say,

"'T were hardly worth my while to choose
Of things all mortal or to use
A little patience ere I die"—

only two other courses seem open to him. He can strike back when adversity presses him. But this constant "kicking

against the pricks" makes a morose disposition, showing itself in the forbidding vinegar face. The other way, which has gained more applause, is to bear the pain in silence with firmly set teeth and a dry eye, and perhaps a smile to make the expression of defiance of fate more complete. Homer's heroes, Achilles and Menelaus, used to weep and roll in the dust, and then arise and do mighty deeds, while the hero of modern culture often thinks he has done enough when he has merely held back the tears. And yet this conduct is simply analogous to that of the prize ring, when, long after the issue of the fight is decided, the poor wretch who loses will pick himself up and allow himself to be knocked down again, round after round, with a smiling face just to hear the crowd say "He is game."

How many men among us fight their battle of life with no higher motive than that with which the gladiators of Rome fought their battle in the amphitheater, to escape the ridicule of the multitude. The rising of a belief in the God of the Bible converts the hopeless, prizeless, gladiatorial fight into the glad fight of faith in which the whole man leaps to the contest with the assurance that life and liberty are at stake, and yet may be secured.

Each man has a vast world truly his own, lying under the dome of his own head. Wonders take place in it. But none so great as when the eyes which yesterday looked forth and reported "All things here are out of joint," to-day look forth and see the Lord's hand ordering everything in mercy and love. Then the harmonies that slumbered in that soul are awakened and it holds such high festival that even those who look in at the windows can see that all is changed inside from Hell to Heaven. Even if death ends all, they are immeasurably happier who, having failed to discover it, pass sweet years of blessed hope.

But perhaps it may seem that this eulogy of hope is uncalled for, because hope, blessed as it is, is not the highest thing in life. Many noble hearts have felt and expressed that to do right is more than ecstasy, and proved their manhood in gloom and despair. I might indeed indulge in unbelief more boldly if I simply felt that it made one wretched. Perhaps "wisdom increaseth sorrow," is the highest law of the universe. But this

is the startling thing in the case. I come to feel in my own person that the lack of hope makes me like an unstrung bow. In the place of that high strung activity which makes life worth living, I become gradually content with purposes less noble and acts less difficult: I learn the terrible lesson to set aside the arduous for the easy.

Sometimes one tree grows large and glorious, while another by its side never gets beyond the dimensions of a sapling, because it has met with certain conditions unfavorable to growth, and has in consequence suffered what we call blight. In a hopeless atmosphere there is danger that a man will suffer blight while his friends go on and up into glorious growths of thought and life.

2. Another want of the unbeliever is the want of a suitable cause in which he may do battle. One of the axioms of life as we find it is, that manhood is only won in battle, and he who fails to spell out that law of nature, bears about with him the penalty of a flabby arm or untrained mind, or disjointed character. But it is useless to prescribe to a man that it is the proper thing for him to give and take hard knocks, unless you furnish him with a cause in which he shall fight. We do have a class of athletes made by mere practice, gymnasium athletes, not equal to our sailors and blacksmiths for real service, but still pretty good physical specimens. But there is no such way of working up character. That has to be forged in the heat of actual service. Christianity "opens the kingdom of heaven to all believers," and opens it on earth when it answers their first great question, "Lord what wilt thou have me to do?" by setting them in the midst of a struggle for a cause so grand that it makes even the small man a giant, forgetting himself in the ardor of battle.

One in whom the Christian faith is really alive wishes to influence everybody. "By all means to save some" is his rule. He would that all men might be such as he is excepting his bonds. But when one who has been engaged in this blessed activity becomes involved in unbelief, the same thing happens to him which happens to a railroad train, when the steam gives out on an up grade. Power and motion cease. Instead of wishing to carry everybody by storm, he is now almost afraid

lest he may by chance influence somebody. It takes an unbeliever of a bold and rather reckless type to be an apostle of the cause. Most of those who have had faith and lost it, go no further than to find a parry against those meddlesome friends who press too close to probe the "aching void." What desolation has one not covered up with the phrase, "Sensible men never tell." Many a man who talks thus evasively, sincerely hopes that his sister may find reasons for not following him. It is a curious condition for a young man with naturally high aspirations, (almost ridiculous if it were not so sad), when he becomes afraid of his own influence. The first thought that strikes such a person is, perhaps, that he will be a neutral. If he has lost his grip on those truths which he has felt to be powerful levers for raising men out of the mire of sensuality, he will at least not help to push them farther in, and so, sad in his heart of hearts, when he feels that he ought to be helping somebody to live a new life, he tries to content himself with teaching a little literature or science, rather than be an utter idler. It is like Hercules sitting down to Omphale's woman's tasks, and throwing down the club with which he had wrought his labors. Perhaps among the keenest agonies should be reckoned that of such a strong young man who neither dares nor wishes to fight against Christianity, and yet feels that he must leave its ranks or call himself a hypocrite.

But the position of a neutral, besides being thus pitiful, is practically impossible. It shows a deep foresight into human history that one should be able to say nearly two thousand years ago, "He that is not for me is against me," and have the saying prove so true that ever since then he has been the one person towards whom neutrality is impossible. On this point each man is forced to declare himself. Silence will not save him, for silence is accounted as a declaration of hostility. Let a man go where he will, in this country, at least, and he finds a sharp battle going on between Christianity and its enemies, and if he does not say a word in defence of Christianity, he soon finds that somehow his weight, whatever it happens to be, has been almost in spite of him been thrown into the other scale, and he cannot get it out. Christianity and its warfare—its friends and its foes, are fixed facts in the world,

and we must plan accordingly. He who counts on neutrality in religion is like the Rev. Amos Barton, who was always making plans "admirably well calculated, supposing the state of the case were otherwise."

8. Another damaging thing about unbelief is, that it leaves a man without anything to worship. This damage is insidious. It is the easiest thing in the world for those who suffer it, to be unconscious of their loss. It is a fashion more prevalent in America, perhaps, than anywhere else to value cold-bloodedness as one of the chief virtues. A good many young men in our colleges, especially those who come from large cities, like to appear a little blasé. The excessive admiration of anything is set down as greenness, supposed to be the especial attribute of country boys. This is surely all wrong. There is some good in an even tenor of mind, but unless the mind is now and then stirred with some strong emotion it stagnates.

The sight of some mighty cataract or some towering mountain may produce such an effect that one is never quite the same man after the sight as before. But even this is a lower order of feeling than that inspired by the presence of some commanding person. Hero worship is a step higher than nature worship. An overpowering admiration of some great man has so often been the means of calling a young man's energies into life, that one may be set down as unfortunate who has never met a living man before whom he was forced to feel a profound veneration. But the feeling which the highest man ever called forth in the most susceptible admirer is feeble compared with that which Christ called forth in the greatest men who ever saluted him as king by bowing at his feet. We might imagine a man who had never seen the heavens except at night, and had been filled with admiration for the stars. If then he should see the stars grow pale before the light of the glorious sun, what would his admiration be? To the believer Christ is the sun, while other venerated men are but stars. To make Christ a fictitious ideal, and still try to make him fill the same place as before would be to substitute a moon for your sun. The moon is bright and beautiful, and can be more comfortably and accurately surveyed, but how long could a man get along with it without pining for the dazzling, blinding, overpowering sun.

Things do not grow in the light of the moon. So when men lose the light of the actual Christ, worship dies out, and stagnation and old night begin to recover their dominion.

Some men do not like to admit that worship is dependent on belief in Christ. They protest, "why! God is still left, the Father and Maker of all." But it is best to be frank in this matter, and unless we take the word worship in a sort of Pickwickian sense, we shall find that there is very little worship outside of those who believe in Christ. A wide look at men as they are, and not as they profess themselves when driven into a corner, shows the profound truth of the saying, "He that honoreth not the Son honoreth not the Father which hath sent him." It is only a species of hypocrisy, caused probably by the odium which has so long attached to atheism, for a scientist to give himself out as a worshiper of God, when by God he means only law or force. That hypocrisy is however passing away, and when it is wholly gone, and those who see no person at the helm of the universe shall no longer proclaim that they worship the automatic wheel, we shall not lose anything by such frankness. When men fairly acknowledge that they are without worship they will feel more deeply the wretchedness of being without it.

It would not have been worth while to follow out this simple train of thought at such length, were it not for the great importance of a correct bias to the thousands who flock through the portals of our colleges into a life of gain or loss.

It has been known to happen at sea that two ships have been standing nearly along side of each other, when the sails of the one have caught a breeze which bore it away on a prosperous voyage, while the other remained still becalmed, perhaps only to be struck later by a hurricane. Such an occurrence finds a parallel in human life. Two boys, about equally promising, about equally well-meaning, are standing together. Belief fills the sails of the one with hope and courage and the spirit of worship. Unbelief leaves the other becalmed. Leave them to their tendencies till fifty years shall have brought them gray hairs. From the former you may expect a long account of blessings received and blessings conferred. For the second you must inquire with some anxiety. All this is plain and

open—on this side of the veil. It hardly seems as if a high-minded man, holding well in mind all the individual wrecks of character which he has seen, could stand before five hundred college students and look them in the face without being stirred by the wish that the gray headed men that they must become in fifty years, might look back on a life of belief rather than of unbelief.

ARTICLE IV.—THE ALLEGED INFALLIBILITY OF THE SCRIPTURES PRACTICALLY CONSIDERED.

I. MR. FROUDE, in a well known passage, states that the fundamental article of Protestantism is the infallibility of the Scriptures. On the contrary, the fundamental article of the Protestant Reformers was the individual believer's right of direct access by faith to God, through Christ as the sole mediator between God and man, dispensing with the mediatorship which Romanism had substituted in the persons of the Virgin, the saints and the priesthood. The doctrine of the infallibility of the Scriptures was deemed fundamental to this position, as a buttress to a wall that required strengthening; but the position itself was the fundamental thing, an appeal from the church to the Head of the church. Confronted as the Reformers were, by a church which claimed infallible authority for its pretensions, their claim of infallible authority for the Scripture whence they drew all their materials for attack and defense was vital to their exigency.

The exigency is so different to-day, that it is a fair question whether the claim which the Reformers found so serviceable has not become, whether well founded or not, an incumbrance rather than an advantage. The adequacy of the Scriptures as an authority fully sufficient for a pure conscience is not in question. But their infallibility, or complete freedom from mistake or defect, is another thing.

Looking now at the subject in a practical light, four things are quite apparent.

1. It being a fact, that modern criticism has opened a multitude of points in which the correctness of the Biblical statements is impugned, what is the position of the ordinary reader, who has no time, and often no capacity, to weigh arguments and conclude whether the Biblical writers or their critics are right? Evidently, he has to leave all these open questions to scholars, and to rest satisfied with *Christ*, in hearing God speak to conscience through the words and deeds of the perfect Son

of man. If he is told that the Gospels themselves can be proved to be mere "unapostolic digests of tradition," he has to fall back on what is independent of all questions about the record,—the testimony of his *conscience*, which assures him that God's grace and truth are there, however they came there,—and the testimony of pious common sense, which declares that the life of the Christ is no fiction but fact, and that "the Life is the Light of men."

In a practical view, there can be no advantage in diverting the mind from this central point of stability to insist upon the importance of demonstrating the undemonstrable freedom of the record from all error. It is like closing the blinds at noon to read by a candle. It has the disadvantage of interposing a book, served by a hierarchy of scholars and critics, between the conscience and Christ, just as Romanism interposed a church with a hierarchy of doctors and confessors. It tends to make a man imagine that he must wait till he has settled matters with the critics, instead of coming directly to the Divine Light which conscience recognizes in the person of Christ.

2. Besides this, there is another practical disadvantage in treating the infallibility of the Scriptures as the *sine qua non*,—the key-stone of the arch of faith.

It is a principle of rhetoric, as the science of persuasion, not to encumber an important argument with points that are difficult, if they can be avoided. Otherwise time is wasted, attention distracted, opposition excited, at the expense of the vital point.

Now what is involved in an attempt to demonstrate the infallibility of the Scriptures? Nothing less than the settling of a thousand open questions concerning the sixty-six books, questions of authenticity and genuineness first, requiring the sifting of a great mass of literature, then particulars of chronology and history, physical science, internal consistency and harmony, questions about the ethics of the writers, the validity of their logic, and so on. The fact is, that all these open questions are proposed to every thinker, and the utmost ingenuity, time and patience have not sufficed, thus far, to bring good men to agree in their conclusions.

With these open questions and irreconcilable opinions as an

inevitable condition under which the Gospel of Christ has to make its way in the world to-day, which is the wisest way, practically, to prosecute the grand argument for faith in God, belief in an immortal life, and its judgments according to the works of this life, faith in Christ as the world's Redeemer, who is "the Resurrection and the Life," coöperation with the society which Christ organized to carry on his redeeming work, and called it his church? Is it not to pass by the doctrine of an infallible book, and the thousand open and undemonstrable questions it involves, as not vital to the argument? If not, why then we might as well repeat "the Athanasian creed" with all its anathemas upon those who miss the orthodox solution of the mystery of the Trinity. If a true solution of the infallibility question, complicated as it has become, is vital to the grand argument of the Gospel that must be preached to day, then indeed, more than ever before, "strait is the gate and narrow the way" of life, and fewer than ever they that find it, except as they borrow the correct opinion that some "master of sentences" may offer them.

Besides this, is not some account to be made of the antagonism to the vital point that is often excited by identifying with it, in a position of apparent unreason, some side question that is made overmuch of?

No wise reasoner will undertake to carry the burden of proving what is termed in logic "a universal proposition" (as for instance, that all of Scripture is free from error), which requires the proving that no one of countless alleged exceptions is an exception, unless the exigency of his argument is content with nothing less.

But the grand argument of the Gospel is content with much less than the universal proposition of the infallibility doctrine. It proceeds triumphantly on the testimony of conscience itself to human need and duty. It adjourns all the impersonal methods of book-criticism, and follows a method strictly personal, confronting the conscience with the Royal Personality, who is himself God's great argument with man, and asking simply, "What think ye of Christ?"

3. Still another practical aspect of the matter is developed by asking: If the Scriptures are strictly infallible, in the sense of

perfect freedom from error, of what greater advantage has that been, in actual experience, than if they were simply authoritative but not infallible? If no more than this, would they not have secured as good a result as that which they have secured? Being by supposition free from error, they have not secured from error. Errorists, as well as the orthodox, resort to them as an arsenal. Romanist and Protestant, Churchman and Dissenter, mystics and literalists, all derive their contrarieties from the same infallible Scriptures. If, *as infallible*, these are to prove *more valuable* than writings of adequate authority not infallible, nothing less than an infallible mind is requisite to declare their meaning. But here we come to the Romanist idea, that the true sense of Scripture can be delivered only by an infallible church. The Romanist is right, if a book deemed infallible is to impart any practical advantage by its infallibility *in addition to* the moral authority conceded to it. The Reformers' doctrine about the book, it is true, was a match for the Romanists' doctrine about the church. But the one was no more true than the other. In fact, the doctrine of an infallible book is cut out of the same cloth as the doctrine of an infallible church or pope. It belongs to the way of thinking which prefers the operation of an external mechanism to the operation of the free and responsible conscience. In Christ's dispensation of the Spirit it is a sheer anachronism.

Now, whatever infallibility be imputed to the Scriptures, they can, it is plain, *exercise* no more authority than the free conscience is disposed to admit. From this, it necessarily follows, that an authority which the conscience admits as adequate to its needs,—though not deemed free in every particular from possible or actual human defects,—is on a par, in point of practical influence, with the adequate authority which it is sought to strengthen by imputing to it complete infallibility.

4. Historically viewing the matter, it is beyond question by any one acquainted with the record of the conflict through which science has advanced, from the days of Galileo and Kopernik until now, that the claim of infallibility for the Scriptures, *the claim*, I say, not the Scriptures themselves, has been a constant impediment to the progress of truth. It cannot be otherwise, so long as any man claims to understand correctly

what the Scriptures pronounce, as he deems, infallibly. And so the elementary truths of science have been constantly contradicted in the name and by the assumed authority of God. The Bible has been constantly used to block the wheels of advancing discovery and thought. Because it is written in the Psalms, "the world also is established that it cannot be moved," Kopernik and the disciples of the new astronomy were branded as infidels for disputing the infallible utterance of the Creator. So, more recently, how did it fare with those geologists who discovered and taught that the world was not made in six common days?

It seems necessary, therefore, to ask those who contend for the infallibility of the Scriptures—meaning thereby that they are free from all defect or error,—what is the *practical* advantage of insisting upon that claim? It is a claim beyond the power of most persons, in the present state of the question, to settle by their own study, however they may borrow the opinions of others. It opens a thousand ways of escape, if one is so disposed, from the direct personal aim of the Gospel argument for Christ. It cumburs that argument with a thousand irrelevant side-questions. It requires an infallible interpreter as the correlative of an infallible book. And, after all, it has to leave the question of *actual* authority just where the denial of infallibility leaves it,—with conscience alone. In addition to all this, even if the assumption were allowed to stand unchallenged, that the original copy of each one of the sixty-six sacred books came from the pen of its reputed author in perfect freedom from all defect or error, the infallibility theory can transfer it to our hands in that original perfectness only by another assumption, which taxes belief more than any recorded miracle, namely, the constant operation of Divine influence to keep it free from material change through the incessant copying and translating of thousands of years. That there has been no such continuous influence, the pages of the Revised New Testament show ample proof.

II. In answer to this question of the practical advantage, it is said: "How do we know that the Scriptures are true at all, if we find them not true in any particular?" This fails to notice that it is to the *conscience* that the Scriptures speak.

Have we not known unlettered preachers, who mangled grammar, and misapprehended matters of science, but were none the less effective in appeals to conscience? If we find a scientific or historical work defective in any point pertaining to *its own sphere*, we distrust it in other points. So if we find an ethical work, dealing with matters of conscience, defective in any point of its chosen field, we distrust it in other points. But we do not distrust a book in the range of its own subject, because of its small inaccuracies in reference to other subjects. The inaccuracies of the Bible have been greatly exaggerated. Many noted instances there are, in which research has vindicated it at the expense of its hasty critics. But admitting what are proven or probable mistakes, they do not lie in the field of conscience, the Bible's special sphere. Here the Bible, like every other specialist, is not weakened by criticism on points outside of its field. Even the ethical defects of the Old Testament, freely as we may acknowledge them, do not detract at all from the authority of the Bible, since it is by its authority that they stand exposed and corrected, without the intervention of any other critic, in the perfect utterances of the divine Master of truth.

Still it is said, "We cannot believe that God has made any blunders." No, indeed. But this objection speaks from the point of view which regards the Bible as written from dictation by the voice of God. The variations in its parallel accounts of the same events are sufficient to dispel that notion. God makes no blunders, but God's servants do. If men blunder, though God made them, why may not a book blunder, though God made it, if he made it by men? God made the eye. But the oculist finds comparatively less perfect eyes than imperfect. Yet the eye is, on the whole, well adapted as a means to an end. Now as to the blundering, which it is said we must ascribe to the Bible if we do not ascribe it to infallibility, it is wholly a question of the sufficient or insufficient *adaptation of means to ends*. When it shall be shown that the Bible, as a means to an end, is insufficiently adapted to develop man's moral nature, to educate the conscience and affections, to sanctify individual life and social life, to reveal God correspondingly to the deepest wants of man, and to develop in man that "image of God," which by

creation he was destined to become, then it will be time to say that the Bible, as God's book, has blundered.

But once more, it is urged: We need something more than an authority to which human defect and error cling. Amid the illusions of the world, and confronting the silent mystery of the grave, we need a word to rest on, to which no doubt can cleave, an absolute certitude. At least as to the essentials of duty and destiny we must plant our feet on the *terra firma* of an infallible authority.

This is unquestionable, if by "authority" we mean the certainty given by recognized truth. In reason, the idea of *absolute authority* is that of *perfect truth*.

III. Now that this authoritative truth is within our reach, no one, who is convinced that we have any revelation from God, can doubt. The only question is how it may be reached, and where found.

It must be reached by *conscience*, the moral reason, demanding moral truth as its natural element. Moral truth is to a benumbed conscience what light is to a shut eye.

It is found in *Jesus Christ*. Not solely in him, but without shadow and without defect in him. Of him even Renan says: "God is in him, * * * He lives in the bosom of God, by the intercommunion of every moment." In him is found "the way, the truth, the life," truth that has been lived, not dictated, a divine word not made with ink, but uttered in living character to the living world. Patriarchs, prophets and apostles, all uttering truth in proportion to their spiritual nearness to him, lead us up to One in whom "is light, and no darkness at all," in whom we find a revelation of God that is intensely *personal*. That his truth is God's truth, his righteousness God's righteousness, his disposition to sinners God's disposition, his commandments God's, and his promises God's, is discovered to conscience with a certainty as indubitable as the reality of material things seen in sunlight. And here, whoever would live in uprightness and die in hope, finds the infallible authority in which he may rest from doubt.

In this, and so far as this, the phrase current in our church confessions, that "the Holy Scriptures are the only infallible rule of faith and practice," receives its vindication. Because

the "faith" is the faith of conscience; the "practice" is the practice enjoined by conscience; because the supreme aim of Holy Scripture is to bring the conscience to Christ, as the Supreme Revealer of that which "the Scriptures principally teach," namely, "what man is to believe concerning God, and what duty God requires of man," and because in Christ the conscience finds what it demands, an absolute certitude for faith in God, and duty to God and man.

In Christ we find our most convincing evidence that the Bible is inspired, though not infallible. Not infallible, because he himself has pointed out utterances of his forerunners to be set aside. Not infallible, because his Spirit unmistakably, though silently, corrects the sacred pages here and there, as uttering the voice not of heaven but of earth. And yet, contemplating him, we see that

"A glory gilds the sacred page,
Majestic like the sun."

His divine life is the light which pervades the volume with a glory all his own. All that in the Bible precedes or follows the manifestation of the Son of God is either introduction or commentary to his personal manifestation of the Father. To him, for two thousand years, "the hope of Israel" points with growing brightness. To him "the witnesses of the resurrection" point in testimony of what their "hands have handled of the word of life." And so it is plain that the Scriptures, unified, corrected, and delivered to us through him, and because of him, derive from *their relation to him* a peculiar quality belonging to no other book in the world. They nowhere claim to be the Word of God, but they evidently contain that Word; they reveal "the Word made flesh." They nowhere claim to be infallible; but no cultivated, no unperverted conscience can fail to confess them *inspired*, as no cultivated ear can fail to recognize in Mozart's "Requiem" the genius of a master.

The Temple is holy because of the Presence which inhabits it. The Book is inspired because of the Life that pervades it, whose Spirit of Truth we may recognize in varying measure through all its ranges, and to whom from all other teachers we may turn and say: "Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life."

That the Bible, as it stands, is not infallible, is patent to every one who is capable of so much as honestly and carefully comparing the Books of the Kings with the Books of the Chronicles.

That the Bible, as it stands, is divinely inspired, and a vehicle of that full moral authority which satisfies the demand of conscience for moral certainties, is patent to every one who is capable of reverence for Christ, and willing to hear him.

We discard, therefore, the dogma of an infallible book, by which the Protestant Reformers made head against the dogma of an infallible church. There is infallibility reached through the book, but it is not the book that is infallible.

Says Professor Stearns, in his masterly inaugural at Bangor, last June:

"It is the desire for an infallible authority in matters of faith and practice, which has given to the doctrine of inspiration its chief hold upon the Christian thought of the past. We need such an authority; but more and more we are coming to see that the infallible authority to which the believer must bow, is not the church, as the Romanist says; it is not human reason, as the rationalist says; it is not the Scripture, as the Reformation theology said. It is God speaking in Christ to the soul, speaking to conscience, and through conscience, speaking in tones which all that are willing to hear his voice can recognize. The Scriptures contain this divine authority, but they are not it. The Scriptures are the setting, but they are not the jewel."

We regard the Reformers' dogma about the book as no better grounded in fact than the Romanists' dogma about the church. It seems to us constructed like that, only by the aid of assumptions, and inferences from assumptions. We regard the dogma about the book as having become, in our day, what the dogma about the church had become in the Reformers' day, an incumbrance to the cause of truth, and an impediment to many in the way of direct access to the Saviour of the world.

But in the spirit of the Reformers' fundamental principle, the privilege and duty of *direct personal approach to Christ*, all

other mediators, whether priestly confessors or scholarly professors, being put aside, we rely upon the inspired book, penetrated as it is with a divine light, simply as a glass. What more can we desire or need than through this to "behold the glory of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth?" What more than through this to enter into fellowship with him, walking in the light that shines from him?

"Great God, mine eyes with pleasure look
On the dear volume of thy book ;
There my Redeemer's face I see,
And read his name who died for me."

ARTICLE V.—FIT TRUTHS FOR FIT TIMES.

How shall religious truth be presented at the present time? How adjusted to secure religious awakening? These are questions of interest to religious thinkers; and the following paper is a contribution towards an answer. Originally presented in a spoken form, its direct method may be kindly borne with by discerning readers.

It may be well, at the outset, to remind ourselves that, as enlightened Christians, we are faced by two indisputable facts,—the unchangeable truth of God, and a changeable world in which to administer it. Hence this inquiry. The principles of the gospel are the same; but neither the minds of the people, nor the ages of the world, are equally open to them. What may awaken in one era, may deaden in another. A fire from heaven would excite more scientific than theological interest now-a-days; while an essay on "Agnosticism" might have been referred by Paul, to Dionysius the Areopagite, as a thing the refutation of which, was not in his mission.

In the light of this consideration let us begin. There is, at present, a certain awakening to religious inquiry, but it is mainly among the cultivated, and for intellectual ends. There is, along with it, an indifference to spiritual religion; to the rebinding of the soul to God, and the life to righteousness. Out of this indifference the Church has to awaken the world. How? By the truth. But, how applied? What aspects of the truth shall be presented? What is likely to quicken the dead in soul?

The first thought that comes to every sincere religious teacher is of himself, as an instrument of awakening truth. He thinks of the searching texts upon "Brutish pastors, who do not seek the Lord, and hence have scattered flocks; upon like priest, like people; upon forgetting the Lord who, on that account, forgets our children; upon the possibility of preaching to others, and being oneself rejected." He recalls the winning texts that speak of conversions following the spiritual renewal

of the teacher; of love to Christ shown by the feeding of his flock; of the joy that thrills the preacher of righteousness.

The fact is, an advance in character is an acknowledged power in the redemption of the world. See what a start the gospel took after the Reformers were quickened. Methodism arose out of the felt need of more spirituality in the English clergy; and personally, Hall's, Chalmers', Dr. West's of Stockbridge experience only corroborate thousands of cases, from the quickening of the apostles to the latest conversions of formalists among ourselves.

The moving of the people after such changes is as easily accounted for, as the spread of a fire after the kindling of it. A minister's life sways his people's. A thinker for others may therefore begin what may upheave the community when he goes into self-examination, and comes out of it with deepening convictions of duty. Vain it is for one consciously far from God, to get others near to Him by officially saying, "Go," instead of "Come." "Though a minister," says a minister himself, "were an apostle, and did not pray, his speech and his preaching would not be with demonstration of the spirit and with power. Though he had the gift of prophecy, and understood all mysteries and all knowledge, and though he had faith that could remove mountains, and did not pray, he would be nothing. Though he gave all his goods to feed the poor, and his body to be burned, and did not keep near to God, it would profit him nothing. Though he spake with the tongues of men and of angels, he would be but as sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal. He might be like unto one that hath a pleasant voice and a lovely song, and plays well upon an instrument; but the music of the lip will not charm away the evil spirit from Saul; nor can it have that divine and life-giving harmony which of stones can raise up children unto Abraham.*

A very short walk along this line of thought discovers to the devout pastor, that to quicken his people with his own quickened mind, he must ply them with incisive truth. All truth is not alike, nor written for like ends. And one benefit of a pastoral awakening is the sharpening of the eye upon the Bible for its best utterances. The mind, illuminated from above,

* Thomas Binney.

goes not gropingly through the Bible, taking any kind of a text for any kind of a sermon.

The crying sins of preaching from historical statements as if they were doctrines of religion ; of insisting that what was local and Jewish shall be universal and Christian ; of assuming that poetic and excited effusions shall be enforced as verified facts, would cease. The new wine of the freshened word, would find itself in the new wine-skin of the new experience, and both would be kept for future use.

Let this allusion to the new wine, and the new wine skins, recall our Lord's authority, for the principle of "fit truth for fit times." Unless he is widely misunderstood, he has instructed us, that his gospel is not for the mending of what is past mending, by having served its end. It is rather to be poured, in the everlasting freshness of its spirit, into every changing civilization.

Under this principle, we are instructed to enforce, what the times enable us to enforce with most effect. To Jews, to become as Jews, to Gentiles as Gentiles, to be weak even, to the weak ; that is, not to profess much, among those who do not know much,—“if, by all means, we may save some.”

An important subject of modern preaching, is the nature and extent of spiritual influence. There can be no awakening to a better life, without divine influence. But, we may hinder our desired end, if we have unnatural, unreasonable, or unscriptural notions of this influence. If we teach, that there is no Holy Spirit at work, in vast tracts of human life, it will be hard to impress those in such deserted districts, with any quickening sense of His presence, or any dependence upon His power.

Moreover, if we have a theory of the Spirit's influence, that does not recognize it outside of strained feeling, and the agitation of crowds, we shall greatly dishonor Him, as the Omnipresent God, who cannot be passive where His presence is.

The Scriptures tell us of His general diffusion, as fully as of His special manifestations. He is “poured out on all flesh ;” He is “convincing the world” of sin ; of the attainability of righteousness ; of a judgment to come. And, evidence of this, is as plain as the declaration of it ; for, who does not already know more truth than he practises. He is, thereby, convinced of sin, and is a resister of the Spirit. We insist, as thoroughly

as any one can insist, that the Spirit's power is increased in answer to prayer; we believe in special descents; in baptisms of the Spirit; in periodical "revivals;" but, we judge that a great deal of religious deadness remains undisturbed, because the Holy One is virtually limited to occasional manifestations, and not presented as everywhere drawing men to the Father, by way of the Son.

We err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God, if some thoughtful preaching upon the nearness of God to men; upon the fact that He has already convinced men of more sin than they have repented of; and, that for this, there is a judgment to come, would not promote religious awakening.

Again, we seem to have come to a turn in history, where descriptions of the Christian life, must give away to exhibitions of it. There was reason, some generations ago, for details of doctrine, and for recitals of mental disturbances under the truth. At the Reformation, our ancestors were busy challenging authorities they had found to be formal and false. Becoming re-formed they gave to their new faith the power of the old church: "Installing the conscience, instead of the priest, conscience soon assumed much of the priestly character, becoming inquisitorial, casuistical, vigilant, and stern, sending a man to his self examination, as before he went to the confessional. Hence arose great scrupulosity of mind, a loss of all dependence on human aids, a feeling of terrible necessity for the help and strength of God. Thus the gay laxity of the Catholic passed into a grim and solemn earnestness."*

This is not the cast of our present life. We have not their self-scrutiny. We are partially delivered from their introspections, their morbid apprehensions, their inner conflicts. We have passed into clearer light. We distinguish between Emotion and Will. Human affections warm us more: human duties are nobler in our view: social interests are of deeper moment: we count our present life a real part of our existence, holding that our conduct presages our eternity. That our religious life is modified from the life formerly led, all thoughtful minds allow. Were Howe, and Owen, and Baxter, with us now, the spiritual instruction they gave, in their own day, they

* James Martineau.

would not give to us. Were Whitfield, and Edwards, conducting revivals now, they would change their own new measures, to newer measures still. Even their thinking would be changed. Edwards's grim ridicule would not fall on the abettors of a self-determining theory of the Will; but upon those who deny Will altogether; or, at least, deny the spirituality of its function. He would insist that the deniers of mind shall give us the contents of that atom, spark, flame, scintillation, which gives us the idea of the infinite, and brings on trembling in view of judgment. "Why fear a molecule, or a twitch of the nerves," we hear him say, "if an atom or a jerk is all that troubles us for the deeds done in the body." Clear it is, that what was of momentous interest generations ago, while of historical value still, is for all practical purposes, of little service to us. According to our Lord's illustration, we may as well try to keep our new wine of California, in the old wineskins of Alexandria.

Should any one think that this casts disrespect upon our ancestors, and their work, let me say, it no more does so, than our Lord's illustration casts disrespect upon Moses, and the prophets. They were good for their day; but the fact that they are dead, and gone, shows, that their day is not ours. Edwards we revere, and had we his life here, to exhibit religion, as successfully as his books describe it, one want of our times would be met.

This call for an exhibition of life has a corresponding call for doctrinal instruction to be presented more fully from its ethical and practical sides. If we have laws from heaven, they are for life on earth. From the need of doctrinal instruction in reforming days, we begin to see that the dutiful side of the gospel has been somewhat undervalued by Protestant Christians. It is instructive to observe how Providence and Grace join in insisting upon the practical along with the doctrinal. One-third of the Epistle to the Romans is detailed duty. After the argument comes the call to action. See the "Complete Duty of Man" by Henry Venn, to keep the English mind straight on practical religion, after the revivalists had laid, broad and sure, the gospel's foundation. And after the Edwardean revivals in New England, there came the Unitarian

protest, against excess of doctrine,—a thing which might have been less serious than it proved, had the churches been interested in the practical side of religion, as fully as they had been in the doctrinal. Indeed, we have heard complaints against our churches for paying too much attention to the Jews, and too little to the men and women who were attending them for help to lead a godly life.

Again, since intelligence has widened, the preaching of the day, should fall in with its present helps to righteousness. People cannot be expected to take whatever they are told, merely because certain men choose to tell it. The world is a long way past what once satisfied it. Titian and Raphael's apostleship has put the world past tattooing as the best of its fine arts. The painters have opened in all men finer eyes for the beautiful. Newton, Faraday, and Darwin have given us new conceptions of the world. And we shall be too proud of our age if we conclude that the end of enlightenment has come. Whether the grandchildren of the men of the new learning shall outdo their grandsires or not, one thing is clear, we are in a broadening era. The apparatus that once worked the world is antiquated. Paris and Richmond were not attacked with battering rams.

Alexander and Charlemagne could not conquer now, without the rifle and the iron-clad. The Revised Version of 1611 may yet be as thoroughly revised as it has been in 1881. Things are as God is willing them; and the question is, shall we live, as if Providence had brought us no help. In our judgment, science has poured uncounted wealth at the feet of religion; and men can be quickened, and not deadened, by its legitimate use. Here is a disputer of the divine displeasure against sin, in visiting it upon the sinner's children, to the third and fourth generation. It is said to be unnatural, and impossible. But Science presents its tablets on heredity, and, with them, a microscope; and, upon a dissecting table, in the membranes of a new born infant's body, can be seen, the "drunkard's tinge;"—confirming the fact, that the drunkard drinks not for himself alone; but also for those who follow him. That old man, once a rake, with tainted blood, has "an awakening" on religious truth, over the visiting sin, in the

blotches on his grandchild's cheeks. In the hearing of children's cries, found to be but the reverberations of pains that once racked their parents, there is little said against the Adamic connection, and its unity of mankind, in a fall from righteousness. But, if spoken against, it is not the Bible only that must be encountered. Science has demonstrated the fact, that, in disputing this doctrine, the constitution, and the course nature must be wrestled with. Further in this direction, Science deepens undisputed truths. Take the secondary consequences of sin, touching which, Science aids Scripture in assuring us, that the Christian remedy does not free the transgressor from certain punishments. Pardon, a moral bestowment, does not dispose of laws which hold creation up. Along with pardon, it is still true, that "whatsoever a man soweth, that also shall he reap." The forgiving God lays on the judicial rod. Consequences of sin may appear in a forgiven man's memory, standing, and destiny. Men are still rewarded, according to their works, some being saved as out of a fire, some having "an abundant entrance" into life.

Further, the new expositions suggest a measure of religious success, where hitherto, it has not extended. Never before has the depth, and delicacy, of a law's action, been so clear. Law is exceeding broad, working everywhere, under the Lawgiver, who Himself is everywhere. Seen or unseen it matters not; classified or unclassified its objects; counted or uncounted its results; there it is, working out its Sovereign's will, honored in the least effect as abundantly as in what astounds us. This suggests religious awakening, in all departments of life. We have tabulated certain phases of life, as religious; and have stopped there. Prayer, praise, attendance at church, interest in church work, missions, Sunday-schools, hospitals, and public reforms, comprise the popular tests of a religious life. So far, so well. But, are those the only proofs of love? Moreover, tests change with times and nations. Some Christians will not enter a concert-hall lest their imaginations be unduly pampered, by a concourse of sweet sounds; yet have no scruple in asking a blessing upon a feast, which ends in a revel. But, not only do religious duties change, and counter-change, new duties come in with new civilizations. In New

Testament times, there was no political self-government to give counsel upon. He can be no lover of God and man, who, now-a-days, does not religiously attend to his new citizenship. And in doing so, he will be religiously aided by remembering, that, whispering, backbiting, suggesting evil, ignorance, breaking bargains, implacability, unmercifulness, intemperance, the gospel is to correct. When, therefore, the gospel gets a man to be outspoken, ingenuous, enlightened, placable, merciful, temperate, and no boaster even of his own mending, we may see some religious life, where there is not a specifically religious experience. True, we are to exult in elect souls, with their inner glories, and their higher aspirations. But, counseled by the signs of the times, we shall do well to acknowledge the gospel's fainter throbbings, in the more distant regions of thought, and action. That is a significant incident, where one was healed, who "wist not who he was" that healed him. Miracles are not ours, but their spirit is; and we can ply the world with that, and like the Lord before us, see many made better, who cannot tell what made them whole.

But, while there are changes, by the coming of the new, and the vanishing of the old, there are certain "things which cannot be shaken," whose old vigor should be put to new uses. Take Divine Sovereignty, and the Purposes of Eternal Wisdom. We do not need these truths to level Rome, nor to oppose Arminianism; but we do need them for an outlook upon the world's destiny. To what are we coming? Are we predestinated to anything? If so, what? "I cannot tell," says one. "I have no concern in knowing, even if I had the power," says another. "It is absolutely unknowable what we are coming to," says another. In such a case, the revelation of a predestinating God is a balm to the heart, an inspiration to the life. Grand is the thought, made grander by our past, that by an eternal decree, our groaning world is on the way to "One, far-off, divine event, to which the whole creation moves."

See, too, how death and future doom are deepened when presented, not only in the figures of Scripture, but in the calm solemnity of facts. To what is one slowly approaching, by present confirmations of character,—where is that slow corruption, that inner hardening, that subtle distaste for God, and

things divine, to leave him. From a startling disgrace there may be hope of recovery; but of recovery from what one is becoming, by his own consent, who can hope; for, evils arising by degrees, seem without remedy. While the physical aspects of death and doom, are of less force than formerly, the inevitable realities of both must bestir the thoughtful. Neither time, nor change, can make them of none effect. Without compromise, or modification, that will ever be before us, what Bunyan said was before him, when under conviction: "Wilt thou leave thy sins and go to heaven, or cling to thy sins, and go to hell."

This view of the Christian system, to many minds, is not acceptable. It costs much, they think, to adapt everlasting principles to new subjects. "Better take it as a system settled for all times, and nations, and if they do not conform to it, let them die without it." But that is to treat it as dead in a living world. True, it does not cost much to keep a dead body: well embalmed and swathed, it may stand a thousand years at the cost of house-room. To keep a living body, is more costly; but then it is alive; and is a force where force avails. A mummy does not minister; it is ministered unto. If Christ is the Bread of Life, and the Light of the World, the world must be directed to him; and, in this work the world must be handled as it is.

Yet, after all we do, to rouse and direct, to explain, and enforce, moral ideas never being so stated, as to defy controversy, and the human will, from its nature, having an alternative, the living gospel, well adjusted, and soundly enforced, may be rejected. We shall not work intelligently unless we allow for this. We have heard of the piping, and no dancing; of the mourning, and no lamenting. And, while thinking, that to some minds, no possible setting of the truth is welcome, we have heard that other word, "Wisdom is justified of her children." And, thinking of Him who told us, we are content.

ARTICLE VI.—RECONSTRUCTION IN THEOLOGY.*

THE theology of an age stands in a vital relation to the Christian belief and thought of that age. The task of theology as a science is not simply to formulate and systematize the facts and truths of revelation in their objective, unchanging form. Rather it is concerned with those facts and truths as they lie in the common Christian consciousness, grasped by the common faith. That there may be doctrines, there must first be beliefs. That there may be a system to be taught, a system must previously exist in the living thought of the church. Each period must draw the material of its theology out of its own profound convictions, mold it by its own intellect, and utter it in its own words. As Dorner has said, "No age can perform this service for another. Each must accomplish the task for itself, however valuable may be the aid of the past, and however assured the continuity of past and present. Each age must again acquire the certainty of truth as truth, if it would have truth; and it must do it in accordance with its own sense of truth."

Our lot has been cast in an age in which this process has been attended with peculiar difficulty. The continuity of past and present has been broken. The old beliefs have been disturbed. Under the influence of attacks from without and impelled by a spirit of inquiry within, the church has been led to reëxamine the contents of its faith. On every side there has been questioning, pulling to pieces, putting to the test. The fundamentals of Christianity, and even the fundamentals of religion itself, have been on trial. With infinite difficulty, in toil and storm, amid fightings without and fears within, we have been winning back our certainty of truth as truth. No age has ever fought the fight of faith more valiantly.

Meantime doctrinal theology has fallen into a measure of neglect. It could not well be otherwise. The thoughts, the energies, the fears, the hopes of the church have been concentrated on other things. The beliefs which furnish theology

* Inaugural Address delivered June 1st, 1881, by LEWIS F. STEARNS, Professor of Systematic Theology in Bangor Theological Seminary.

with its materials, out of which it constructs its orderly system, have been in confusion, undergoing a process of revision and readjustment, the worn-out and useless not yet wholly separated from the permanently valuable, much of the old passing away, the new only slowly and dimly appearing. We need but compare the past quarter of a century with that which preceded it, in order to say that this has not been a theological era.

Yet we should make a great mistake were we to infer from this that theology has permanently lost its power. From its very nature as a science and its relation to Christian truth, this is an impossibility. As long as Christianity exists, its beliefs, in so far as they become settled beliefs, must find precise and systematic expression. Theology may change its form and method from time to time; it may fall into temporary abeyance; but until Christianity ceases it will not cease. By a permanent, ever-recurring need of the church, the time must come sooner or later—and all the signs of the times point to it as speedily to come—when theology will regain its old place in the interest of the Christian world.

In truth, such a period as that through which we have been passing is only seemingly antagonistic to theology. Rather, it opens the way for a career of new vigor and success, under more favoring auspices. But for such periods in the past, when the theological field has long lain fallow, we should never have had the progressive periods in which the sacred science has proved so fruitful and exerted such a beneficent influence upon religion. Quietly, without observation, in this period of conflict, the old truths have been adjusting themselves to new conditions, taking on new shapes, preparing themselves for new tasks. The work has been going on in the hearts of Christian believers and thinkers, under the guidance of the great Head of the church. Indeed, there is a sense in which we may say that, hidden from sight, a new theology has been growing up, taking form and consistency in the common consciousness of the living, believing body of Christ. So that the task of the theologian seems to be, not to make a new theology, not to attempt to revivify one that has fallen dead and obsolete, but to discover and uncover the present, to return to the church in science what it possesses already in faith.

However this may be, it seems to me that, as the dust of this period of conflict and confusion clears away, we begin to see more and more distinctly the outlines of those things which cannot be shaken and must remain, and to discern the changes which have taken place, while certain tendencies plainly manifest themselves in the religious thought of the time, which enable us, in some degree at least, to determine the lines in which the theology of the near future is likely to move.

I ask you now to look with me *at some of these changes and tendencies in their bearing upon the restatement and reconstruction of the system of theological truth* which we all feel will be called for at no distant day by the revival of a theological interest and activity in the church.

First of all, let me speak of the tendency of Christian thought respecting the great problems of natural theology.

The struggles of the last quarter of a century have raged most hotly around the citadel of religion, the belief in the existence of a personal God. That in all that period there has been a moment when this fundamental belief has been really imperiled, we should not admit. But there have been times when the old arguments seemed to utterly lose their power, and the hearts of the weak failed them for fear, while the opponents of religion looked on with unconcealed triumph. Butler, Paley, Chalmers, and the other great natural theologians of the last and the first half of the present century found the strongest support for their teachings in the facts of nature, as interpreted by physical science. The necessity of a First Cause to account for the beginning of matter, the origin of life, and the genesis of man, was pressed by these Christian thinkers with indisputable force of reasoning; the permanence of species appeared to require, in order to explain their existence, a series of special creations. The manifest tokens of design and adaptation in nature were exhibited with great fullness and clearness of explanation, and urged in proof of the fact, that the First Cause is an intelligent, wise, and benevolent being. Buttressed by the ontological and moral arguments, the proof seemed complete, and for the age it *was* practically complete. Atheism was the exception even among scientific men, and infidelity moved almost entirely on theistic ground.

It was not strange that when a new philosophy made its appearance, admitting a Power behind phenomena but relegating it altogether to the region of the unknowable, only to prepare the way for a new theory of science which it was claimed was quite sufficient to explain by natural law the beginnings and the transitions in the development of organized, as well as unorganized existence, and to render the assumption of design superfluous, while it accounted in similar and satisfactory ways for all that had been thought transcendental in the human mind—it is not strange that at first there was dismay and confusion, and it seemed as if the old foundations were crumbling into ruins. I need not rehearse the story of the last twenty years. We know it well enough. It is the old story over again, which has repeated itself often, though perhaps seldom on so large a scale, and with such fruitfulness of result, in human history. Whenever any great advance is made in the physical sciences, the impression goes abroad that the grounds of being are about to receive a physical explanation. There is a tremendous dust thrown up in the scientific camp. But by and by it clears away, and there is progress indeed, but the old problems stand there untouched, and the babel tower of matter is just as far away as ever from the blue firmament of spirit above, and over all still shines, unquenched and glorious, the Sun of the divine existence. We have learned the lesson over again which every age of Christian thought must learn for itself, that there is no possible danger to religion from any discoveries a genuine science can make. It is good for us that we have learned it. We have come to see that the philosophy of nescience with its corollary of practical materialism is no part of true science. We have learned, also, that there is nothing in the hypothesis of evolution, apart from that philosophy, which is at war with Christian theism, but rather that it may, like all science, render the richest service to religion when we discover how to apply its results. The broadest, boldest, most successful generalization since the days of Newton, there is no question that it is to be the working hypothesis of science for years to come, taking its place by the side of the law of gravitation. That it is the final expression of truth its wisest advocates do not claim. It has failed as yet, and probably will

always fail to explain the origin of things, and to bridge over the great gaps in the successions of being. Doubtless in the progress of science it will have to be revised. But it does not touch the great truths of natural theology nor can it touch them, except as it gives us new materials with which to prove them. Since theologians have been coming to the conclusion that this is the case, the tide that seemed to set so strongly against belief has turned. The change of attitude towards this subject marks the beginning of the new era of religious thought upon which we have entered.

The argument from design will have indeed to be restated. But the prospect is that it will be stated in a far stronger form than before. The old teleology had its weak side. There was more than a grain of truth in Herbert Spencer's now much-worn sarcasm about the "carpenter's theory of the universe." We cheerfully admit it. In the natural theology of the future, something of the mechanical will be sacrificed, but we shall gain in its place a profounder idea of infinite Will and Intelligence working by the slow, uniform, certain processes of natural law to accomplish far-off results. And when the work of restatement is accomplished, there is reason to believe that many who have been led astray in this age of doubt will be brought back to a belief in God. True science must always in the end have that result. The noble words of Bacon are as true in our day under the reign of evolution as when they were first uttered, that, "while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them and go no further; but when it beholdeth a chain of them confederate and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity."

It has been well, however, that in the doubt which has been temporarily cast upon the external arguments for the being of God, we have been compelled to fall back upon the internal proof from our moral intuitions. In times past we have been too prone to ignore them, forgetting that that which is "the likeliest God within the soul," must ever be to the majority of mankind the strongest, irrefutable proof of him. We have returned to this class of arguments with a new sense of their power. We see, as never before, that this idea of an absolute Right ruling us and everything, from which we cannot free

ourselves, which every man feels, which compels even those who deny a personal God to assume some "Eternal not ourselves that makes for Righteousness," which finds expression in the lowest forms of nature worship as in the most cultured religion—is a proof of God which is able to stand in its own strength and bear any weight that may be put upon it. It is not merely *one* of the pillars upon which the evidence of God's existence rests, an argument among arguments, but it is the argument *of* arguments, the broad, solid foundation upon which the pillars themselves rest which support the edifice of belief in a personal God.

There has resulted from the assiduous study of nature in which our age is engaged a grander conception of God, a profounder sense of his power, a broader view of his activity in the universe, which cannot fail to have its influence upon every new statement of truth in this department of theology. The old theology laid its chief emphasis upon the *transcendence* of God. It viewed him principally as a moral Governor, making his relation to nature and to man outside the sphere of religion, too external and mechanical. Its intent was right and laudable. The strength of theism, as opposed to pantheism on the one hand, and materialism on the other, is in the maintenance of this conception of God's personal relation to our souls as a free Being to free beings. But there is another class of truths which are not inconsistent with, but simply complementary to, this and which deserves a place in any complete account of the revealed God. God is imminent in nature, as well as raised above nature. Though we have been learning the truth anew from science, it is only what the Hebrew poets taught long ago. As Charles Kingsley admirably expressed it, "The unknown x which lies below all phenomena, which is forever at work on all phenomena, on the whole and every part of the whole, down to the coloring of every leaf, and the curdling of every cell of protoplasm, is none other than that which the old Hebrews called—by a metaphor, no doubt; for how can men speak of the unseen, save in metaphors drawn from the unseen?—but by the only metaphor adequate to express the perpetual and omnipresent miracle, the Breath of God: the Spirit who is the Lord, and the Giver of Life."

But I pass to speak of another tendency, manifesting itself in the change which has taken place in the apologetic basis of theology. The evidences of Christianity employed by the theologians of the last century with so much success against the anti-Christian scepticism of their age,—which were until recently regarded, and in fact were, an impregnable bulwark against the assaults on revelation,—have fallen quietly into disuse, like the fortifications we used to build before the days of iron-clads and rifled guns. It is impossible to-day to rest the weight of Christianity on the external evidence of prophecy and miracles, or even on the external fact of the resurrection of Christ. Not that these facts are not as true as they ever were. They are. Not that they are not still worthy of a place in apologetical science. But in the order of our logic Christianity must prove them, not they Christianity. Our method, partly historical, partly moral, goes down far deeper. It seeks in the historic Christ the explanation of that new power which, no one can deny, came into the world through the medium of his wonderful personality. It finds in him the satisfaction of the religious needs of humanity, the culmination of all antecedent development in the Jewish and heathen worlds, the beginning of a new era in human history. It traces through the ages since his advent the ever-widening stream of religious life, of Christian morality, of Christian civilization. It shows Christianity to-day to be the great moral motive power. Most of all, it rests the weight of its argument upon the religious consciousness of the church concerning Christ, and the personal conviction of the individual believer, that inner certainty of Christ, born of experience, which is not an opinion but a knowledge, carrying with it its own self-evidencing proof,—the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*, of which the Reformers speak so much and which gave such buoyancy and serenity to their faith, but which fell so sadly into the back-ground in a later and less profoundly spiritual age.

This Christocentric tendency is not confined to apologetics. It is characteristic of the religious thought of the time generally, and will undoubtedly influence decidedly the coming theology, especially in its structure as a system. The preaching, the religious literature, the practical religion of the day, find

the productive source of Christianity, its vital centre, in the personality of Jesus Christ, the God-man, the Mediator between God and man. In spite of many temptations to yield to the humanitarian view of the Saviour's nature, the Christian church of our age has held loyally and with hearty sincerity to the belief in the divinity of Christ. More than half a century has passed since that younger sister of the Puritan family, clear-eyed and beautiful, to whom this doctrine had become a stumbling-block, went forth from the old household of faith, with bitter words on both sides which perhaps both sides afterwards wished unsaid. Her high enthusiasms, her earnest teachings of the supremacy of truth and duty, her achievements in literature, her unswerving advocacy of the cause of right and freedom, her unselfish philanthropy, have won for her the admiration of the world. Long ago we of the older household learned to appreciate what was good and noble in her and to love it. We have rejoiced in her triumphs as our own, we have shared her pride in her distinguished sons, we have gladly received the many useful lessons she has had to teach us, we have felt her modifying influence upon some of our beliefs, we have sorrowed with her in these late years when some of her children have wandered from her quite off the ground of Christian faith. But from the first we have felt, as we still feel, that there is a deficiency in her belief which must always prevent her from achieving the highest success as a Christian church. In this respect we have not desired—we do not desire to-day—to follow her. The great body of Christians in this country have never abandoned the belief that Jesus Christ is in the highest sense God. In the denominations which are the rightful heirs of the primitive churches of the land there is no difference of opinion upon this subject.

But while we hold thus firmly to Christ's divinity, our age has rejoiced to learn with new power the meaning of his humanity. The devotion with which the Gospel history has been studied, the great number and popularity of the lives of Christ which have appeared during the last three or four decades, show the direction of current thought. It is in the man Christ Jesus that this generation has been taught to discover the God who is manifest in the flesh. It is when we see

the marks of his human suffering, and feel in our inmost hearts his brotherhood with us, that we cry as Thomas did, "My Lord and my God!"

The system of Christian doctrine must find its center in Christ. The old reformed theology, the theology of Calvin and of the Westminster and Savoy Confessions, the theology of our American Calvinistic churches, centred in the decrees of God. It was a high thought to begin thus back in the eternal purpose of the Almighty, and from that transcendent standpoint to develop the whole system of Christian truth. The result was a logical, powerful, most coherent whole. In all the modifications of Calvinism from Edwards to Emmons that centre was maintained. But it is so no longer. Long ago Christian thought, quietly and scarcely aware of the change it was undergoing—a revolution almost as great as that through which science passed in its transition from the Ptolemaic to the Copernican system—detached itself from the old centre and began to swing freely around the new. The former system, with all its elevation of the divine sovereignty, was narrow and mechanical. Its theodicy failed just where it was most needed. It placed the doctrine of election, which is true and scriptural as the practical corollary of the divine efficiency in regeneration and sanctification, at the forefront, and subordinated everything to it. In it the elect were everything, and everything was for the elect. But the new theology finds another centre. It is fitting that Christ, who is the historical centre of the Christian religion, as he is the vital centre of his church, should be the centre of the theological system. About him all the truths and doctrines must group themselves.

Another manifest tendency of the time is to a broader view of the nature and office of the Scriptures. If science and philosophy have been applied in their modern forms to the investigation of the fundamentals of religion, modern criticism has set itself, with all its wealth of resources, to test the primitive records of Christianity. With an untiring enthusiasm this work has been carried on since the opening years of the century, calling into play the profoundest linguistic scholarship, critical acumen, and historical knowledge, the tithe of which has never been bestowed upon any other department of litera-

ture. These labors—prosecuted with equal zeal by believing and sceptical scholars—have not been without result. They have laid utterly to rest the old charges of forgery and imposture in which the last age delighted. They have vindicated the historical reliability of the books which make up the canon. They have emphasized and brought out in its wonderful significance the divine revelation which those books contain, beginning as it does in the remotest period of Jewish history and increasing in fullness till the very Word of God came down to men in Jesus Christ. At the same time they have brought most clearly to view in the Scriptures a human element, which is by no means confined to human idiosyncrasies in thought and expression, but must be admitted to include human imperfection and human error. They have led to a more accurate discrimination between the different parts of the Bible in respect to their religious value.

The old method which took the Bible as a whole, according equal value to all its parts, and which by its indiscriminate and all-comprehending doctrine of plenary inspiration gave to the whole an infallible authority, vastly simplified the task of the dogmatic theologian. Gathering his proof-texts where he would, from Moses to Revelation, he did not concern himself especially with the character of the book from which they came, and often not, with any particularity, the context in which they occurred. That was possible in an unscholarly and uncritical age. But who shall say that it is possible to-day, or that it will ever be possible again in the future?

It is the desire for an infallible authority in matters of faith and practice which has given to the doctrine of inspiration its chief hold upon the Christian thought of the past. We need such an authority. But more and more we are coming to see that the infallible authority to which the believer must bow is not the Church, as the Romanist says; it is not human reason, as the rationalist says; it is not the Scripture, as the reformation theology said; it is God speaking in Christ to the soul, speaking to conscience and through conscience, speaking in tones which all that are willing to hear his voice can recognize. The Scriptures contain this divine authority; but they are not it. The Scriptures are the setting, but they are not the jewel.

We do not cast away inspiration. We believe in it more truly than ever. If there is that within us which is capable of recognizing the divine Spirit, it finds traces of that Spirit all through those sacred books, as in no other books the world possesses, and it feels and knows that their authors were moved and led by that Spirit as men have never been led before or since. But we look at the subject practically. We see evidences on every page that this influence was not an overpowering and mechanical one, but an influence that left them in full possession of their human freedom, and that was conditioned by the stage of religious and intellectual development at which they stood. We believe that it is not quite honest to begin with an *a priori* theory of verbal inspiration and then make the facts conform to it. First let Biblical criticism do its work, and then after that we may explain our theory in accordance with the facts.

Convinced as we are, by historical and moral proofs, that the teachings of Christ and his apostles are the truth of God, and that the New Testament gives us a substantially true record of those teachings, as well as of the facts connected with them, while the Old Testament gives us a substantially true record of the divine preparation for this new dispensation of grace and mercy; convinced as we are that God's providence, ever working in human history, wrought with especial and wonderful power in the Jewish nation to bring mankind the Christ, we can afford to leave many questions open till research and scholarship shall settle them, and to leave undetermined the precise boundary line between the human and the divine in that wonderful series of books which is permeated so manifestly, from beginning to end, with the presence of Divinity. The truth of our dogmatic system does not rest, still less does our Christian faith rest, on the decision this way or that of such questions as the authorship of the Pentateuch or the origin of the Levitical system. Those are questions for the scholars to settle, to whose departments they pertain. If a portion of the Old Testament, which we have been accustomed to assign to the earliest period of Hebrew literature, is of post-Exilian origin, we want to know it that we may readjust our historical and dogmatic teachings accordingly. If it is not so, we want

to know that too. But it is a question to be settled in the dry light of scholarship, not in the heated atmosphere of a trial for heresy. And let us beware that we do not rest upon the decision of such a matter, lively as may be our interest concerning it, the standing or falling of the faith.

In spite of the freedom with which the age construes the doctrine of inspiration, its spirit is eminently scriptural,—perhaps because of its free construction of that doctrine. The minute and patient scriptural study, of which there has been so much in our time, has taught us that the Bible is a mine of divine truth, ready to reward the earnest seeker. It is the field wherein lies the hidden treasure, all the more valuable because it is to be sought if it is to be found. An indiscriminate bibliolatry misses what is best in the book. An enlightened Christian consciousness finds it a living source of life and light. There is a growing tendency to seek the doctrines of the Christian system directly from the revelations which it contains, rather than indirectly from the speculations of the theologians. We can see now that one of the faults which brought the theology of the last age into disrepute and prepared the way for the general neglect of theology which our own times have witnessed, was its extra-scriptural—for I will not say unscriptural—character. Its favorite dogmas were metaphysical rather than biblical and practical. It relied far more on dialectics than on exegesis. It did good work in its time; but it failed when the time changed. Our age will have to be approached in another way and by a simpler method.

It is a matter of no small importance that this critical period culminates with the revision of our English version of the Scriptures. Among the many blessings for which we may look as the result of this great work—the first fruits of which are even now commending themselves so strongly to our acceptance in the lately published New Testament—will be an impulse to the renewed study of biblical and dogmatic theology and a popularizing of theology in both its forms. The masses have lost faith in theology partly because they have lost faith in, or rather become confused with respect to, the accuracy of our old version. When they come to see, as we may now hope they will do, how readily and clearly a simple system of theol-

ogy, adapted to the needs of the time, may be derived from the Scripture, they will return to its study with renewed avidity and demand its preaching as in days gone by.

We might expect that the eager and extensive researches made in the fields of biology, physiology, ethnology, sociology, and the kindred sciences, which have followed the introduction of that most fruitful scientific working theory, evolution, would exert some modifying influence upon the doctrines of anthropology. There is much in the tendencies of the present time to show that this will be, if indeed we may not say that it already has been, the case. Unquestionably the great facts of the old theology,—freedom, sin, personal responsibility, the soul's spirituality and immortality,—will remain untouched in spite of the tremendous efforts put forth in some quarters to make evolution a substitute for the fall and to materialize the soul. Christianity must always be spiritualistic rather than materialistic, and from the nature of the case if it accepts evolution at all it cannot accept it in such a form as to exclude the fact of human sin. But there is a side on which man is allied to the lower orders of nature, a side which needs to be taken into account if we are fully to understand his earthly and his higher relations.

It was the fault of the Reformation theology, as it was of Augustine's, that it confused the two great facts of human nature,—man's connection with his fellow-men, on the one hand, in the solidarity of the race, in virtue of which all mankind is one, and his individuality, on the other, by which he is differentiated from every other soul and stands in a relation to his Maker wholly unique. Not that the distinction was not recognized, but that it was not duly made at the critical points. All the old doctrines of original sin from Augustine to Edwards laid the stress on the corporate unity of man, finding in it the measure of responsibility and failing to properly distinguish it from his individuality. On the other hand, the New England theology of the present century, true to that characteristic which has shown itself so potent for good—though sometimes too, it must be confessed, for evil—in every department of our American life, reacted into an intense individualism which almost ignored the other factor. It was an individ-

ualism which manifested itself not merely in anthropology but in all the doctrines; but preëminently in that. It made each soul a unit over against the great Moral Governor of the universe,—for all the highest purposes God and it alone in the world. It made freedom and responsibility all-pervasive and all-sufficient, extending them over the whole sphere of intelligent and conscious life. Clearing away all difficulties on the scriptural side by its distinction of natural and moral ability, it gave the individual, with an immense moral power, an awful responsibility.

Under the influence of a less mechanical philosophy and a more discriminating scientific knowledge of man, we are learning to separate as well as distinguish, as never before, the twofold nature of man, corporate and individual. We are learning to recognize in the one the region of necessity and in the other that of freedom, and to distribute responsibility more fairly than of old. The scientific law of heredity has brought into new currency the doctrine which the old theologians strove to express under the name of original sin, a term which had a meaning as it was first used by Augustine, but which is an awkward misnomer if we accept any other theory than his. Sometimes it almost seems as if we were gravitating back to their doctrine. But the retrogression is only apparent. We shall avoid the mistake into which they fell, while we retain the truth they darkly attempted to express. The line of progress in theology—to borrow a figure which Motley somewhere finely applies to history—is not the straight line, or the circle that returns hopelessly to its own starting point, but the spiral which rises higher with each revolution.

And then, the tendency of this age as a scientific age is to greater simplicity. Science and philosophy are both teaching that power lies in the direction of unity. The deeper we penetrate into the mysteries of nature, the fewer and less complicated are the laws and forms we discover. If the Bible is from the author of nature we may look for a like simplicity in the system which underlies its facts and binds together its life-giving truths. And as that system is more and more understood, as the common faith of the church grasps it more completely, we may look for a simpler statement of it in terms of theolog-

ical science. There is a growing feeling that theology has been too complicated in times past, that we need to throw aside much of the old cumbrous machinery and to concentrate upon the vital facts. The age is fast forgetting the scholastic divisions and the misleading terminology of the past. It is time that a new distribution of material be made between systematic theology and its sister science the history of doctrine. There is much that can be passed over from the former to the latter to the advantage of both. Drawing its materials from a wide field, not disdaining to accept from science, from history, from the religions of the past and of the present, the light they have to throw upon its great problems, theology must distribute its subject-matter into fewer and simpler categories.

Moreover this age has been teaching us some useful lessons in what Whately calls "that important and much-neglected branch of learning,—the knowledge of man's ignorance." It is the boast of one school of scientific thought at the present time that it teaches only positive truth; of the other that it relegates to the realm of the unknowable all that is incapable of proof through the senses. I will not stop here to ask how far either of these schools has maintained its own principles with thorough consistency. But it is certain that Positivism and Agnosticism have exerted in some respects a most salutary influence on our time, an influence which has been felt powerfully in the sphere of religious thought. The dogmatic speculation of the age is far more modest than that of times past and acknowledges its limitations and is willing to confess its ignorance on many subjects respecting which the fiercest battles of theology used to be waged. It was the dream of that remarkable theologian who brought to a close the interesting development of Calvinism which we call the New England Theology, and whose influence is still so widely felt through the works he left behind him, that all the gaps in theology could be filled with logical "joints," as he called them, and a system constructed, compact and complete, with no chasms to divide its parts. The attempt of Dr. Emmons, in spite of the acuteness of his mind and the ingenuity of his method, was a failure, as all such attempts must be. The daring system he constructed fell apart when his own intellect ceased to hold it together. Per-

haps his failure has had as much to do as the prevalent scientific philosophy in teaching us our lesson of self-restraint. At all events, we are content to take up on many points an attitude of ignorance. This Christian agnosticism—if we may accept this popular and inexact use of a much-abused word—is no flippant pyrrhonism: nor is it that other kind of ignorance which Carlyle has called in his caustic way, “Ignoramus speaking in loud tones to Ignoratis;” it is a sober recognition of the limitations which revelation and the constitution of our own minds alike place upon our knowledge, an acknowledgment of the fact that we cannot by searching find out God, that there is no common measure between the finite and the infinite, and that there are mysteries even in our own natures that our profoundest thought is utterly impotent to fathom.

We are willing to admit that human speculation went too far in days gone by in attempting to explain the high doctrine of the Trinity, that theology too presumptuously pressed forward to investigate that awful mystery before which the angels veil their faces. We see now that the centuries of controversy which in the earlier and later history of the church was waged around the question of the relation of the two natures in the Saviour’s person failed to solve the tremendous problem, however useful it may have been in staying the progress of unscriptural error. We discover at last that the silence of revelation respecting the precise connection between the first great sin and the sins of the millions of individuals who have lived since then is a silence that neither science nor philosophy has been, or is, able to break with an altogether satisfactory explanation. We see that it is possible to accept the Catholic and scriptural doctrine of the atonement, that Christ’s work availed not only to reveal the love of God to man, but to remove the hindrances in the eternal justice of the universe to the forgiveness of the sinner, and yet to cheerfully admit that it is impossible for us, looking from our present standpoint, to explain how it was that his work accomplished this result,—saying as Butler did, “If the Scripture has, as surely it has, left this matter of the satisfaction of Christ mysterious, left somewhat in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it must be, if not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain. Nor has any one reason to

complain for want of further information, unless he can show his claim to it."

We recognize the inscrutable element which must ever accompany us, defying all our attempts at definition or solution, as we traverse the border-land where the divine and the human meet in our investigations of the relation of the divine grace to the human will in the antecedents, the initiation, and the progress of the new life. We accept unreconciled the two great facts, maintaining not only the full right of human freedom in its integrity, but also the other great fact, which a superficial theology, desiring to make all things clear, discards, but which a deeper and more spiritual theology retains as required alike by reason and Scripture, as well as necessarily involved in all genuine Christian experience, the saving grace of God which reaches in its grand sweep of power from eternity to eternity, and carries each believing soul through its earthly to its heavenly state.

We confess the difficulties and obscurity of the doctrines of eschatology, belonging as they do to the "undiscovered country," into whose darkness experience throws no light at all, reason only the faintest glimmering, and revelation far less light than we could wish, even though it gives us all that we need. The religious thought of our time checks itself where it used to speak with undoubting certainty, admitting that now we know in part and prophesy in part. And while, on that darkest and most solemn of all these questions, the future of those who persevere in their resistance of God's offers of love, the church clings loyally to the simple statements of Him whom it believes to be the very truth of God, as he is the way and life of men, and resists all attempts to teach theories which it believes he meant to exclude, it still shrinks from dogmatism respecting a subject so awful, and humbly hopes, though it knows not how, that there is a solution to this mystery which will manifest, when it shall be revealed, in the fullest and highest sense, what we believe with undoubting confidence, that infinite justice and infinite goodness are one.

Other sciences confess their ignorance. Why should not ours? When theology has learned to say without a blush at its own ignorance, "I do not know," then it will be prepared

to declare of that which has been clearly revealed, "I know and I believe."

Closely connected with this willingness of the age to confess its limitations is its broader tolerance in matters of religious belief. The common battle which has been going on against infidelity and irreligion has brought the various denominations and parties in the church closer together than ever before. It has taught them that the common ground upon which they stand and which they are all interested in defending, is far larger and includes much more than they had supposed; that there are fewer essentials and more non-essentials in Christian belief than they have sometimes been disposed to think; that it is possible to differ on many points of faith and practice, and yet hold fast the great saving truths of the gospel of Christ. And as Christians of different creeds have come nearer to each other, as they have looked into each other's faces and caught each other's spirit, they have come to see that the differences are of minor importance, in many cases only seeming differences, opposite sides of the same great truth. For in reality these divine truths are mighty things, not only stretching off into the unfathomable infinite far beyond our reach and comprehension, but even in their seen proportions surpassing the ability of any one person, or church, or mode of thought, or form of speech, to compass and hold them. We are beginning to realize that both sides may be right upon subjects of belief, and that the truth, instead of lying on one side or between them, may lie in them, and around them, and above them, so that both together may contain what one alone may fail to have, and both together fall far short of the complete truth.

Unquestionably this tendency will have its influence—if, indeed, we may not say that this has been the case already—upon the method and spirit of theology, making it more comprehensive, catholic, and tolerant. Where the polemical interest predominates theology becomes necessarily one-sided and narrow. The bitter controversies of times past have too often infused the *odium theologicum* into the dogmatic system, always with the effect of raising doctrinal half-truths into the place of whole truths, and bringing into undue prominence matters of

minor importance—frequently the mere mint, anise, and cummin of theology—while pushing the real essentials into the background. Who can fail to see that this was the effect of the controversies of Old and New School which rent our American churches forty or fifty years ago, controversies to which we now look back with shame? And must we not be convinced from the events which followed, that they were largely instrumental in bringing theology into its later neglect? It is not necessary, in order to precisely state and firmly maintain the doctrines we believe to be true, that we should exclude all other forms of statement, spending our strength in the effort to disprove them and to show that they have no right of existence. It is not necessary that we should be always labeling the formulas of others who prefer a different phrasing from ours with old terms of polemical import—Pelagian, Semipelagian, Arminian, and the rest.

There are, it is true, extremes to be avoided on both sides. There is in these days a false liberality in the church which is willing to give up even the essentials of the Christian faith. There is a tolerance springing from mere indifference, to which all beliefs are the same because it has no earnest beliefs. There is a so-called liberality, moving on extra-Christian ground, which has swept around the circle into dogmatism and intolerance, and makes of its negations a system quite as tyrannous as any that it accuses the Christian church of holding or having held. These extremities are indeed to be avoided. But we want to rescue that grand old word, liberality, now

"Defamed by every charlatan
And soiled with all ignoble use,"

and restore it in its true meaning to the theology of our age. It is not to be expected that the time of theological controversy is over, nor is such a result to be denied. The new interest in the doctrines of Christianity will awaken new discussions. The greater the interest, the more earnest the discussions will be. But is it too much to hope that they will be carried on upon a broader field and in a more generous spirit than in times past? Need we lay such emphasis upon points which are mere shibboleths of sect, or matters of diverse philosophies? May we not look for a system in which the Christian church

may unite as it has not done in times past—a system which shall occupy higher ground and afford a broader outlook?

I have thus endeavored to show that the age is preparing the way for a new career of theological science; that the materials are already in existence, and that the character of the system is, in part at least, to be discerned. From the nature of the case I have been able to speak only in general terms. At present, after the period of confusion through which we have been passing, there is much in the new theology that is unformed and inchoate. It needs some divinely-guided, scientific, organizing mind to reduce its materials to form and system, some mind to do for the teeming thoughts of our age what Origen and Augustine and Calvin did for theirs. It needs special work upon special doctrines before they can take their place permanently in the system. When this preliminary work has been done, is it too much to predict that there will be a revival of interest in doctrinal theology such as the church has not seen for many years?

I have spoken of a new theology. Let me not be misunderstood. I do not speak of a new truth. Truth is divine, and abides forever the same. God has made no new revelations to our age. But theology is human, and changes with human thought.

“ Our little systems have their day,
They have their day and cease to be;
They are but broken lights of thee,
And thou, O Lord, art more than they.”

We believe that a new theology is coming, better and fuller of truth than the old, certainly better adapted to our times. But the truth which it will express will be the unchanging truth of the ages, the truth of the Bible, the truth of Jesus Christ.

We cannot overestimate the importance of the system which is thus to be the vehicle of truth to the future. If the faith of an age gives character to its theology, theology in its turn exercises a most important influence upon the faith and practical life of the age. The theology of the coming years will largely mold the Christianity of the coming years. It is to furnish the substance of Christian preaching. It is to teach the methods by which souls are to be saved and built up in pure and Christ-like character. It is to provide the matter, and determine the

form of the religious instruction which will be given to the children of coming generations. It is to put into the hands of minister and teacher the weapons with which they are to oppose and, with God's help, overcome unbelief. It is to go with the home missionary to the waste places of our land, and enter into the thought and faith of the new communities, composed of people from many lands, which are springing up in our great West. It is to supply the permanent motive for foreign missions. It is to form the subject matter of the instruction of the new converts in the now benighted regions of the earth, and to give shape to the message which those converts in their turn, catching the missionary spirit, will preach to people and nations beyond. It is to play a part—who shall say how important?—in bringing in the blessed consummation of the Redeemer's kingdom. Long after we have passed away its influence will be felt. Its record will be written in eternity. God only knows how great its power will be.

And now, in conclusion, let me say a word concerning my own future. I entered thus formally upon the work to which I was called last autumn, to me so unexpectedly, with a profound sense of its responsibilities, and much doubt of myself. I came hither because I thought that God directed me hither. That conviction gives me strength to take this new step, and to go forward with the work. I believe that there is no task higher and more far-reaching in its influence than the education of Christian ministers. I believe there has never been an age when that work was likely to count for more than it is now. It is with a certain sober, trembling cheerfulness and buoyancy, born of a trust which I believe is wholly sincere, that I devote myself to this high profession, and to the service of this ancient and beloved Seminary, to labor here so long as the great Head of the Church may count me worthy of such a privilege. In my prayers to-day I do not ask God to make my work great before men, but I do ask him to give me wisdom, and strength, and singleness of purpose to fit the young men committed to my charge in this department for the highest usefulness, and through them to do much to advance the Master's cause. This is God's work. That he will bless it, that he will watch over it, I, for one, do not question. To him I commit myself and these important interests.

**ARTICLE VII.—CHRISTIAN WORSHIP IN ITS THEORY
AND PRACTICE.**

THERE has been a remarkable agreement throughout the communities and generations of Christian believers in regard to the proper constituents of religious worship. God's word, prayer, song,—these have been universally recognized as the three essential parts and elements of public worship in the church from the beginning. There has been diversity of opinion and of practice in regard to the order in which these elements should appear in worship, as also in regard to their relative importance and the due predominance consequently to be given to them respectively. There has been diversity of practice, likewise, in regard to the incidental modification of these constituents as to persons, place, dress, posture, tone, and other things incident to the use of them. There has been diversity of opinion, moreover, in regard to the way in which the order and incidental character of these constituents should be determined, whether prescribed more or less by authority, either of express ordinance or of established custom, or left free to the dictates of the occasion, or to the discretion or caprice of the leader of the worship. These modifications of the three universally recognized constituents of worship have been suited to the ever varying usages and opinions of the time or place, to the accidental habits, tastes, culture, spiritual condition of the worshipping community.

While in regard to the essential constituents there has been this uninterrupted harmony throughout Christendom, the church has been in all ages subject to agitation and disturbance over these incidental modifications that are not of the proper essence of worship. As Christian life and experience change, and especially as in the progress of Christian civilization, religious tastes, and habits, and needs change, inasmuch as old usage in religious things acquires a sanctity which seems to forbid a change of form even where the original occasion and reason of the form has passed away, this agitation must reasonably be

expected. It is the sign of a living, growing Christianity. The present time happily bears this characteristic. In various parts of Christendom, in truth, in all the denominations of Christians, the so-called liturgical, as well as the more characteristically non-liturgical churches, inquiry and discussion are more or less engaged on this subject. A need of change is felt; change is sought; change is urged and perhaps resisted; change is made, change which is not always improvement. It is timely, therefore, to propose for careful, thoughtful consideration and determination, the question, What is Christian worship in its proper nature and essence? A clear apprehension here must certainly be supposed to help greatly to the proper settlement of these agitations, and possibly, if not probably, prevent wrong, and therefore more or less hurtful conclusions.

The terms expressing the notion of worship in different languages have been variously derived from the object of worship or from the agent rendering it. In the former class, is our own word—worship—which primarily respects the peculiar worthiness and dignity of the object of worship. In the latter class the terms are derived either from the outer bodily acts usual in worship, as bowing the head, bending the knee, prostrating the body, or the inner mental states, a sense of subjection, dependence, fealty.

According as the object of worship, or the agent rendering it has been more in view, the theories of worship have thrown into the shade the one or the other—the human or the divine—side of the act itself. Thus the more prevalent German theory at present regards worship as simply “the representation of the inward life of the believer.” Worship is here reduced to a mere “representation without ulterior aim or object.” It follows easily from this that “prayer is not to be considered as the first element of worship;”—it is merely “not out of place in an assembly of worshipers.”

On the other hand, where the object of worship is more exclusively regarded, worship is represented as simple “adoration—adoration in act.” Preaching in this theory is thrown into the background or entirely excluded, as was prayer in the other. “Preaching,” says Vinet, “is framed into worship, rather than an integrant part of it;” “it is in addition to wor-

ship, but is not worship." With this view, which elevates the divine side of worship, the older German writers on Pastoral Theology, as Græffe and Kaiser, are more in harmony.

These are obviously partial, one-sided views, as the common consent of Christendom in accepting in universal practice the three essential constituents of worship, which involve each, both the divine and the human, and in necessary correlation, most clearly shows. The mediation of these opposing partial views gives the true theory. Worship—and by this term, we mean everywhere in this Article formal church worship—includes both God and man as present acting participators. True religious worship is no longer Aaron offering sacrifice without the vail; it is more indeed than God and his people communicating through Moses at the door of "the tabernacle of *meeting*"—not tabernacle or tent of the congregation, as our old version inaccurately rendered the phrase; it is free communion face to face before the Shekinah; it is Christ, the manifested God, within the doors, meeting and speaking, as reconciled and reconciling God, with his friends. Its charter is: "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." Worship may then be exactly defined as *the formal communion between God and his people*.

We propose to justify and illustrate this definition of church worship in its application to its different parts and at the same time in reference to present usages and needs of the church.

I. True Christian worship is ever and essentially *communion*. This is the innermost, most vital, most essential element of worship. It necessarily involves two parties, who alike participate in the act, one as expressing, imparting, offering; the other as receiving, accepting; or one as impressing and communicating to the other, and this in return becoming impressed and being communicated with. This statement in its broadest and its exactest import will hardly be controverted. The notion of an actual common presence and mutual sympathy is implied in each of the three universally recognized acts of worship in the church mentioned. The Word is from God, speaking to his people hearing; the prayer is of a beseeching supplicant addressed to a gracious hearer; the song is of an adoring heart to a present, condescending Majesty. Worship is everywhere

a communion between rational spirits in sympathetic participation. "God is a Spirit; and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and truth."

This characteristic of all true worship, as its radical and vital element, while none perhaps will considerably reject it, is yet, there is reason to fear, often overlooked or disregarded. Certainly the full and intelligent acceptance of the truth will effectually dispose of some controverted questions now stirring some bodies of believers, and perhaps bring about some reforms in current practice among them. There are, it should be borne in mind, manifold religious observances and procedures that are not of the nature of worship. Any act, whatever it may be, done in the name of God, in the service of God, in the recognized presence of God, is properly a religious act; it is not worship, however, only as it embraces a conscious address to God, or a conscious, devout listening to him as directly addressing in person his worshipping subject. It is ever in worship *Thou and I*; simply *He and I* is not enough, for in it is not necessarily communion. As a quick test and touchstone, this notion of worship may be applied with all confidence to all acts and usages that may pretend to be reckoned as worship. It not only excludes such acts as are merely outward and formal, not engaging the heart in them; but also all of those truly religious acts and observances, which although done in all sincerity of soul by the true servant of God, lacks this feature of immediate personal communion. It has been a common but most pernicious error to hold mere duty to be worship, except in the loosest figurative sense or the allowed license of poetic usage. No act of duty is worship in its true and proper meaning, which is not communion, personal and conscious reciprocation of heart and spirit between God and his creature. To impose such religious acts wanting this element on others, or to perform them oneself as acts of worship, is a delusive or wanton misdeed; in either case a grievous offense and must be of hurtful consequence. Every true, honest soul will carefully shun both the delusion and the wrong.

II. The communing PARTIES in worship are God and his people. It is necessary here only to indicate the specific forms of this communion or the modes in which the communing parties appear in legitimate and acceptable worship.

1. *The Divine Word* appears in worship in a two-fold way : in the reading of the inspired Scriptures and the lessons—*lectio* of the liturgies ; and in the sermon.

The reading of a portion of Scripture has been from the beginning the prominent part of worship in the Christian Church as it was a like integrant constituent of that of the Jewish synagogue. Its significance is precisely this, that the words of God himself are addressed directly to his people through the lips of the leader of the worship as his representative. The conduct of this part of worship is exactly and, we may add, authoritatively determined by its character as thus indicated. The time and place in the order of the service, the person to perform it, the spirit, voice, and manner generally of conducting it, as well as the posture of mind and body on the part of the worshipping people, all should be controlled by a distinct regard to this essential character of the service. It has no place or significance in worship but as a communication of God's own words directly to his people by his minister. God speaking—what solemnity and awe, what forgetfulness of self, what earnestness and impressiveness, what filling of the soul with the whole thought of God should characterize him who is called to be the mouthpiece of God, and what devout, reverent, docile attentiveness is required of the listening people in order to prevent culpable indecorum and profanation, and in order that the service be, as it should be, both most engaging and most profitable to the worshiper.

But especially do we wish to emphasize the truth that this part of worship is a *reading* :—it is a *lectio*, a lesson, in the old sense of the word, as distinguished from the praying on the one hand and the singing on the other. It is not a proper speaking, it is not oratory ; and it is not a dramatic reading. And the characteristic tone and manner of the orator and of the actor are utterly foreign to the service. It is reading, not praying, and therefore the proper tones of prayer are disallowed in it. It is reading and not singing, and therefore the peculiar vocal qualities of song, whether of intonation, chant, or proper song, are forbidden in it. It is reading and should be true reading, governed by all the laws that govern true reading. There is a radical difference between reading and

singing which seems to be very commonly overlooked or disregarded with consequent damage to effectiveness and profit as well as offense to a true taste and sense of fitness. Reading is the expression of thought; and its end or purpose is distinct apprehension by the intelligence; song is the expression of feeling and its end is responsive emotion. Reading is properly univocal; song naturally seeks sympathetic harmony and multiplicity of sound, voice supporting voice and answering voice as in the old grand antiphonies or anthems, or seeking support from harmonized instrument. Reading is effected by a vocal movement directly the opposite to that in song, being ever a rising or falling in pitch in the enunciation of every syllable, while in song the voice characteristically maintains the same line of pitch continuously on the syllable. Thus radically different are reading and song, in nature, and design, and manner of rendering; and to confound these, to misplace them, to make one a substitute for the other, is mischievous everywhere and, more than anywhere else, in worship. Ignorance, supposably, in some instances, formalism in others has occasioned this offensive and mischievous substitution. But if reading of the Scriptures in worship be the communication of God's thoughts to the intelligence of his worshiping people, then this part of divine service cannot properly be performed in the movements peculiar to song as by intonation or chanting on the one hand, or by multiplicity of voices on the other. To do this is offense against the reason and nature of things—irrational; it is consequently offensive to sound taste, and a hindrance to the designed effect of this part of worship, which can be none other than to 'give the sense' of God's Word to the people.

The unity of worship, it may be remarked here, requires, as Kaiser well enjoins, that the selections from the body of revealed truth for use on particular occasions be such as shall harmonize with the other parts of the service.

The Divine Word appears in worship also in the *sermon*. In its truest conception the sermon is the utterance of the mind of God to his worshiping people, representatively through the convictions, the emotions, the words of the preacher. Pulpit discourse is radically distinguished from all other kinds of

oratory by this ;—that it is a constituent part of worship ; it is the address of God in this communion with his people. The preacher is the mouthpiece of God and is to speak the words which God commissions him to speak and these only. He is but the ambassador of God, the messenger of God, bearing what God has to communicate to his people. It is only as the preacher's whole soul is saturated, so to speak, with this sense of ambassadorship, that he can worthily fulfill his function or succeed in his work. He must feel that he is divinely commissioned ; be persuaded that his call to the service is indicated by the Spirit of God and in the providence of God. He needs to assure himself that he has the mind of God through the requisite research and prayerful inquiry and study. He must invest his sermon throughout with the representative character and spirit, so that God in it shall appear everywhere speaking and he himself nowhere but as organ. The portion of the divine communication to man which he selects for the particular occasion of worship, he needs to select and use in the conviction that it is the particular message which God would at that time convey through him to the people ; and then use it in expounding and enforcing it so that the divine authority shall appear pervading it throughout ; so that the worshipping congregation shall never be kept unmindful of the fact that it is God himself addressing them. He need not and should not seek to lay aside his own personality, with all its proper characteristics, whether of excellence or of weakness ; simply as organ, maintaining ever his own identity, he is to suffer the truth of God to be transmitted through him. So long as the Bible is accepted as containing all truth needful for salvation, since it is even better to err on the side of reverential caution than of presumptuous license,—to keep within the extreme limits of divine revelation than to cross beyond into the field of human imaginings, there is great wisdom in the established usage of Christendom which requires that the inspired text be the foundation and germ of all pulpit discourse. No mere prefacing of a passage from Scripture in deference to custom, no mere use of inspiration as a motto or device or vague suggestion or fanciful association, will answer the demands of worship. The “text,” as it is, in familiar phrase, abusively

named, is the summons of the hearing worshiper "to the law and to the testimony;" he should be able to follow the reverberations of that divine voice through the entire discourse. The sermon must be essentially and characteristically *the unfolding of divine truth*. It must bear the proper personality of the preacher, but in the same way as the bush in which God appeared to Moses remained a bush while yet burning with the brightness of God and uttering forth the majesty of the mind of God.

But the sermon is in worship the address of God *to his people*. It has a rational end as well as a rational source. It is not an essay, a study, an intellectual investigation or finding out of truth, on the one hand, nor an imaginative rhapsody on the other. It is rational address, address with conscious end or purpose; planned and constructed throughout to accomplish a rational effect in the minds of those who hear in worship. The preacher worthily fulfills his office in worship only as he on the one hand by the most prayerful diligence possesses himself in the largest degree of the mind of God, and on the other acquaints himself most fully and sympathetically with the spiritual needs of his hearers. The sermon in worship is not empty form, although properly to be regarded as formal inasmuch as it is a constituent part of worship which is necessarily formal, but only formal so as to be thereby most full of content.

The sermon, it should be distinctly remarked, must be ranked as the leading part in worship, since in the meeting of God with his people it must be what God has to say which constitutes the commanding and controlling feature. In every way in which this ranking, this superior, commanding character can fittingly be manifested, should the sermon be shaped to direct and regulate all the parts of worship. The prayer, as expressing most prominently the spiritual wants of the people, so far at least as left free to the minister of worship, must be colored in reference to the sermon which has been designed exactly to meet these wants; and song equally must follow, not lead, must subserve, not subordinate the designed uses of the sermon. The preacher accordingly is the rightful leader or directing and ordering mind in the best type of Christian worship. This, at

least, must be accepted as the rule; and to the rule the fewest possible exceptions should be allowed. Only so can the requisite proprieties and uses of worship, and the needful harmony in its parts, be secured; or its highest excellences and usefulness be attained. At least where the ordering of the service is free, the sermon should give character and tone to the entire service, so that there shall not be in any part anything that is discordant or obstructive. In accordance with this principle and in recognition of its importance, in some churches, more characteristically liturgical, the rubric prescribes that the text and theme of the sermon be taken from the Scripture lessons or readings of the day, with which the prescribed special prayers and psalms or hymns are of course in harmony.

2. *Prayer* and *Song* are the twofold forms in which the people address God in worship. In the prayer this address is, properly and in fact well nigh universally, offered representatively through the minister. In the song the people themselves unite in harmonized voice in this worshipping address.

The characteristics which this view of prayer in the worship of the church must impress upon it in order that it may be a legitimate and acceptable part of worship, not an empty form, not a mockery, not a perversion or abuse, are obvious. It must be conceived and offered as pure address to God. Exhortation, rebuke, persuasion, information, or anything else that savors of address to the people, is at best but wanton profanation of the holiest of religious rites. With God ever in view as the one being addressed, it must suit itself in form and manner becomingly to the divine majesty and excellence—must be reverential, elevated in thought and grave in expression, never low or flippant or chatty. It must on the other hand be expressive of the feelings and thoughts common to the congregation of worshippers. The leader in worship here is but the mouth-piece of the people, and must drop his own individuality from view except as organ and medium. As prominently expressive of felt needs, of desires, it must be characteristically emotional, and the vocal utterance will ever shun the simple upward and downward slides of colloquial discourse, and employ the balanced waves natural to grave address. In short, the very nature of prayer in worship as communion between

God and his people prescribes that the matter, words, and tone on the part of the leader of worship, and the posture and demeanor of them that follow and unite with him in it, should be such as comport with direct address to the majesty on high on the one side, and on the other express the unity of feeling and of desire which the service supposes in the worshipping congregation.

The *song* is the other form of address to God by the people in worship. It differs from the address in prayer by most decisive marks and characters, both of inner and essential quality, and also of outer expression. While in prayer the body of worshipers unite in following a leader, waiting on the thoughts, the words, the tones of feeling, which he may give to them that they may take up his sense and make it their own, in song the people become in truth the leader; it is the common sentiments and words which they already have in their memories, or in their books of song, which they take and bring to expression in the music. It is this—the hymn, the psalm, the sentiment embodied in the hymn, which in true worship must ever be regarded as the leading, governing element in the song. This, it is true, must of necessity be brought into the common possession of the worshipers. The selection may be made for them; most fitly every way the selection is made by the minister, as only thus can the required harmony of the service be secured. But the hymn is for the music, not the music for the hymn. The music, as the hymn, must be brought to the worshipers in common; and this is fitly done by a designated and trusted chorister, who of course is bound by the very nature of his office to select first such music as will be a fit expression for the selected hymn, and then such that the worshipping people may express the sentiments of the selected hymn now made their own in it. There may be music, instrumental and also vocal, that shall be preparatory to worship; and such is admissible in the house of God. But any song which is not the expression of the sentiments already in the minds of the worshipping congregation, all so-called voluntaries in which the body of worshipers cannot express the actual sentiments they have or ought to have, lacks the very essence of worship; it is but sacrilegious mockery and an abomination to God, as well

as to all devout worshipers, to impose it upon them as such. It is only a performance that belongs to the theater, and has no place in the house consecrated to the worship of God. Let this be distinctly understood, however, that there is a place for music, instrumental and vocal, as simply preparatory and auxiliary to worship, while not of the essence of worship; but such music should with utmost care be so conducted as never to make the impression that it is worship, and ever be in truth only a help and incitement to it. Let it be understood, moreover, that the worshiping spirit may engage in the song representatively and by proxy, so to speak; may pour out its reverential adoration and its affectionate trust through the lips and voices of the experts in song; that indeed the soul of pure devotion, especially in a numerous body of worshipers, perhaps never rises to a higher pitch of acceptable fervor than when it breathes itself out thus through the voice or voices, shaped and filled by a common sentiment, of one or more masters of song. But this is essential in all admissible song as a part of proper worship that it be expressive of sentiments animating alike the breasts of the body of worshipers.

The song in worship furnishes the only means of the highest union in worship; the only medium through which the body of worshipers can be brought into accordant expression. In their attempted addresses to God, their voices must be harmonized in pitch and in time, or even their simultaneous expression of the same words and sentiments must be offensive discord and jargon, alike unbecoming the occasion, and hostile to the spirit of true worship. The two chief elements in music, tune and time, are thus the indispensable condition of any united participation vocally on the part of the body of worshipers in the service. Any attempt accordingly to engage more fully the activity of the congregation in worship must observe this principle, or prove an abortion and a failure. Happily these prime elements of music present to the church all the means and incitements to this active congregational participation in worship that can be desired. There is an inexhaustible wealth of resource here open in both melodies and harmonies, that have been or may be composed, in the common tunes for metrical verse, and chants for other lyrics, which the church will show

its wisdom in appropriating and bringing into its service, diligently training its children and youth for a ready and edifying participation in it. Its Sunday-schools have here an opportunity and a call for most effective service.

The general practice of the church from the beginning in recognizing the three constituents of worship—preaching, including the use of the Divine Word with or without comment, prayer, and song,—is thus shown to be in harmony with the theory of worship that it is simply and only communion between God and His people in reciprocating rational address. There are indeed other rites or usages which have been to a greater or less extent introduced into church worship, and have been felt to be properly there. The benediction at the close of worship is one of these general usages. But the benediction, whether regarded as a supplication for the divine favor or as an actual pronouncing of that favor as authorized by God through his minister, is of the purest essence of worship; is either address of God to his people or their address to him through his and their representative and minister.

The recital of the Creed can hardly be regarded as worship in its strictest sense; it may be accepted as a fitting accompaniment to worship, as it is a solemn declaration by minister and people alike and in unison of the character in which they appear together in worship—that of believers in certain truths necessary to be recognized in right approaches to God in social worship.

The use of the Lord's Prayer is a proper act of worship. The objection to it in the church as it is ordinarily offered, is that it lacks too much the social character. There is a partial agreement in respect of time, but the utterances are individual and separate; there is no accord in pitch or syllabic time. In practice, accordingly, the sense of decorum enjoins the most subdued and faintest murmuring compatible with audible utterance, as if the worshiper were to regard himself as alone with God, insensible of the presence of others around him or they of him, the voice of the leader only audible that by it these isolations of the worshipers may be kept within the limits of the social order that must prevail at the time and place.

There is another rite or usage observed in some portions of

the church in their public worship which is of a more questionable character. As it is one that is more than any other engaging the attention of the churches we give to it a more extended examination. It is that of "Responsive Readings," so called.

While the acts of worship that have been named have a warrant in Scripture, all, certainly, except perhaps the Creed, this has none. We find no trace of it anywhere in the Word of God, or any thing that could properly suggest, much less warrant it. In fact, it is of very recent origin, and of very partial use. It dates back only to the beginnings of the Anglican church and is hardly known outside of its communion, only in a few scattered so-called non-liturgical churches that have very recently ventured upon it. In the Anglican church and its connections responsive readings came into use only as a necessary substitute for an entirely different thing. The order of service as ordained by the royal head of the church in England prescribed the Psalms—the Psalter—to be uniformly used in the regular ministrations of church worship. But the psalms were composed and introduced into worship with the single end and purpose of being sung. Reading them as set in the ritual would have seemed as preposterous to those who introduced them as reading instead of singing the hymns in our hymnals. Such was at first the uniform usage—singing the psalter. But in England it chanced that singers here and there failed, and so there could be no singing. The rubric still enjoining the use of the psalter, the only expedient was to read the appointed portions, as now sometimes for a like necessity the hymn in social worship is read instead of being sung. Responsive reading in the Anglican communion was thus a mere expedient of necessity, a simple makeshift for a better way. So that church has regarded it; has deplored the necessity; has sought earnestly and persistingly to remove this necessity; and in England, it is understood, with success, so that to-day, in the general, the responsive reading of the psalms has ceased and singing has been restored to its rightful function in this part of worship. The same movement is in progress on this side the water. It is pertinent here to note the interesting fact that the reason for retaining in the liturgy of the Anglican church the

old version of the psalms when the new, King James's, version of the Bible was appointed to be read in the churches, was that "the choirs were accustomed to it and its language was considered more smooth and fit for song, than the new."

Responsive reading, as a rite in worship, is thus not only without scriptural warrant; it is an innovation on the uniform usage throughout Christendom; the literal fact being that the practice in all known forms of religious worship in the Church, both Jewish and Christian, with the few recent sporadic cases of exception in some local communities just mentioned, has been against it.

But farther, responsive reading as a rite in worship, is opposed to all reason, except, as has been before observed, as a mere makeshift or temporary expedient in a case of necessity. Audible reading is an irrational act, unless it be to communicate thought. That is its true function and purpose; it has no other; for we need here take no account of the fact that the form of reading is sometimes employed for purposes of amusement or vocal exercise or the like. But responsive reading as practiced in worship is certainly not for the purpose of communicating thought. To whom does either the minister or the people think of communicating thought in the reading? To whom does he properly read? It is an empty mockery of all rational reading. Then, rational reading should proceed in certain ways prescribed by its very nature; it has rules that should be observed by all who read rationally. It requires pauses and intonations that the sense may be properly rendered. But responsive reading as attempted in worship can observe no pauses, no fit intonations; the performer must needs hurry on and cannot stay so much as to study out the sense himself, much less to choose his vocal movements so as properly to give the sense to others. In Nehemiah's time, we are told "they read in the book in the law of God distinctly and gave the sense and caused them to understand the reading." But if the individual worshiper should presume to read distinctly so as to give the sense in responsive reading he would cause intolerable confusion, and be noted as unpardonably boorish. Every eye would be turned towards the offender in deserved rebuke. Responsive reading, accordingly, in worship is both meaningless as to any rational object in reading, and also from the necessi-

ties of the case can proceed only by trampling under foot the fundamental rules of all correct reading.

The responsive element in this practice is equally insignificant and out of place. Response in church song—antiphony—has a rational place in worship. In the Jewish and in the Christian church, worship has instinctively availed itself of this element in its highest and purest elevation; has lifted itself through it to the loftiest ecstasies of devotion. For song, as already noticed, is essentially expressive of feeling. It is thus sympathetic and free and eager to unite all surrounding objects with itself in accordant responsive-emotion. This is the meaning of response in song and its only ground and warrant. But in reading which expresses thought, not emotion, it can have no conceivable significance; there it is entirely out of place. It is an abuse of reason to employ it here. It is indeed directly hostile to the only rational design in proper reading.

Moreover, responsive reading, if we have set forth the true character and essential nature of Christian worship, has nothing of that character in it; it is not proper worship. It is not of the nature of communion between God and his people. Here is found the most fatal objection to the usage, except as its use is understood to be but a mere expedient for something better, a mere makeshift for singing. It imposes on the inexperienced and inconsiderate for true worship that which has not an element of worship in it. The effect cannot fail to be most pernicious, every way and everywhere. If worship is essentially communion, as we have seen, then in this rite men offer "strange fire" on the altar of God; they bring to him what he has not appointed; what indeed is but an unwarranted substitute for what he really requires—a direct communion with him in spirit and in truth. God commanded the Jews, when their children should ask in regard to a rite in their worship, "what mean ye by this service," to return to them a rational answer. In regard to this new rite of man's contriving no such rational answer is possible; for it is meaningless as an act of worship, excepting, as we have repeatedly said, when regarded as a substitute and makeshift.

The evils resulting from this practice are obvious. It is a hindrance to true social worship. The sincere worshiper seeking personal communion with God, can indeed be supposed to read

to himself, and so to be receiving the address of God to him, but this certainly is a poor way to secure the fullest impression on his soul from the word of God; it is usurping the prerogative of the minister in worship and the irrational substitution cannot but be a loss so far as the attainment of this object is concerned. It in no conceivable way helps to worship, while, as assuming the place and occasion of worship, being yet in no respect true worship itself, it misleads and stands in the way of it.

It leads and nourishes formalism. Church worship must be more or less formal to "be done decently and in order." It may not be ordered by State appointment, or by ecclesiastical authority, diocesan or parochial; it may be only by authority of custom. People must know what they are to do, the steps they are to take, the path they are to tread, in order to move in an orderly and decent way. A liturgy, an order of divine service, may bind up every part and movement in worship, or leave more or less free. But order there must be, order that is understood by the worshipers in common, and into any such ordered service there may creep in the evil of formalism, in which men shall observe only the outer forms of the service, and consciously or unconsciously put nothing of the heart of worship into them. This rite of responsive reading peculiarly invites and encourages this evil spirit of formalism. By no possibility can one find in it anything that leads to a direct personal communion with God,—an act in which he addresses God, and God in turn addresses him. He is instructed in the rite that he can do that as worship which has nothing properly of worship in it; and so he comes to regard himself as a true worshiper when he has not put forth anything of the nature of an act of worship.

The practice is offensive to all devout taste, or a true sense of decorum. A stranger chancing in upon a congregation engaged in united responsive reading, meets a babel of discordant sounds, a grating jargon of voices, harmonized in neither time or tune, giving forth no intelligible utterance; what could appear to him to be more opposed to the spirit of true devotion that moves best only when it moves in purest taste, in accordance with the laws of man's aesthetic nature?

It is difficult to find any considerations of weight favoring

this innovation on the usage of Christendom. That it is brought in under the force of example of the Anglican communion, is indeed a fact; but if so, it is as we have shown, under a sore misapprehension of its significance and meaning there. The communion deplores the evil imposed on them by unavoidable necessity, and is struggling hard and successfully to rid itself of the evil. The desire to introduce the congregation into a more active part in worship has doubtless been a moving consideration with its advocates. This is the accepted reason for concert reading in Kindergarten schools; the practice keeps the tired scholar still awake, and serves, also, to train in reading. But it is a sad confession by the church of spiritual weakness and decline, that it resorts to kindergarten expedients to keep the spirit of devotion awake in its appointed order of worship, and the church is not a Sunday school to train the ignorant in the art of reading. The endeavor after concert in pitch and syllabic time in imitation of this school-training exercise, shows indeed how instinctively the devout ear shuns the confusion and discord of voices each on its own key and with its own time; but the truly devout spirit can never rest satisfied with a rite that is neither good reading nor good singing, in fact but of a mongrel nature, observing some of the forms proper to each, but violating other fundamental laws of both, an illegitimate, characterless, altogether irrational procedure. For it, there is no necessity. By means of wisely selected and varied song in chant and in tune for metrical hymn and psalm, every object desirable to be obtained in this novel rite can better be accomplished. In these days of general culture there is not, or need not be, any lack of sufficiently trained voice. Simple song in fact is of easier attainment than the plainest reading. The interests of piety demand that every child of the church, rather than every child among the people, so far as is possible, be, as a thing of prime importance, trained to participate in this important constituent of worship. Providing with diligent care that music never be suffered to become a mere performance and exhibition of artistic skill, the church can devise no more powerful attraction to its services, and no more engaging means of interest in them, in a word, no better improvement in its methods of devotion, than by drawing upon its unused resources in sacred song.

ARTICLE VIII.—PROFESSOR PHELPS' "THEORY OF PREACHING."

The Theory of Preaching—Lectures on Homiletics. By AUSTIN PHELPS, D.D. Late Professor of Sacred Rhetoric in Andover Theological Seminary. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1881. Pp. 610.

PROBABLY no name could add more weight, or insure a wider reading, to a treatise of this kind than that of Professor Phelps. For thirty-one years an efficient instructor in the department of Homiletics, he brings to the preparation of this volume the garnered wisdom of age and experience. The book is welcomed and read with eagerness and profit not only by those who have been Professor Phelps' students at Andover, but by hundreds of others who have been indirectly acquainted with his thorough and practical system of instruction.

Not all parts of the work will prove of equal interest to the average pastor. The portion which treats of the application of rhetorical principles to the preparation of sermons must, of course, traverse about the same ground as the numerous other treatises on the same subject, and in much the same way. It would be hard to say anything really new in this department of Homiletics. The general idea, the constituent parts of the sermon, and the way in which these parts are to be adjusted and developed, so as to realize the idea of the sermon as an "oral address to the popular mind, upon religious truth contained in the Scriptures, and elaborately treated *with a view to persuasion*" (p. 21), occupy in their discussion more than two-thirds of the volume. Anyone who has received a course of homiletical instruction must have passed over very much the same range of thought as is here presented.

But this fact does not render this part of the book wanting in interest to the trained and experienced preacher. There is a vigor of treatment and a freshness of illustration which clothes the old themes of class-room instruction with a new life. The subject is elaborated in all its details, but the terse and forcible

language and the aptness and profusion of the suggestions insures the reader's sustained attention throughout. Many will think beforehand that they can hardly afford the time to read a hundred pages on the Text, its Uses, Sources, etc., or as many more on the qualities of the Introduction and Proposition, but few, having begun, will stop reading until they have finished all that is written on these subjects. We are always reluctant to begin a book on a familiar and hackneyed theme, but there is nothing which interests us more, when once we have discovered it, than a fresh, suggestive treatment of such a theme. Such a combination of the old and the new is especially agreeable. We like to meet an old friend in improved health.

The style of the book is itself a good example of those excellences of composition which it commends to the preacher in the preparation of his sermons. It is clear and pointed, abounding in short sentences, without being blunt, diffuse without being redundant. What is a still greater merit, every page is full of suggestive remarks, introduced incidentally and without any appearance of digression, which concern the *matter* of preaching and even of theology. These suggestions are always germane to the subject under discussion but they also have a value quite independent of the theme which they are designed to illustrate. Here, for example, is an excerpt taken almost at random :—

"If the Bible be an inspired volume, it is inspired for a purpose. If inspired for a purpose, it is divinely fitted to that purpose. If fitted to that purpose, it is a compend of the truths most necessary to the world in all time. Distinctions of past, present, and future do not destroy its pertinence as a whole. Much more inspired truth has been uttered to men than the Bible contains. The Bible is God's selection from the accumulated archives of inspiration. Its histories, its biographies, its liturgies, its psalms, its doctrines, its precepts, its prophecies; its pictures of character, divine, angelic, and human; the secret life with God which it portrays; and its disclosures of the eternal worlds,—are all selected fragments, put together for a purpose, like a mosaic." (p. 52.)

The scope of the book is that, we suppose, which strictly belongs to a treatise on Homiletics. Its chief aim is to discuss the sermon. The Text, Introduction, Proposition, Division, Development, and Conclusion are treated at great length with both rhetorical and practical ends in view. The book is

not merely a treatise on Sacred Rhetoric. It does far more than merely rhetorical principles to preaching. It aims to consider the entire range of conditions upon which depends the effectiveness of the preacher's words. It combines therefore, in an eminent degree, the practical with the scientific. It reminds the preacher often of what he must be, as well as of what he must know and feel, in order to preach with success. Without seeming to be giving much advice, the book is really full of it, and of the most practical and stirring sort. Take this which falls in naturally after some comments on the "Bible Service," in illustration:—

"Supply your libraries at the outset with the best works in biblical literature. Do not spare your purses in so doing. Wear the old coat, and buy the new book. Incur any hazard or hardship, but those of debt or dishonor, to get your outfit of tools to work with. You must have them early in your ministry if you are ever to use them. Your wedding can wait but your library cannot. Then systematize your biblical studies and give yourself to them religiously. Let the garden go unweeded and let the potatoes rot in the ground. Get rid of church councils, and building committees, and executive miscellanies, so far as you honorably can. Leave the social dinners, and the pleasure-parties, and the regattas, and the operas, and the fast horses, to those who need them. Say you, with Nehemiah, to the messengers who tempt you to such things: 'I am doing a great work, so that I cannot come down; why should the work cease whilst I leave it and come down to you?'" (pp. 218, 219.)

With all our appreciation of the larger and more strictly homiletical part of Prof. Phelps' volume, we venture to think that those lectures which concern more prominently the matter of preaching than its form, will command the deepest interest on the part of the average pastor. We allude especially to those lectures, which under the general head of "The Conclusion," discuss the causes of weakness in a preacher (XXII-XXIV) and to the lecture on Ministerial Culture (XL). In this connection also the Appendix on Homiletical and Pastoral studies is well deserving of mention.

Of especial interest in their bearing on the Theology of the Pulpit are pages 477-496 which fall within the thirty-third and thirty-fourth lectures, and which of practicable and impracticable theology in preaching. Prof. Phelps reminds us (p. 477) that some theologies cannot be preached. They may be formulated in creeds or taught in the theological class-room.

They may even find some justification for the speculative intellect. But in contact with actual life they must give way. They cannot be made practicable in preaching. This theology includes such doctrines as limited Atonement, the imputation of Adam's sin, and the two-fold will of God, secret and revealed, in reference to the salvation of men. Such dogmas as these can never constitute a working theology. They are "not rational elements of persuasion in preaching."

"A working theology must possess three elements—freedom from contradictions to itself, consonance with the necessary intuitions of the human mind, and harmony with the Scriptures as a whole as the unlettered mind reads them." (p. 478.)

In this connection the author touches upon a point which seems to us to be of the utmost importance to the forcible presentation of the gospel, and at the same time, to disclose one of the profoundest tendencies of modern theological thought. He teaches that to construe the gospel under the forms of such dogmas as the sinner's absolute inability to repent until the Lord grants him his time and the mission of the truth to harden the impenitent heart, is to rob it of its moral power, because it leaves it no longer a moral system at all.

"The misfortune of these distortions is that they cut the pulpit loose from strictly rational uses of anything in preaching. They do not belong to a moral system at all. Under the gloom of such theories, hearers are not proper subjects of the appliances of persuasion. Persuasion, how? Persuasion by what? Persuasion to what? Nothing in the system gives intelligible answer. Man is no longer a moral being, in God's image, susceptible of right motive, of holy choice. Under the dead weight of such a system of government,—I cannot call it "moral" government,—men are no more proper subjects of right influence by the instrumentality of preaching than so many oak trees." (p. 481.)

Dogmas like those just alluded to are built almost wholly upon physical analogies. They are attempts to express moral and spiritual truths in terms of mechanics. Conceiving the influence which God exerts upon human hearts as a physical force compelling a definite and invariable result, it concludes that where God exerts that influence, conversion results, and hence where conversion does not result, God withholds the power. Considering sin as a physical cause binding the will and the affections as gravity binds a body to the earth until

some one by simple causal efficiency lifts it, it concludes that men cannot repent until God grants them the ability to do so. And so throughout the whole range of theology. Under the reign of physical analogies, the matchless mystery of divine love which we call the Atonement, becomes a mechanical substitution of Jesus Christ for man in punishment, and to one under the dominion of this theological physics no heresy is so shocking as to deny this sort of substitution, and to insist upon the inherent vicariousness of the divine love. All these distortions of Christian doctrine can be defended by a merciless logic, if their presuppositions are admitted. This whole group of dogmas has a strict logical unity. They have but one fault—but that a grave one—they are not true. They are based upon a false view of God's nature and government. We hear often in the danger with which physical science threatens theology. The danger lies solely in the persistence with which theology clings to physical conceptions and insists upon construing its truths under physical and mechanical analogies.

The pulpit must keep step with the profound tendency of modern theological thought in discarding these modes of presenting spiritual truth. It cannot begin so much as formerly with some abstract, philosophical theorem, but must take as its first and foremost theme, the life and work of the personal Christ. This, we take it, is really what distinguishes the "evangelical" method of preaching, as Prof. Phelps calls it, from those methods which begin with some philosophical presupposition from which is developed a theology which is impracticable as a means of persuasion.

It probably did not fall within the range of Professor Phelps' work to discuss the relation and proportion of the doctrinal and personal conceptions of Christianity in preaching. It seemed to us almost strange that in speaking under five heads of the "evangelical theory" of preaching, nothing should be said specifically about presenting the personal Christ, though doubtless this is implied throughout. To us this would seem to be the chief point to be specified and dwelt upon. The practical working of the pulpit is Christology. As the life of Christ is the consummate revelation to man of what God is, so should that life be held up to every needy, despairing soul as

the object of admiration and love, and the pledge of hope. The first effort of the preacher is to explain the meaning and enforce the truth and certainty of the actual life in this world of One who was more than man; whose character and teaching are the very expression and truth of what God is for all who will love and trust him; whose greatest power was his love, and whose crowning glory was his more than human tenderness and self-sacrifice. When we have made Christ real to the despairing soul, we have revealed hope, and have shown that life is not after all barren of meaning and sweetness, and that the world is not after all a "charnel house with specters, but God-like and our Father's."

We believe that the importance of the personal conception of Christianity should be more insisted on—that conception of it which regards no doctrinal thesis, but Christ himself—his life and character as the basis and centre of the gospel, and the constructive force of the gospel's work among men. No other conception so reveals the unity of all Christian truth. As the solar system finds its unity in the fact that the centre is the sun whose attractive forces holds every member of the system in its place and course, so do all the elements of divine truth find their true unity in the character and personality of Jesus. This unity is close and organic. The gospel is no longer a set of philosophical questions; it is a consistent body of truth, all the elements of which find their common ground and center in the personal life of the Christ.

Any cardinal Christian truth may be taken in illustration of these statements—the truth of atonement, for example. How often have we seen men culling out a passage here, or a phrase there, in order to establish some view of Christ's sacrificial work, instead of turning first to the study of the life and character of Jesus, out of whose heart the atonement was born. The study and explication of the atonement ought to begin with the study of Christ. All that is written in the Scriptures for our learning on that subject will take its place about him, and find in the actual life he lived, and the death he died, its explanation and justification.

So, also, the presentation of the personal Christ in preaching is essential to the simplicity of the gospel. "The simplicity

that is in Christ," is one of Paul's profoundest phrases. The simplicity is in him, and it can be possessed in his truth only as that truth is constantly referred back to his character and life, and interpreted in their light to the soul. Take the doctrine of faith, for example. Any one who has read much theology on this subject, and observed the long psychological program of exercises which is often prescribed for a sinner on his way to peace with God, must have thought that faith was anything but a simple thing. And so it is, when expounded as a doctrine. But when seen to be trust in a person, the commitment of the soul in loyalty and love to Christ, nothing is simpler. If faith is preached as consisting primarily in acceptance of propositions, however true, it is a struggle with mysteries; if it is preached as the clinging of the heart to a personal Saviour, it is the key with which the mystery of Christ is unlocked to the heart. The preaching of personal loyalty and love to Christ as the one thing needful, is the only preaching which makes Christian character simple and real, and which leaves nothing strange or magical about the Christian life.

We would suggest also under this point, that the conception of the gospel which makes its center Christ himself, is the only one which gives completeness to Christianity. The life of the church, and of the individual Christian, are incomplete embodiments of the Master's spirit. All theologies, all expositions of religion, are fragmentary and imperfect. They are partial because they seek to reduce to statement what can, at best, be only imperfectly formulated. The fullest expression of spiritual truth can find place only in life, and its highest expression is the life of Jesus. All theologies, all formularies, are true in proportion as they keep near to him. He is the corrective of theology. Without him we could have scarcely more than a philosophy of God, great and wise perhaps; satisfactory enough to the speculative intellect, but still cold, abstract, and quite too vague to meet the wants of the heart.

This digression is designed only to suggest a practical line of thought in our judgment of great homiletical importance, which may be followed out in extension of Professor Phelps' observations on preachable and non-preachable theologies.

This part of the book can not be too heartily commended for its forcible and useful suggestions.

The concluding lecture on Ministerial Culture, is of equal value and interest. Attention is forcibly called to the widening distance between the ministry and the masses in England, Scotland, and America.

"We are creating vast organizations of lay-laborers, Sabbath-schools, mission-schools, mission-chapels, young men's Christian associations, colporters, Bible-readers, etc., to reach the masses of the people, because of the admitted fact that our pulpit, as administered to our own wants and tastes, does not reach them." (p. 579.)

With the explanation that the cause of this gap is an over-educated ministry, our author has no sympathy. Its cause, on the side of the ministry, is rather a lack of consecrated culture; a lack of "subjection of the personal tastes, which high culture creates, to apostolic and Christ like motive." This state of things finds its explanation in a misuse of wealth and culture. Culture is made quite too much a luxury, not a power.

"Ignorance is a remedy for nothing. Imperfection of culture is always a misfortune." "The cry should be, not 'less intellect, less study, less culture,' but simply, 'More heart, more prayer, more godliness, more subjection of culture to the salvation of those who have little or none of it.'" (pp. 584, 5.)

The appendix, entitled "Homiletical and Pastoral Studies," must not be passed without mention. It comprises twenty-five groups of topics appropriate to pulpit discussion and traversing every range of theological thought from the doctrine of the Being and Attributes of God to questions of Church Polity and Sunday School work. The larger part of these topics will not, we think, be found *directly* useful in the pulpit, but they will be suggestive and helpful in guiding the minister's private studies and so will be of incidental and indirect service. Indeed this is their primary purpose.

"The chief value of them is found in the hints which they give of the range of study which is open to a studious pastor in the direct line of his professional work,—a range which the studies of a life-time cannot exhaust." (p. 589.)

We commend the attention of readers to this appendix. It cannot fail to stimulate a spirit of inquiry. Let one take up, for example, the list of topics which centres in the subject of

the inspiration of the Scriptures, embracing such questions as these: "Does the popular conception of inspiration need revision?" "What is the most useful line of argument in the popular treatment of inspiration?" "What is the bearing of inspiration on the literary character of the Bible?" Such lines of thought as these queries suggest must rouse the earnest and inquiring mind to its best efforts of investigation and thought. If a preacher finds himself drifting into pulpit commonplaces in the choice and treatment of themes, let him turn to this appendix and take a few of its suggestions, almost at random, and he will find himself in possession of seed-thoughts for more sermons than one to which he will have but to supply the conditions of growth.

A recent writer* complains that no satisfactory treatise on Homiletical Science has yet appeared from the pen of an American author. It would be difficult to guess what qualities would be demanded in a treatment of this subject to render it satisfactory to one who had read Professor Phelps' thorough and practical treatise. This judgment may have been recorded before the work under review appeared. The book does not profess to treat of pastoral duties except so far as they are involved in the preparation of the sermon. An equally thorough treatment of this branch of Pastoral Theology would, no doubt, require a volume as large as "*The Theory of Preaching*." But as a treatise on Homiletics proper, it leaves little to be desired. It is no book of recipes for good preaching; and yet, it is eminently practical in its aim and spirit. It is no hand-book of commonplace advice, but is thoroughly scientific in its treatment of its themes. Moreover, it is adapted to the times, is keenly conscious of the special dangers and needs of our age and country and hence will be a source of suggestion and inspiration to many a student and preacher.

* In *The Independent*, Art. "American Scholarship and the Science of Homiletics," by Rev. E. E. Thomas. Nov. 3d, 1881.

ARTICLE IX.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

GODET'S DEFENSE OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH.*—These lectures were delivered by Prof. Godet in reply to attacks on the Christian Faith in Neuchatel, where he resides. Though delivered almost immediately after those to which they are a reply, they present the results of life-long study of these subjects by their learned author. The subjects of the seven lectures are, the Resurrection of Christ, the Hypothesis of Visions, the Miracles of Christ, the Supernatural, the Holiness of Christ, the Divinity of Christ, the Immutability of the Apostolic Doctrine. They are written in a popular style and are well fitted for general reading. The high reputation of the author renders further commendation unnecessary.

THOUGHTS ON THE GOSPELS.†—Mr. Upham is already favorably known as an author. This work has the characteristics which secured a favorable reception and commendatory criticism for "The Wise Men." The style is clear and agreeable, and the thought original and fresh. His arguments, however, are sometimes inconclusive, he urges what must have been, instead of what was, oftener than critical scholarship can approve, and his suggestions, which are often ingenious, are sometimes fanciful. The book is interesting to read and awakens thought.

DR. STEBBINS ON THE PENTATEUCH.‡—This volume is substantially a reprint of articles published in the *Unitarian Review* in

* *Lectures in Defence of the Christian Faith.* By Professor F. GODET, author of Commentaries on St. Luke, etc., etc. Translated by W. H. Lyttleton, M.A., Rector of Higley and Canon of Gloucester. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co., 900 Broadway. pp. v. and 320. Price, \$1.25.

† *Thoughts on the Holy Gospels.* How they came to be in manner and form as they are. By FRANCIS W. UPHAM, LL.D. Author of "The Church and Science," "The Wise Men, Who they Were," and "The Star of our Lord." New York: Phillips & Hunt. Cincinnati: Walden & Stowe. 1881. pp. 378. Price, \$1.25.

‡ *A study of the Pentateuch for popular reading*; being an inquiry into the age of the so-called Books of Moses, with an introductory examination of recent Dutch theories as represented by Dr. Kuenen's "Religion of Israel." By RUFUS P. STEBBINS, D.D., formerly president, lecturer on Hebrew Literature, and Professor of Theology in Meadville Theological School. Boston: George H. Ellis, 141 Franklin street. 1881. pp. 232. Price \$1.25.

1879 and 1880. It contains a review of Kuenen's "Religion of Israel;" and a study of the Pentateuch in three divisions: Introduction, External Evidences, Internal Evidences. He reaches the conclusion that the Pentateuch belongs to the Mosaic Age, and "fixes the authorship upon Moses and his contemporaries and immediate successors." Dr. Stebbins had opportunity for special study of the Old Testament in his professorship at Meadville, and presents arguments of much force, both from external and internal evidence. He examines the miraculous events recorded in the Pentateuch only as they bear on the date and authorship of the books. But he takes pains to declare that "we have no conclusive proof that the wonderful things there recorded are true."

THE SPEAKER'S COMMENTARY, VOL. III.*—In this volume Rev. E. N. Gifford, D.D., expounds the Romans; Canon Evans, I. Corinthians, and the remaining books comprised in this portion of the Commentary are interpreted by other clergymen of the Church of England. The reader will be disposed to turn with most curiosity to the Galatians, which is explained by Dean Howson, whose studies on the Life of St. Paul constitute an important qualification for the handling of the critical points suggested by the Epistle. Connected with Ch. ii. is a long additional note on Paul's journeys to Jerusalem. The several exegetical books which comprise this work, which is popularly designated "The Speaker's Commentary," are of quite unequal merit. As a whole they fail to justify the expectation raised by the original announcement of the series.

ECCE SPIRITUS.†—This is not a thorough, profound, or comprehensive treatment of the subject. The Spirit seems to be the general principle of right living; it is conformity to law, or the adjustment of life to its environments—the environments being regarded as divinely ordered. Christ is merely a man; he died a martyr in fidelity to his principles. Sin is maladjustment. Redemption is effected by the divine spirit or law, exemplified in Christ; faith in whom draws the believer into moral conformity with the laws of the universe. No account is made of Christ's

* *The Holy Bible*, with a Commentary, etc. New Testament, vol. iii. Romans to Philemon. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1881.

† *Ecce Spiritus*. A Statement of the Spiritual principle of Jesus as the Law of Life. Boston: George H. Ellis, 141 Franklin street. 1881. 238 pages.

resurrection or of miracles. Yet the work breathes a devout and serious spirit. The author's eulogisms on Christ seem greater than his theory of Christ's person and life warrants. The style is animated and pleasing; and the book abounds in suggestions and hints and glances of insight which will pay for its reading.

THE ORTHODOXY OF TO-DAY.*—This volume contains six sermons on the Churches and Creeds; Does Orthodoxy misunderstand God? Forgiveness and Suffering; Imperfect Theories of the Future Life; Negative and Positive Elements in the Conception of the Future Life; Social Immortality. They were prepared to answer objections against Christianity in a local newspaper, and are printed in the belief that they may meet the same objections in other localities. They carry out the type of progressive thought indicated in the author's previous volumes and are like them in vigorous and scholarly thought. The author says, "The view of the Atonement which is suggested in the third discourse seems to me to be in harmony with the truth of Christ seen and welcomed by many minds who have been awakened by the touch of Dr. Bushnell's magic thought to simpler and more purely moral conceptions of the work of Christ; while, at the same time, the cross is regarded as in some real sense necessary for the satisfaction of God's own nature in forgiving sin; and therefore I shall not, I trust, be found to have missed wholly the truth hidden in the heart of the older, sacrificial theology."

ANTHROPOLOGY; BY TYLOR.†—This volume is designed as an introduction to the study of Anthropology for use in a course of education. It avoids technical details and deals with the subject in an elementary and compendious way. The author is a high authority in the science, and the volume gives the results of the latest investigations on the several topics so far as it professes to treat them. The work is crowded with information and will be interesting to the general reader. It treats of Man ancient and modern, Man and other animals, Races of Mankind, Language,

* *The Orthodoxy of To-Day*. By NEWMAN SMYTH, Author of "The Religious Belief," and "Old Faiths in New Light." New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1881. xi. and 189 pages. Price, \$1.25.

† *Anthropology*: An introduction to the Study of Man and Civilization. By EDWARD B. TYLOR, D.C.L., F.R.S. With illustrations. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1, 3, and 5 Bond street. 1881. pp. xv. and 440.

Writing, Arts of Life, Arts of Pleasure, Science, The Spirit World, History and Mythology, Society. It contains 78 illustrations.

BUDDHA.*—The author says he has devoted nine years to the study of Buddhism. His object in this work is to show that the agnostic Buddhism, which is atheistic and teaches the ultimate annihilation of every man, is a later development of the original gnostic Buddhism. This he supports from an investigation of Buddhist writings, history, ritual, and all other sources of information. He seems sometimes fanciful and extravagant. He thinks he can show that Buddhist missionaries "evangelized America in the fifth century A. D. and persuaded King Quatzal Coatl to abolish the sacrifice of blood;" and he says that Paul seems to have held the idea that "the higher Buddhism and the higher Christianity were the same religion." The book is interesting and contains a great amount of information as to Buddhism.

RICHARD GRANT WHITE'S ENGLAND WITHOUT AND WITHIN.†—This volume, which relates, in quite a glowing style, the pleasant impressions made upon the author during a somewhat extended visit in England, appears at a time when it probably will have a very favorable reception. There has been no period, for many years, when there has been a disposition among the American people to regard England with such friendly feeling. The sympathy extended to us in such a generous and unfeigned manner, from all classes in that country, at the time of the death of President Garfield, has done more to attach this country to England than any thing that has ever happened before. Mr. White's readers are prepared beforehand to sympathize with all the kind and admiring things he is disposed to say of our transatlantic cousins. Some of the papers which are here published have already appeared in the pages of the *Atlantic Monthly*, and all who had the pleasure of reading them there, we are confident, will be pleased to see that they are now to be preserved in a more permanent form. It is quite amusing to find that

* *Buddha and Early Buddhism*. By ARTHUR LILLIE (late Regiment of Lucknow). With numerous illustrations drawn on wood by the author. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 27 and 29 West-Twenty-third street, New York. xiv. and 256 pages.

† *England Without and Within*. By RICHARD GRANT WHITE. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1881. 12mo, pp. 601.

even Mr. White himself has occasionally been vexed at some of the manifestations of the rude spirit which characterizes *some* Englishmen. But we have all learned to make allowances for these special cases. There are plenty of unpleasant Americans; and now, when we meet with one of these gruff Englishmen, we are only amused. We set him down as exceptional, and study him as we would some wild animal.

APPLETON'S HOME BOOKS.—The Messrs. Appleton are publishing an attractive series of little illustrated volumes devoted to "Home and the Household." The subjects of the volumes already published are: Building a Home; How to furnish a Home; The Home Garden; Home Grounds; Amenities of Home; and Household Hints. Two new volumes have just appeared—Home Amusements and Home Decorations—which, from the number and character of their pleasant suggestions, are well worth the examination of all who value a bright, cheerful, and attractive home.

GALILEE IN THE TIME OF CHRIST.*—The author of this monograph, who is well known as a member of the Palestine Exploration Committee, has collected with praiseworthy zeal all that can be known in regard to the fertility and populousness of Galilee, and has come to the probably just conclusion that they have been underrated. Whoever wishes to obtain a lively impression of the province in which our Lord was born, and of many of the scenes of his earthly life will do well to read this treatise. It originally appeared, in substance, in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, but in its present form has received considerable additions. The distance of Galilee from Jerusalem necessarily made it provincial. The mixture of heathen inhabitants of which Strabo expressly speaks, whose testimony can hardly be set aside by a simple denial, obtained for it the name of Galilee of the Gentiles. Their language appears to have been somewhat peculiar either in its written or spoken form or probably both, and it is entirely credible that Nazareth was not exactly the sort of city from which the Messiah was expected to come. All this may be accepted in entire agreement with the author's main position in regard to the fertility of

* *Galilee in the Time of Christ*. By Rev. SELAH MERRILL, D.D. With an introduction by Rev. A. P. Peabody, D.D. Boston: Congregational Publishing Society, 1881. 16mo. pp. xiii., 150.

Galilee, and the patriotism, industry, intelligence, and morality of the inhabitants. A valuable list of books pertaining to the subject and a full index closes this worthy contribution to theological literature.

THE INCARNATE SAVIOUR.*—The author aims to narrate in a popular form the chief events in the life of Christ and to show how these bear on the doctrines of the Incarnation and Atonement. He assumes the truth of the evangelical history and of its ordinary interpretation in the evangelical churches, avoiding critical questions. His aim is not to give a full narration, but to bring out the leading inferences for those who accept the facts. The successive chapters might have been sermons on the life of Christ, and as such they are of great excellence. Their thought is fresh, their style attractive, while their simplicity and spiritual richness make it a valuable work for religious reading.

SCRIBNERS' "CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR."—Messrs. Charles Scribner's Sons have commenced the publication of a series of small volumes under the general title which we have given above. They have been prepared with great care from original documents. Four volumes have already been published: *The Outbreak of Rebellion*, by John G. Nicolay; *From Fort Henry to Corinth*, by M. F. Force; *The Peninsula*, by Alexander S. Webb; *The Army under Pope*, by John C. Ropes. Each volume is supplied with plans of battles and all necessary maps, and when completed the series will prove one of the most valuable contributions to the history of the war which has been yet made.

THE ART AMATEUR.—In the December number there are no less than fourteen pages of practical designs for china painting, wood carving, art needlework, painting on silk, "etching" on linen, etc., etc. George R. Halm and others will continue to furnish for 1882 designs for menus, ball programmes, fans, kettle-drum cards, etc., etc., and leading artists will contribute original designs for ladies' dress. The suggestions for Home Decorations will be especially valuable. The price of *The Art Amateur* is 35 cents monthly, or \$4 a year. Montague Marks, publisher, 23 Union Square, N. Y. City.

* *The Incarnate Saviour*. A life of Jesus Christ. By the Rev. W. R. NICOLL, M.A., Kelso, Scotland. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 520 Broadway. 1882. x. and 360 pages.

A new volume of the *MAGAZINE OF ART* commences with the December number. Among the Articles in this number is a sketch of the life of an "American Humorist in paint"—William N. Beard—with beautiful illustrations taken from his paintings. This Article is the first of a series of papers on our American artists which is to be furnished in 1882. Among the other attractions of the year are to be a series of biographical accounts of representative British and Continental artists; and illustrated papers on remarkable windows, at home and abroad, in cathedrals and other edifices, by artists of the past and to-day. A series of illustrations of English park scenery, in the December number, is particularly fine.

Cassell, Petter, & Galpin, New York. Price, \$3.50 per year.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Houghton, Mifflin & Company, Boston.

The King's Missive and other Poems. By John Greenleaf Whittier. 99 pp.

Geo. H. Ellis, Publisher, Boston, 1881.

The Duties of Women. A Course of Lectures. By Frances Power Cobbe. 193 pp.

Roberts Brothers, Boston.

Modern Society. By Julia Ward Howe. 88 pp.

G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

Sir Richard Whittington, Lord Mayor of London. By Walter Besant and James Rice. 222 pp. 12mo.

The Literary Life. Edited by William Shepherd. Authors and Authorship. 258 pp.

The New Infidelity. By Augustus Radcliffe Grote. 101 pp.

D. Appleton & Co., New York.

Saints and Sinners (Noirs et Rouges.) From the French of Victor Cherbuliez, author of *Meta Holdensis*, etc., etc. 111 pp.

The Art of Speech. Vol. II. Studies in Eloquence, Logic. By L. T. Townsend, D.D., Professor in Boston University. 261 pp.

Florida for Tourists, Invalids, and Settlers. By George M. Barbour. 210 pp. 12mo.

A World of Wonders; or, Marvels in Animate and Inanimate Nature. With three hundred and twenty-two illustrations. 496 pp.

The Verbalist: A Manuel devoted to Brief discussions of the right and the wrong use of words, and to some other matters of interest to those who would speak and write with propriety. By Alfred Ayres. 220 pp.

Appleton's Home Books. Home Amusements. By M. E. W. S., author of "Amenities of Home," etc. 152 pp.

Home Decorations: Art Needle Work and Embroidery. Painting of Silk, Satin, and Velvet; Panel-painting and Wood-carving. By Janet E. Runtz-Rees, author of Horace Vernet, etc. With numerous designs, mainly by George Gibson. 120 pp.

Anson D. F. Randolph & Co., New York.

My Bible Study; for the Sundays of the Year. By F. R. Havergal. 61 pp.

Our Saints. A Family Story. By Rose Porter, author of "Summer Driftwood," etc. 264 pp.

A. S. Barnes, New York.

Worship in Song; A selection of Hymns and Tunes for the Service of the Sanctuary. By Jos. P. Holbrook, Mus. Doc., Musical editor of "Songs of the Church," etc. 444 pp.

Robert Carter & Brothers, New York.

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From the Nile to Norway and Homeward. By Theodore L. Cuyler. 357 pp. 12mo.

Phillips & Hunt, New York.

Commentary on the Old Testament. Vol. VI.—Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Solomon's Song.—Book of Job. By J. K. Burr, D.D.—Book of Proverbs. By W. Hunter, D.D.—Book of Ecclesiastes, and of Solomon's Song. By A. B. Hyde, D.D. D. D. Whedon, LL.D., editor. 557 pp. 12mo.

Young Workers in the Church; or, The Training and Organization of Young People for Christian Activity. By Rev. T. B. Neeley, A.M. 218 pp.

Fords, Howard & Hurlbert, New York.

Shakespeare: For the Young Folks. A Midsummer Night's Dream. As You Like It. Julius Cæsar. Edited by Robert R. Raymond, A.M., Principal of the Boston School of Oratory. 224 pp.

Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

Campaigns of the Civil War—III. The Peninsula. McClellan's Campaign of 1862. By Alexander S. Webb, LL.D., President of the College of the City of New York, etc., etc. 219 pp.

Campaigns of the Civil War—IV. The Army under Pope. By John Codman Ropes, member of the Massachusetts Historical Society, and the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts. 229 pp.

The Conflicts of the Age:—1st. An Advertisement for a New Religion. By an Evolutionist.—2d. The Confession of an Agnostic.—3d. What Morality have We Left? By a New Light Moralist.—4th. Review of the Fight, by a Yankee Farmer. 90 pp.

THE
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ARTICLE I.—THE NEW ENGLAND FAMILY.

WHY the *New England* family the subject of this paper? Because it is a historic family; it is the root and seminal principle of American civilization. The ideas born and nurtured in it are permeating this whole nation. Fifty millions of people have received a social, political, moral, spiritual impulse from it, and the end is not yet.

The peculiarities of such a family deserve to be better understood. Also if there are any agencies threatening the stability and best interests of the family in this highly favored portion of the land, they should be exposed. It is evident that some changes, anomalous and difficult to explain, are taking place in the population of New England.

As the family is the natural source of increase in population as well as the fountain head of social and national prosperity, a careful study into the influences that affect this institution and the changes which are being wrought in it cannot but be profitable.

It may be well to notice first, certain general principles in Physiology which have a direct bearing upon the subject. This science is comparatively of modern growth and may justly be said to be in its infancy, as it respects some important applications.

Once Physiology was studied chiefly with reference to disease and individual health,—its relations to public institutions and the welfare of society generally not being well understood. Within forty or fifty years the relations of Physiology to education have received much attention, and more recently, special interest has been awakened in respect to its bearings upon hygiene. The more thoroughly this science is investigated in its varied relations to human welfare, the more extensive will be found its applications, as well as valuable its results. But in respect to the family and the laws of human increase, the principles of this science have not been investigated or applied as they should be. It requires no argument to prove that physiological laws have a most direct and intimate bearing upon both subjects. While the laws of population and the family institution have been discussed from different points, the laws that govern the human body in multiplying the species have not as yet been properly investigated and explained. Here physiology is destined, we believe, to achieve its noblest triumphs.

The most distinguished writer on population, T. R. Malthus, makes very little account of this science. In all his discussions touching changes in population, its increase and decrease, there is no allusion to the operation of the laws which govern a human organization. The science of physiology was scarcely known in his day. The two most important English writers succeeding Malthus—M. T. Saddler and T. Doubleday—laid more stress upon physical organization, but failed to establish any general principle. The course pursued by Herbert Spencer and Charles Darwin is very different. Yet while they have made important discoveries in Physiology, and discussed its application in a variety of ways, the laws that govern population and the family institution have received from them very little consideration. We venture to submit here a general law or principle on this subject. At this time we can

present only the substance of this law, referring the reader to papers in which it is more fully discussed by the writer.*

This law is based upon a normal or perfect standard of the human system—where every organ in the body is complete in structure, and performs all its natural functions. This implies that the body is symmetrically and well developed in all its parts, so that each organ performs its proper function in harmony with all the others.

While this perfect physiological standard may only rarely be found there are approximations to it in great numbers, some much nearer than others. The fact that the law is based upon physiological organization does not preclude the influence of other agents, such as climate, food, government, etc.; but these factors are secondary. Also, in carrying out this law, it is presupposed that other conditions, such as age, sympathetic union, and mutual adaptation of the married parties are favorable.

With such an organization there will uniformly be found—provided no laws of nature are violated—not only the greatest number of children, but they will be endowed with the highest amount of physical strength, health and mental capacity. On the other hand, let the body be developed to extremes in either direction, towards a predominance of nerve tissue with a large active brain, or towards a predominance of the lymphatic muscular temperament; either extreme will be found very unproductive of well organized children. This normal standard of physical development applies also to the brain. It is of the highest importance that all parts of this organ should be well developed and their functions harmoniously performed.

This is especially necessary in respect to the marriage relation. Whatever differences of opinion may exist among physiologists as to the functions of the brain, on minor points, it is

* *The Laws of Human Increase.* Quarterly Journal of Physiological Medicine. April, 1868. D. Appleton & Co., New York.

The Physiological Laws of Human Increase, Vol. 21. Transactions of the Amer. Med. Asso., 1870. Philadelphia.

Lessons on Population suggested by Grecian and Roman History. Cong. Quarterly, Oct., 1871. Boston.

Lecture on Hereditary Influences before Mass. Board of Agriculture, Transactions, 1872. Boston.

The Normal Standard of Woman for Propagation. Amer. Journal of Obstetrics, vol. ix., April, 1876. Wood & Co. New York.

generally agreed, that the social and domestic affections have their seat in the lower posterior portions, while the moral and religious depend upon the upper portions, and the intellectual upon the frontal lobes. To ensure the perpetuity and the best interests of the family, all the parts or all the faculties of the brain must coöperate.

Connected with those views two important considerations should be borne in mind. 1st. That exercise increases the parts, physical or mental, which are used, while neglect of exercise diminishes them. Thus a constant change for the better or the worse may be going on in the organization and character of an individual.

2d. The establishment of a general law of population affords an explanation of the laws of inheritance. These spring from the former, and constitute one general plan; for without a general law or guiding principle these hereditary influences cannot be correctly understood, or successfully applied. It is through the brain that mental qualities are transmitted; and by the adoption of a normal standard of physiology applied both to the body and the brain, the laws of inheritance become intelligible. The physiological laws which have been considered in respect to population, hold an intimate relation to the family. The more thoroughly this science is investigated, the more extensive and practical shall we find its principles as applicable to every day life. It will enable us better to understand individual peculiarities, and the relations we sustain one to another, especially in domestic life.

This will appear more and more evident in the discussion of the subject now before us.

The value and the permanency of the family as an institution cannot be too highly estimated. It is indispensable to all civilized society.

It is the nursery of the church, and no people or nation can prosper long without it. Wherever in the history of the world a people have attained the greatest prosperity, or advanced to the highest civilization, there the interests of the family have been most sacredly guarded and preserved. It was so in the prosperous days of Greece and Rome. The same facts were true in regard to the Jewish nation.

In Great Britain, from its earliest history to the present time, the family has been looked upon with a sacred reverence. Civil authority has surrounded it with the strongest safeguards, and the church has regarded it as of divine appointment. On nothing have the affections of the English people centered more than on the home, and nowhere else have the relations of the family been more permanent than in the land of our fathers. The greater the culture and refinement, and the stronger the religious element, the purer and more sacred has been the tie that has bound families together.

Such is this institution in Great Britain at the present day, and such was its character among the Puritans in the early history of New England. The family stood with the church in the respect and affections of the early settlers. The relation of husband and wife, of parents and children, was held as most sacred. The mutual interest of the parties in these relations generally lasted through life, their sympathies growing stronger and their attachments more tender. For two hundred years the homes of New England were well nigh models. The families were generally large and lived in a kind of patriarchal style. The government centered in the united head of the family, was usually administered in kindness and in accordance with high Biblical principles. Seldom was there a separation between the husband and wife, or was there discord among the members of a family. The instances of breaking away from parental authority were rare, and it was not often that a son or daughter turned out badly in life. The fruits of good discipline, faithful instruction and early training, in the family were every where visible.

In the history of no people probably can there be found better illustrations of well ordered families than for two hundred years were found in New England. While the religious training was prominent, the education of the intellectual was carefully attended to, and the social and domestic affections were most wisely developed.

But the New England family is not the *same* now that it was two hundred or one hundred years ago. Changes that deserve careful consideration are taking place in respect to its character and permanence. That we may better understand

these changes and the dangers that threaten the family, let us inquire briefly what is its true foundation—what its primary objects? The family has a two-fold foundation—the sacred Scriptures and man's physical organization. The Bible teaches that this institution was established in Eden, and all through the Old Testament and the New, it is regarded as the cornerstone of the church and State,—in fact it was itself the early church and State. The family in all places in the Bible is treated as of divine appointment. The family institution is based also upon physical laws which are a counterpart of Revelation. These laws always harmonize perfectly with the revealed will of God, when both are correctly interpreted. Independently therefore of the Scriptures, or of any divine teachings, or examples, we believe the necessity of such an institution as the family can be proved from physiology alone.

There are fundamental laws in this science which clearly point in that direction, and cannot otherwise be correctly understood or properly observed. Moreover, it may be proved that the race cannot be perpetuated in its best estate or highest development, without such an institution.

Taking this view of the subject, we shall find the applications and observance of these laws to be of the greatest consequence.

What then are the teachings of Revelation and Science as to the primary objects of marriage or the family? The teachings of the former are briefly stated or summarized in works on the subject, in formulas of marriage, in liturgies and prayer books, by both the Protestant and Catholic churches throughout Christendom, as follows: 1st. The production of children. 2d. The preservation of chastity; and 3d. Mutual company and help.

That these simple propositions constitute the primary objects of marriage can be substantiated by the testimony of writers of the highest authority connected with all the leading religious denominations both in this country and in Europe. The experience of family life in Christian nations where there has been the greatest amount of culture, morality, and piety, confirms also the truth of these statements. It may be added that these propositions are not antiquated or superseded; that

whatever religious changes have taken place, or modern fashions have been adopted by society, the objects and relations of the family remain the same. Many changes have been made in society which may be considered real improvements, but it is not so with the family ; its laws are fixed and unchangeable. But it is not left for the sacred Scriptures alone, nor even experience to prove the truth of the propositions here stated. The laws of the physical system afford the strongest possible evidence.

Such is the construction of the organs of the human body, including the brain, and such are their functions, that if exercised normally, they are adapted to secure all of the objects here specified. If there is a real defect in structure or function in any part of the system, or if there is a failure in securing either of the objects stated, it goes so far to weaken or impair the marriage relation. It matters not whether this occurs through ignorance or design, these laws cannot be violated with impunity. If this violation of law is designed with a motive prompting to it, and a will sanctioning it, the injury is not merely physical but a most serious one to the mind, and destructive of moral principle. Let such violation be often repeated and long continued, and the injury to the body and the whole spiritual nature is incalculable. No one but a physiologist can fully appreciate it, or forecast its consequences.

Nowhere have these primary objects of marriage been secured in a higher degree than among the earlier settlers of New England. Nowhere has the marriage relation been happier, more permanent, and attended with better or greater results. But has there not been within fifty years, a wide departure from the examples and teachings of these settlers? Has there not been a marked deterioration in the sacredness of this relation, and have not the influences and motives leading to the formation of marriage sunk to a lower plane? In short, have not the primary objects of marriage been more or less lost sight of, and the relation been considered very much in the light of mere partnership, intended to promote simply the convenience and self interests of the parties? If a change of this character has been made from what may be considered a normal, healthy, religious basis, to one abnormal, artificial, and selfish, it is very evident that its fruits or results must prove unfavorable.

The family as an institution must be based mainly upon the domestic affections, guided by the intellect and controlled by the moral sentiments; otherwise the relation cannot be either happy or permanent.

But a change in this respect has been gradually taking place among a large class in New England. The cause of the change is a greater diversity in pursuits, modes of doing business, the powerful influence of fashion, a higher style of living, and a more artificial state of society.

The general introduction of foreign help, we believe, has had in a variety of ways an injurious effect upon the family. It has caused that all kinds of domestic service—extending to that performed by the members of one's own family—is looked upon generally as menial and degrading. Once American girls in large numbers were employed to do house-work, which not only educated them in the best possible manner to perform all such duties, but at the same time improved their constitution and gave them physical strength.

No kind of work or exercise is so well calculated to develop all parts of woman's physical system, as housework. The variety of it, being always at hand, and suiting itself to one's convenience, would seem to indicate that nature expressly designed it for the healthy development of woman's constitution. In this way not only good health and a knowledge of domestic duties are obtained, but also the best fitness and qualifications possible for the relations of the family.

Few American girls can be found at the present day who are willing to engage in domestic service, and those living at home do only the lighter kinds of work,—the harder portions being performed by their mothers or hired help. By neglecting work in the kitchen and the home, and seeking pursuits that tax chiefly the brain and nervous system, the young woman changes not only her habits and character, but her organization. Large numbers from five to fifteen years of age are confined in school, and have very little time for work or exercise. Thus the brain and the nervous temperament of the young woman become unduly developed, and she fails to secure that physical strength and stamina which are indispensable for discharging the duties and responsibilities of the family.

As a result of this change of physical organization and of supreme devotion to brain development, pursuits and objects of interest are sought away from the home. Thus a desire is created for a more artificial life, a higher style of living, and hence a multiplication of wants.

To such an extent have these things gone, that there is set before the young New England people a higher and more expensive standard of living than the majority have the physical strength or pecuniary means to support. Young men contemplating marriage and finding they cannot adopt this standard of living, are compelled to postpone it till they can obtain the means, or they give it up entirely.

When matrimony is seriously contemplated, its delay usually multiplies these obstacles, and the plan fails of completion. Those who postpone it are exposed to many temptations, and often find that the habits formed in single life become fixed, so that when they do marry, the relation does not prove what they expected, and instead of a happy or perfect union, unpleasantness and discord mar their life. Also those who enter upon married life early encounter many difficulties. They must live in boarding-houses, or at hotels, or have rooms in one place and take their meals at another. In case they commence house-keeping, finding they cannot live in just the style they wish and have their wants gratified, they resort to more rigid economy and closer calculations in expenses. The questions of personal comfort, of fashion and self-interest, have a controlling influence. For preventing or reducing expenses, a sharp eye is had to those things that cost the most, rather than to what is most useful in making a virtuous, healthful and happy home. With too many young women the fashions of the day and the attractions of society have more influence than the duties and enjoyments of home. The monotony and confinement of domestic life become irksome, its cares and labors burdensome, so that no increase of numbers can be encouraged. The least change in that direction is looked upon as so much additional care, bondage, and expense. By this and other means, the foundation of marriage is transferred from the domestic affections to the selfish sentiments and the intellect. What must be the effect of such notions on the conduct and character of

individuals? Do they not tend to make them more selfish and weaken the domestic ties? While these remarks may seem to reflect more particularly on women, it is not so intended; man is a party and partner in all this.

Again: What is the effect of this change in respect to the primary object of marriage, viz: the production of offspring? This is no trivial question. Language cannot express its importance in its bearings upon the family. All that we can do here is to state a few facts and inferences.

For half a century or more the birth-rate in New England has been steadily diminishing, and for the last twenty or thirty years much more rapidly than at any former period. Our birth-rate is now lower than that of any European nation except France, and when confined to the American class, it is lower than that of France.

The birth-rate and the death-rate are approximating in New England, so that it is very questionable whether in many places there is any increase of population among native New Englanders. The increase is confined almost wholly to the foreign element. The birth-rate among the Irish, Scotch, English, and Germans is twice as large as among the Americans.

Among the foreigners are many large families, and only a few married couples without children; whereas among the Americans there are many married people who have no children, and very few that have large families.

What a contrast do the families of the present day present to those of one hundred years ago, in which were eight, ten, twelve, or more children? In 1875 a census of Massachusetts was taken by families, which brought out some striking facts. While the number of foreign families is much the smaller, they report a large majority of the births. In tables representing the number of children at different ages in American and foreign families, there is a surprising contrast. In the former there are only a few large families, and many consisting of only one, two, or three persons. The census reports at that time in Massachusetts 359,009 families; of these, 23,739 consisted of only one person; 115,456, of only two, and 140,974, of only three persons.

While the census does not report the number of children in

these three classes—making in the aggregate 279,569 families—it is evident that there were very few. The great body of the children must belong to 79,446 families, constituting the balance. A large proportion of this class of families is undoubtedly foreign. As to the increase of population reported by the census and other authorities, we are in danger of being misled. If no foreign element had ever settled in New England, or if this class could now be entirely eliminated, the changes in population would be far better understood. It would be seen at once what the increase is and whence it came. It would develop a class of facts, we apprehend, that for a civilized people, has no parallel in history.

There is another way in which both census and registration reports may deceive us. These documents base their tables or figures upon nativity and not upon nationality. Some registration reports have endeavored to distinguish between the two classes, so that reliable data might be furnished showing the relative growth; but finding so many difficulties in the way it is now generally abandoned.

Thus the transition from foreign to American is rapidly taking place in New England. All born here are called "Americans." It should be borne in mind that the census, in reporting the largest class of families in Massachusetts as consisting of but three persons, includes the foreign element in the count. If this enumeration of the families in the State had been confined to the original settlers, it would make quite a difference. It is unfortunate that the real facts in the case cannot be obtained. Few persons are aware how rapidly this foreign element is increasing in New England. In several of the States the annual registration reports have returned for years a majority of the births as being of this class. The school children in nearly all the cities are composed largely of those of foreign descent. The "Catholic World," published in New York, estimated in 1877, that nearly seventy per cent. of all the births in New England belonged to Roman Catholic families. That estimate seemed large at the time, but it is undoubtedly too small now. Since then over 100,000 Canadian French have come into New England, who abound in children. It is estimated that foreigners compose but a little more than one-quarter of the whole population.

There is another test of the family institution which indicates a deterioration. Within twenty or thirty years there has been an alarming increase of divorces in New England. These are confined almost entirely to Protestants and native Americans. The statistics on this subject have been carefully collected and tabulated for a series of years. It appears by these tables that divorces have been steadily increasing in all the New England States. The latest return (1879), is as follows:

One divorce in Connecticut to eight marriages; one to nine in Rhode Island, one to thirteen in Vermont, and one to fifteen in Massachusetts. As Maine and New Hampshire have never published any official reports of divorces and marriages the exact ratio for these States cannot be given. But from partial statistics obtained, and from other sources, it is very evident that they make no better showing than Vermont or Massachusetts. The records of the courts show also that about one-fourth of those applying for divorce fail to obtain it on account of adverse evidence or opposing facts developed in process of trial. From the large number of divorces and the exposure it makes of personal and private matters, the presumption is that there must be many more families where discord and variance exist, but they decline to bring their troubles before the public. It should be stated that most divorces are obtained within a few years after marriage, and generally there are few or no children, even if the parties have been married many years. It should also be stated that among no other people or nation, at the present time, do we find divorces to such an extent; and at no former period in history have they ever been so numerous, except in Greece and Rome, shortly before their downfall, and in France a little after the French revolution.

Why should there be in New England so great a prevalence of divorces? It might be supposed from the social, educational, and religious influences existing, this would be the last place where the family, the most important of all our institutions, would thus be broken down. It does not arise from any alteration in the laws, for the demand came first, and as the appeals became more urgent and numerous, legislation has been changed or modified in their favor. Divorces have greatly increased in several of the Western States where society is con-

stantly changing, and things generally are in a more unsettled condition. It might be expected that there marriages would be hastily formed and on too slight an acquaintance. But in the State of Ohio we find a singular development of facts. As these have a most significant bearing on several points under discussion, we quote the following statement from a lecture given Feb. 25, 1881, by Rev. S. W. Dike in the Monday course of lectures at the Tremont Temple, in Boston.

"In the Western Reserve, comprising the twelve north-eastern counties of Ohio, settled mainly by emigrants who went from Connecticut long before that State entered upon its new departure in divorce, and containing, it is said, a purer New England stock than can be found in the entire country, unless it be in parts of Maine; the ratio of divorces to marriages was 1 to 11.8 for the two years 1878 and 1879, while in the rest of the State it is 1 to 19.9. Nor is the worst of the Reserve in the cities. The ratio in Ashtabula county, among a farming people originally from New England, is 1 to 8.5. And in Lake county the proportion of divorce suits begun to marriages is 1 to 6.2, and of divorces granted, 1 to 7.4. Unless there be like counties in Maine, this is the worst county in divorces in the United States, except Tolland county, Connecticut, as that was for a few years. But if you go down to Gallia county, peopled with Welshmen and Southerners, the ratio is 1 to 50, and in Coshocton, 1 to 47.2. The divorce rate in these counties of the Reserve is several times what it is in these and other counties. I am told, too, that the birth-rate in Ohio is lowest where the divorce rate is highest. It is said that the people of these counties are the most intelligent and virtuous of any in the country, and that the law-abiding citizens of the Reserve go to the courts for divorce, while those in other counties do not."

In the same State and under the same laws, why should there be this difference in the ratio of divorces? Why should there be one divorce to every *six* marriages among the "most intelligent and virtuous" people in Ohio, while there is only one in *fifty* among the less cultivated and refined portions of the same State? It should be borne in mind that the people occupying that part of Ohio designated "Western Reserve" are in their origin New Englanders, transplanted to a richer soil and a more

widely extended territory. They are understood to have New England religious principles, educational advantages, and domestic habits. But these people are generally composed of the second, third and fourth generation of those once emigrating from Connecticut. After so many years, and so long a separation, why should the family there partake of the same character as in Connecticut, in respect to the fewness of children? May not the reasons be the same as in New England—a departure from the primary object of marriage, but especially a radical change in woman's physical organization?

No satisfactory explanation of these facts about divorce can be given only as we refer them to a physical cause. Changes in the laws, differences in religious character, in educational advantages, and family training, cannot account for them.

The second object of marriage is chastity. Many things show that marriage now fails to secure this object to the extent that it should. That adultery is brought forward so prominently among the charges against one of the married parties to obtain divorce is pretty sure proof. In Massachusetts this charge is proven in more than one third of the divorce cases; in Rhode Island and Connecticut, about one third, and in Vermont, one fourth, making for the whole, full one third. In the attempts to obtain divorce, it is well understood that adultery is a difficult charge to substantiate in court, so that if the crime is actually proved in one third of all the cases, there is reason to believe that licentiousness prevails extensively, not only in married life, but far beyond those bounds.

While it may be difficult to show to what extent or in what way marriage at the present day fails to secure chastity, there are some practices bearing on the subject which are alarming. That licentiousness is actually increasing in New England, it may be difficult to prove by facts and figures, but that covert vice of this character in certain forms is positively increasing, would be the testimony, we believe, of the most competent judges—especially of members of the medical profession.

In order to obtain evidence on this subject, the Rev. S. W. Dike, of Vermont, instituted lately the following experiment, which we give in his own language. In his lecture on "Divorce," given at Boston, Jan. 24, 1881, Mr. Dike says: "I sent

a list of questions to a hundred or more gentlemen in nearly all parts of New England—mostly judges, State's attorneys, lawyers, police officers, large numbers of physicians, and specialists, with a few clergymen. Nearly all responded. About seventy letters are of value for the purposes of classification. These cover probably one hundred towns and cities, giving the opinions of nearly two hundred persons who were consulted in their preparation. I form, so far as these letters go, the opinion that there is probably less of open and coarse vice of certain kinds in many respectable country towns than there was seventy or eighty years ago; very likely less than there was fifty years ago. But with this exception which covers but a part of our country towns and occasionally a city, as correct a summary of opinion as I could give would be like this: In three-fourths of the localities reporting on this point, licentiousness is said to be increasing. In nearly as many, the destruction of unborn life goes on as fast, or faster, than ever. Physicians are very emphatic on this point, and many speak with great indignation of the wicked practices of some church members. In one half the places licentiousness and drinking are found together, while one quarter report more licentious than intemperate persons in their communications. Nearly all find this increase among the native population."

Few persons are aware how extensively this "destruction of unborn life" is carried on even in what are considered the better classes of society. But the "arts of prevention" which are also being extensively employed are a far more dangerous foe, not only to the family, but to the virtue and purity of the community. They open in a covert way the flood-gates of iniquity. If violations of law are encouraged in married life, and found to be safely practiced there, the same things will be attempted outside and the primary object of marriage will be defeated. Methods that have long been employed in France have become not only well understood here, but improved upon by Yankee skill and ingenuity. Besides the viciousness and criminality of such practices, their evil effects upon physical organization are incalculable. Every physiologist who has given the subject careful consideration will testify to the truth of this statement. The very existence of the family is imper-

illed, we believe, more by these practices than by all other agencies combined.

In the present state of society there is another way in which licentiousness is increased. In consequence of the reduction of the marriage rate, and postponement of the time of marriage, we now find a much larger number of persons of both sexes, at a marriageable age in the community than formerly. This increases the temptations to licentiousness, both within and without the marriage circle.

The fact has been well established by experience, that early marriages are the best safeguard to virtue and chastity. When we consider, in this state of society, how the "practices" referred to above, are thought to secure the violators of law from exposure, what powerful temptations are presented to the passions! Virtue and moral principle do not afford sufficiently strong barriers to restrain excited passions which, under such circumstances, can be so easily gratified. The eating of forbidden fruit creates a distaste for that which is pure and holy. The high and noble objects of the family institution are defeated; its true pleasures and enjoyments are lost, and mankind sink to a level far beneath that occupied by the brutes. Chastity violated carries with it a dreadful penalty. From this Nemesis no guilty one, man or woman, can escape.

As to the third object of marriage, "mutual help and company"—it is difficult to ascertain exactly to what extent this is secured. On account of the changes in the times and the different modes of doing business, men are kept away from their homes more than formerly. Such also is the competition in trade and the expensive style of living, that men are compelled to throw their whole energies into business, early and late, to the neglect of domestic duties. Such is the strain, the "wear and tear," upon body and mind, that men in active business break down early, especially in cities.

Thus the rate of mortality has considerably increased among this class, and there is also a greater number of widows than formerly. Also men and women are drawn away from their homes more now than formerly, to summer and even winter resorts, for society, rest, and recreation; and these places are often scenes of temptation. There are also lodges, clubs, con-

certs, and saloons, which draw together the people. The attraction in either case is stronger than the attractions of home. The influence that centres in these places is not always the highest, the taste cultivated not such as ministers to the wants of man's nobler nature. Many husbands spend much time in this way, which they could more profitably devote to their families. Much of their hard earned money is thus unwisely consumed. What they give to gild and decorate public places would make their homes a paradise.

While the introduction of foreign help into domestic service has its advantages, it is at the same time attended with many disadvantages. Its effect upon the family institution deserves far more consideration than it has received. One obvious effect of employing foreign domestic help has been to impair the constitution and health of New England women. This is a most serious injury in its relations to the family, and especially in its bearings upon the welfare of the race. It tends to prevent that training and education of the American girl in the kitchen and home duties, which are so essential in domestic life. Instead of learning in the kitchen the art of good cooking, the girl now finds it more convenient to study it in books, and to be taught it by lectures in school. But this mode of instruction frequently comes too late in life; besides very few even pursue this mode. Good housekeeping is a great home attraction. Economy, neatness, order, and good cooking are indispensable requisites to the health and happiness of a family.

In no way are the bonds of the family so firmly cemented and strengthened as by the comfort and happiness of the home; and these depend much upon the persons by whom household duties are performed. It may be said that the present mode of educating girls and giving them the advantages of greater refinement and higher accomplishments makes them better company and more fit to take charge of domestic affairs. But if this course of education impairs their strength and injures their health, how can such girls become practical housekeepers? Invalids make poor house-wives. In the marriage relation, a sound constitution and good health are of primary importance. The lack of these is one of the greatest abate-

ments to domestic happiness and furnishes a prolific source of trouble in married life. And when their importance becomes better understood, multitudes will be deterred by this alone from entering the marriage relation.

There are some general considerations that have an important bearing upon this subject. Registration reports show that the marriage rate has been, for many years, lessening in New England, and also that marriages are more frequently postponed to a late period in life. The census of 1870 reported that 54 per cent. of the adult population in Massachusetts were unmarried, and that only about half of this per cent. was under twenty years of age. This fact shows that a large number of adults in this State were leading a single life. If the foreign element could be eliminated from society, this proportion would relatively be much larger. The same fact applies to other New England States. The proportion of adults leading a single life is likely to increase. Such a state of society is abnormal, and operates in a variety of ways unfavorably to the family.

The causes that have led to this can in part be explained, but the remedies for the evil cannot so easily be applied. The elements, physical and mental, that constitute the family relations and cement and perpetuate them are not fixed quantities. They may become weakened or strengthened by our own acts; even radical changes in disposition and character may be effected by hereditary influences and thus be transmitted from one generation to another. Not only the family but the highest interests of the race are involved in these hereditary influences.

Formerly New England women found little difficulty in nursing their offspring; this is true at the present day with the English, the Irish, and the German women living in our country. But not more than one-half of our young New England mothers can now properly nurse their offspring, and this number is every year decreasing.

It has been said that this neglect arises from unwillingness on the part of mothers. This may be true occasionally, but it is not the rule. Inability, from lack of sufficient development of the mammary glands and the requisite power in the digestive organs, is the real cause. The nervous system has been

developed unduly, while the sympathetic, affectional, and muscular natures have been stunted. The failure to nurse offspring shows something radically wrong. The like of it, to such an extent at least, cannot be found anywhere either in history or among the women of any other race or nation at the present day. Evidently the divine office of maternity, woman's brightest crown, her grandest privilege, is here passing away. The laws of nature make supply and demand coëxtensive and inter-dependent. If mothers nurse their children they have and keep the power; if they neglect it, they lose the power. If they have lost the power some important law has been violated. There may be instances of natural infirmity, disease, defect, or idiosyncrasy of organization which account for the inability to nurse. Such cases are very rare and they excite no alarm. But when the inability becomes common, including perhaps a majority of married women, and is rapidly increasing, it may well awaken anxiety. If this goes on, what will the end be? What will the woman of the next generation and her successors become?

Connected with the inability of mothers to nurse their children, another change of vital significance is going on—there is dying out of our women the “love of offspring.” This love constitutes the noblest and purest of all the instincts or affections in woman. It was wisely designed by the Creator that this should become, especially in females, a leading feature in their character. Accordingly we find among the women of all tribes and nations this “love of offspring” very predominant, and the more enlightened and Christian a people are, the purer and stronger should be this affection. While this instinct is naturally one of the strongest, and is intended to have a dominant influence in life, the whole order of a normal, healthy state of society encourages and develops it more and more.

What could be more unfortunate than that we should find certain influences operating in society to stifle, suppress, and crush out this natural affection! The agencies so pernicious are not described in books, nor are they taught in schools, and very little talk is heard in society respecting them. Still they are all powerful, as much so as self-interest and fashion can possibly make them.

There seems to be a settled determination among many New England women approaching or entering the marriage relation not to be troubled with the incumbrances of children, or at least, to make their number very limited. It is true this sentiment or purpose so unnatural, so unbecoming, is not proclaimed publicly, but it is well understood by the parties themselves, and it is the general sentiment of what is called cultivated and refined society.

They compliment those who have none or a very small number of children, while comments not pleasant or becoming to hear, are made respecting those who have large families or a goodly number of children. This we know is a grave charge, and may shock the sensibilities of some, and be repelled by others ; but we think it is true. Connected with the above is another most baneful sentiment which is gradually creeping into popular favor among young people—that the bearing and rearing of children belong to low life and are degrading. Whenever married couples in city or country town are blessed with several children, remarks or insinuations are frequently made reflecting upon them, implying that their life is vulgar and sensual. The manner and tone are more significant than the language. But the sentiment is not confined to verbal expression. It crops out often in a variety of ways, in the popular magazines and books of the day. How different the teachings and examples set before us in the Scriptures. How different the instructions and illustrations found in Grecian and Roman history. How different from the spirit and practice of the best society in Great Britain. And what a change in this respect between the women of the present day, and those of a hundred years ago.

The “arts of destruction and prevention of human life,” referred to in another part of this paper, are comparatively unknown among the Irish, English, and Germans of New England. But if the “arts” here practiced, with all their ruinous effects, could be brought to light, they would make a terrible revelation. If physicians should publish what they know on this subject it would make a shocking disclosure.

There is one place in particular where the maternal relation is brought to the test, and to which physicians are not unfre-

quently witnesses. We cannot describe it better than in the language of one of the oldest and most distinguished physicians in Boston who has had a very large Obstetric practice.

In the Dec. No. of the Boston *Medical and Surgical Journal* for 1879, Dr. A—— says: "In the early part of my practice the prevailing fashion and desire among married women were to bear children and rear families. They possessed the courage and were willing to suffer for such a boon. To be barren was considered among the Jews a curse of the Almighty, and many of our grandmothers cherished sentiments akin to this. *Tempora mutantur!* What physician at the present day has not had to hang his head for shame, and feel the strength of his moral indignation rise at witnessing the apathy or positive dislike—to use no stronger term—with which the first faint cry of the new born infant is received. I cannot say welcomed by the friends, and perhaps by the suffering mother! . . . I have never known an Irish mother, no matter how poor, or how many little ragged children around her, that did not receive every new born babe with emotions and expressions of gratitude as a blessed gift from God. This sentiment, however rudely expressed, has never failed to win my admiration, and I take pleasure in pointing it out as the finest trait of Irish female character."

What a contrast do these two pictures present? How tender and natural the latter,—how cold and heartless the former! If such is the reception of the infant at birth, what will be its care and treatment in life? Then if the infant is deprived of its natural nourishment at the breast, and is fed artificially, there being at the same time a lack of strong natural affection for children, it is not strange that infant mortality has greatly increased. It is the testimony of physicians that no one thing is so conducive to the health and life of the infant as a plenty of good breast milk, and this is generally accompanied with strong natural affection.

Again: If the love of offspring is constantly suppressed, and in the course of time in a great measure eradicated, what is to be its effect upon female character! Will it not destroy in a measure the family element in women! Nothing strengthens the ties between husband and wife so much as children; noth-

ing binds together a family so closely, and makes home so attractive as the parental relations. But if the primary object of marriage is defeated, soon the family will be a thing of the past.

In conclusion we remark that the foes described as threatening the New England family have not come suddenly into existence, nor do they rest upon the surface of society. There is a lack of that patriotism which leads one to endure pain and practice self-denial to people his land. There is a wide-spread spirit of luxury which makes both men and women seek supremely their present and personal enjoyment. There is too little of that high moral principle that prompts people to forget self and find their life in giving life and happiness to others. There is also too little value set upon the worth of an immortal soul. If parents can bring into existence and rear up for endless bliss a never-dying spirit, how great the privilege! But these considerations, so powerful in the early settlers of New England, have greatly ceased to influence our people. Selfishness, the love of ease and present enjoyment, and living for this world only have become dominant, and they have already wrought so much evil that a change in woman's physical organization is one of the results. And this effect now itself operates as a cause to hasten on the ruin which is impending the family.

Again : these foes are not the product of a true civilization, or of pure Christianity. They arise from direct violation of the spirit of the latter and the laws of the former. The most effective means of reform consist in exposing the origin of these evils, and their dangerous tendencies. The question may be asked, have not these evils already got such headway that they cannot be arrested? Certainly not. The family is not what it once was in New England, to be sure. The difference does not consist in numbers merely, but a failure in the unity and strength of all the relations which make the institution stable and prosperous. Considering the great importance of the family in its influence upon society, and human welfare, its purity and strength should be most sacredly guarded, and its welfare most earnestly sought. It may seem to some persons that the changes and dangers here described as going on

in the family are overrated. Such may be the impression of those who have never given the subject much thought or consideration, and who look only upon the surface of society ; but no one who has carefully watched for years the undercurrents of influence, and at the same time recognized the powerful agency of physical laws in the formation of habit and character, can be of that opinion. It is the change of women's organization, instinct, and character—and that too in the wrong direction—which clothes the subject with so much importance. But it is not the women, or family of the present, that alone suffer ; it is the *type* of organization—the hereditary tendencies that must be taken into account. These will be transmitted in an intensified form. The interests of the race and of generations are involved in the issue. It is *this* which gives the subject transcendent importance.

ARTICLE II.—HISTORIANS OF EARLY ROME SINCE NIEBUHR.

IN the year 1811, Niebuhr published his history of Rome. Rarely has it fallen to the lot of any man to exert so marked an influence upon succeeding historical investigation.

In spite of a style which was exceedingly monotonous and obscure, his work made at once a deep impression. His scholarship was so varied and profound, his theories so novel, and his style so dictatorial, that he accomplished a revolution almost without a blow. In some respects his work was written at a time fortunate for its own success. No historian of marked ability had possession of the field of Early Roman History. Gibbon's magnificent work was held as undisputed authority for the later centuries of the Roman Empire, but over the more debatable territory of the first three centuries of Roman history no one was supreme. There were historians of Rome from the earliest times, but these writers had never ventured to question the literal truth of Livy, Dionysius, and Plutarch.

This faith in the accuracy of early Roman history* was the delight of Cicero, Livy, and Tacitus. Neither Milton nor Bacon questioned it; and even Hume and Gibbon, who are regarded as sceptical historians, seemed to have placed almost implicit confidence in the recorded history of early Rome.

One or two French historians, in the early part of the last century, had published treatises calling in question the truth of early Roman history, but they are said to have found few followers. Those were the days in which Livy found willing subjects in his hearers and readers; when he rehearsed in confiding ears those stories, which are so familiar, of Romulus and Remus, of Horatius and Virginia, of good King Numa, and Tarquin the Proud. The field was therefore open, and Niebuhr invaded it with criticism so vigorous and radical that the effect was almost bewildering. It was the beginning of that

* Ihne's *Early Rome*.

crusade against so much that is romantic and beautiful in history, which has been prosecuted so widely ever since, and which promises to leave us hardly a tradition for entertainment or a hero for reverence. The spirit of Roman history ever since the time of Niebuhr has been sceptical. Arnold entered with his spirit and adopted his theories with the greatest enthusiasm. He looked upon Niebuhr as a scholar and critic, with a feeling akin to reverence. He regarded Niebuhr's historical intuition as almost more than human. In Arnold's own language he "tried to follow Niebuhr's example; to imitate, so far as he could, his manner of inquiry; to observe and pursue his hints; to practice his master-art of doubting rightly and believing rightly." He thought that Niebuhr "knew antiquity better than antiquity knew itself." Arnold's masculine and independent spirit would have refused to pin its faith blindly to the creed of any historical guide, and yet such was his admiration for Niebuhr that he differed from the great German only with extreme reluctance, and after the most cautious investigation; and even then, as he said, he always had the feeling that further research would have convinced him that Niebuhr was in the right. Niebuhr's peculiar theory as to the origin of early Roman history—which has been called the "ballad theory"—has entirely lost its hold upon the consideration of scholars, and is regarded as obsolete. Macaulay and Arnold entered into it with spirit for a time, but it is now referred to only as a curious and ingenious, but exploded, speculation. But the spirit of doubt and the canons of criticism, which originated with Niebuhr, have been predominant in Roman history ever since. For a long time his authority was unquestioned at Oxford, and it was only under compulsion and with reluctance that he was relinquished as a guide to Roman history. The spell of Niebuhr's fascination, says Freeman, in one of his historical essays, "is one which is not easily broken; it is in fact much more than a spell. The faith with which we looked up to him in our youth was exaggerated, but it was not wholly misplaced. His method, at once so destructive and constructive, is surely essentially sound."

Arnold prefaces the first chapter of his history with a passage from Sir James Mackintosh, as follows: "The old songs

of every people, which bear the impress of their character, and of which the beauties, whether few or many, must be genuine, because they arise only from feeling, have always been valued by men of masculine and comprehensive taste." He then goes on to give in order what he entitles the "Legends" of Romulus, Numa, Pompilius, and Ancus Marcius. Arnold evidently believed, as Niebuhr did, that the early history of Rome has no substantial foundation, but was the outgrowth of a number of highly imaginative songs or romances which were rehearsed by minstrels at the tables of the rich, sounding the praises or celebrating the virtues of distinguished men. After giving these "Legends," Arnold opens his second chapter as follows: "I have given these stories of the early kings and founders of Rome in their own proper form, not wishing any one to mistake them for real history, but thinking them far too famous and too striking to be omitted. But what is the real history in the place of which we have so long admired the tales of Romulus and Numa?" In taking up the history of the Tarquins, Arnold says: "Even for the second period upon which we are about to enter, we have no certain history; but a series of stories, as beautiful as they are unreal, and a few isolated political institutions, which we cannot confidently connect with their causes or their authors." . . . "We are on enchanted ground; the unreal and the real are strangely mixed together, and although some real elements exist, yet the general picture before us is a mere fantasy." Indeed Arnold was disposed to treat early Roman history more unsparingly than Niebuhr. The pupil surpassed the scepticism of his master. "Were I to venture to criticize the works of this great man," says Arnold, "I should be inclined to charge him with having overvalued rather than undervalued the possible certainty of the early history of the Roman commonwealth." Arnold believed that Niebuhr had restored and established far more than he had overthrown, and that he had rescued from scepticism much which less profound writers had too hastily given up. Niebuhr, it is true, stopped in his destructive criticism, far short of that extreme to which some later writers have pushed their views. He believed that a true history of Rome, with many details of dates, places, events, and characters,

might be recovered from the beginning of the commonwealth, but he did not believe that such a history could be found in the pages of Cicero, Livy, or Dionysius. It was not in their records of reigns and battles and civil institutions that he found Roman history, but only in certain deductions or inferences which he made from these. The stories of the Rape of the Sabines, of Horatius, and of many of the wars with the neighboring tribes, are hardly more than suggestions to him of certain facts in the social or political condition of the times. .

Macaulay entered with great spirit and confidence into this theory of the ballad origin of early Roman History and it was in illustration of these views that he wrote his "Lays of Ancient Rome." He sets forth his views at some length in the preface to the Lay of "Horatius," which I give with some freedom and condensation. He starts with the idea that it is our common experience that ballad poetry flourishes at certain stages in the progress of society. The Lay of the Niebelung, the poem of the Cid, and the minstrel poetry of Scotland, seem to indicate this. Cicero probably referred to some such verses when he exclaimed: "Where now are those old verses of ours which once the Fauns and Poet sang?"; and again he says, "Would that those verses were now extant which Cato in his 'Origines' tells us were sung at banquets many generations before his age, by guests, in celebration of the praises of distinguished men." Macaulay thinks that there was a vast amount of such minstrel poetry in existence among the early Romans; but that as manners grew more refined and a literature and literary taste began to be developed, these old ballads gradually fell into disuse and decay.

In his opinion Ennius, who was regarded as the father of Roman Literature, was in reality only the father of the second period of Latin poetry; and there was a literature as much older than Ennius, as Ennius was older than Vergil. That this ballad literature should have entirely disappeared, he regards as far from strange, when we remember that the Niebelungenlied, the Cid, and other similar poems, have barely escaped oblivion, even after the invention of printing: and he imagines that a search among the Apennines in Cicero's time, as diligent as that which Walter Scott made among the Highlands, might

have brought to light many fine remains of ancient minstrelsy. He thinks that discerning critics can still perceive in the early History of Rome numerous fragments of this lost poetry, and that the orators and annalists of late times borrowed from this ancient poetry the materials for their use.

No one could present this theory in a more attractive form than Macaulay, and undoubtedly his "*Lays of Ancient Rome*" have, by their beauty and naturalness, contributed somewhat to its support. And yet since the time of Arnold and Macaulay it has found hardly a single champion. Unfortunately for such a theory, the very portion of Roman History for which it was supposed to account is in most of its features exceedingly prosaic. Or if some romantic features can be found in it, there is certainly little which is more so than many scenes in the Annals of Tacitus, or in the life of Mary, Queen of Scots, or than large portions of the career of Napoleon. Niebuhr's theory "broke down in his own hands;" it was extensively modified by himself in the beginning of his second volume, and is now practically obsolete."

The next prominent and able historian of Rome was Mömmsen,—himself, like Niebuhr, a native of the little duchy of Schleswig Holstein. "To have produced two such historians, scholars and statesmen," says Max Müller, "would have been an honor to any kingdom in Germany; how much more to this small duchy." Mömmsen's History did not produce such revolution as did Niebuhr's. It was not possible that any succeeding history should produce such an effect; unless it be some work which shall establish the absolute and literal truth of early Roman History. It is however a work of vast research and learning and, in a literary point of view, stands far above Niebuhr's history. According to Max Müller, the fact that it was readable and has become a popular book, excited the wrath of many critics, who thought it beneath the dignity of a learned professor, to digest his knowledge, and give to the world, not everything which he has accumulated in his note books, but only what he considers really important and worth knowing.

Mömmsen's style is exceedingly fine. He has not the moral qualities which are so marked a characteristic of Arnold. In-

deed Freeman charges him with having no notion whatever of right and wrong; but in point of scholarship he is vastly Arnold's superior. That a German should be master of a style so rich and flowing, is certainly a matter for remark. In this respect he is removed by an immense distance from Niebuhr. "Niebuhr," says Freeman, "could not tell a story; he could hardly make an intelligible statement. His setting forth of his own opinions is so jumbled up with his citations and arguments, that it is no slight work to know what his opinions are. He pours forth the whole workings of his mind upon the subject and we cannot always tell the last stage from the first. Mömmsen, on the other hand, without troubling us with the process, gives us the results in the clearest shape. We should very often like to ask him his reason or authority for saying this or that: we never feel the need of asking him, as we should often like to ask Niebuhr, what it is that he means to say."

Mömmsen, though not adopting Niebuhr's peculiar theories, is nevertheless practically a follower of Niebuhr. For the essence of Niebuhrism is not so much the theory, as it is a deep seated suspicion and doubt as to the trustworthiness of the records of early Rome. Mömmsen evidently believes that the history of Rome, as handed down to us, is incurably false. He does not regard it as a narrative which may be reduced to a trustworthy record simply by toning down a few exaggerations, or rejecting a few evident errors. He looks upon it as a mere bundle of forgeries, so hopelessly infected with falsehood, that not the most skillful manipulation can take the text and reconstruct from it anything like an authentic history. The text of Roman History down to the time of the Gallic invasion he hardly regards as worthy of consideration. It is not deserving even of an argument to show wherein and to what extent it is erroneous. Unlike other historians who have expended great labor in analyzing the text of Livy and confuting or ridiculing his statements, Mömmsen ignores him or regards him as deserving hardly a sober thought. He accepts, it is true, some of the events of history; yet not in the relations nor with the significance which the Roman historian attached to them. As one might dig out the stones of a temple thrown down by an

earthquake, and covered with the dust and rubbish of ages, so Mömmsen tries to recover these isolated facts; to separate them from a mass of tradition and falsehood; and therewith to reconstruct, not the original edifice, but a temple of his own. The Kings of early Rome are as unreal and fantastical to him as King Arthur or Orlando. In reading his pages seldom or never do we come upon those names which are so familiarly connected with the early centuries of the city. He recognizes in that early history tribes and tribal relations, religion, art; but he knows nothing of any individual. The individuality of the kings is utterly ignored. He believes that kings did reign at Rome, not because Livy or Cicero says so, but merely because he discovers in the constitution of the Roman State evidences of this fact. But as to who the kings were, or what was the character of their reign, he has no knowledge whatever. He admits the bare fact that the last reigning family at Rome was of Etruscan origin, but says that the traditional story of the Tarquins is neither history nor legend and that the historical chain of events, in this instance, is not merely entangled, but completely torn asunder. He accepts many facts; he makes his own inferences and writes his own history. Indeed in reading Mömmsen's first volume, one feels that he is reading a profound treatise upon Ethnology, Philology, Religion, Art; but hardly a history of Rome. No historian has made use of Comparative Philology in dealing with the problems of history, with such learning and skill as has Mömmsen. So masterly is his use of this divining rod in tracing out the origin and early characteristics of the peoples of Italy, that one follows him in his dogmatic utterances, almost like slaves at the beck of an enchantress. There is an air of confidence about his style, which impresses one at times with the feeling that the writer was almost an eye witness of these pre-historic movements. Undoubtedly comparative philology is one of the safest and surest guides to the secrets of early history. This science takes us back to periods much earlier than those, even, which are in a measure chronicled by poetry and tradition. It is not the use of this means of investigation which surprises the reader of Mömmsen. One is rather charmed by his genius and success in this department of his work. Our surprise

arises rather from the fact that he uses this, and other methods which we might call inferential, to the exclusion of almost all recorded history in attempting to solve the problems of early Rome. But whatever his virtues or defect may be as the historian of early Rome, Mömmsen's star is undoubtedly in the ascendant. In broad knowledge and masterly grasp of his subject, he stands without a rival. And though perhaps time may not justify his thorough-going scepticism of early Roman history, yet as covering the whole ground from the earliest period down to the time of the empire, Mömmsen's history must long remain a work of the very highest authority.

A more recent critic of early Roman history is found in Sir G. C. Lewis, whose view are also substantially those of the German historian Schwegler. Lewis, like Mömmsen, assumes that the whole early history is fiction and forgery and almost utterly valueless. No one has pushed this criticism with more daring and skill than Lewis, and in his work on the "Credibility of early Roman History," he reaches the conclusion that a "trustworthy history of Rome does not begin before the war with Pyrrhus; that is to say, the second half of the fifth century after the foundation of the city." He accepts, as does Mömmsen, certain events as historical: e. g. the united kingdom of the Romans and Sabines; the three stem tribes; the addition of the plebs; and the overthrow of the monarchy; but all the details as well as the connection in which these events are placed by the historians, are probably invented. From the character of Lewis' work, which is professedly a criticism of the early history, he is under obligations to give us the grounds on which he discredits the recorded history of early Rome, as well as the method by which he assumes that this history originated. In regard to the first point it will be enough to say that he holds, that for four and a half centuries, if there were any records at all, they were of the most meager kind, and that whatever records may have been in existence were destroyed in the burning of the city by the Gauls. Having disposed therefore of all trustworthy records of the early centuries, how did a history so circumstantial in its character come into being?

Lewis seems to have penetrated and analysed the mental

characteristics of the old Romans with the last degree of nicety, and he evidently comes to the conclusion that they were a highly imaginative and poetic people—an idea certainly which has not generally been entertained in regard to them.

The four headings under which he classifies a large portion of early Roman history and by means of which he divines the real facts, are: "Legends," "Myths," "Aetiological Myths," and "Etymological Myths." Truly a formidable classification. Four centuries of Roman history, when sifted down, come to this. He distinguishes between a legend and a myth somewhat as follows: a legend has some historical occurrence as its foundation, which is handed down from one generation to another, especially in national songs, and which is decked out by the imagination, yet without any conscious design. The legends of King Arthur are properly so named. A myth, on the other hand, has not as its foundation an historical occurrence, but simply an *idea*, while the story is only the dress which the poet uses to bring his idea into view. Lewis following Schwegler holds that early Roman history contains both legends and myths in the sense explained above. "Brutus is a legendary figure. The battle of Lake Regillus is depicted in a legendary manner." As an illustration of the myth, he instances the way in which the different elements in the Roman national character—the military and political, on the one hand, and on the other, the religious—are derived by the historians from two original founders, one of whom, Romulus, arranges the military affairs of the State, and the other Numa, makes provision for religion and worship.

But the pure legend and myth will not, in Lewis's opinion, account for more than a small portion of the traditions of the early Roman State. He has another resource in the "Aetiological myth."

This myth, says Schwegler, is a story subtly invented in order to account for the existence of certain usages, institutions, monuments, etc. He holds that a great part of the early history which is occupied with accounts of the origin of law and religion, is simply manufactured, and is to be regarded as made up of myths of the Aetiological kind. Aetiology is defined as the science of causes; and Lewis holds that wherever a cus-

tom, ceremony, or institution, was found which seemed susceptible of an explanation, some fabulous account of it was given. This is a line of investigation which becomes fascinating in proportion as we indulge in it, but which is easily carried to a foolish and ruinous extreme. It is precisely this kind of reasoning which makes of Christ an unhistorical character, and regards him as simply the result of an attempt to account for certain moral and religious ideas which sprang up in society about that time. In a similarly ingenious way Archbishop Whately has done away with the historical Napoleon. Napoleon was simply the result of an attempt to account for certain financial fluctuations and political or military disasters in the English government about the year 1800. We find in the English language a large infusion of French words. In some way it has happened that the French language has left an impress upon the Saxon. If we should attempt to explain this by the story of the Norman Conquest we should be giving a fair example of Lewis's Aetiological Myth. Indeed this "myth" is a weapon altogether too facile and too magic in the hands of the archæologist. Its execution is too thorough. It explains too much, and there is little which it cannot be made to explain away.

But Lewis still has the Etymological Myth to fall back upon. This, as the word suggests, is the invention of stories to account for certain names, as e. g. the origin of the Tarquins from Tarquinii,—the building of the Tullianum, by Servius Tullius,—the idiocy of Brutus, and the story of Scævola with his burned right hand. Schwegler and Lewis admit an historical occurrence as lying at the foundation of some of these stories; but the dress they regard as fictitious. Much of the very early history of Rome, Lewis disposes of in this way. Romulus never lived. The reputed origin of the Romans from a concourse of people to the asylum opened by Romulus is of course rejected. Indeed, little but ocular demonstration will satisfy a mind so sceptical as that of Lewis. When he hears the story of Virginia or of Horatius at the bridge, he simply asks, "who saw them?" and thinks that the whole matter is disposed of.

Next to Lewis comes Wilhelm Ihne, Professor in the Univer-

sity of Heidelberg, who has set forth his views in compact form in a little volume called "Early Rome." He is substantially of the same school as Lewis and Schwegler; and yet at times he makes admissions and even advances claims which would go far towards satisfying the staunchest defenders of early Roman history. "What we contend for," he says, "is that the substratum of all these tales is real and not simply fictitious, and even where the detail is lost, the general character of the events, and the leading features, stand out with sufficient distinctness." He explains, however, much of the early history as falling under the head of myths in one form or another. Romulus and Tullus are the same, says Ihne; they are both warlike, both double the number of Roman citizens, etc. In the same way he regards Numa and Ancus as but one person. He discovers enough similarity in the acts ascribed to each to make him believe that one is but a shadow of the other. The first and second Tarquin are not only the same, but are also only Romulus and Tullus in other forms. But such a line of argument as this may be quite as fatal as the use of the Aetiological myth. If even striking similarities in the lives and acts of rulers, are to be taken as evidence that one is but a shadow of the other, or as ground for combining or rejecting two distinct careers, then history is but the plaything for ingenious antiquarians. There are few monarchs of ancient or modern times who have not had their counterparts. If we could imagine the records of the past twenty years confused or lost, what should prevent some smart historian in the year 2,000, from proving that Garfield was but the double of Lincoln. Each rose from the humblest walks of life to the Chief Magistracy of the Nation. That one was a canal boy and the other a rail splitter, has no significance; since the details in each case will of course have a different coloring. Each came to office in times of considerable popular excitement. That the excitement in one case was over civil war, and in the other over civil service reform, is an incidental matter which need not trouble the historian. Each met his death at the hand of an assassin and was buried amid the lamentations of the people. These are but a few of the resemblances which might be noted between the lives of these two men. Their very names were

substantially the same—Abram—Abraham. We venture the statement that no two kings of early Rome are more alike than James A. Garfield is like Abraham Lincoln. Such is the difference between tampering with the records of ancient history and modern history. In the former case the writer is an ingenious and able historian; in the latter he has lost his senses. Yet with Ihne for our guide, it is difficult to see how we can have any king in early Rome. The first king was a myth, and each succeeding one only a repetition of the original humbug—a sort of Monsieur Tonson, who persists in turning up again and again—an old friend with merely a new face. "The story of the kings" he says, "is unreal and improbable from beginning to end. Its whole plan, composition and arrangement bear the stamp of bold and clumsy fiction. And so all the way down to the capture of the city by the Gauls. Ihne criticises and rejects almost the entire frame-work of early Roman history.

The latest of these critics is Professor Seeley, Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge. In his attempt, which is apparently a futile one, to issue an edition of Livy, he publishes as a preface to the first book an introduction of nearly one hundred pages, in which he examines very fully the early history of Rome. After a destructive criticism of the regal period, he says: "Is it then possible to know anything about the early history of Rome? Nothing, I think from the history, books taken alone, and about that part of the history which deals with particular persons, nothing from any source." For his sources of information as to early history he depends upon comparative Philology, comparative Mythology, comparative Law, Archæology, and the later history of Rome. In the institutions and customs of later Rome, he finds much which is suggestive and from which he may make trustworthy inferences as to the condition of affairs in early Rome. But though Professor Seeley does not believe the Roman accounts of the institutions, laws, and conquests of the early state, he treats us to a somewhat extended and elaborate account of how the traditional history may have grown up. He admits that it is probable that a house of Tarquin's really reigned at Rome, but claims that for the most part the regal period is not truth, merely corrupted by passing from mouth to mouth, but fiction

from the beginning. Professor Seeley thinks that the two principal influences have been at work in generating early Roman history. The first he terms Euhemerism, by which he seems to mean the manufacturing of history out of Mythology. The second is the Aetiological influence already explained. His theory of Euhemerism he seems to apply principally to that portion of the record which precedes the founding of the city. But as Livy himself expressly refuses to indorse the traditions before that period, Professor Seeley's theory would be somewhat superfluous. The Aetiological argument he treats precisely as the other had done before him, making use of the same illustrations. He admits that "with Romulus the Mythological period of the history closes; the later characters may not be less unreal, but they can no longer be explained by Euhemerism." In Numa, Professor Seeley sees only an account of the foundation of a religious system. He exists simply as the explanation of certain religious usages (p. 40). After examining the history of the kings, Professor Seeley comes to the conclusion that it "*may* have been constructed artificially from the beginning." His "*may*" is a somewhat lame and impotent conclusion.

But after Seeley's deadly and ruinous assault upon the foundations of early Roman history, we are surprised to find how much, after all, there is left of the original structure. Instead of the mere fragments and relics which we might expect, we find on the contrary, according to his own conclusions, that the substantial outlines of the edifice remain. He closes his destructive criticism with a long list of what he regards as facts reasonably established in connection with early Rome. After he has distilled away the fable, and fiction, and tradition with which he considers the whole subject pervaded, the residuum is found to be a formidable array of facts giving a well-defined outline of the social, political, and religious constitution of the early Romans.

But the sceptics have not by any means had the field wholly to themselves. Niebuhr's extreme views produced a reaction, and even in Germany, Niebuhr and Mömmsen have met with sharp reviewers. One of the most vigorous of these is Prof. Ludwig Ross. He has no patience whatever, with his sceptical

countrymen, and he breaks out into bitter invective and ridicule at what he considers the perverseness of their learning. His satirical recipe for modern historical research is as follows: "What is unanimously handed down in the sources, accredited by contemporary monuments, and confirmed by the later history, is, for those very reasons, to be rejected as invented, or at least to be doubted and suspected; while, on the other hand, what cannot possibly be known, because it has not the shadow of testimony, is on that very account to be asserted, with the most confident assurance, as an indisputable fact."

A formidable champion of Early Roman History for English readers is found in Dr. Thos. H. Dyer, of the University of St. Andrews. He has written with considerable fullness upon this subject and is quite able to hold his own in point of scholarship against his opponents. His history of the city of Rome is a work giving evidence of wide and minute research. In his history of the Kings of Rome he has given a defensive criticism of the early history and has replied with great learning and ability to Mömmsen, Schwegler and Lewis. His reply to Professor Seeley is contained in a pungent little pamphlet in which he subjects the Professor's logic and scholarship to a spirited fusillade of argument and ridicule. There are three possible hypotheses which may be made as regards the early history of Rome: First, that it is wholly true; second, that it is wholly false; third, that it is partly true and partly false. Dr. Dyer proclaims himself a believer in the third hypothesis. "It would be absurd," he says, "to claim for a narrative coming down from comparatively rude and illiterate times, and in so fragmentary a form, the same historical authority which may be accorded, for instance, to the history of England during the last two or three centuries. All that we contend for, is that there is evidence enough to establish the main outlines of the narrative after the foundation of the city; to prove the names of the seven kings, the order of their succession, and the principal events of their reigns, and thus to vindicate the history from being, as some have called it, a mere phantasy, or from being treated as Dr. Mömmsen has done in his history, where the individuality of the kings is completely ignored.

Dyer begins at the very earliest period; examines the ques-

tion whether the early Romans were familiar with the art of writing; explains with great fullness all the sources of information with regard to early Rome, such as the *Annales Maximi*, the *Commentarii Pontificum*, the *Libri Augurales*, etc. In a thorough discussion of the subject he shows that these various books contained not merely a few meagre and barren records, such as superstition might suggest; but that they embodied a vast amount of intelligence with reference to the civil, military, and religious development of the State. He scouts the idea that there was no contemporary evidence for the history of early Rome. He admits of course, the destruction of many and valuable records in the Gallic conflagration; but shows with a reasonable degree of certainty that some of the most valuable did not perish, but were in existence at a much later period. Even Ihne excepts the capitol from the general destruction of the city, and admits that it is "possible that the ancient records were not so completely destroyed as the later annalists have reported." And even in those instances in which the original records were lost, it would be a strange thing if such a people as the Romans,—so proud of their family traditions and of the glory of their ancestors,—should not have made instant and vigorous efforts to replace, so far as possible, the lost history. Undoubtedly there would attach to this restored history hardly the value and authenticity which belonged to the original. But there can be no doubt that if efforts *were made* to replace the lost records it could have been done with a large degree of accuracy, and though some fictions and exaggerations would have crept into these new records, yet it is perfectly evident that the groundwork, the substantial facts of the early history could easily have been reproduced from memory.

Within the limits of such an Article it is obviously impossible to follow in detail the argument of the conservative historians. It is enough to notice that even the most destructive criticism, like that of Seeley or Lewis, leaves the framework of early Roman history substantially unharmed. In regard to all matters of politics, history, religion, the mind inevitably passes through various stages of fluctuation and change. The pendulum which in one century swings to the extreme of credulity, swings in

the next to the extreme of scepticism. So the battle is ever going on between liberty and tyranny, faith and unbelief. The nineteenth century is a period of marked reaction and revolt from all dogmas whether in science, government, or theology. "*In medio tutissimus ibis.*" A safe and tenable ground is doubtless to be found somewhere between the two extremes. If the first decade of Livy is not history, neither is Professor Seeley's labored introduction history, but the *baldest* conjecture. We shall have histories and histories of early Rome; but the historian who will tell the story in its final form, has not yet written.

ARTICLE III.—WHAT IS UNITARIANISM?

THIS question heads an article in the January number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, by Rev. Thomas Hill, D.D., LL.D., formerly president of Harvard College. The writer has made himself favorably known to the readers of the journal by able articles from his pen. I have read this one with special interest, partly because it is one of those historical and theological subjects which sets one to thinking, and partly because of its frank, clear, and attractive exhibit of the peculiar claims of Unitarianism.

One of the first descriptive statements is, that "Unitarians have always denied that, strictly speaking, they are a sect." Are they, then, the holy Catholic Church, and those the sects who dissent from them? This is the claim of the Papacy and the hierarchs. What is a sect? Webster says it is "a body of men united in tenets;" and that tenets means opinions, principles, doctrines. Have the Unitarians none of these on which they are agreed?

He says "they have no creed;" but adds later, "further than is implied in the name Unitarian Christians." Then he proceeds: "We adopt with all the strength of our minds and hearts the opening article of that old symbol: 'I believe in God the Father almighty, and in Jesus Christ, his Son, our Lord,'" and that "the fundamental creed of Unitarians is expressed most briefly in the baptismal formula." "Holding fast with earnest tenacity to these doctrines, we must show in what sense they make these three doctrines of Father, Son, and Spirit peculiarly their own." This is done by counting the Son a mere creature and the Spirit an influence.

"Equally marked is their difference from Orthodoxy concerning the great object of the Gospel." "They fancy that they see in the modern and moderate forms of Calvinism and Arminianism the notion that Christ came to save men from the penalty of their sins." It does not require *fancy* to find out that all true Calvinists and Arminians, modern and ancient,

moderate or extravagant, hold this notion. Do the Unitarians discard it? "They say that He came to save men from sin itself." So do the Orthodox. Will the learned author cite a sentence from any reputable Orthodox teacher in any of the Christian ages, that even implies that Christ did *not* come to save men from sin itself?

Another point on which the "Unitarian differs from what is called Orthodox Christianity, is the part which the death of Christ bears in our redemption." "The Orthodox interpretation of New Testament expressions concerning the death of our Lord, makes them refer to an action in the divine counsels." To what else can they ultimately be referred? Where else could our redemption start, but from God's eternal counsels of love? "The Unitarian interpretation makes them refer to an action in the hearts of men." So does the Orthodox interpretation, and insists that without it, redemption is impossible. Had the ex-president turned to that old manual, the Westminster Confession, he would have found how essential in Orthodox Christianity is this action in the hearts of men, regenerating, subduing, sanctifying "the whole man." The Orthodox teach the divinity of Christ. Would it not be a strange logic that should infer from this that they denied, or even did not teach his *humanity*?

But liberty is set forth as the "distinguishing characteristic of Unitarianism." "Perfect liberty is granted in the interpretation of the New Testament." Puritan Orthodoxy holds the same liberty in the interpretation of both Testaments, not as *granted by* any pope or college of cardinals, or conference, but from Him who made us, and gave us the book. "The original of this liberty was simply the Protestant ground,—reason against authority." Whose authority? God's? Then it is rebellion, not liberty. The Protestant ground is *agreement* with this authority and submission to it. Is it man's? Then the assertion is only a play upon words, putting one man's reason, notions, authority, against another's. But what is liberty, this "distinguishing characteristic of Unitarianism," this negation of authority? It has no force. It does nothing, only gives a chance. In itself it is mere emptiness. In a glowing eulogy at a late festival, George William Curtis said: "So absolute is

the spirit of liberty, which is the essential and vital point in what we call Unitarianism, that it has always been found impossible to reduce it to a formula." This is not strange. *Entities* can be formulated, but not emptinesses. It is just this kind of liberty, President Eliot says in his last report, "which makes the Harvard School practically unserviceable to the vast majority of young men who prepare for the ministry."

Yet Dr. Hill states: "The Unitarian believes that his perfect liberty, his entire freedom from authority, his ultra Protestantism, making every man his own judge of what allegiance to the truth requires, is the safeguard and assurance of the Christian faith." Does not this Unitarian *seem* to make himself thus the sole keeper of the common faith,—an Assurance Company, in behalf of humanity, for its purity and safety? Simple Protestantism makes every man his own judge of what truth is and what it requires. Nothing can do more, and nobody needs more. "*Ultra* Protestantism," "*entire* freedom from authority," means no government, insurrection, anarchy. Calvin states the Protestant doctrine of authority and freedom when he says: "In the kingdom of God, nothing but eternal truth is worthy to be regarded as authority," and that while "the fathers serve us they are not to have dominion over us." Puritan Milton puts it in the same clear light in his admirable speech for the "Liberty of unlicensed printing."

I do not see how Unitarian liberty can go beyond this without setting itself above law, and making the finite reason arbiter of the Infinite. Nor do I see how this kind of liberty can be the safeguard of faith. The writer himself admits that it cannot. "Some liberty-loving Unitarians, by the exaltation of liberty above truth, have been seduced into strangely paradoxical notions" and "novelties of errors,"—that "every account of a miracle must be rejected," that "physics is mistress and sole queen of the whole."

Dr. Bellows, in his letter to Professor Bruch, of Strassburg, says, concerning this class of liberty-loving Unitarians: "Theodore Parker * * must be considered as the head of the Free Religious movement. And" he adds, "it cannot be denied that Dr. Channing's influence contributed largely to the making of such men as Parker and Emerson and their successors; and

that his own spirit and direction were logically unfavorable to church institutions." A religious system, in historical fairness, must be judged of rather by the men it makes, than by those who make it.

Under this ægis of liberty the article informs us that "the Unitarians do not wish to quibble about such terms as Christ, or Messiah, or Logos, or Son." Will the writer tell his readers who of the Orthodox teachers do wish, or have wished to? Was Moses Stuart, who treated all these terms, a quibbler? Let his unanswered letters to Dr. Channing answer. "The Unitarian does not speculate much on such points." The *Christian Inquirer*, of New York, an able journal, told the public a few years since, that "even more than other sects, Unitarians are liable to suffer from theological speculation over the inspirations of evangelical tenderness. Most of our men are 'sicklied o'er by the pale cast of thought,' and not much stirred by the divine sparks of love." While Unitarians believe in God with all the strength of their minds and hearts, "they are indifferent to questions concerning theology." "They do not trouble themselves concerning the nature of Christ, whether he had any preëxistence,—or was literally the child of Joseph and Mary," and of God, only as being the best of the children of men. And this indifferentism seems to be set forth as proof that, with these "advanced thinkers," theology, the science of God, is going out of vogue, and more important scientific matters taking its place. Dr. Eliot, president of Harvard College to-day, takes a different view. In a late report he says: "Through constant changes in the direction of interests, theological themes remain the themes of supreme interest to thinking men."

May it not be from just this, *not troubling* themselves about theology and Christology, that so marked a change has come over the denomination in the last half century, their leaders being judge? A strong writer in the *Christian Examiner*, not many years back, said: "The wise among us tell us that the glory of learning is departing from our ranks. They mourn that, while educated men are slow to come to our ministry, uneducated men have no such reluctance. How few of the young preachers take interest in theological subjects, and most of those who

pretend to interpret, have but slight knowledge of the languages that must be dealt with." What these wise ones feared might come, *has come*, "that when the frail life of the Professor of Hebrew should end, the place must remain vacant for want of a man to fill it; or we must be mortified in seeking a man to fill it beyond our sect." C. H. Toy, LL.D., a trained Trinitarian Baptist, has just been chosen to the chair of Hebrew, in the place of Prof. Young, resigned, and "on the simple ground," says the President, "that he was the most eminent scholar in the Semitic language to be procured."

Another writer in this same Unitarian journal, said: "The secret of the weakness of Unitarianism as a body of doctrines, is its utter disjointedness. To launch its loose planks on the stormy sea of human thought, is to embark on a heap of boards for a cruise around the world. Unitarianism is a wood-pile, not a ship."

But the paper answers another question: Who are Unitarians? In my personal acquaintance, I have found them kindly and courteous, and number among them excellent friends and choice neighbors. Some of them have been royal philanthropists, able preachers, fine writers, and earnest workers. But it is the view Dr. Hill gives of them that we are to look at.

He says: "Every plain, straight-forward reader of the New Testament, who reads with reverent and obedient spirit, without gloss or comment, is a Unitarian." Are *all* such readers Unitarians? Are there no Unitarians except those who shun glosses and comments? If the reverent reading of the New Testament alone can be relied on to convert men to the Unitarian faith, how is it that the denomination expends so little for the circulation of the Scriptures without note or comment; one of their preachers says,—“they take little or no part in Bible circulation,”—and so much in gratuitous donations to Orthodox ministers and students of their own works, controversial and combative of Orthodoxy?

"The Unitarians believe that we know what the teaching and doctrine of Christ were more accurately and thoroughly than those of any other teacher of antiquity." Yet, when He says of those who will not be drawn by his love, "Depart from

me, ye cursed;" these "shall go away into everlasting punishment," language so plain that the great mass of reverent readers and scholars without gloss or comment, are agreed as to its import, they are perplexed; do not understand; do not know where they go, but guess it must be into some realm of the "uncovenanted mercies of God," and to the life eternal, at last.

"They have held that fidelity to the spirit of Jesus is incomparably more important than any intellectual interpretation of the doctrine." In this they are nothing but Old Calvinists. The Genevan teaches that without fidelity to Jesus, no interpretation of doctrine is of any avail. "They are interested and zealous for pure and undefiled religion." So are the Orthodox. "They insist upon the spirit of piety and charity as being in themselves the pearl of great price." So do the Orthodox. Dr. Channing, in his Baltimore sermon in 1819, says: "Among the virtues, we give the first place to the love of God." So does Calvin,—*"We say the beginning of piety is love to God."*

In his discourse at New York in 1826, Dr. Channing takes the ground that Unitarianism is "the system most favorable to piety," and in his remarks upon Dr. Worcester's letters, he speaks of the Unitarians of his day as "deficient in none of the qualifications which were required in the primitive ages,"—as "exemplary followers of Jesus Christ." And of himself, when putting on the armor to do battle with Morse and Evarts and Worcester, he says in the Thatcher letter: "My self-respect is wounded by coming into contact with assailants who not only deny us the Christian name, but withhold from us the treatment of gentlemen." "I feel as if I were degrading myself." Respecting those assailants he further says: "Persecution has given up its halter and faggot, but it breathes venom from its lips, and secretly blasts what it cannot openly destroy."

In the letters addressed to Channing by Worcester, "Rev. and Dear Sir," opened each one, and "With sentiments of affectionate regard," closed each. He sent a copy to him, with a note of personal fraternal regard, before either of them went to the bookseller. Of these courtesies, Dr. Channing took no notice, but turning coldly away from them, he addressed his remarks on Dr. Worcester's letters to the public.

In respect to the pure and undefiled religion of the Unitarians, James Martineau writes: "In devotional literature and religious thought, I find nothing of ours that does not pale before Augustine, Tauler, and Pascal."

Concerning "fidelity to the spirit of Jesus," the system "most favorable to piety," and those who insist most on charity, "as the pearl of great price," a question in comparative religion, Dr. Bellows, whom all allow to be a competent critic and judge, uttered some significant comments at the last anniversary of the Unitarian Association: "God knows that our Orthodox brethren with their decaying faith, as we have been accustomed to say, have evidently known better how to meet the wants of the common people, have evidently known better how to institute and organize religion, have evidently been the pioneers in moral and religious progress over all this continent. What and where should we be to-day if the religionizing of this whole nation were left in the hands of the Unitarian body? I look with wonder and amazement, with admiration and love upon the devotion and labor and zeal of my Orthodox brethren, in my own city and everywhere else. But I cannot think with them." I am sorry one so candid, one who feels so much with us, cannot think with us. I wish he did. I hope he will, and believe he will, since *feeling* alike is very apt to make good men think alike.

But the article culminates polemically, in the statement that "the bigotry of Old Calvinism has manifestly softened, has none of that awful Antinomian aspect at which the early Unitarians so fiercely rebelled, "that the old Unitarianism is nearer the central truth than any other views yet announced, and that the old Unitarians believe that all the oscillations of human thought are settling towards their position." "Awful Antinomian aspect" of Calvinism! John Calvin set the Gospel against the law! "Inner light" above the Bible! put apart justification and sanctification, linked inseparably, as he held by regeneration, make faith sufficient without works! All his life long he was a staunch fighter against every thing of this kind. "Those who separate faith from piety," he says, "are liars." What these early Unitarians "rebelled at" as Calvinism in this matter and fought against so fiercely, was a wind mill, a man of straw, an inference,—nothing more.

Dr. Bellows wrote of the Unitarians in the *Christian Inquirer* not very long since: "They have a system of religion smooth as a chestnut and as cold, polished, portable—to which nobody objects, but for which nobody much cares. "In the past," he added, at a recent meeting of the Hudson River Conference, "our body, with all its intellectualism, has been as cold as ice."

Dr. Channing, in the latter part of his life, said: "I am less and less a Unitarian every year I live," and only two years after his celebrated panegyric on Unitarian liberty and piety, he declared in a public discourse at New York that, "were the Unitarian name more honored, I would be glad to throw it off, for I fear the shackles which a party connection imposes." In 1839, three years before his death, this man, for whom humanity has reason to be thankful, and of whom, in his riper, mellower age, his country to be proud, wrote of Unitarianism: "The system was, at its recent revival, a protest of the understanding against absurd dogmas, rather than the work of a deep religious feeling, and the consequence is, a want of vitality and force which gives us little hope of its accomplishing much under its present auspices."

A recent liberal writer in the *Christian Inquirer* confesses that "The chief defect of both Universalism and Unitarianism is, want of religion,—that piety is not the characteristic of liberal Christians,—that they think more of liberty which is the condition, than of love, which is the end of life." Emerson, in a late number of the *North American*, May, 1878, makes a similar significant admission. "I confess our later generation appears ungirt, frivolous, compared with the religions of the last or Calvinistic age." "Luther would have cut his hand off sooner than write theses against the Pope, if he had suspected he was bringing on the pale negations of Boston Unitarianism."

Mr. Alcott, at a symposium in the Seminary chapel at Andover, expressed the feeling that the early Unitarianism of Channing and Ware was largely a protest against hyper-Calvinism, and that if the doctrines of the Trinity, and Atonement, and Human Depravity had been generally held as they are now taught in this Seminary, there would have been no such thing as Unitarianism; and that, in the nature of the case, it could not outlast the errors against which it protested."

Of the same cast of thought is the comment of the *Christian Union* on Professor Park's retirement and the issue of his lectures. "He has bridged the gulf between the Old Calvinism of the old New England theology and the theology, whatever it may be, of the New England of the future." Such a theological structure at Andover, and the third of a century in erecting it! A mighty bridge-builder indeed, a veritable Pontifex Maximus!

And what has the learned Professor built across to?—Beecherism and Universalism? or the cloud-lands of agnosticism? We do not know, only it is to a "whatever-is-to-be-theology" of the New England of the future. The Professor is one of the advanced and advancing thinkers of the times; but he knows the road over which he has been traveling, and where it has been leading him, and where to stop. As a builder, he understands the material the Master-builder has been furnishing—gold, silver, precious stones, from the diverse mines of Nature, Reason, and Revelation, and when his work appears, I think it will show a *temple* not a bridge, and on the "foundation that is laid."

Was not the veteran Concord teacher aware that Unitarianism was in the church a thousand years before hyper-Calvinism got into it?—that the doctrines of the Trinity, Atonement, and Depravity, have been from the apostolic age, generally held and taught in the Church, and by its great Councils, essentially as they are now at Andover? If Unitarianism,—only a protest against *errors*, is to last till it has made the world believe that *these* central pillars in the Christian temple, — man's fall, the Deity of Christ, and the Holy Spirit are fancy work, it will have to last forever. Did he not know that the same Calvinistic Catechism and Associate Creed which made the foundation of the Seminary when Channing and Ware uttered their protests, make it to-day, and that the Professors now, as then, give the same pledge to teach the same doctrines, and give it with equal honesty and intelligence? The idea that there has been any essential change made in these or any of the Christian doctrines by these men is an impeachment of their trustworthiness or their intelligence, to which the guardians of the Institution would lend no countenance, and which

the churches would Christianly resent. It leaves an impression that the change which, in his maturer thought and ripe experience, puts him in such genial sympathy with Andover, has been accompanied by one there, that places the Seminary in more fellowship with Channing and Ware. Is there anything in the teaching at Andover that warrants this implication? A compromise between Trinitarians and Unitarians on the Deity of Christ,—the one positively affirming it, the other as stoutly denying! on the Cross, held on the one hand as the Centre of divine light and love, and by Dr. Channing, on the other, as “a central gallows that threw gloom over the universe,” “under laws written, like Draco’s, in blood!”

The *religious* branches of the Church, drawn to this one, of which its chief defect is “the want of religion,” of “vitality and force!” The theological schools of the world yield to this which is *indifferent* to theology! All “the lines of human thought,” scientific, philosophic, ethical, Christian, come to a consensus in “a pale negation,” “a chestnut,” a piece of “ice,” a “wood-pile!”

Some of the younger Liberals regard this as settled beyond question. Rev. Brooke Hereford, an English clergyman, at a late Boston Conference, affirmed,—“We have proved it in England, you have proved it here beyond all possibility of doubt that Orthodoxy is tottering to its foundations,” that “it has not a leg to stand on.”

Meantime, one who should be curious to know “What Orthodox Christians are Doing,” would get some idea from a candid and carefully prepared editorial under this question, in the *Christian Register*, of Sept. 11th, 1880:

“They are lengthening their cords and strengthening their stakes. And this is a passing phase of a great historic fact. Right beside the great Foreign Missionary Societies, have grown up powerful agencies for Home Evangelization. Millions of Bibles, and billions of other printed pages have been distributed. A large part of the population of Mississippi Valley and the Pacific Coast is now gathered under religious instruction; and the same influences which have hung bells in hundreds of steeples all over the prairies to summon the people to prayer and praise, have also helped to carry the common school, the academy, and the college to the very verge of the frontier. They hunt up, bring forth, and educate men for the ministry. They give money to younger societies, which will both help themselves and begin at once to help others. The training of the churches for a generation to systematic giving has been so far successful, that the great army

of missionaries and teachers is paid as promptly as the army of the United States. Thus the very work which Unitarians say ought to be done in the liberal way is actually being done in the Orthodox."

This commendation, so much in the spirit of the Master, is appreciated by all honest, earnest workers. The Orthodox are not monopolists in this field. We have done and are doing little, far too little in it, and we wish our Unitarian friends to share it with us, improving our methods, and greatly excelling us in efficiency. We extend to them the right hand in all their endeavors in the spirit and truth of the Lord of the vineyard ; to remove the world's darkness and desolation by the light and love of the Gospel, a slow, but divine work.

" Little by little the world grows strong,
Fighting the battle of Right and Wrong ;
Little by little the Wrong gives way,
Little by little the Right has sway ;
Little by little all longing souls
Struggle up nearer the shining goals !

" Little by little the good in men
Blossoms to beauty for human ken ;
Little by little the angels see
Prophecies better of good to be ;
Little by little the God of all
Lifts the world nearer his pleading call !"

ARTICLE IV.—THE SACRIFICIAL ASPECT OF CHRIST'S
DEATH, AND ITS PLACE IN THE WORK OF
REDEMPTION.

THE question "How shall man be just with God," which perplexed the upright Job in that dim era before Abraham appeared as the crowning example of the faith which is imputed for righteousness, has been the chief agitating theme of all the ages. Around it have circled controversies and out of it have grown systems which are familiar to every reader of theology. During considerable periods there have seemed to be settlements of the cardinal points, and substantial agreement upon what is termed "the Catholic Doctrine." Again the matter would be opened and a revision demanded, followed by a general acquiescence, with the old views substantially reëstablished, modified by such changes of phase or phrase as progressive culture make inevitable upon every subject of knowledge, for amid all the agitations the author and giver of salvation has maintained His own unswerving position and imparted His unchanging truth. Notwithstanding occasional aberrations of sects or schools, and individual rejections ("wandering stars for whom the blackness of darkness is reserved") none not avowedly atheistic fail to claim recognition in the grand chorus of ascription to Him who should be always and everywhere "called Jesus, for He shall save His people from their sins."

Within the present generation there has occurred one of these re-openings of the subject and demands for revision of specific statement, and an opportunity offers for serious discussion among those who are in essentials united, in non-essentials charitable. The movement is just now stirring the air of churches and pulpits and divinity schools, producing increasing freshness of thought and utterance in many quarters, or, as some fear, circulating malarious influence. Out of it have already come such books as those of Bushnell and Smeaton and Dale, Maurice and Robertson, the best known perhaps to New England preachers, reminding students of the old works of Anselm and Abelard, Aquinas and Scotus.

In attempting a slight contribution to the discussion, the title of this article will indicate the particular line pursued. The death of Christ had, undeniably, a sacrificial *aspect*. Was that real or only apparent? Did He, in His death, actually offer Himself as a sacrifice in any proper sense? If so, in what sense; and what place did His sacrifice occupy in the work of redemption which His earthly career fulfilled?

In seeking answers to these questions the method proposed is not the rationalistic, constructing out of the supposed requirements of fallen human nature an *a priori* scheme; nor even out of the elements of revelation a theory which reason will accept as satisfying all its inquiries; but rather after the manner and in the spirit of the ancient motto of the schoolmen "Faith seeking Knowledge," the aim will be to collate a few of the easily verified *facts* made known by revelation and history, and from them formulate the doctrine which proves to be most intelligible to reason and most acceptable to conscience.

I. The first of these is the fact that God has, *from the beginning* put into men's minds and made universal the idea of propitiation by sacrifice, and caused it to be the basis of their faith of acceptance with Him. Very near the opening of history, under the first intimation of man's effort toward peace with Him after the fall, we encounter this. The two sons of Adam are represented at their altars with their offerings; one is trustful, obedient, and accepted; the other unbelieving, disobedient, and condemned. In the Epistle to the Hebrews the key to their conduct and its result is given. By that faith which is "assurance of things hoped for, a conviction (or proving) of things not seen," which to rationalism is blindness, but which "wrought with His works and by works was made perfect," faith in God's requirement and promise, Abel made the acceptable offering to which God had respect. It cannot, indeed, be claimed as entirely clear, that this was a sin-offering rather than a thank-offering; but, judged in the light of similar transactions under positive appointment, the inference that it was so is legitimate. The language of God to Cain, which is often quoted as verifying the supposition, is not so interpreted by the best expositors. "If thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door;" i. e., not a sin-offering is at hand—a lamb by whose offering, like that of Abel, thou mayest yet be forgiven, and

reinstated, but rather sin, the power of evil, personified as a malignant enemy, croucheth close to thee. It is a warning against impenitence, not an offer to faith. If thou persistest impenitently in ill-doing sin will permanently master thee. "His desire is unto thee now, but thou shouldst subdue him and rule over him." If, thus warned, and encouraged, Cain had subdued the evil which threatened to control his life, and turned with penitence to God, he would surely have offered a sacrifice like in substance, as well as in spirit, to that of Abel, and God would have had equal respect unto it. But however we may interpret these words the supposition in regard to the accepted offering, that it was designed as a sacrifice of propitiation, stands at least in strong probability. It is the first recorded in an uninterrupted series through the ages. If so, whence came the conception and the practice in this original family of earth whose then living head had been in closest communion with the Creator? The notion that it was merely the self-moved and unwarranted act of the natural mind feeling after God and peace, or a fanciful suggestion from the observed tendency of inanimate objects (as "it was the way of the smoke to go heavenward, giving them a natural hint to make it the vehicle of religion—sending up their cloud of homage by offering in fire upon their altars"), is a very inadequate explanation. Even if in any degree it accounts for that part of the offering which expended itself in the burning, what bearing has it upon the bloody part of their chief sacrificial transactions upon which, though not mentioned in this first instance, yet in all the continued history of religion such supreme stress was laid? Moreover, upon the assumption that it was a self-prompted, natural movement of the human mind, if it proves to be a movement from the beginning and practically uniform, it must be classed among those intuitive moral conceptions which are the developments of the Divine Creator's mind, wrought into the constitution of the creature; essentially a revelation or equivalent to it. "A law unto themselves," because "the work of the law written in their hearts." So unavoidable is this judgment that Dr. Bushnell (though with an object contrary to that intended in this Article), declares "Sacrifices are not the mere spontaneous contrivances of men, but contrivings impelled and guided by God;

just as truly appointed by Him as if ordered by some vocal utterance from heaven."

Passing, however, beyond the first recorded case, we come to another still clearer. We find Noah coming forth from the ark to his act of sacrifice. There the distinction between clean and unclean animals is already recognized, typical of the cleansing from sin and consequent holiness required in the worshiper, and equally of the demand for such offerings as God would accept for the purpose of securing from Him such cleansing. The distinction was more fully developed afterward, when even the allowance of the things which they might eat suggested, by its strictness, to every Israelite their moral relations to Him, and that there could be no sound daily living, as well as no spiritual life, until peace was established with Him. No happiness nor holiness without pardon first. So, as Noah, with whatever foretokenings of "the law of the beasts, to make a difference between the clean and the unclean," was given to the antediluvian world, approached the altar, he took with him such as "a young calf for a sin-offering, and a kid of the goats for a sin-offering, and a bullock and a ram for peace-offerings." The divine response manifested both the propitiatory object and the propitiative effect, for "the Lord smelled a sweet savor, and said in His heart I will not again curse the ground any more for man's sake."

Still keeping within the remote period preceding Moses we read of Job who "rose up early in the morning and offered burnt offerings according to the number of his sons; for he said, It may be that my sons have sinned and cursed God in their hearts. Thus did Job continually." No doubt there of the design of the sacrifices. And again we ask how did such men, the righteous Abel, the just Noah, the perfect and upright Job, come to such thoughts and practices, with such purposes and assurances and results, except through more than native instincts, through direct communication with Him who evidently conversed with them and taught them habitually concerning His will? It is a strange perversion, much like arrogance, to imagine otherwise; especially to attribute the whole system to the distorted, misguided operation of crude minds in the childhood of the race.

II. The second fact, more fully manifested in the process of

development under Moses and the prophets, is that the sacrificial system has been evidently settled as the one essential method of salvation for all time. It is not necessary to reduce this statement to specifications by referring to the multiplied instances which fill the Scriptural record. It is sufficient to say that, as this well established "common law" of religion, which had held sway over the race branching in every direction from the dispersion, became perverted, God tabulated it into positive statutes for His representative people. It is incredible that He should have done so if the original idea had been only a human invention, and a monstrous imputation upon His wisdom and holiness to intimate that He adopted it from heathen corruptions, to fasten it authoritatively upon His chosen nation for 1500 years. "The law and the prophets" proclaim his unqualified sanction of the principle. The sacrifices of the former period were confirmed and others added. They were required and made available for each generation and each person. There were variations of detail for specified purposes and cases; some were for social ends, collective or separative, some for individual correction or stimulus; they bore upon every phase of wrongfulness, whether of ignorance, inadvertence, presumption or guilt, and were carried out in every degree of love, excellence, or devotion consequent upon acceptance, but underneath them all lay the vital idea of expiation and propitiation. In the opening verses of Leviticus this fact is indicated. "If any man would bring an offering to the Lord of his own voluntary will" he must "put his hand upon the head of the offering" (the symbolic act by which in penitent faith he transferred the burden of his sins to the victim) and "it should be accepted for him to make atonement for him." Thus atonement preceded thanksgiving and consecration, as a prerequisite involved in every possibility of divine favor. No gift presented to God, from the simplest fruit of the tree or soil to the choicest of the flock, would have been received if sin had not been first expiated. To repudiate the necessity was the error of Cain, as it has been the error of self-righteousness ever since. The principle was always assumed when not expressly stated. The altar to which the gift was brought was a blood-sprinkled altar, and the worshiper must have "a heart sprinkled from an evil conscience." The prin-

ciple ran also through the current life of the Israelite. The great annual day of atonement in the first month of the year on which expiation was made for the sins both of priest and people, taught its profound lesson and sent on its hallowed influence for every day of the year, to be renewed by a multitude of minor trespass offerings as occasion might require. "According to the law, I might almost say *all things were cleansed with blood*, and apart from shedding of blood there was no remission."

But while the law was thus making its immediate requisitions and giving its immediate satisfactions, its symbols were always suggesting something to come. The prophecies, also, which began with the law and kept pace with it, from Eden onward, pointed distinctly or obscurely to the same—"a sacrifice of richer blood and nobler name"—which in its turn pointed back to the former for its illustration and interpretation. There is the continual interweaving of one illuminating thought from the beginning of revelation to the end; proving the unity of design and unity of method in the entire scheme of salvation. Several dispensations, corresponding to changing civilizations and advancing Providence, but one economy of grace.

Now, if the former sacrifices, which passed away when "He was manifested at the end of the ages who put away sins by the sacrifice of Himself once," were, as is claimed, only types and shadows of that, the question is pertinent and sharp, What did they signify? They were types and shadows of what? A type supposes a reality as its antitype; a shadow a reality as its substance. Were these shadows of something which in its turn is only a shadow? Were these prefigures of something which in its turn is only a figure of speech? Was the theology of the first sacrifices only a fancy, operating on the superstitions, and is the theology of the one great sacrifice equally a fancy, operating alike, only more potently, on the superstitions of believers? Is the "theology of the feelings," by which as well as by the "theology of the intellect," the language of inspiration from Genesis to Revelation, is to be expounded, the theology of faith, and is not the theology of faith the theology of facts? If not, the legitimate inference is that it is a delusion all the way through. By an express divine

arrangement repeated thousands of times, and reiterated through scores of inspired teachers, a long line of delusions pointed to one grand delusion, which is to continue to the end of the world and to be reëchoed in the jubilations of heaven! It is difficult to conceive how a sound "moral impression" can be made by such a gigantic fiction. How can there be a "moral view of the atonement" if there be no *real* atonement? What is "the spiritual significance of sacrifice" if there was no actual sacrifice in Christ's "offering of Himself through the eternal Spirit, once for ever and once for all, by which He entered, through His own blood, into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us?" No theory of types and shadows can stand a moment in logical thought which does not assume the positive, substantial reality of that which was typified and shadowed. The declaration that "the blood of bulls and goats could not take away sins," nor "the law make them perfect that drew nigh with their continual offerings" is no valid objection to this assertion. The evident meaning is that they had no virtue or power in themselves to these ends; but the faith of the worshipers, exercised through the ordinances, had such power. In every case, when employed in faith, the promise concerning sin of whatever kind, was "*It shall be forgiven,*" and it undoubtedly *was* forgiven. Through such faith the offerers "year by year" were undoubtedly made (in the Scriptural sense) "perfect"—not by virtue of the blood of the imperfect victim but by the grace of the divine Sovereign, who associated those sacrifices, in His own purposes and promises, with the One perfect sacrifice reserved for every believer. He "had no pleasure in them" and "would not have" their continuance, as compared with the pleasure which He had in that which was to come, and abolished them to make way for it. They "had no glory by reason of the glory which excelleth," but in their time they were the glory and the salvation of millions.

III. We reach thus the third fact in the series. Coming down to Christ we find His position standing out definitely under the same representation. In the new dispensation of the one economy the "ministry of reconciliation" is, that "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself, not

reckoning unto them their trespasses," because "Him who knew no sin He made to be sin in our behalf, that we might become the righteousness of God in Him." "While we were yet sinners Christ died for us." "We were reconciled to God through the death of His Son."

What is this "reconciliation?" The simple and proper meaning of the word is, harmony. Moreover, it is not here a term of feeling but a term of relation. The appeal "Be ye reconciled to God," is not merely that we should be in right feeling toward Him, but primarily in right relation to Him, and that relation must be established on both sides. In order to it the first condition is that the *offended* party, against whom wrong has been committed, should be placated. As between men, Christ distinctly expressed this in the direction "If thy brother hath aught *against thee*, go and be reconciled to thy brother." And thus, also, man is reconciled to God, or brought into harmony of relation with Him, when that which God has against man is taken out of the way. When, therefore, He is represented as "reconciling the world unto Himself," it is not first by appeals to the world's feelings as placating them, but "by the death of His son," as first removing the obstacle out of his own way—the obstacle which justice and mercy recognized—that, "being justified (or set right before Him), by the blood of His son, we shall be saved from the wrath of God by Him."

There can be no doubt that all this is after the manner, as it is under the forms, and is meant to be received in the exact sense, of the sacrifices and conciliations, the justifications through blood and death, the sin-offerings and salvations of every former period. It is "the righteousness which has been witnessed by the law and the prophets—the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God set forth to be a propitiation through faith, by His blood, to show His righteousness because of the passing over of the sins done *aforetime*, in the forbearance of God—for the showing of His righteousness at the *present time*." It is the redemption to which Paul summons Abraham and David to testify, and the blessing which he says was pronounced upon Jew and Gentile, circumcision and uncircumcision. It was intended and extended from the begin-

ning to the end of time. John saw in the Apocalypse its application to "those whose names had been written from the foundation of the world in the book of life of the Lamb that hath been slain" (as he explains the phrases in the thirteenth chapter by their repetition in the seventeenth). The book was prepared and its record commenced then, when we may hope that repentant Adam and Eve head the list, to be filled up out of every tribe and kindred and tongue; but their salvation was always by the Lamb that has been slain, "the Lamb of God that taketh away—or beareth—the sin of the world." And again the question arises, Is all this a figure or a reality; a fiction or a fact?

IV. So we pass to the fourth fact to be noted, viz: the *effect* of His sacrificial position and suffering indicated. Under this head, also, much specification is forbidden by necessary brevity. A concise generalization is all that can be attempted. The intimations given in the Scriptures, by language already quoted, lead to the conviction that their effect *toward God* depends on the truth as to three points—1st, what sin is; 2d, what is the bearing of God's holiness upon sin; 3d, what is His attitude toward sinners.

If sin is only deflection from righteousness or a negative absence of rightness, and so an error and misfortune; if God's holiness is only the criterion of His sentiment concerning such deflection—a measuring line by which to estimate it—producing in a rectilinear nature a passive disapprobation or, at the utmost, regret and pity; if His attitude is only that of a Father, sympathizing with His offspring who have gone wrong and desiring their recovery, then the way of reconciliation is easy. Then the effect of Christ's sacrificial position and suffering, as toward God (if indeed they have any effect—if they be not themselves wholly an effect, the projecting of God's mind before itself and the universe, vicariously, in self-moved and self-moving benevolence—a view well styled "Platonic Sabelianism), must be only that of impression upon His personal feeling. In that sense they might placate or propitiate Him, and the result might be put within the control of His son, as a matter of the Father's favor, induced by the son's holy vicarious sufferings in love, the right to bestow the Father's

pardon and grace upon those in whose behalf the sacrifice was made. And this again is a sort of high Arianism.

But if sin is transgression of law and positive rebellion against the law-giver; if God's holiness is the principle in His being which demands righteousness in His realm, guards His sovereignty, and is outraged by rebellion; if His attitude toward sinners is that of a sovereign, the integrity of whose rule must be maintained even at the cost of His fatherly affection, while that fatherly affection also prompts to His utmost measures for bringing the rebellious into happy allegiance, then evidently the way of reconciliation is, of necessity, by some kind of propitiation to His *position* rather than to His feeling. In other words, it is propitiation of His *righteousness*, or rightness, which is not, in this use of the term, an attribute of His nature but an attitude of His being, the product of all His perfections. It is thus the apostle uses it when he says that "God has set forth Jesus Christ to be a propitiation for the showing of His righteousness—that He might be just (or right), and the justifier (or righter), of him that hath faith in (or is of the faith of), Jesus."

It is commonly said that *our idea* of redemption depends upon our *ideas* on these points. But more than that must be asserted, viz: that the *fact* of redemption depends upon the *facts* on these points. What the facts are can be ascertained, not by subjecting ideas to the test of each inquirer's habits of speculation or constitutional preferences, but to the surer test of the current tenor of God's word. In regard to that it suffices here to say that the statements in the second group of propositions is that which this essay is designed to maintain. Those are the facts concerning sin, holiness, and God, which are most patent in the Bible, and in accordance with which the sacrifice of Christ is revealed.

It must be remarked, however, that in seeking the contents of that one great sacrifice—within which, as has been shown, the saving effects of all other sacrificial transactions are included—we are led into a region of representations where considerable latitude of explanation is allowable. One supreme fact is distinctly announced—that its office was somehow that of substitution. He stood before God and the law in the place

of the sinner. His suffering was in place of theirs. He assumed liabilities in place of theirs. Accepting this central conception, there may be considerable variety in the positions from which it is regarded and in the interpretation of language. An intelligent and devout Unitarian avowed, "I have no expectation of God's favor on account of my righteousness. I know that I can do nothing to earn it. I cannot shape the doctrine of atonement as you do, but I believe that Jesus Christ did *something* in my behalf, on account of which God can justly pardon and accept me, though I know not what it was. On that I rely. My conformity to the moral principles of Christianity will not save me. I want a personal Saviour in whom to trust." Though an Arian in creed and Socinian in connection, this confession of faith certainly put him well over the line into the bounds of evangelical religion. It is not the purpose of the present writing to analyze much further than that. Christ a *substitute* for sinners, to do *for* them, *toward God*, what they could not do unto salvation; that is surely, *so far*, the scriptural formula of His sacrificial work.

It may be desirable to add some statement as to His fitness for such a position—the ground of His right, as well as readiness, to assume it. It is found in His double relation. 1st. His relation to God as the appointed Judge of men. The Father who has "given all judgment to the Son" has thus assigned to Him a position regulative as to law and appeasive as to the condemned. In this relation He is specially qualified for the work of mediation on the divine side. It is He above all others in the universe who might fitly propose and produce whatever alternative for the sentence of the law is possible to justice and adapted to mercy; referring all, as Judge, to the ultimate decision of the Sovereign. 2d. His relation to men is *essentially* representative, i. e. not by authoritative selection, nor by compact, as a "federal head," which would be arbitrary, but by His original connection, as the actual root of the race, in the order of creation. In this sense He is styled "the First born of every creature (or of the whole creation)" "i. e. as having both priority to creation and a normal unity with it. "For in Him were all things created—unto Him and for Him—and

in Him all things consist." Preëminently is this the case in reference to humanity, the crown and object of all creation within earth limits, and His incarnation is thus to be regarded, not as an arbitrary, unnatural assumption, but rather as the complete expression, for the furtherance of His mediation, of what was inherent in His state "from the beginning of the creation of God." As such, He could, with a strict fitness, beyond that even of divine appointment, *stand for* the race (His own race), before God, to suffer for it, obey for it, live, die, rise, and intercede for it, to magnify and make honorable before Sovereign and subject the law dishonored by it, and thus obtain eternal redemption for it—harmonizing both parties in His own body, "so making peace." Into any other "mystical unity" we need not attempt to penetrate, but this representative unity, growing out of original relation, is sufficiently intelligible, and sufficiently justifies the ways of God to man in atonement.

If a correct solution of the effect of the sacrifice toward God has been reached, its effect *toward man*, the other party in the reconciliation, is easily apprehended, and can be stated in few words. As a "propitiation set forth" by God, its first designed effect must certainly be persuasive, through the natural principle of impression upon the mental and moral faculties. To this extent the "moral view of the atonement" is unobjectionable, and not only so, but necessary to a complete exhibition of the facts of atonement. God does not work out salvation for sinners, through the great Sacrifice, as a result accomplished, without any participation on their part; and that participation is secured by means of the impression which the truth of the Sacrifice is intended and adapted to make upon them. "I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me;" and He draws them "with bands of love, with cords of a man." The only supposable exception to this rule is in the case of those saved to whom He had not been presented, or who were incapable of impression by him, on earth. Yet, correctly understood, they may form no exception; for, even in their case, before their salvation really occurs, by their exemption from the penalty of the law at the tribunal of the Judge of quick and dead, there may be such a "setting forth of the pro-

pitation" to them also (not in any second probation, but in the awaking after death) that its due impression will equally be made upon them, as the basis of their acceptance of it—being already essentially or incipiently in a believing condition—by a penitence and faith appropriate to their condition. From first to last, and universally, salvation will thus be only through faith in Jesus Christ produced by an apprehension of Him as "the Lamb that was slain, and that did purchase unto God with His blood men of every tribe and tongue and people and nation."

The necessary qualification and caveat, therefore, to the "moral scheme," so-called, is the reiteration of what has been already urged, that it must find its foundation of reason in the *reality* of the sacrifice, upon whose impression it relies. Without that it is equally void of meaning and of saving efficacy. We adopt the words of Professor Shedd upon a kindred topic. "The objective work of Christ on Calvary must become the subjective experience and rejoicing of the soul itself." "Protestantism," he says, "unites in a living synthesis, the objective atonement with the subjective faith in it."

It remains only to mention in condensed sentences, bearing upon the second part of the subject embraced in the title of the essay, that the *place* of the sacrificial aspect of Christ's death in the work of redemption is absolutely central. That work, whether viewed systematically in theology or practically by faith, undoubtedly includes all that He was and did as Mediator, every thing that lies "between the two eternities" of His existence. But we must guard against the idea that His death was only the culmination or rounding out of the earthly part of it. Whatever might have been the case if He had, for any other purpose, apart from sin and salvation, taken upon Himself humanity, His actual entrance upon it was for this one distinct purpose, out of which sprang the whole divine scheme, wrought into completeness through the personalities of the Godhead. The Sacrifice of the Son of God was the very core of His incarnation. Everything that He was and did in the world developed from that vital center and gathered around it, to form in His life the perfect fruitage of divine mercy—God's "unspeakable gift" to men under the double name Immanuel and Jesus.

It is a matter of utmost importance that this be borne in mind both in the teaching and the receiving of the gospel. Dr. Dale, in the opening of his admirable lectures on the atonement (in which, as well as in the volumes of Professor Smeaton and Principal Cunningham, some of the foregoing points are strongly argued) quotes the language of Turretin, who declares the sacrifice of Christ as we have now described it to be "the chief part of our salvation, the anchor of Faith, the refuge of Hope, the rule of Charity, the true foundation of the Christian religion and the richest treasure of the Christian Church." The assertion is not too strong. The tendency sometimes to deny or ignore it has always been followed by a lowering of the quality of preaching, and a corresponding lowering of the quality of piety in the churches. Sentimentalism has taken the place of spirituality. The sense of divine holiness and veracity, and of the righteousness of divine requirements, which is essential to the most vigorous religious life, has been dulled by an inordinate conception of His paternal clemency, and fidelity has been supplanted by sensibility. With individual exceptions, largely due to a previous experience of the truth which subsequent departure has not wholly suppressed, such has been the drift and steady backward sweep in some of the otherwise evangelical portions of the church. It accounts, in part at least, for the manifest spiritual ebb tide of late in various quarters. We are persuaded that a general reviving of faith in "the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered Himself without blemish unto God," would "cleanse our consciences from dead works to serve the living God." It would produce a reviving of the "ministry of reconciliation which is committed unto us." It would answer a question recently discussed concerning "the relation of evangelical doctrine to the formation of character," showing it to be, under such a revived ministry, with such a revived faith, the link of highest union to the immaculate Lord, and of widest uplifting connection with fallen man. In a word, the genuine sacrifice of Christ-crucified is "the power of God and the wisdom of God unto them that are called." Believing it and proclaiming it, we may confidently say, "who hath known the mind of the Lord, that he should instruct Him? But we have the mind of Christ."

ARTICLE V.—SCIENCE AND PHENOMENALISM.*

THE argument of this book can be briefly stated: the reasonings of science are based upon the existence of sentient beings and the external world of common sense. But when followed to their logical consequences, they furnish no ground for believing in the existence of any sentient beings, or of the external world. The explanation of this contradiction is found in the fact that reason, compelled to be ontological, assumes that the phenomena, with which science deals, are ontological facts. Let their phenomenal character be frankly recognized, and it will be clear that science transcends phenomena, and must do so in order to reason at all. It will then appear that the absurdities into which science leads us, arise from the attempt to explain one set of phenomena by another set assumed to be more than phenomena. The objection to transcending phenomena will then be withdrawn, and we shall find among our ontological facts, not only other people, but a Divine Intelligence.

The assumption that science takes for granted the external world of common sense, is clearly stated in the following passage: "It is beyond question that if, as Professor Helmholtz teaches, the external world is known to us only by its symbols in consciousness, they, strictly speaking, are the only phenomena, which the material universe presents to us; and, if science adheres to its professions, it must confine itself to them; if it recognizes the world behind them, it transcends the region of phenomena and enters the region of ontology. It is notorious that science does this. It proceeds unquestioningly on the supposition that a material world is spread around us, whose objects and changes are telegraphed, by the mechanism of perception, to the brain centres where alone consciousness is supposed to reside."† Now when science professes to deal only with phenomena, is it fair to dispose of the question by saying that

* "The Realistic Assumptions of Modern Science Examined," by Thomas Martin Herbert.

† Page 304.

it is notorious that it does not? Surely we ought to assume that scientific men mean what they say, until the contrary is proved. This Mr. Balfour undertakes to do. He tries to maintain this thesis: "Received science cannot be true if the idealistic account of the universe be accurate; nor is the discrepancy between the two merely verbal; it is fundamental and essential and can be bridged over by no mere artifices of terminology."* Before examining his argument, let us try to learn what science means by phenomenon. Sometimes, a state of consciousness, but clearly not always. The atoms and molecules of chemistry, the ethereal undulations of physics, the original star-dust of astronomy, are clearly not states of consciousness. They might become states of consciousness to beings with acuter senses, under the proper conditions, and it is in this sense that science claims to speak of them. The scientific definition of phenomenon, then, we may understand to be an actual, or conceivably possible, state of consciousness. We are now ready to consider Mr. Balfour's argument. The gist of it is contained in his examination of Mill's assertion that, "For any statement which can be made concerning phenomena on the Realistic theory, there is an equivalent meaning in terms of sensation and possibilities of sensation,"† and he takes this proposition to illustrate his objection: "The candle at which I am looking produces in me certain sensations of light, color and shape. Stated in terms of the psychological theory this proposition would run: The group of sensations and permanent possibilities of sensation known as a candle produce in me sensations of light, etc. Now the candle which is here asserted to be a cause is, like other perceived objects, constituted (on the psychological hypothesis) by two elements, viz: sensations and permanent possibilities of sensation. Are both of these necessary to produce the effect? Certainly not. One of them is the effect. The sensations, which the candle produces, are part of the candle. What produces the sensation must therefore be the other part of the cause, namely, the possibilities of sensation. But the possibilities are, *ipso facto*, not in consciousness, and, to avoid side issues we will suppose them not to be in any one else's either. So that though starting from a proposition pro-

* Defence of Philosophic Doubt. Chapter on Psychological Idealism.

† Examination of Hamilton.

fessedly idealistic in its terms, we are forced to conclude that the cause of my sensations of color, etc., is something independent of consciousness."* Forced to conclude? Why? Because of the tacit assumption that a cause must be something actual. But Mr. Mill defines cause to be the invariable, unconditional, *phenomenal* antecedent or group of antecedents. When, therefore, Mr. Balfour concludes that the causes of the sensation in question must be permanent possibilities of sensation, and therefore an actual objective something, he forgets that permanent possibility of sensation means what Mill would call, in logical language, a phenomenon, even though it be nothing actual at all. Undoubtedly, questions might be raised concerning the validity of Mill's account of causation. But that is not the question at issue. The question is, are Psychological Idealism and science consistent? To say that they are inconsistent because a possible state of consciousness cannot be a cause is not to argue the question at issue, but to object to Psychological Idealism. Mr. Balfour continues: "This may be true but again I must point out that it is not Idealism. . . . For we might imagine a being so endowed that he could perceive at one moment every quality of the candle, which would in that case, it is evident, consist entirely of sensations: the possibilities of sensation being all converted into actualities. He might also perceive all the physiological changes which are the necessary antecedents of these sensations, and which would thereby, in the same way, become sensations themselves. Now it would clearly be erroneous to say of such a being that the immediate causes of the sensations, which constitute his perception of the candle, were permanent possibilities of sensation (since, by hypothesis, the sensations are all converted into actualities); and it would clearly be absurd to say that these sensations were self-caused; and it would be altogether impossible to say that they were not caused at all. What fourth reply could be given on any theory which was both idealistic and scientific I am unable to imagine."† The fourth reply from the point of view of science is that the physiological changes, which are the necessary antecedents of those sensations, are the cause. These, on any theory, are admitted to be the immediate

* Defence of Philosophic Doubt. Chapter on Psychological Idealism.

† Defence of Philosophic Doubt. Chapter on Psychological Idealism.

cause, and the mediate cause is the necessary antecedent of the physiological changes. I submit then that Mr. Balfour has failed to maintain his thesis, that received science cannot be true if the idealistic account of the universe be accurate.

We are now able to judge of one of Professor Herbert's important arguments. He contends that the legitimate conclusion of science is, that there is no such thing as consciousness in the universe. The bodies we see around us, we ought, if we are loyal to the teachings of science, to regard as wholly unconscious. Indeed the consistent application of scientific method would require each man to deny the fact of his own consciousness. Of course no one will be guilty of such absurdities. Each man knows that he is conscious, and irresistibly believes that he is surrounded by other conscious beings. The explanation of the contradiction, Professor Herbert finds in the fact that science, knowing nothing but phenomena, assumes to know ontological realities, and hence has to bring into relation the utterly heterogeneous facts of consciousness and material realities, or deny the former altogether. Logically it is obliged to deny the facts of consciousness, and this is what we might expect, for consistency would have required us to exclude them from the start. Assuming one-half of consciousness, the phenomena of perception to be unconscious, ontological facts, we have no business to regard the other half as facts of consciousness. To treat these homogeneous facts as heterogeneous, involves absurdity. Suppose you look at a picture representing a scene of mountain, wood, and water. What you see is really paint. You criticise it on the assumption that it is a landscape. Suppose however you allow its representative character only in part, and speak of bits of paint, lying on the mountain, or floating on the water, or of the water as surrounded by paint, or of the mountain as having a background of paint, and your absurdities would be an exact illustration of those into which science has fallen.* But if Professor Herbert is mistaken in supposing that science does regard a part of the facts of consciousness as objective, ontological facts, this explanation will not suffice. Logically, we must hold that there is some flaw in the reasoning that ex-

* *Modern Realism Examined*, p. 322.

cludes consciousness from the universe, or frankly admit that we have no right to believe in it at all. We are required therefore to review the reasoning that leads to that conclusion. The problem to be explained is the relation of brain-changes to facts of consciousness. Now the brain is a part of the material world, and, consequently, comes within the scope of the conservation of energy. That doctrine maintains that the energy of the material universe is a constant quantity. "It is proved by numerous facts, both natural and of artificial production, that agencies which had been regarded as distinct and independent sources of force—heat, electricity, chemical action, nervous and muscular action, momentum of moving bodies—are interchangeable in definite and fixed quantities, with one another. It had long been known that these dissimilar phenomena had the power under certain conditions of producing one another; what is new in the theory is a more accurate estimation of what this production consists in. What happens is, that the whole or a part of one kind of phenomena disappears and is replaced by phenomena of one of the other descriptions, and that there is an equivalence in quantity between the phenomena that have disappeared and those which have been produced, insomuch that if the process be reversed, the very same quantity which had disappeared will reappear, without increase or diminution. Thus the amount of heat which will raise the temperature of a pound of water one degree of the thermometer, will, if expended, say in the expansion of steam, lift a weight of 772 pounds one foot, or a weight of one pound 772 feet; and the same exact quantity of heat can, by certain means, be recovered through the expenditure of exactly that amount of mechanical motion."* If we accept this doctrine as true of nervous and muscular action, we have no right to believe in the efficiency of consciousness. For the theory maintains that the energy manifested in brain changes is the transformation of some other form of physical energy. To say with Dr. Carpenter that the mind of man uses and directs (within certain limits) the physical energy of his body "just as a rider utilizes and directs the motor energy of his horse," is to abandon the theory. "A rider who employs only

* *Mill's Logic*. A good statement of the theory although it is not true, as Mill says, that it is proved of nervous and muscular phenomena.

the energy of his horse must remain entirely passive," that is, does not employ it at all—"the moment he begins to direct the animal he must expend some power of his own." If he expend power, there is, as far as the material universe is concerned, a creation of energy, which is a denial of the doctrine. In such a case, we have an appearance, which is not entirely a transformation, of some other form of physical energy. According to the theory, all phenomena of motion find their explanation in previous phenomena of motion, and if it be true, there is no room for the efficiency of consciousness, and Professors Huxley and Tyndall are right when they affirm that our consciousness has no more to do with our life than the whizz of a wheel has with its motion, or the prattle of a brook with its flowing. Just as a man's shadow indicates his position, whether he stands, or walks, or sits, so the facts of consciousness give notice that certain brain changes are initiating certain actions, with which brain changes the facts of consciousness have nothing to do. To imagine that the facts of consciousness cause the brain changes, or influence them in any way, would be as absurd as to suppose that a man's shadow determines his position. If this theory be true, I think we must admit that there is no evidence for the existence of other people. Their consciousness, if it exists, makes no sign, gives no indication of its existence, and is to reason non-existent. The so-called men and women we see about us, act exactly as they would if they had no consciousness. Their buying and selling, their visiting and gossiping, their studies and their amusements, their laughter and their tears are wholly unaffected by consciousness. The rapturous expression of a saint, the sardonic grin of a devil, the innocent laughter of a child, are all wholly the result of the changes of the brain. To be sure each man knows that he is conscious himself, but that is altogether insufficient to justify him in assuming the presence of an inexplicable and utterly useless something, in connection with the millions of other bodies in the world. The basis of the generalization is too narrow. If death were known only of one man, it would be manifestly illogical to believe that all men are mortal. If the doctrine of the conservation of energy be accepted, our only reason for believing in the existence of

other conscious beings must be that of Professor Clifford's—that we belong to a gregarious race—and he well knew that such a reason was no reason at all.

Nor is there any way of avoiding this result without abandoning the doctrine in its application to nervous phenomena. "There is no rupture of nervous continuity," writes Prof. Bain. "The only tenable supposition is that mental and physical proceed together as undivided twins. When, therefore, we speak of a mental cause, a mental agency, we have always a two-sided cause, the effect produced is not the effect of mind alone, but of mind in company with body. That mind should have operated on the body is as much as to say that a two-sided phenomenon, one side being bodily, can influence the body; it is, after all, body acting upon body."* The last clause states it exactly: "It is after all body acting upon body." Our two-sided phenomenon, one side bodily and the other mental, acts on body and, according to the theory of the conservation of energy, it must do it through its bodily side. The mental side of the phenomenon is unknown to the conservation of energy. That doctrine states a certain relation between physical phenomena, and deals with them only in that character. A few sentences further on, Prof. Bain writes: "The mental sequence is mind-body giving birth to mind-body." Bear in mind that in Prof. Bain's opinion it is body that gives birth to mind-body, and you will appreciate the force of the following dilemma: Either the mental side of the phenomenon is produced at the expense of the physical energy of the preceding physical changes, or it is not. If it is, then there is in fact, a rupture of the nervous continuity, though Prof. Bain says there is not, since part of the energy that might have been devoted to a change in the nervous processes, is exhausted in producing the mental side of the phenomenon. If it is not, then it cannot be correlated with physical changes; it is therefore wholly unproductive of physical phenomena. Indeed it is in either case wholly unproductive of physical phenomena, if the conservation of energy be true.

Mr. Spencer holds that both nervous and mental changes are manifestations of the same Ultimate Reality. But physical

* Correlation of "Nervous and Mental Forces."

science has nothing to do with the Ultimate Reality. Science is concerned only with the manifestations and affirms a certain relation between the manifestations in nervous changes. It affirms that the manifestations in nervous changes are correlated with a great chain of manifestations—what we call the physical forces. It affirms that the invariable antecedents of any one of these manifestations, or group of manifestations, is to be found among those manifestations which we term physical phenomena, never among mental phenomena. If it be true, it is plain that there is no room for the efficiency of consciousness.

Prof. Clifford's theory involves the same result. He holds that mental and material phenomena are invariably associated, that in connection with every atom of matter—the material unit—there is something akin to consciousness, "mind-stuff"—the mental unit. On this theory, what we call consciousness is the result of a peculiar aggregation of these units of "mind-stuff," just as the matter that we perceive results from the aggregation of material atoms. But the conservation of energy knows nothing about "mind-stuff"—has nothing to do with it. The relation affirmed by that doctrine, exists only between the material phenomena, and is true, whether the "mind-stuff" exists or not. We are obliged to conclude, therefore, that "the two things are on utterly different platforms—the physical facts go along by themselves and the mental facts by themselves. There is a parallelism between them, but there is no interference of one with the other."*

We are compelled, therefore, if we accept the conservation of energy in its application to nervous phenomena, to deny efficiency to consciousness, and to admit that our belief in other conscious beings is a groundless assumption. But this groundless assumption we must make, and with it, the efficiency of consciousness. We are compelled to make it, not only by the practical demands of every day life, but by the demands of reason. There are a multitude of plain, hard facts utterly inexplicable on any other hypothesis. Consider the realization of a purpose.† It is a matter of momentary experience that there is a correspondence between our purposes and their real-

* Clifford, "Body and Mind."

† "Modern Realism Examined," p. 184.

ization. If consciousness has efficiency, the explanation is simple: The purpose effects its own realization. But if consciousness has no efficiency? A young man decides to go to college, performs all those exceedingly complicated actions necessary to take him to the institution he decides to attend, buys books, reads, attends lectures, passes examinations, graduates, but not because of his purpose. According to the theory his purpose is powerless. The nervous processes have initiated and sustained all of those countless actions: his *purpose* had nothing to do with them. But since the courses of action open to the nervous system are practically infinite, how does it happen that the particular series is hit upon, which effects a result in harmony with his purpose? And this argument is strikingly cumulative. Every moment I am forming purposes and witnessing their realization. In view of these facts, what must we say as to the probability of the efficiency of consciousness? I think we must say that it is inconceivably great.

Further, it is a well known fact that pleasures are generally associated with beneficial, pains with detrimental, experiences. Eating, for instance, in moderate quantities, is beneficial and gives pleasure; fasting immoderately is detrimental and gives pain. There are two explanations of this fact: The Theist maintains that it is due to the action of an overruling Intelligence; the Evolutionist (who of course may be a Theist) that it is due to the action of natural selection. If any animals should take pleasure in poking their heads into the fire, they would not survive and the result would be a race of beings who do not enjoy such experiences. But both of these theories presuppose the efficiency of consciousness. If consciousness is a bye-product, sustaining the same relation to the nervous processes that the prattle of a brook does to its motion, it is altogether accidental that pleasure is associated with beneficial experiences.*

Further, the efficiency of consciousness is necessary to give any notion of the possibility of evolution. Those who are acquainted with Spencer's psychology will remember that he refers every improvement of mind to the Instability of the Homogeneous, that is, to chance. The nervous current luckily

*January number of "Mind," 1879. Article by Dr. James.

happens to take a new departure in a useful direction. The wearing action of the nervous current prepares the way, to a limited degree, for a second flow, in the same direction, thus increasing the probability that the nervous current will take that course again. But the Instability of the Homogeneous is just as likely to take the nervous current along a line, which will be death to the animal. And the probability is just as great that the new departure of the nervous current in any animal will be in wrong directions, as in right ones. With no principle but chance, the evolution of brain is absolutely inexplicable. But if you add the efficiency of consciousness, which emphasizes the departure in useful directions, and thus tends to perpetuate them, the evolution of brain becomes conceivable.*

If therefore we are to choose between the efficiency of consciousness and the conservation of energy in its application to nervous phenomena, there ought to be no doubt of our choice. The theory is only proved in the case of heat, electricity, chemical, and mechanical forces,† and when it comes in conflict with such a fact as the efficiency of consciousness, every canon of logic requires us to give it up. This conclusion Prof. Herbert is in no wise inclined to accept. I had almost said that his book was written to avoid it. How to admit the reasonings of science, and at the same time deny certain conclusions frequently drawn from them, was the question he seems to have asked himself. He felt very strongly the influence from which no man in our time can escape, the influence of scientific authority. Deny the conservation of energy as a scientific theory in any of its applications he durst not. Science had affirmed it, the oracle to which we owe so many truths, so triumphantly verified in the brilliant inventions of this century. He could venture, however, to question the metaphysics of science, endeavoring in that way to avoid the conclusions he felt to be untrue, without impeaching the authority for which he had such profound respect. A very cursory examination will suffice to show his failure. "The problem which proves utterly insoluble is to account for the emergence of feelings among the mechanical processes of the nervous organism, that being a strictly material structure,

* See January number of "Mind," 1879. Article by Dr. James.

† Bain, "Correlation of Nervous and Mental Forces."

whose operations consist of movements, and admit no break of continuity. We have all the evidence of which the case admits, that the nervous organism is as completely subject to physical laws as the universe around us; but, according to the problem before us, a certain series of nerve changes are accompanied by a series of feelings wholly incommensurable with movements, yet exhibiting the closest parallelism with them, the two constituting a double set of processes, for only one of which we are able to account. To account for this superfluous doubleness is the riddle."* And we know already how, in Prof. Herbert's opinion, we can get rid of this "superfluous doubleness." Abandon the untenable assumption of science, that it deals with ontological facts, and the "doubleness" is gone and with it the difficulty. We have no longer two wholly incommensurable classes of facts, feelings, and movements. We have nothing but feelings—states of consciousness. The facts called movements are only a kind of feelings. That the feelings called movements should produce feelings to which that name is not applicable, and that these in turn should produce the kind of feelings called movements, now presents no difficulty, since, in either case, the cause and effect are both feelings. Such is Prof. Herbert's opinion. But we have seen already that we cannot dispose of the difficulty in this way if we accept the conservation of energy. That theory asserts that the states of consciousness (actual or possible) called movements find their *complete explanation* in previous states of consciousness (actual or possible) called movements. The difficulty is not *à priori*, as Prof. Herbert supposes. There is nothing, in the nature of the case, to prevent the feelings called movements from being explained by feelings of a different sort. But as a matter of fact we do not find it to be so. If you suppose, therefore, that science does erroneously identify states of consciousness with ontological facts, you have taken no step towards removing the difficulty. Whether the conservation of energy be affirmed of ontological facts, or states of consciousness, it leaves no room for the efficiency of consciousness. We must still say that the doctrine as applied to nervous phenomena is false, or that the notion that consciousness has any efficiency is a delusion.

* Page 97.

I agree with Professor Herbert that though science claims to deal only with phenomena it is nevertheless compelled to transcend them. This may appear inconsistent with the position taken in the first part of this Article. I there stated my belief that science and Idealism are consistent, that there is nothing to show that science is necessarily Realistic. But it is clear that science makes assumptions about past and future phenomena, that it reasons about phenomena on the sun, for example, on the supposition of the truth of the axioms of mathematics. By what right does it do this? The trustworthiness of memory, and the uniformity of nature are not phenomena, nor can they be proved from phenomena. To grant that science is occupied with phenomena is one thing; to say that the principles by means of which we obtain the phenomena about which science reasons—the principles which guide us in reasoning about them—are derived from phenomena, is quite another. The subject matter of science is phenomena, but the principles by means of which we obtain them and reason about them, are not phenomena, nor can they be derived from them.

I agree with him further that these non-phenomenal principles are not properly described as intuitions. "The conclusions described here as inferences from phenomena, are sometimes called intuitions of the mind, and sometimes primitive beliefs, both expressions suggesting convictions directly implanted within us, as distinguished from conclusions arrived at by way of inference, which is the view taken of them here. No doubt they—or many of them—bear now to every formed mind the character of direct intuitions and primitive beliefs, and it may well be that we inherit natures which cannot but develop these results as soon as they develop at all. But though we possess such irresistible convictions, which seem to shine by their own light, it appears to be truer to regard them as inferences, owing their immediate character to invariable experience, perpetuated through countless generations, rather than as intuitions originally bestowed in their present form. For we have convictions of all degrees of strength, several of which, undoubtedly, have been engendered by experience and are capable of reversal; some have been reversed; and it is

not satisfactory, it is not possible to divide them into two classes, one containing convictions, intuitive and irreversible, and the other convictions presumably reversible, because their character of greater or less certainty is supposed to be due to constant experience. If constant experience can produce convictions of this kind, it is an adequate and known cause of them, which renders other explanation of their origin superfluous. And to recognize that the present form of our indubitable conviction has been arrived at gradually, is only to recognize that the natural history of their production is similar to that which has marked large portions, if not the whole, of the universe as known to us; moreover, it is to deal only with the successions of phenomena, with the antecedents of physical causation, and does not touch in the slightest degree the great question of efficient causation, and of the guiding intelligence concerned in their production; for those as we have seen are not among phenomena.”*

For the reasons here stated with such admirable clearness, I think Professor Herbert altogether right in maintaining that these primary convictions should not be called intuitions. The term intuition has been applied to beliefs, peculiar in their origin and absolute in their authority. Cognitions elicited into consciousness *through experience*, not derived from experience by any process of abstraction, comparison or generalization, have been called intuitions, and their authority has been considered by some philosophers at least as unquestionable. Professor Herbert's inferences certainly differ from intuitions in their origin, and it conduces to clearness to give them a different name. But whatever they are called, we should have some way of determining what they are, and what validity they have. The author calls them inferences. If they are, they ought to be tested as all other inferences are. He says that they are incapable of philosophical proof. Well, perhaps, they can be shown to be philosophically probable, and if so, we ought to have had clear and definite statement of the grounds of that probability.

He tells us again that the evidence on which reason endorses convictions she cannot prove, is their conformity with our constantly recurring experience. But what does conformity mean?

* P. 354.

Take the belief in external substance. Does that conform to experience? Do the axioms of mathematics, as truths for all time and space, conform to experience? Does efficient causation in the external world, conform to experience? He remarks again, "The evidence on which reason pronounces must be of the most varied character, wide as the range of our nature, and its relations to the material and spiritual world which surround it." Is it not clear that since that evidence is to be our warrant for the principles that underlie and guarantee all our reasoning, it should have received most definite and explicit statement? The force of these criticisms will be more fully appreciated when attention is called to some of the beliefs, which the author thinks are thus established. The trustworthiness of memory, the uniformity of nature, efficient causation, personal identity, the axioms of mathematics, the existence of other people, and, finally the existence of God. It is clear that the method of establishing these propositions cannot be the same. Some of them are assumed at every step of reasoning, some of them, the author undertakes to establish by elaborate processes of reasoning. If they all "conform to experience," they must do so in very different ways, since they have such different relations to experience. One of the natural consequences of the author's failure to decide just what should be the test of "transcendental inferences," is that he never seemed to have decided what kind of propositions he would prove, and what he would assume without proof. This confusion is noticeable in his argument for a Creative Intelligence. "It is imperative to recognize human intelligence, and regard human works as achievements of mind, although to do so is to concede the merely phenomenal character of the materialistic hypothesis; it is not only legitimate, but equally imperative, to ascribe to intelligence the countless phenomena of external nature, which indicate it similarly, or rather, indicate it in degrees immeasurably higher." Now if he means that the manifold marks of design of external nature irresistibly suggest a designing mind, though the suggestion is incapable of proof as the trustworthiness of memory—that it is to be received as true, nevertheless, because of its adaptation to our needs—he occupies, as I think, an impregnable position. If, however, he means that processes of reason-

ing based on the indications of design can establish a great probability in behalf of Creative Intelligence, he occupies an entirely different position. It is evident from a number of passages that Professor Herbert accepts the doctrine of evolution. If he accepts that doctrine, in a thoroughgoing sense, the argument from design must be made from the original distribution of forces. Professor Jevons says that out of infinitely infinite possible collocations of atoms, that collocation was hit upon which finally developed the world as we know it. The question, then, is this: does that collocation point to a guiding intelligence? Now if only one of these infinitely infinite possible collocations would develop intelligence, the chances in favor of a guiding intelligence are almost infinitely great. If, however, we have no reason to deny that a large part of these collocations would develop intelligence, the probability becomes slight. If we have no reason to deny that any one of them might develop intelligence, the probability disappears altogether. The hypothetical case last stated I believe to be the true one. I think we have no ground whatever for denying that any one of these collocations might have developed intelligence. Let me call attention to three facts which should be borne in mind in this discussion: (1.) Our question concerns the probability of the development of order and intelligence, and adaptation under different collocations of *the same atoms, obeying the same laws*. To ask what would be the result of a different arrangement of atoms, obeying mechanical laws merely, or mechanical and chemical laws, might be an interesting question, but it would not be our question. (2.) We know absolutely nothing of the conditions under which life and intelligence made their appearance on the earth. They are here now. For certain reasons we believe they have not always been here. On the supposition of thorough-going evolution, they must have been developed out of lifelessness and non-intelligence, but we are utterly ignorant of the conditions under which they were developed. (3.) We cannot say that there may not be an infinite variety of conditions under which life and intelligence may appear. Even if we knew the actual conditions of their original appearance, only omniscience could affirm that there may not be an endless variety of other condi-

tions of the same phenomena. The conditions, then, of life and intelligence may be fitly symbolized by x from two points of view: x represents our knowledge of the actual, as well as of the possible, conditions of intelligence. With these facts before us, we can restate our question: what is the probability that any other collocation than the actual one would develop x conditions? There are three ways of answering the question: We may say that there is more or less probability that other collocations would produce the required conditions, or that there is no probability, or that we don't know anything about it—that our proper attitude towards the question is one of entire suspense of judgment. If we make either of the first two answers, we must justify it by reasons. He who makes the last, sufficiently justifies himself by saying that he sees no reason for a decision, and by showing the fallacy of proposed reasons. I should make the last answer, and I now propose to state my reasons for thinking any arguments opposed to it invalid. Such reasoning must be deductive or inductive. Deductive reasoning is inapplicable for two reasons: (1.) The premises are so numerous, so comprehensive, and so complex, that they are infinitely beyond our powers. Given the collocation of the atoms of the universe, to determine the results, is a problem beyond our powers. It would be clearly impossible if we knew all the laws of the atoms, but when it is remembered that we have no reason to suppose that we know more than a tithe of them, we may safely say that it would be impossible for a perfect intelligence with our knowledge to solve the problem. (2.) If the problem were capable of solution, since we do not know the conditions of life and intelligence, we could not identify the results reached, with the required conditions. What will be the result of laws, some known, and some unknown, upon any definite collocation of atoms? Will the atoms in obedience to those laws, develop x conditions, are questions that cannot be answered. Inductive reasoning fails equally. The argument is sometimes stated substantially as follows: Our experience of unintelligent particles leads us to suppose that the chances, of their arranging themselves in intelligible and orderly ways is small. It is improbable, therefore, that any collocation of unintelligent atoms will develop order and intel-

ligence. The reply is that the resemblance between the combinations we deal with, and those that constitute the original collocations, is too remote to make it the basis of an induction. The earth revolves around one of the heavenly bodies and so does the moon. The earth is inhabited; therefore, the moon is. No one, I suppose, accepts the validity of that reasoning, although it conforms perfectly to the type of all reasoning. It is reasoning from experience, but I think you will say poor reasoning, because our experience is not wide enough to justify any conclusion at all. In the case in question our experience is not only remote, but in unessential particulars. Why has our experience of unintelligent particles led us to conclude that the chances of their arranging themselves in intelligible forms is small? Simply because the proportion of intelligible forms to possible forms is small. Take any combination of letters. The number of ways in which they can be arranged so as to make sense is small; the number of possible arrangements without regard to sense is very much larger. Now this is the cause of our experience with unintelligent particles, and any resemblance between those we have dealt with and others that we have not dealt with, that includes this feature, may be made the basis of a valid induction, and no other can. In other words, we must know the very fact we wish to prove: that the probability is small that the unintelligent atoms of the universe will develop into order and intelligence, before we can prove it by inductive reasoning. But this is to admit that inductive reasoning does not apply to the case; that the problem, if solved at all, must be solved by deductive reasoning.

The consequences of the author's failure to decide just what should be the test of "transcendental inferences" are seen in a number of defective arguments. I will give one more illustration. He is discussing the question, which may well be said to have been *the* question of theology since the time of Butler's *Analogy*; the question of ascribing moral attributes to the Deity. "No doubt it is true, that if we are to infer the moral attributes of the Supreme Being from the facts of the world, taken altogether, and taken alone, we cannot shut out of view the perplexing facts of evil, which lie on every hand side by side with good; and since it would be a contradiction to sup-

pose that such opposite attributes coëxist in one Being, it might seem that we are pointed to a Dualistic theory. But not to dwell on the fact that the highest positive conception of God is derived, not simply from the world but from teachings delivered by those who declared they had special authority to utter them . . . , it is sufficient to say without entering on the discussion of Dualism, that although some modern as well as ancient writers have contended for that theory, the great majority of thinkers of all schools have rejected it."* Stated briefly, this argument is as follows: The facts of evil point to Dualism, but thinkers of all schools have rejected Dualism; therefore, there is no difficulty in ascribing moral attributes to the Deity! The fallacy is so plain that it hardly needs to be pointed out. It is a glaring instance of *ignoratio elenchi*. The author appeals to the authority of the great majority of thinkers against Dualism, to prove the theistic conception of the Deity. And this is his sole contribution to the settlement of the question which more than all others ought to have received his attention.

* Page 426.

ARTICLE VI.—SISTER AUGUSTINE: AN OLD CATHOLIC.*

IN a notice of Montalembert's "Life of St. Elizabeth of Hungary," Sainte Beuve quotes a poem descriptive of a picture of Charity, attributed to Raphael; the divine mother clasping in one arm a crowd of naked, shivering orphans, the other arm stretched out for more; some in the rear grasping the folds of her garment, and, though unseen, already welcomed and comforted:

"Jamais, jamais assez, O Sainte Hospitaliere!
Mais ce que Raphael en sa noble maniere
Ne dit pas, c'est qui au cœur elle a souvent son mal,
Elle aussi,—quelque plaie à l'aiguillon fatal;
Pourtant, comme à l'insu de la douleur qui creuse,
Chaque orphelin qui vient enleve l'ame heureuse!"

Love has its own ache! Yet there is no sweeter balm for a wounded breast, than binding up the wounds of others. If poets "learn in suffering what they teach in song," Christian souls, passing through various painful experiences, learn to comfort others with the comfort wherewith they themselves are comforted of God.

Look at this Sister of Charity! Under the white coif and pointed hood shine out eyes full of intelligence and determination, eyes that have wept many tears, but have lost none of their sweetness and fire. The straight nose and firm, sweet mouth confirm their promise of strong character and sound sense. No seer of visions and dreamer of dreams is this nun; but a woman of deep experience, clear convictions and strong faith, whose will, surrendered not to man but to God, ruled her life in steadfast obedience to His will; whose loving heart was never frozen up by conventual restrictions, nor her judgment obscured by the mists of philosophy and vain deceit, or submitted to those who teach for doctrines the commandments of men; a Mother Superior by the grace of God, through natural character and the discipline of life; an Angelique Arnauld among the women of to-day.

* From the German "Memorials of Amalie von Lasaulx." Henry Holt & Co., New York.

Does the fact of her being an Old Catholic explain this somewhat unusual character, or was Sister Augustine an Old Catholic simply because she was Amalie von Lasaulx? The Germans are fond of tracing inherited characteristics; and though the chapter of family history, in the translation, is abridged from the original, we find its incidents valuable, recognizing in Sister Augustine the bravery of the Lasaulx who was ennobled for fighting against the Turks, the wisdom of the Privy Councillor, the patient endurance of the grandfather who was unjustly imprisoned, as well as the artistic tastes and valuable qualities of her father the architect, and the tinge of maternal sadness and severity, which subdued her natural vivacity and caused occasional periods of painful depression.*

She entered the Religious Life rather by force of circumstances, than from a natural fitness, attracted by the vocation, her only road to which lay through convent walls. If she had belonged to a Protestant family she might have found in Pastor Fliedner's training school, then just established at Kaiserswerth, the introduction to a happier, and not less useful life, free from the irritating bondage against which her deepest instincts and strongest convictions never ceased to rebel.

* Amalie von Lasaulx, born at Coblenz in 1815, belonged to a family of French extraction—Jean de la Saulx (of the Willow), and his son having been ennobled in 1611, for bravery in fighting against the Turks. Her great-grandfather came to Coblenz and died there in 1791, Privy Councillor of the Elector of Trèves. Her grandfather was Syndic (Recorder) of Coblenz, during the French Revolution; a man of great energy, honesty, and public spirit, but unjustly accused of treason, and confined in the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein for fifteen months. The establishment of his innocence finally released him; but not until seven years later was it fully acknowledged by the Elector, who could not then restore him to his former post.

Her father, Johann Claudius, was an architect, the builder and restorer of many beautiful churches, and known beyond Germany by his works on architecture; a man of admirable qualities, which some of his children inherited—faithful, energetic, unselfish and lovable.

Her mother, of a deeply serious nature and sternly upright character, seems to have been less beloved in her family, and the household was oppressed by a certain gloomy solemnity. But though there was great reserve among its members, there was no compulsion in matters of education or religion; and the children grew up as their gifts and tendencies decided, all uncommonly clever, and the girls especially with an immense capacity for work, and the ability to rule others, which found opportunity in later life, when all three became superiors of hospitals or convents.

Yet there is a certain sadness which seems inseparable from the life of a sisterhood, either Protestant or Catholic, the giving up of natural ties, of the home life, most satisfying in its affections and beneficial in its gentle discipline, for a life involving constant sacrifice of the will, the tastes, the affections, in some institutions even of the conscience ; a sort of self-crucifixion to which very few can be really called of God. This unseen "plaie, à l'aiguillon fatal," more effectual than the hair shirt, chain girdles, and cruel "discipline" of Romish saints, is something not to be lightly undertaken, though its results may be blessed to the development of rare saintliness and beauty of personal character and great benefit to others.

During Amalie's childhood, a society for relieving the wants of the poor had been formed at Coblenz, and an orphanage and hospital established, the latter under the care of the Sisters of Mercy of the Congregation of St. Charles Borromeo, at Nancy. Anna von Lasaulx had taken the vows at this convent, after a few years becoming Superior of the Order of St. Elizabeth, in Luxembourg. At this time Amalie was still a child. A friend said to her, jokingly : " Who knows ; perhaps you will go into a convent too !"

"I'd sooner jump over the garden wall into the Moselle;" said the little girl, indignantly.

She might have been a happy wife, if the right one had sought her. After refusing one offer after another, till her parents were so displeased that they did not speak to her for several months, she warmly denied the charge of haughtiness, from one of her aunts :

"I am not haughty ; there is somebody whose shoes I would clean, if he asked me."

"Somebody" never knew. It was the second sister, Clementina, whom he sought, unsuccessfully.

Later, when Amalie had recovered from this attachment, she became engaged to a young doctor ; but he proved unworthy, and the engagement was broken. An attack of fever brought her to the verge of the grave, and she returned to life, looking for happiness thenceforth only in devotion to her suffering fellow-creatures.

It was not convent life, but the occupation of hospital nurs-

ing which attracted her, and she seemed providentially guided in this direction. After her illness she spent some months in the family of her brother Ernst, and used to visit the hospital opposite and often sit by the patients and assist in caring for them. "God himself gave me my vocation," she said to a friend.

For a long time she kept her purpose secret; the sacrifice of home and friends cost her a severe struggle; and she finally took the decisive step without asking the permission which would have been either refused or most reluctantly granted. Two years before, she had applied for admission; and in 1840, at the age of twenty-five, she took the veil, at the parent house at Nancy, and was known henceforth as Sister Augustine.

In entering the Order, she took this vow: "I promise and vow before God never to leave it, to live and die within it, and for the rest of my life to serve the poor and neglected sick, according to the rules and statutes of the said Order. I vow never to consent to the Order giving up the work which I now engage in, of caring for the sick poor; nor ever to forsake the Order myself, out of weariness, obstinacy or longing for a change of life."

The House at Nancy was one of the best of Roman Catholic institutions, with rules less strict in some respects than those of the general order of St. Vincent de Paul, and was governed at that time by sisters of the simple, Evangelical Old School, very different from the Ultramontane influences afterwards dominant there. The Lady Superior had belonged to the Congregation for sixty years, and was a heroine of the Revolution, bravely guarding her nuns, when the convents were thrown open and the sisters dispersed. Her death warrant had been signed and a price set upon her head. Later, during an epidemic of typhus, when fifty sisters had died, she and one other had taken entire charge of a large hospital.

The mistress of the novices had little sympathy with needless restrictions. "Children," she would say, "the calling you have chosen is truly hard enough,—you need not try to make it harder; we have not been sent into the world to make our lives bitter!"

Amalie's old teacher, Seydel, thought she went into a con-

vent because of her broken engagement. A man's opinion, like Percival's of his sister :

"A holy maid; though never maiden glowed
With such a fervent flame of human love,
Which, being rudely blunted, glanced and shot
Only to holy things." —*Idyl of the Grail.*

With Sister Augustine, "the fervent flame of human love" glowed to the last, not only for personal friends but for all who needed her love and care. In the ideal Religieuse, love should be given "only to holy things." It would simplify her life, if this were possible; but human hearts are not so easily transferred from earth to heaven.

To a nature so self-reliant as Sister Augustine's, the giving up of personal freedom was a sacrifice requiring constant struggles. "How often have I to seek help at the large chapel crucifix, in order to hear from the Saviour's lips that He is not held a prisoner there by the sharp nails, but by His infinite love to humanity! How needful for my passionate heart that the fetters which bind it be wrought of that same love to my poor suffering brethren! On entering the Order, I have given up my free-will to the Lord in a stricter sense than other Christians do; and how have I to struggle for strength in order to be constantly victorious! How fierce the battle, day by day, finding perhaps, neither rest nor peace, until death takes the weapon from my cold hand and lays me down, at last, to quiet sleep!"

But one does not fight forever the same enemies; and she learned to look on all the distasteful externals of convent life as the price of her vocation, into which she entered with joy and zeal, feeling a special interest and affection for each patient, and repeatedly saying in her letters: "The greatest gift of God's grace granted me in this life is His having made me a Sister of Charity."

Upon leaving Nancy, she was sent as dispenser to a hospital at Aix la Chapelle. She soon became the life of the house; but the seven years spent there were years of the most painful loneliness, which neither work nor prayer could wholly conquer. She perceived clearly how different her manner of thought and feeling was from the spirit of the Order to which

she was irrevocably bound. "Often, with burning tears, I prayed God to make me callous and careless of everything that since my earliest youth had appeared to me great and noble. How many times afterward have I prayed Him to forgive that foolish prayer! How utterly impoverished would my soul have been, in the midst of my arduous calling, had my deep, lively feelings been blunted." Especially revolting to her intense affection for relatives and friends, was the new spirit pervading the Order, which required the giving up of all home ties. "We are recommended not to love any human being, in order to love God the more. . My God, if I must seek Thee in *this* way, then I shall never reach Thee nor possess Thee!"

Among all the sisters there was not one whom she could trust with the burden of her misery. But this loneliness laid the foundation of that spiritual independence, which led her in later years to seek help from God alone, and find in her own conscience the law for every action.

The death of her father, whom she loved intensely, but had rarely seen since entering convent life, caused her deep sorrow, all the more as she reached his death-bed too late for a parting word.

During the next year, 1849, she left Aix la Chapelle, for Bonn, where she had been appointed Superior of the new hospital of St. John. With a number of Sisters from Nancy, she arrived late one evening in November, each bringing her few possessions, sewed up in a pillow-case. They were not expected so soon, and found the house utterly unfurnished. The janitor borrowed some potatoes, for the supper of the hungry Sisters, and they passed the night on bare floors. Next day, contributions of all kinds poured in; and in a few weeks the hospital was ready for patients. In addition to ordinary patients, provision was made for aged men and women. Under Sister Augustine's energetic and loving care, this hospital became not only a model of neatness and cheerfulness, but a happy home for all its inmates. The sisters lived together like sisters indeed, in fulfilment of that rule of the Order which bids them "remember that they are Sisters of Mercy, and that they ought to be of one heart and one soul, like the early Christians."

The Superior was a mother not only to them, but to all the patients, sitting by their sick beds, comforting and cheering them. She was especially fond of night-watching, calling the still hours of the night the bright side of her work. "When silent night in her strange solemnity quiets all restless hearts, I too feel quieted in my lonely watch. I feel reconciled to all the wrongs done me throughout the day; in the stillness without and within, I can again understand my own heart and others. In such blessed hours, I often am carried away on the wings of prayer, to the feet of Him, whose heart never for one instant was wanting in sympathy." Watching with a poor, dying man, who expired after a long struggle, and remarking the expression of intense peace which came over his face, she says: "It seems to me as if the spirit, on its flight to the realms of bliss, had turned back once more to the body in which it dwelt, just as the setting sun gilds for one last moment some lonely dwelling-place in the valley. I love to see that beautiful light on the brow of the dead; just as a stranger welcomes a messenger from his beloved distant home."

Her position as Superior suited her perfectly, and she made no secret of her pleasure in it. "God gave me the talents for it, and I am glad to make use of them. Why should I not frankly acknowledge this?" False humility was no part of her piety; "the main-spring of her character was truth and unselfish love."

The tendency to untruthfulness, which had developed since the Jesuits had the direction of the convents, leading to hypocrisy and imaginary self-righteousness, was a constant trial to her straightforward, honest character. When one of the young sisters reproved the janitor, who accidentally came in contact with her, while carrying some heavy sacks into the cellar: "How dare you push me, who am a temple of the Holy Ghost?" the Superior was shocked. Her friends found the incident amusing. "It is no laughing matter, I assure you; I could weep over it."

Coming from the influences at Nancy, the novices were surprised to find that Sister Augustine exacted no blind obedience from them, but encouraged modest suggestions, or even remonstrance, if she had ignorantly proposed anything which

could not easily be done. This was in accordance with the rules of the Order, to be sure, but strange to the modern spirit of it. Gradually, under her influence, their sanctimoniousness gave place to simple and healthy piety. She had great discernment of character, and knew how to find what was best and noblest in every one, and use it for their good. Not only to the sisters and patients, but to a wide circle of friends, was her influence a blessing, as a wise, strong friend, and a tender comforter in sorrow. "When we have nothing else to give, we can always give *love*," a sentence of her childhood's teacher, Seydel, was her motto through life.

Like many energetic and capable people, she had great trouble in keeping her temper with stupidity, and reproached herself bitterly for her failures. Yet she had patience for a long time, finding fault as little as possible, using silence instead of scolding, and never dismissing a servant while it was possible to retain her. "The Saviour never lost patience when His disciples misunderstood or altogether failed to understand Him; their spiritual poverty never could exhaust the riches of His merciful love. What a condemnation of me there is in this! How impatiently, and with how little love and sympathy, I treated one of my fellow sisters to-day! In spite of her want of understanding she is possessed of a heart that seeks God humbly and therefore finds him. Envious possession, devoid of which I must ever remain poor." She recognizes that her hardest task will ever be to have patience with herself. Another hard battle was with her tendency to melancholy. Often "a cloud of gloom" oppressed her, owing doubtless to physical reasons, but assigned by her sensitive conscience to her own negligence or selfishness. Evidences of this depression appear in extracts from her letters and diary.

"In the course of a year, many a day is spent under a dark sky, breaking and closing without a ray of sunlight to brighten it. It is just so in my little world. For days together I go about mechanically, without so much as once raising the eye of faith to the everlasting hills." She compared such days to the "autumn winds that strip the trees of their foliage."

In 1854, she wrote: "When you have to groan, as I do, under the constant oppression of an hourly changing state of

mind, then you can understand what a depth of blessedness is expressed by the words 'entering into the rest that remaineth for the people of God.' Yet these painful changes are a preparation for heaven. Through storm and rain, through heat and cold, the pilgrim must continue his way, until his weary feet reach the rest of his Father's home. The heart must be prepared by the sorrow and bitterness of life for the enjoyment of eternal rest."

Describing the peaceful calm of a lovely spring morning, she continues: "Sometimes a Sabbath peace like this finds its reflection in my soul. But how many days, weeks, and months of storm and darkness must pass over me, before I can experience such a blissful moment of rest? How seldom the risen Saviour enters my heart, with the blessed salutation: 'Peace be with thee! It is I, be not afraid!' Yes, when His wounded hand grants me the inward consciousness of His presence, then indeed a spring-tide awakes within my soul, with flowers which the warm sunlight of His grace opens to far greater beauty than those of earth. But, alas! how seldom such sunshine breaks through the dark clouds of my sky, and it is the deepest sorrow of my wounded soul to know that it is by my own fault so little is granted me. Yesterday, I once again had the pleasure of standing on the summit of a hill, and of being greatly impressed by the scene. In the church there, I was as happy and peaceful, as if I had left all my cares in the valley below. I felt as if, having laid aside my burden, I could now kneel down and lovingly remember those who were still tossed about in the tempest of life. . . . We went behind the church to the hillside and gazed on a lovely valley, with peaceful cottages, which looked as if the sorrows of the world could never enter them. . . . I can never altogether comprehend why a peaceful solitude like this should make me so sad. Is it the painful contrast between the beauty and freedom of nature, and the backward and stunted growth of my own soul? Does the peaceful landscape bring me a greeting from the everlasting hills, whose peace is never troubled by a storm? Yes, the sadness that fills the heart is only home-sickness,—a yearning for our Father's house!"

Regular out of door exercise seldom forms a part of convent

life, and hours of recreation are limited. With very early rising, frequent watchings and fastings, little variety in life, or relief from the strain of responsibility and anxious care and sympathy, it was not strange that the nervous system of Sister Augustine became depressed, and that at times she almost sank into religious melancholy. The advice of a friend, to consult a specialist for nervous diseases, while it hurt her deeply, yet roused her to more active resistance to the weakness which she thought sinful. "God alone knows how deeply I despise myself for feeling thus. May He forgive my ingratitude!" But she had concealed her depression, for years, from all but her closest friends, and sought "by her bright face to give the lie to eyes red with weeping."

Other extracts from her diary speak of her joy in prayer, and in the Holy Communion at early morning, bringing the soul into the very presence of Christ.

"Our faithful Saviour well knew what in His constant personal presence He gave to the world, especially to the convents, which arose in later centuries, within whose walls the inhabitants are obliged to silently bury the bitterest sorrows of their hearts. When mind and body ache under the burden of my calling, and I strive to hide my pain from those around me—in whose heart then could I seek help but in His, who never sent the helpless away? . . . And yet the Saviour would not grant us a constant, living consciousness of His presence; and why? He allows us to feel the pressure of our chains, in order that like prisoners, we might long for freedom. Another truth, too, seems to me to be contained here: His love wished the unity, not the discord of His children. It was purposed that we should feel helpless, lonely, and forsaken, only that we might cling in affectionate sympathy to our fellow men, bear joy and grief together, and comfort and support each other."

Some of these extracts seem to have been preserved, without her knowledge, from a diary which in her loneliness she wrote, and afterwards burned, and of which she once said: "I feel as if a faithful heart were sharing my sorrows. It would appear as if God had so implanted the desire for communion with others, within my heart, that even life within an Order, though it may check, cannot uproot it. How maiming the spirit of

an Order, or indeed of almost all convents, is to the human heart, which God surely intended to ennoble and to sanctify by communion with others!"

Sister Augustine was an unconscious Protestant, maintaining that the foundation of all truth is "to clearly understand your own mind, and to act according to personal conviction." She had no sympathy with the increasing restrictions of convent life, and all that was best in her character was in contradiction to its spirit. Only the practical benevolence of the vocation reconciled her to the Order. "In any other convent I should have been completely lost." Speaking of the decay of monasticism, she observes: "Our calling seems to afford a better guarantee for the continued existence of our Order. Our treasures are the poor and sick. The outward and inward sufferings of others—these are our fields of labor!"

Having suffered so much herself, she could help the 'inward sufferings' of others. Sisters in doubt and perplexity, at peace neither with the Order, the world, or their own consciences, sought and found comfort with her. The true source of her religious life, the belief in a personal Saviour, was the leading motive in all her actions. To all her sick and needy patients she ministered as unto Him.

Remarkably free from religious prejudices, and loving the deep religious experience which she met in Protestant life and literature, she remained warmly attached to her own Church, to the great and simple doctrines common to all evangelical Christians. She was truly an Old Catholic. Among her friends were numbered many Protestants, Professors in the University and the Protestant clergy of Bonn; but the friend to whom she felt most indebted was Professor Hilgers, to whom she was attracted by similarity of views and feelings. Though not personally acquainted with Dr. Döllinger, she followed his intrepid career with the greatest sympathy.

When the Syllabus of 1864 appeared, containing eighty opinions which the Pope pronounced heretical, among them several which formed the very basis of political life, Sister Augustine said, "I find myself condemned sixteen times." After great struggles with the Parent House, she had succeeded in excluding the Jesuits from her hospital. To a friend

she writes: "If these hot-headed saints knew how inwardly, and as far as possible outwardly, I am alienated from them, they would have driven me from the land long ago. Don't be at all astonished, if I should be one day quietly superseded."

When the war in Schleswig-Holstein broke out, and there was a demand for Sisters of Charity in the field, Sister Augustine was one of the first to offer her services. Since she had entered the convent, twenty-four years previously, this was her first journey, except for the annual retreat at Nancy. She began with sixty patients, sick and wounded, with three other sisters and two doctors, and soldiers for nurses. She went from place to place, following the troops, sending away the wounded who were able to be moved, and preparing for fresh arrivals after every battle; working incessantly, with unfailing energy and love; devoted to her "poor, shattered soldiers," and, in spite of the horrors of war, happier than she had ever been in her life.

This campaign proved a blessing to her. She was henceforth less dependent on human friendship; she wrote no more diaries; her whole nature had gained independence and clearness from this experience. Two years later, during the war with Austria, she went again to the front, and passed through even more painful scenes, on the battle-fields of Bohemia. The wounded were of all nations, for the Austrians left their wounded to the care of the enemy. In the space of a week, between the battles of Nachod and Königgrätz, sixteen thousand wounded, and in a few weeks following, over six thousand sick, filled all the churches and buildings of any size in the adjacent country. Her days were occupied in nursing, and her nights in washing and repairing the clothing of the soldiers. Owing to the neglect of the wounded, many of whom had lain from four to eight days in the woods, without food or drink, the mortality was dreadful; and as the hot weather came on, cholera broke out, and some of the Sisters died.

A touching incident is related of a wounded Italian, whom Sister Augustine had nursed. He felt himself to be dying, and was very impatient to see her. When she came he looked at her with deep feeling, and summoning up his last strength he said, "When Sorella dies—immediately with Jesus!"

She remained in charge of the wounded for several months after peace had been arranged. "The impressions received here have been very painful," she writes, "but they will be a blessing to me in my whole after life."

Her health had been injured to such an extent that she gave up all hope of recovery, and from this time she endured many painful illnesses. During these years she had suffered many bereavements, losing her mother, eldest sister, and two brothers, three sisters of her father, all very dear to her, and her old friend, Professor Perthes. Her only remaining sister, Clementina, was alienated from her by differences of opinion.

More painful than losses by death were the struggles and animosities which followed the General Council of 1869. The protesting bishops and their adherents were followed up by a systematic pressure to which many of them succumbed. Dr. Döllinger and others were excommunicated, and Sister Augustine herself looked forward to expulsion from her dearly loved home, the Hospital of St. John. She writes to a friend, "We shall have to emigrate, and live among the polar bears, or go to Strossmayer, in Hungary, the only one of the Bishops who has remained true." (Eighty-eight had voted against accepting the Dogma.) She adds: "Do not be anxious about my health; I am not the least so myself, although it is always getting worse."

When the Franco-Prussian war called for nurses, she was too feeble to go to the front, but she received as many wounded as possible into the hospital, and was filled with admiration, as she had been before, by the heroic fortitude with which the poor soldiers bore their sufferings.

"What times these are!" she wrote, in October, 1870. "We had enough to do with the war, but now there comes this moral misery in the Church, which will leave even deeper wounds. The convents will be carefully searched, and the knife held at our throats. What I am to do is perfectly clear, but what will come of it all God alone knows; but when the time comes He will help us."

Only one of the Bishops remained steadfast; one after another of her old friends, among the professors and pastors, yielded to the pressure, and a new loneliness came over her :

she had now no one upon whose judgment she could rely. "She had at last come to the conclusion that perfect fidelity, entirely pure, unselfish feeling, and guileless truth were not to be found in any human heart."

The blow fell at last. A boarder in the hospital informed against the Superior. She had received visits from some of the suspended priests. The Ladies Superior of Nancy and Trèves arrived, ordered a confession of her faith, and formally deposed her, appointing a new Superior in her stead, amid the grievous lamentations of the Sisters. "They may set a Superior down upon us," said one, "but they can never again give us a Mother."

At first it was proposed to take her to Nancy, but the house physician would not permit her to be moved. Some weeks later, at her own request, she was taken to a hospital at Vallerendar, near Coblenz, leaving "her dear home," where she had worked so faithfully for over twenty years. Many friends had begged her to come to them; but she remembered her vow, and preferred not to leave the Order unless absolutely driven out. Resting in her little turret chamber after the exhaustion of the journey, she was overwhelmed with a feeling of the most painful loneliness. "There I lay with my face to the wall feeling all darkness within me; but then I said to myself, 'After all I am foolish to be so sad; I have got Christ, and that is enough.'"

They would not even let her die in peace. The Sisters, Jesuit priests, even her own sister, Clementina, made unceasing efforts to procure her submission, causing her many tears and sleepless nights. Her longing for death daily increased, like a longing for home; but she was severe upon herself, even yet saying, "All longing for heaven which does not center in Christ alone, but rather springs from the desire to escape from this life, is false and self-deceptive." She often recalled with joy the words of the dying soldier in Bohemia: "Immediately with Jesus."

The prospect of being deprived of the last sacrament and of Christian burial, was a great trial; yet she was supported under it by the assurance "that just as there is a blessed baptism of spirit and of blood, so also there is a spiritual partaking of the Holy Communion."

The sacrament was administered by a friendly priest, without the knowledge of the Sisters, but no one was allowed to officiate at her funeral services. After her peaceful death, on the 28th of January, 1872, her body, deprived of its convent-robe, as the last dishonor possible, was placed in a coffin and carried in a small boat across the Rhine to the burial-place of her family, at Weissenthurm. A few friends followed it to the grave, Professor Reusch spoke a few words of affection, and all joined in repeating the Lord's Prayer. Flowers and a palm-branch were placed on the grave, symbolical of the noble army of martyrs whom she had joined in heaven.

The black robe, worn for thirty-two years, had been taken from her; but none could deprive her of the "white robe, given to each one." Instead of her faithful service to the poor and wretched "in His name," she stands "before the throne of God, and serves day and night in His temple." "And the Lamb shall be their shepherd, and shall guide them unto fountains of waters of life; and God shall wipe away every tear from their eyes."

ARTICLE VII.—ADDRESS AT THE FUNERAL OF
REV. LEONARD BACON, D.D.*

BY PROF. TIMOTHY DWIGHT.

WE meet together, this afternoon, as a company of friends—almost as the members of a single family,—that we may render the last service of regard and kindly affection to a man who has long been held in honor by us all. We meet in this House of Public Worship, rather than at his own home, because no private dwelling could receive within its walls the large numbers who, by reason of his departure from among us, are filled with a sense of personal bereavement, and because it seems fitting that one who has for so many years borne witness here for the truth and for God should be carried to his burial from this consecrated place. But we do not meet for the utterance and hearing of formal eulogy, or for the minute setting forth of those events and works which have made his career so remarkable. A time for this will be asked for, and will be found, by the community when, the first freshness of our grief having passed away, we may be able more calmly and thoughtfully to estimate what he was and what he did. A great man and a good man, such an one as does not often live in any city, large or small,—the full narrative of his life, whether told by some competent and loving fellow-worker in the good cause here to an assembly of his townsmen, or recorded in a volume which may bear to other regions and another generation the knowledge of his character and his influence, cannot but be a blessing to every one to whose serious reflection it may present itself. It would be a loss indeed, if the story were not, at some early moment, to be thus given to the world. To-day, however, we only speak to one another as if a sorrowing household, sorrowing most of all for the word which we have heard, that we shall see his face no more. Our thoughts are voiced, as it were, in a half-suppressed whisper of affection and grateful memory in the very presence of the dead. They are spoken by one of the company to the rest, in the few moments

* December 27, 1881.

before we say our last farewell at his open grave. They cannot review the past history. They must be imperfect even as related to the fullness of what we feel. The talk by the fire-side on many a Sunday evening in our several homes; the tender recollections in many an hour of converse with our own minds,—these alone will complete the picture to each one among us of the friend who has just left the things that are seen for those that are unseen. And yet—as in the family circle—we cannot help recalling, even at this hour, some traits of his character, and asking the questions, What of the past, and What of the future?

Our friend who has now finished his earthly work was a man of varied powers and of admirable qualities, both of mind and heart. He was made by nature on a grand scale. We who knew him as a fellow-citizen and a friend came to understand this more and more fully as the years passed on. Those, also, who merely saw his face, and heard of him or from him in other places, were impressed by the same thought. No man could read a page of his writings or listen to one of his more powerful discourses, without having some true appreciation of his extraordinary ability. We have often said this, as we have spoken about him in the past. We say it again, and with a deeper sense of its truth, if possible, at this hour. And why should we not allude to it even here, as his mortal part still lies before us. It is not as praise to him that it comes to our lips (which, at such a time, he might wish to be left unexpressed), but as a grateful remembrance for ourselves. These powers and qualities made up the life of the man. They rendered him what he was to our thought. They will cause him to be a living influence for us in the future.

As I bring him once more before my mind, he appears as a man of wonderful memory; of clear perception of truth; of that logical power which belongs, not indeed to the authors of systems of philosophy, but to the ablest advocates in the conflicts of thought; of wide and comprehensive mental grasp; of a rhetorical skill and culture characteristic of the best writers of our language; of an uncommon poetic sense and feeling; of such extraordinary suggestiveness and fertility in ideas, that his

mind could never be inactive or at rest; of so exquisite humor that it was a continual charm to listen to his conversation; of a native dignity of expression which everywhere compelled respect; of a beautiful combination of intellectual vigor and tender feeling. How often have we found him, when questions of the past were before us, ready to bring forth from the storehouse of his recollections those minute details and that freshness of living fact which contain within them the reality of history. He seems, from his earliest years, to have seized upon all that he heard from persons who were older than himself, and to have laid it aside in his mind for use at any moment. His remembrance was in this way prolonged, if we may so express it, over a period of half a century or more before the time of his birth. It was thus enabled to realize for himself and for us the earlier life of New England, and in a high degree that of the city where he and we have found our home. His reading, also, carried him back into the more distant past. Here, again, the accuracy of memory brought everything into his lasting possession. He was an authority with regard to historical facts and dates. He had a most lively interest in all that was interesting in every period and in every land. He comprehended and entered sympathetically into the struggles of other ages, and, while he lived with an enthusiasm for the present beyond that of most men who know little of what is behind it, he fired the energies of his spirit by the example of the heroes and martyrs of liberty and of faith. I am sure that the men who fought for their rights against tyranny and oppression in England two centuries ago and more would have recognized him as a kindred spirit, and would have seen in him, as he carried on the conflict in this later day, the influence of their own lives. Truly, we have lost in his dying much of the past; much which had been within his own experience; much more which was so made a reality through his memory of what he had heard and read, that it seemed as if he must have experienced it. I feel that the world has, in a certain sense, grown younger to us all than it was a few days ago, from the passing away of what was in his recollection.

How quickly, also, his mind moved. He had more new and fresh thoughts in a day, we may almost say, than most men,

even men of culture, have in a week. I never knew a mind more rich in ideas, more constantly active, more awake in every direction, more ready to effervesce and scintillate with bright thoughts, when aroused by the excitement of intelligent conversation. As St. Paul's ideas seem to have pressed for utterance, oftentimes, more rapidly than the pen of his amanuensis could record them, so in the case of our friend I have sometimes felt that the mind was unable to contain all that was in it, and that, as he poured forth his thought in its abundance, he was, as it were, only thinking aloud. He was not, however, like some men, a constant talker. He could be silent in the contentment of his own meditation as easily as he could speak. But he needed only to be stimulated by the presence and discussion of cultivated friends, and his mind opened at once in every beautiful way. The rich resources of memory, the precision of his thinking, the play of keen wit, the love of truth, the purity of sentiment, the facility of language, which were characteristic of him, all combined to make the expression of his thoughts delightful to the hearer.

There are few persons within the circle of our knowledge I am confident, who exhibit in their style so much of rhetorical finish and of the purest English expression. Every sentence, whether written or spoken, appeared to fall, as by a natural law, into the proper order and to assume a rich musical character, kindred even to that which has given to the English version of the Scriptures such power over multitudes of minds. It was this, in a large measure, together with his appreciative sense of what was fitting, which made us all trust him in any emergency to say the right words in the right way. What a sweet and solemn strain, as if coming down the ages from the times even of the old prophets, there was in his prayers. What a measured eloquence in his best discourses from the pulpit, and in his orations on the memorial and festive days of the commonwealth. What a charming picturesqueness when he told of the simple life of our grandfathers or of the trying times of our Revolutionary history. We turned to him, as by a unanimous impulse, whenever the spirit of patriotism was to be fired, or the gratitude of the people to God for our national blessings was to find its best expression, because we knew that his words

would be fitly spoken—would be, in the language of the Old Testament writer, like apples of gold in pictures of silver. The grand march of the ages appears also in some of his hymns, as in that which opens with the words,

“O God, beneath thy guiding hand,
Our exiled fathers crossed the sea;
And when they trod the wintry strand,
With prayer and psalm they worshipped thee,”

and the true poetic and tender emotion, which were so marked in his nature, manifests itself in others, such as that whose beginning is,

“Weep not for the saint that ascends
To partake of the joys of the sky,”

or the hymn for the evening twilight,

“Hail tranquil hour of closing day.”

This last-mentioned characteristic of his mind was most beautifully exhibited—as so many here present know better than any one can tell them—in those seasons of sorrow when he was called, in the households of his people, to do for the dead what we are now doing for him. I shall never forget the pathos, and Christian tenderness, and sweet utterance of hope and confidence with which he guided our thoughts along the uncertain future of life, and to the Kingdom of God in heaven, as we were celebrating the Lord's Supper in the Divinity School at the close of the last college year. It was at about that time that the first warnings were given to his mind that he might ere long be called away to another life, and he may have been thinking then of what has now been realized.

With what brilliancy of intelligence, what strength of clear reasoning, what effectiveness of wit, what manliness of free debate, he contended for righteousness and truth, when the battle was raging around him. There have been few statesmen in the country who have sounded the clarion notes so often as he has done. There are many in this house who recall the old days of the contest between the slave power and the free in our nation, especially in the later stages of it; and where in all the land is there a more conspicuous figure, rising before our memory of that warfare, than this honored man whom we bury to-day? He would have accomplished the end by peaceful

measures, if he could. But when he saw that there was no peace—that there was to be and must be a war of ideas, he threw himself with energy and with eloquence into the strife. And when the conflict of argument was followed by the war of arms, his voice and his heart were wholly and constantly for the country until the hour when victory was secured for the right. He was a true patriot. It has been said that his writings established Abraham Lincoln in his opposition to the slave-system; and thus we may gain some estimate of what he accomplished for the good cause. We speak in his praise, at this hour, for what he did in those days now happily gone into the past. But, when we are thinking of him as a man, we rejoice that among the grounds of our admiration and our friendship are the powers of heart and mind which made him, then and always, what he was in the warfare for the truth.

In his stormiest conflict with the enemies of right and the common weal, however, I do not believe that our venerated friend had any personal bitterness. He had a deep sense of righteousness, a strong conviction of the truth. But his opposition was to what was false and wrong. It was not a private hostility. He was a genuine lover of freedom. He had the courage of a soldier when he had once committed himself to the battle. He even gloried in being present in the thickest of the fight, with all its excitement and its danger. Yet it was the cause that he fought for, not his own reputation. He was as little inspired by selfishness or ignoble feeling as any man whom I have ever met.

In the conflicts on less vital subjects than the one just mentioned, it has often been the play and force of his intellect alone which have been engaged. He was always, no doubt, a formidable controversialist. He rejoiced in debate and discussion, and was ready for it at any moment. But he was by no means a passionate, or a jealous, or in any way a bad-hearted opponent. He never desired to do evil to another. He never cherished the remembrance of evil inflicted by another upon himself. He never waited and watched for an hour of requital or revenge. For sixteen years my associate professors in the Divinity School and myself have had the most constant opportunities for the closest intercourse with him; and it is our

united and joyful testimony, as it is that of his two colleagues in the pastorate, that we have never had the acquaintance of a man of nobler temper, of more kindly nature, of a more beautiful spirit as related to fellow-workers, of more freedom from suspiciousness or jealousy of other men, of larger-heartedness—a man, in a word, to whom we could give our affection and esteem more willingly than to him. And though he does not need our testimony where he is revered by every one, as he is in New Haven, it is a satisfaction to us to give it, as we find ourselves bereft of his presence for all the future of our lives.

The Apostle John is called a Son of Thunder in the gospel by St. Mark. To some it has appeared strange that such a man could afterwards become the gentle, loving disciple who leaned upon the breast of Jesus, and who, in his latest days, made it the burden of his exhortation to his Christian brethren, that they should love one another. In the case of the friend whose loss we mourn to-day, it was the heat of the conflict and the zeal for the truth (as it may have been in the apostle's early days), which made him to the view of many, a man of bitter hostility. But it was only the armor and the smoke of the battle, which were concealing the man. How clearly, in these sixteen years of which I have spoken, the reality of the nature has shone forth, and has proved that the combatant, who was full of the soldier's spirit as he fought for the cause, was at the same moment abounding in kindness and love towards all men. How plainly, also, those years of intercourse with him have manifested to us who looked upon his daily life the loving character of his personal relation to the Master. He was like Peter and Paul in his labors, his energy, his earnestness, his ability and readiness to sound the notes of battle; but in his own soul's life he had much of the simplicity and beauty of the Johannean love to Christ.

Our honored friend was magnanimous; he was generous; he was always disposed to aid in any work in which he was engaged with associates; he had no desire to take away from the honor or reward of others in order to increase his own; he was a hearty believer in the powers and capabilities of young men, and was hopeful for them; he was ever a promoter and advocate of the highest well-being of the community. He had

the kindly instincts of a true gentleman. He had the trustful, serious, self-sacrificing, devoted, manly, godly spirit of a sincere Christian.

How much he did for New Haven can be measured and estimated best by observing what a place he holds in the regard of his fellow citizens, and what weight has, for these many years, been given by them to his opinions and his words. He has been identified with the life of the city for half a century. Its interests have been near to his thoughts and to his heart. His energies and his wisdom have responded to its call whenever they were needed. It has been an interesting sight to see him, in his later life, as he walked about the streets. Others have spoken to me of it, and I have often thought of it myself, as a noble element in our life here, that a man like him who has contended for more than a generation against evil, and in the name of God has warned and rebuked evil-doers,—a man who has had no favors to ask or to give, but who has simply tried to do the Great Master's work and to speak for him, no matter who opposed or threatened,—should have been able to gather around himself at the end the veneration of men of every party in Church and State, of the poor and the rich alike, of the foreign citizen as well as the one born upon the soil, and should pass the bright and lovely evening of his lifetime without an enemy. I am glad that our eyes have been permitted to witness this sight, and that the city of our abode has this honor for itself. The name of Leonard Bacon will surely be always enrolled among the number of those to which the highest place is assigned in the history of New Haven.

Our friend's career had a remarkable completeness. He had lived beyond the ordinary limits of human life, and in two months more would have seen his eightieth birthday. And all the years from childhood onward were full of work. From his early maturity, even from his college days, he won the esteem of all who knew him best, both for his mental power and his moral excellence. At the age of twenty-three, when most young men are still in the work of preparation, he was called to the pastorate of this Church of Christ. Though scarcely more than a boy in years, he proved himself to be no unworthy successor of the ablest men who had preceded him. He took a

high rank as a preacher, and as a man he was among those whose power was felt throughout the community and the commonwealth. For forty years, a period as important as any in the country's history, he labored in this office, giving his daily service to his people, but striving for the good cause, also, in the regions beyond. He worked steadily onward until he had survived the older generation to whom he ministered at first, and then he handed on the message of the Gospel to their children, and even their grandchildren. But he lost none of his strength and ardor as time passed away. For a great many years before he laid aside his active work here, he was the most conspicuous leader in the Congregational ministry, while none in any branch of the Church held a more prominent place. He made this Church to be known and honored everywhere. At the end of this extended period he said to his people that he had served them long enough for their highest well-being, and asked them to give the work and the responsibility of his office to another. Then he devoted himself with all the enthusiasm of youth to a new employment. He became a teacher of Doctrinal Theology,—a successor in the Divinity School of our University of the distinguished divine whom he had also followed in the pastorate. In this new position he found delightful occupation. He gave to his pupils the fruits of his long years of thought and of learning, and he ever kept his mind open to the truth. When this position was subsequently filled, in accordance with his own views, by the gentleman who now holds it, he took, at the urgent request of his colleagues, another chair of instruction. To ten successive classes of students he has lectured upon Church Polity and American Church History, subjects respecting which he was as well qualified to communicate valuable knowledge as any man in the country. His work in this lectureship continued to the latest moment. I found him on Thursday afternoon of last week giving the concluding lecture of the term, and before the sun had risen on the second morning afterwards his life on earth was over.

Success and honor attended him in both spheres of his activity from the beginning to the ending. He had the consciousness that he was doing good service, which would be lasting in its influence, both in this Church and in our Theological School.

To what he has done for the former the Christian knowledge and Christian thought of many among the living and the dead have borne witness in the past. The Christian life itself in others has owed its beginning to his teaching and his prayers. Even in these declining years of his old age, he has almost resumed the duties of its pastor and has thus centralized its Church life in himself in no small degree. His work in the School of Theology, on the other hand, is well known to his associates and to many of its friends. For his efforts to establish the school on the best foundations, and to give it its highest efficiency and an honorable fame, the churches throughout the land may well be grateful to God. For his instructions and his personal influence more than three hundred ministers now in the work of the Gospel in different parts of the country and the world remember him with unfeigned regard, while they all have a tender feeling towards him as a venerated father and friend.

The great causes for which he has labored have always been good ones also, and to a remarkable degree his efforts have been manifestly attended with good results. He has rejoiced for years in the victory of freedom and of the cause of the Union, for which he strove so long and so well. His mind which has had such extraordinary interest in the progress of the world, has been granted the vision of the wonderful things both for science and for Christianity accomplished in our generation. He has passed his lifetime in an intellectual circle and in a cultivated city. He has known the greatest earthly blessing—a happy home, sacred in its joys, and equally sacred in its sorrows. He has seen his children grow up around him and find for themselves spheres of usefulness and honor, while their children also have added to the comfort and satisfaction of his old age. He has been permitted to behold the sunlight of heaven shining along his pathway, as the end of his earthly pilgrimage began to draw nearer. He has had the privilege of working to the last, with all the freshness of his mental vigor and all the buoyancy of an ardent soul. He has died almost in a moment, and almost without a struggle. Happy life,—we say to one another,—who could have wished it to be otherwise in its progress or in its closing?

The closing was at the hour of earliest dawn on Saturday last. It was a falling asleep, as we call it. But the sleep was only of the bodily powers. The active spirit passed at that moment beyond our earthly vision to its home. As the tidings came to us so suddenly, I could not but ask myself in the hours that immediately followed, What is the new experience through which he is now going? We often think of the great account and the solemn judgment when life is ended; and every serious mind must feel the influence of this coming scene as giving to all that we do here a deep significance. But, as I tried to picture to myself the beginning of the new state of existence for our venerated friend, in those first hours, I could not help thinking that the judgment was found in his case to be all comprehended in a Father's welcome to the heavenly house. May we not believe that dying was to him but the closing of his eyes to the familiar surroundings of the home in which he had lived so long and so happily, and the opening them a single moment afterward to the other home beyond our sight; and, thus, that there was no interval or waiting.

Every sudden death brings the unseen world very close to our thought, and seems to show us that it is only a thin, though impenetrable, veil that separates life here from life there. But when we find a man like him whose departure from us we now mourn dying so suddenly, we are almost forced to think that any break or interruption in the mental and spiritual work is impossible. Our friend, on the last evening, was engaged in the preparation of a paper upon one of the vital questions of our national life. He left it lying on his table unfinished, as he retired to rest for the night. It was, like so many that he had written before, a discussion of an evil which has long disgraced the nation, and was designed to inspire the public mind with right ideas, and to help, in some measure, towards a good result. In the morning, instead of returning to his study table and resuming his work, as he had expected to do, he saw the veil parting asunder, and, in answer to a call from the Divine Master, he entered within it. And then it closed behind him. That was all. Surely we must believe that in that other room, or other home, he found another work all ready for him to begin, and that he at once turned to it; employing now his unwearied and

widely-ranging powers, not indeed in the removing of evil, for this no longer manifests its presence, but in some line of joy and blessing, in some service of love and good-will. Yesterday, at home in the body, and therefore absent from the Lord. To-day, absent from the body and at home with the Lord. What a wonderful—what a wonderfully blessed experience! Who of us would not wish for the same experience for himself, when the end comes? The dying of our friend seems little like death. It seems, rather, like what St. Paul speaks of when he says in such expressive language, “That which is mortal is swallowed up of life.”

I think of our honored friend, once more, as he comes into the society of kindred souls in that other life. What does the heavenly vision reveal to us? A mind like his, which has so realized the life of other times within itself, must, as it would seem, now find itself associated with the perfected spirits of the early Christian fathers of our own city and New England—with men like Hooker and Davenport and Pierpont and Brewster. It must be brought into union with the heroes of civil and religious liberty who struggled for the good cause in former ages and generations in this or other lands, some of whom died in the dark days of the conflict, and some with the first sight of the victory. It must ally itself with those who have from the beginning been honored by God with a summons to a peculiar and illustrious work for Him on earth and with the thankful remembrance of succeeding generations. It must draw very near to the glorious company of the Apostles, and the goodly fellowship of the Prophets, and the noble army of the Martyrs. The assemblage of the great and good must gladly open their ranks to welcome such a man, as he enters on his new life, ransomed like themselves from the power of sin, and received by their Lord and his with a divine benediction.

I think of him, also, as joyfully meeting with the brethren in the ministry of the Gospel with whom he labored here before old age had come upon him, and to whom he bade farewell long since as they went to heaven; with the brethren and fathers elsewhere, also, whom he knew and honored as they equally knew and honored him; with that little company of faithful men, whose presence among us the older portion of this

audience well remember, the men who made up so large a part of the life of Yale College for half a century, Day and Silliman and Kingsley and Goodrich, and the rest. As they recognized him in the days gone by as their associate and helper, it must be with an especial joy that they see him again, now that, after so long a time, he is admitted once more into their society, his work on earth so happily completed.

We think of him even more tenderly, as we try to realize his reunion with the great number of believers who have listened to his teachings and his prayers in this ancient church, but have finished their earthly course before him. For more than fifty years they have been entering, one by one, into the world to which he has now been called, and in their happy thanksgivings for their own blessed life in heaven we may not doubt that they have often borne his name upon their hearts. As he has followed them to the same glorious home and is beginning his new life there, what must be their feeling and the holy greeting which they give. He stands among them a loving and beloved friend,—to find, for all the future, the happiness of his soul manifolded by the happiness of theirs; the satisfaction in his life's work deepened and heightened continually as he is able to appreciate more fully the measure of its good results.

And, if we may draw still nearer to the inmost circle of his past life, we think of him, still again, as seeing once more the members of his family whom God has taken to Himself in other years; among them that one who cared for him with an eldest daughter's affection for so long a period, and at whose grave we saw him standing, it seems as if but a few months since; and that gentle, loving son, whose death in the prime of his age was so great a loss to the church and the ministry, the beauty of whose Christian living and whose generous spirit, which had shone so clearly all the way through life, seemed to beam forth with an almost unearthly brightness when, in the later hours of the day before his death he said, "It may be that to-morrow I shall be allowed to touch the hem of the Saviour's garment." We may not trust ourselves with the thought of such a meeting. But it must be one which passes in its joy the power of our present understanding, and one which shall be followed by a happy, hopeful waiting for those who are left on earth.

And then, above and beyond all else, there is revealed to us the vision with which the New Testament prophet was blessed. "They serve Him day and night in His temple. He that sitteth on the throne shall spread his tabernacle over them. They shall hunger no more, neither thirst any more; neither shall the sun strike upon them, nor any heat; for the Lamb which is in the midst of the throne shall be their shepherd, and shall guide them unto fountains of waters of life; and God shall wipe away every tear from their eyes."

Such was the past, and such, we may believe, will be the future for this noble Christian preacher and teacher, this pure-minded lover of his country and of mankind, this friend of ours who labored and prayed for the kingdom of God unceasingly until he had almost reached the age of eighty years, and then in a moment, and in answer to a sudden call, went to his reward.

"A mortal arrow pierced his frame,
He fell—but felt no fear.
Tranquil amidst alarms,
It found him on the field,
A veteran slumbering on his arms,
Beneath his red-cross shield.
His spirit, with a bound,
Left its encumbering clay;
His tent, at sunrise, on the ground,
A darkened ruin lay.
The pains of death are past,
Labor and sorrow cease;
And, life's long warfare closed at last,
His soul is found in peace.
Soldier of Christ, well done!
Praise be thy new employ;
And while eternal ages run,
Rest in thy Saviour's joy."

It is now forty-four years since, on my first coming to New Haven as a boy just nine years old, the friend respecting whom I have spoken these words received me kindly to his house, almost every day, as the playmate of one of his children. He

had at that time only reached the middle point of the allotted three score and ten of human life, and yet how old he seemed to my childhood's thought. I know of nothing more strange or beyond belief which the open vision of the future, had it been given to me then, could have revealed, than that for so many years I should be his associate and colleague in the work of his later life. But so it has been ordered in the progress and changes of time, and the one to whom I looked in the early days as my father's friend, I now most gratefully remember as my own—of an older generation, indeed, but so full of confidence in those younger than himself, and sympathy for them, that we almost forgot the difference of the years and felt that he was one with us in our labors and our thoughts. As I recall to mind, to-day, the period in which we who have been working together in the Divinity School have known his presence with us, I rejoice that we may bear into the coming time the assurance which he gave, at one of our last meetings, of his deep satisfaction in the perfect and uninterrupted harmony of our association. With tender feeling he expressed the thought which we all were thinking—but we thought, also, how much of it was due to his own unselfish and friendly spirit.

That I have been requested by his family to say the words of affection and regard which all hearts here wish to be spoken before we bear him to his burial, I feel to be a great kindness to myself. The words might have been said by others in a more fitting way, but I am sure that there is no one beyond the limits of his own household who could bear more willing witness to what he has done and especially to what he has been. Our last farewell to him is spoken at this hour with sorrow that we are to meet him here no longer, but, as we think upon his life, it is spoken with the pleasantest memories of the past and the most joyful hopes for the future.

ARTICLE VIII. — LEONARD BACON: PASTOR OF THE
FIRST CHURCH OF NEW HAVEN.

A SERMON BY REV. GEORGE LEON WALKER.*

THE nature of the service I am to attempt to-day is, as I conceive of it, a very definite one. The termination of a pastoral connection, subsisting in more or less completeness of meaning for nearly fifty-seven years, and the request of the officers of the bereaved church that some words should be spoken of the honored man who sustained that relationship, by one whose only fitness for this undertaking is his succession for a while to the title and duties of the office when the elder pastor laid them down, indicate very plainly the quality of the action proper to this occasion. It is not a general and complete survey of the life and character of Leonard Bacon that this hour calls for; but some little retrospect and consideration of him, in connection with this church he loved so well, and which so truly loved and honored him. Other voices and other occasions may more fittingly deal with the broader aspects of his large and many-sided personality and with the variety of his public work.

Suggestions of these things have already found expression, not only in that tender and discriminating address spoken in this house at the funeral service, but in the pages of the secular and religious press, whose manifold utterances are bearing testimony to the importance of the place he filled in the general eye, and the value set on the many great obligations under which he has laid his fellow-men. Indeed it is within the scope only of the chapters of an ample volume adequately to tell the whole of what Doctor Bacon was and did.

A writer of rare fertility and on many a theme, a historian of penetrative insight and patient research, a leader of men's minds in matters of public welfare, a commander on every field of ecclesiastical struggle, a strong pillar of support to every philanthropic enterprise, a conversationalist of unsurpassed richness of

* Preached January 15, 1882.

resource and raciness of utterance, a poet whose sweet strains find frequent voice in our worship, a complex and various minded man, combining elements any one of which were distinction enough for most,—it is only the leisurely pages of biography which can set properly forth the portraiture of his character and the record of his work.

Fortunately our duty is a narrower one. We meet to-day in this church, which, though it by no means confined, was nevertheless the center of his most distinctive labors, to speak of what he has been to this flock of his early and only pastoral charge. Such outlooks and glimpses into other and wider spheres of his activity as his characteristic work in his own people's behalf will hurriedly allow, we may not quite shut out; but Leonard Bacon, the Pastor of the First Church of New Haven, is to-day our theme.

This house of worship where we are gathered was about eleven years old when its echoes were wakened for the first time by the voice which was to be familiar here so many years. That was on the earliest October Sunday in 1824. It was the first Sunday after Mr. Bacon's ordination to the ministry, which had been conferred on the Tuesday previous through the hands of the Hartford North Consociation, met at Windsor, September twenty-eighth. Tradition tells that the youthful appearance of the preacher, who was in fact only twenty-two and a half years old, excited at once the interest and the criticism of the congregation accustomed to the commanding presence of his predecessor, Nathaniel W. Taylor, and many of whom recalled still the "stiff and antique dignity" of Dr. Dana, who had disappeared from his place in the pulpit by the side of Moses Stuart only twelve years before.

This division of opinion respecting the competence of the young man to occupy a position so conspicuous as this, and rendered doubly exacting by the ability of his two immediate predecessors, expressed itself in the hesitation with which, after having listened to "fourteen sermons" from him, the Society still debated the question of his "call."

At length at a "second meeting" on the subject, on December twenty-eighth, by a vote of sixty-eight against twenty, the Society expressed their desire that he should settle with them,

and the church joined in the invitation. The call thus half-cordially given was however listened to; and on the seventeenth of January, 1825, affirmatively answered. And on the ninth of March following the formal exercises of the Pastor's induction into his office here took place. The sermon on the occasion was preached by Mr. Hawes the Pastor of the First Church in Hartford—himself in the seventh year of his ministry—in the exercise of those fraternal courtesies which have marked the relationship of these two ancient churches of Connecticut both before and afterwards. Of course it hardly needs to say that all the members of the council who took part in the services of that occasion—President Day who was the Moderator, Carlos Wilcox who offered the introductory prayer, Joel Hawes who preached, Stephen W. Stebbins who offered the prayer of installation, Nathaniel W. Taylor who gave the charge, Samuel Merwin who expressed the fellowship of the churches, and Eleazar T. Fitch who led in the closing prayer, have gone—and most of them have for many years been gone—from human sight.

The young man thus put in charge of this influential congregation was not utterly a stranger to the town. Born February 19, 1802, at the far Western outpost of Detroit, and coming to his first memories of life as he tells us "in the grand old woods" of Ohio, on ground "never ploughed before," and in a cabin to whose door the "red-skin savage sometimes came," and around which the "wolves howled at night," he was nevertheless of Connecticut ancestry, and at the age of ten years was sent to be educated under the care of an uncle at Hartford. From thence after about five years he had come, a now fatherless boy, to New Haven, and entered the sophomore class in Yale College; the rules of the institution being as he says "somewhat relaxed in his favor" on account of his youth.

Here, from fifteen to eighteen, during the three years of his residence in the place he had walked these streets, and he had doubtless at least occasionally entered the doors of this sanctuary, and heard from some gallery corner the impassioned utterances of Dr. Taylor, one of the princeliest preachers of New England's history. Little did the youth imagine, or the fathers of the congregation dream, how much wider a place in this

church's history the unnoticed listener in the gallery was to fill, than even that eloquent man.

But though the young Pastor a little knew New Haven, New Haven knew scarcely anything of him. He had his way to make without other advantages than the resources of his own powers. And the obstacles to be overcome were peculiarly difficult. Not only had his formal call been a divided one, but he had that kind of disadvantage to surmount which, whatever be the unanimity of invitation extended to a new pastor, always arises from the remembrance by a congregation of preceding pastorates of any very special attractiveness and power. And the two previous pastorates had been very eminently such as make a successor's difficult. They had been marked by great religious awakenings, and they were those of men leaving a distinct and abiding impress on the people of their charge. I have myself, after the lapse of the whole duration of Dr. Bacon's active pastorate of forty-one and a half years in this place, heard old men and women recall and sometimes rehearse the eloquent utterances of Taylor and even of Stuart fourteen years previous, which had stamped themselves on their memory with ineffaceable clearness.

The new Pastor felt the difficulties of his situation keenly. He has told us about it himself in his retrospective discourses preached on the fortieth and fiftieth anniversaries of his settlement. In those addresses he describes the situation of matters, in various aspects, on his coming here—the yet unwelded fragments and remainders of old controversies in the congregation; the oppositions of “Old Light” and “New Light” principles and personalities still remaining after the two revivalistic pastorates which had just passed, and other differences. But in especial, speaking of the difficulty of following two such preachers as Stuart and Taylor, he says with characteristic simplicity—and I may add with the characteristic modesty also by which, with all his gifts, Dr. Bacon was eminently marked—“I know it is not an affectation to say, that I never had any such power in the pulpit as they had in their best days. For many years after the commencement of my pastorate I was habitually brought into most disadvantageous comparison, not only with those distinguished preachers, but

with others of like celebrity. How it was that I continued here long enough to become a fixture cannot easily be explained."

The explanation is however not so difficult as the modesty of the speaker indicated it to be. The new Pastor was not then or afterward the peer perhaps in the power of eloquent and moving pulpit utterance of his two predecessors, certainly of the latter of them. But he had pulpit powers of a high order, and he combined with them such a variety of gifts beside, as more than supplied the comparative lack in the single point in which the contrast was likely to be at once so easy and so misleading. He gave indications of being, if not a great preacher, what was more a great man and minister. The congregation soon began to find it out.

And yet his preaching suffered only by comparison with what was absolutely the best possible. It was itself always eminently good. It was marked, as were all his writings or utterances, by an almost matchless felicity of expression and clearness of style. And it had that best test of excellence, it was always best and most moving in dealing with the weightiest themes and on the most important occasions. I have heard it said that a kind of turning point in the appreciation of the pastor was a sermon on the government of God, from the text, "Thy commandment is exceeding broad." It might very well be the case. The subject was one especially fitted to the preacher's habit of thought. He needed a broad subject to give scope and play to his large mind. And a theme which enabled him to lay hold on and to state great moral principles in their application to the duties and welfare of men, always was a theme by which he easily rose to a grave and commanding eloquence.

Not long after, too, in this early period of his ministry here, he had the satisfaction—more precious than any other to a Pastor—of seeing saving results from his labor. In 1828, forty-eight persons united with this church by confession of Christ. In 1831, in connection with protracted services held here whose solemn power has not yet died out of the vivid memory of many in this congregation, one hundred and eight. In 1832, thirty-three. In 1833, twenty-one. In 1837, thirty-four. The

witness of the Spirit could not be mistaken. The suggestions which had occasionally been dropped during the first three years of the Pastor's labors, by some of the congregation who remembered with longing the revival times of Stuart and Taylor, "that New Haven needed a more efficient ministry," were heard no more. Henceforth his position was established as a minister honored of God and approved of man for his conspicuous fidelity and power in the Gospel.

But the mental activity and prodigious industry of the young Pastor could not limit his labor to the routine, arduous as most men find that routine to be, of the regular requirements of the pulpit and the parish. He flowed over in all directions, even in that early day, with frequent contributions to the press and addresses on topics of public interest at the time.

More scholarly in its quality, and distinctly pastoral in its aim, was his republication, in these days of this earlier ministry, of selected writings of Richard Baxter with editorial comments thereon.

But the chief work, collateral to that which he was ordained to in this pastoral charge, belonging to what may be called the first period of the Pastor's ministry, and a work which he fulfilled as a part of that ministry, was the preparation and preaching his thirteen *Historical Discourses*. He had been set as a light in an ancient candlestick. The old church of which he was Pastor had had a long and noble history. It was a line of eminent men into whose succession he had been brought. And the history of the First Church of New Haven was essentially the history of New Haven Colony. Nay, it widened out to still broader relations, connecting itself with the story of the planting New England's churches and governments, and of the Puritan movements in the mother land from which the founders of New Haven had come. The two hundredth anniversary of the church was approaching, and as a loving tribute to her praise the Pastor prepared the *Discourses* which mark the arrival of that anniversary, and which mark also the completion of thirteen years of his own service in her behalf. Never had a church a more graceful and valuable offering. Among many undertakings similar in aim I know of none which can for a moment challenge comparison with that which put this church

in the possession of so accurate and so attractive a chronicle of her history. This volume gained for its author at once a secure place among the best writers of New England. Marked by the truest historic instinct, and written in a style of charming vivacity and elegance, it constitutes one of the richest possessions of the church in whose service it was undertaken, as well as one of the most significant tokens of the industry and pastoral loyalty of its author. The Pastor was proud of his church. Henceforth the church was proud of him. The Pastor with filial fidelity had sought to do honor to his predecessors, and to the church whose representatives they were. The church now saw that among that line of honored men there was none worthier of love and admiration than the man who stood now at thirty-six years of age her representative, borrowing conspicuity no more from the place he occupied, but conferring conspicuity on the place. Mr. Bacon of New Haven, or Doctor Bacon as he just about this time began to be called by virtue of a degree from Hamilton College, was as well recognized a reality as New Haven town.

At this point, then, we may set the mark of the second great division of the story of Dr. Bacon's relationship to this church. Accounting the thirteen years up to the publication of the *Historical Discourses* as the first epoch, and the sixteen years after he resigned the pastoral care as the third, there lies between the two a period of about twenty-seven years of immense and varied activity. He was, at the beginning of this second period, according to his own judgment of the terms into which the life of man is naturally divided—as expressed in his beautiful sermon on the *Measure of our Days*—"in the full vigor of his powers." Henceforth his life was that of a public man as well as that of a parish minister; a man of national reputation and influence.

It is impossible in a discourse like the present to touch even scantily on the diverse and manifold aspects of the work Dr. Bacon did during this period. Nor for my design is it needful. I keep singly to my purpose of setting those things before you to-day wherein the Pastor of this church fulfilled his duty to this charge.

But the main things which interested him were those in

which his people had also a concern. And the clash of the weapons he wielded on other fields found a frequent echo within these walls.

The cause of Temperance had in Dr. Bacon an earnest advocate. At his installation here, at the public dinner provided by the society, there was as he tells us "an ample supply not only of wine but also of more perilous stuff." But among the zealous promoters of a reform in the practices of society in this matter, and of the legislation of the State concerning it, he was one of the earliest and most strenuous. I mention it however, mainly, at this time, as being one of the first instances in which in his people's behalf he threw himself distinctly across the prejudices of a very considerable number in his congregation, and very many in the community about him, in the advocacy of what he believed to be right. A pamphlet published by him at about the beginning of what I have called by way of convenience the second period of Dr. Bacon's ministry, shows at once the vigor of his utterances on this matter of temperance legislation and practice, and indicates plainly that his utterances had subjected him, in certain quarters called highly respectable in this town, to not a little obloquy and reproach. But there is reason to believe that here, as on some other fields of effort where he likewise crossed the prejudices of some of his congregation, he partly won and partly compelled an ultimate coincidence of opinion upon the matter.

As an earnest laborer in the great Benevolent enterprises of the day—among others of Missions, Foreign and Home—Dr. Bacon had few if any superiors among the pastors of New England. Of many of the societies, having these interests in charge, he was among the founders or early directors, and he brought to their advocacy before this church, not only the comprehensiveness of view which made him an intelligent and effective promoter of the cause he espoused, but the courage which did not hesitate to press the obligation of beneficence upon his hearers. That this church has had and still has an honorable record upon the pages of most of the great organized Christian philanthropies of the time for the largeness of its pecuniary bestowals, is greatly owing to the fervor of his interest and the persistency of his appeals in their behalf.

Himself the child of a missionary, the interests of missions were always dear to him. Himself a far-seeing watcher of the progress of God's kingdom among men, he discerned well how great a share in that kingdom's growth, missionary enterprises have had in the past and must have in years to come.

More conspicuous in its adaptedness to draw public attention, as well as doubtless more potent in stirring the various sensibilities of his congregation, was Dr. Bacon's attitude and endeavor in reference to Slavery. His interest in this subject had begun early. And his pen, even as far back as his Seminary days at Andover, had been occupied respecting it. From 1833 to 1846 it was employed often in a series of discussions, which frequently found their echo in the pulpit here, upon the various aspects of this national wrong, and which at the later of the dates mentioned were gathered into a volume. He himself says in the second of his *Four Commemorative Discourses*: "From the beginning of my official ministry, I spoke without reserve, from the pulpit and elsewhere, against slavery as a wrong and a curse, threatening disaster and ruin to the nation. Many years I did this without being blamed except as I was blamed for not going far enough. . . . Yet you know how I have been blamed and even execrated, in these later years, for declaring here and elsewhere the wickedness of buying and selling human beings, or of violating in anyway those human rights which are inseparable from human nature." This contrast of treatment which the Pastor's utterances met and which he so distinctly recognized, grew out, not of alteration in his sentiments but of alteration in the aspect of the problem of slavery itself. The question became progressively less and less a merely philanthropic one, and more and more a political one. As long as it was confined chiefly to the sphere of ethics and beneficent sympathies the Pastor's utterances stirred little opposition. But when the question came to be one along the line of which parties divided in contest for governmental control, and the mercantile ranks split apart according to their interest in the ascendancy of one or another theory of the province of legislation respecting this sin, the case was altered. The Pastor found himself in opposition to a great proportion of the friends and companions of his earlier minis-

terial days in the general fellowship of the churches, and to not a few in the closer precincts of his own congregation. Yet he himself rightly says, "I have held and always asserted the same principles on that subject which I held and asserted at the beginning."

It was so. It was the holding of those principles which led to the Pastor's early advocacy of the Colonization Society; it was the holding of them, too, which in the altered condition of the problem led him to cease that advocacy. It was the holding those principles which led to his espousal of the cause of the Amistad captives and in doing so to one of his first conflicts in the struggle which was to last so many years. Those principles led him to the long and acrimonious debates over the conduct of the Tract Society affairs, in which he parted company with some of his oldest and most intimate associates. They led him to the assumption, in 1848, of the onerous duties of a joint editorship, with Drs. Thompson and Storrs, of the *Independent*, whose then unpopular and execrated banner-inscription was, "We take our stand for free soil." They led him on Thanksgiving day, 1851, to preach from this desk his sermon on *The Higher Law*; the adoption of which political watchword, and the advocacy of which ethical principle, was by multitudes of the most influential and religious men of the land and some in his own congregation, regarded as the ultimate and perfect test of hopeless and perilous fanaticism. They led him in 1855 to advocate, even at the threatened expense of blood, resistance to the incursion of slavery into Kansas. They led him later on, when at last the struggle of arms came, to make this pulpit a tower for the sounding out of the battle-cry of freedom; and to make these walls, dedicated to the gospel of peace, to reverberate with that utterance of it which proclaims "deliverance to the captives" and the setting "at liberty them that are bruised."

It was a straight-forward, consistent course. But it cost him many friends. In other cities and other fellowships dear to him, many; some here. Darkened faces looked up at him from these pews. But he triumphed, because the right which he represented triumphed. And without a tinge of bitterness in the retrospect, he says of these alienations—let us be thank-

ful for the most part only temporary alienations—"I make no complaint. . . . All reproaches, all insults endured in the conflict with so gigantic a wickedness, are to be received and remembered, not as injuries but as honors."

Less frequent in finding reverberating notes in this place, though occasionally finding them, were Dr. Bacon's activities as a representative Congregationalist. The Pastor was a Congregationalist on principle. Into the history and theory of the polity he had studied deeply. Upon it he wrote largely. Of its superiority to other forms of Church government he had no doubt. The pathetic and heroic story of its struggles in England and its planting in America always inspired him. He loved to speak and preach upon it, and often levelled a lance in debate with defenders of other systems. The arrogance of Episcopal claims in especial always amused him and often kindled his sarcasm or his ridicule; while among Episcopalians were many of his best-loved friends. Presbyterianism was a system he could and did heartily oppose, yet among Presbyterians he chose many dearest to him.

At all great Congregational assemblies he was a foremost, generally the foremost figure. At the difficult councils his was a guiding voice. The last extended platform of polity expressive of the generally accepted principles of our churches, and presented at the Council of 1865, was drafted mainly by his hand. Beyond all comparison he was looked to as the typical Congregationalist of America. Leaning a little in his later days, undoubtedly, more to that side of Congregationalism which makes for independency than that which makes for mutual responsibility, and a little out of sympathy with the more recent movement of our churches toward combination and unity of action, he was nevertheless Congregationalism's most venerated representative.

And few can estimate the value, in the Ecclesiastical assemblies of this Commonwealth and the land—whether on occasions of stated and routine assembly or of exigent and occasional gathering—of the influence exerted by the Pastor of this Church. No consideration of Dr. Bacon's pastoral character could be other than incomplete which did not lay emphatic stress upon the work he did in our denominational

Councils and Conventions through so many years. Through him this Church has had a voice in the guidance of the religious concerns of our own State, and the wider domain of Congregational Christianity, superior perhaps to that of any other. Unmatched in debate, unequaled in wit, unparalleled in fertility of resources, without a peer in his capability of swaying the deliberations of an assembly, his power was with almost complete uniformity employed for the uses of benefit and not of strife. On many an agitated debate he poured the oil of a composing and reconciling wisdom. Into any quarrel of an ecclesiastical character among the brotherhood it was difficult to force him to go.

While himself sturdily evangelical in his interpretation of Christian doctrine, and showing a certain leonine contempt for small assertors of independence and "liberality," he had large allowance for those who differed mainly in their philosophic statement of truth. In more than one theological controversy among leading ministers of this State, his influence was that of a mediator of separations, if it could not fully be that of a reconciler of oppositions.

This observation prompts to the remark that Dr. Bacon, spite of all his capacities for conflict, was a peace-loving man.

During the agitating periods of the Anti-slavery struggle previous to the war, he was often called the Fighting Parson. The title had a certain superficial pertinence, but it was superficial only. He himself said of it when spoken to on one occasion concerning it, and said with profound earnestness, "I never had a controversy on merely personal grounds in my life." The declaration was nearly or wholly true. And another thing he said was also true in its application to himself quite as much as in its application to him of whom he was speaking. In his sermon at the funeral of Dr. Taylor he remarked: "Those who knew Dr. Taylor best, know how painful controversy as distinguished from discussion was to him. He loved discussion; but controversy with its personal alienations, its exasperating imputations, and its too frequent appeals to prejudice and passion, was what his soul abhorred." True as those words may have been concerning Nathaniel Taylor they could not have better told the truth concerning Leonard

Bacon. A sweet and tender heart was united with his formidable powers of debate and, if need be, of conflict. His arrow-tips were not poisoned. A gentle, almost deferential manner toward younger and more humbly gifted men, disarmed envy and conciliated fear. The foremost man for prowess he was also well nigh the best-beloved.

But how now, the question arises, how about the distinctively home work of this Pastor, whose time was so largely employed in matters which had a confessedly important but only partial reference to this vineyard of the First Church? Well, the question is a fair one. And it deserves to be considered, especially in a survey of Dr. Bacon's life not so much as a whole as in the pastoral aspect of it.

And I suppose it may be fairly said it is a question admitting of a divided answer. These public services which so largely engrossed the time and thought of the Pastor of this Church, to a certain extent and in some directions diminished the effectiveness, at least the immediate local effectiveness, of his ministry. To some degree they gave excuse to an impression that the Pastor was more interested in things abroad than at home. They curtailed the number of fresh discourses from his pen, and necessitated the more frequent repetition of old ones. They made impossible the personal familiarity of the Pastor with all the members of his congregation which is, or was, one of the traditions of the New England ministry. That they did these things no more, is itself a striking testimony to the tremendous capacity for work lodged in the Pastor's comparatively slight frame. But that to some extent they did them, was unquestionably in the later days of Dr. Bacon's responsible pastorate, to a degree recognized. But over against whatever possible deductions may properly be made from the local and immediate effectiveness of the Pastor's ministry on the grounds spoken of, there were great offsets. The Pastor brought into this place the sense of power wielded on other arenas of effort, and the people recognized it. He brought with him the light and inspiration of large endeavors and wide outlooks and contacts with great interests and men. His lesser performances caught some subtle touch of vigor and intelligence from his greater ones. He borrowed strength in

his own consciousness, and in his congregation's eyes also, from his acknowledged supremacy elsewhere. A certain wise and rational allowance, creditable to both, sprang up and maintained itself between minister and people. They knew the pastor was doing a great work and in many ways. And he on his part knew that if he gave his people less than under some conceivable circumstances he might have done, he gave them enough. He gave them a full return. He loved his people and trusted them. They trusted and honored him. And they had reason to. For after all which the alertest criticism may suggest, what a pastorate his was! Forty-one and a half years of the fully responsible portion of it. And marked by what excellencies, in well nigh all that goes to make a pastoral success!

His Sermons. How simple in construction, how clear in expression, how direct in aim, how evangelic in sentiment, how solid in thought! They dealt always with important matters. No bursts of inexplicable passion, no rhetorical displays, no mystical musings, no aspirations for the rare, the unexpected, the sensational. They were grave, strong, manly sermons; not without exquisite passages of unsought beauty, and sometimes of noble eloquence, taking hold on the main question of Christian truth and conduct. They had the great value of a power of setting familiar things in clear and fresh aspects and relations. They were powerful with the strength of a firm hold on the great principles of the gospel, and they were rich with the results of a deep experience. They handled a wide range of matter; sometimes the highest of theology, but then with reverence and skill; sometimes the most delicate in moral behavior, but then with consummate propriety and taste. They swept the field of faith and practice as thoroughly as any pastor's anywhere. They were such sermons as are an education to a congregation. And they found the center of their inspiration and the end of their aim in loyalty to Christ the Saviour and the King. Christ the redeemer for sin; Christ the conqueror of death; Christ the ruler of the world; Christ the head of the kingdom which is to come—these were the mighty truths out of a profound conviction and love of which those sermons came.

And his Prayers. The beauty and propriety and sober fervor of his prayers were something wonderful. In these unpremeditated but marvelously simple and appropriate outpourings of his mind and heart he came closer to his people than in his sermons, even at their best. He had the instinct to take up and upbear the common want or the special necessity of the hour, in an utterance of sweetness and majesty which it is given to few ever to attain. The listening and co-worshiping congregation were never jarred by inharmonious suggestions, never put in doubt as to the full propriety of the utterance; they rested upon and went along with his prayers in entire responsiveness to their devout and gracious supplication and thanksgiving. No liturgical utterances of prayer one can anywhere find, are more perfect types of what prayer should be, than the petitions which rose from his lips in this pulpit and in the family and by the side of the open grave, often were.

And his pastoral ministrations in his people's homes. The sincerity of his sympathy, the tenderness of his instruction, the wisdom of his counsel, the fervency with which he implored restoration to the sick, or asked comfort for the bereaved, these things are all known to you. And he had been taught thus effectively to minister to others, by the discipline of personal grief. Death had come into his circle many times. Infant days and manly and womanly years had alike been broken off in his household. The variety and the bitterness of bereavement was fully known to him. And from the school of that personal knowledge of tribulation he borrowed the experience which made his words and his silent presence, so often a consolation in your abodes. Into too many of the homes in this city has he borne the Pastor's offices of help in hours of joy and hours of sorrow, to make it needful to say more.

Ah yes, take it all in all, it was about an ideal pastorate!

But the time at last came when in the Pastor's judgment it seemed best that he should be relieved of the responsible duties of his office. He announced this conviction in a sermon preached on the twelfth of March, 1865, the fortieth anniversary of his settlement. He was then sixty-three years of age. His eye was not dimmed nor his force abated. But he was the oldest pastor in Connecticut in active service, and he had done an

amount of work no other pastor had done. With characteristic happiness of expression, and characteristic forecast of what would be wise in the case of most men he said: "I am old enough now, to ask for relief; and at the same time I am not too old to receive it without feeling that I am slighted by the offer of it."

In acceding to this suggestion on the Pastor's part, the Society recorded its inability to "see any symptoms of decline of power which should lead him to wish relief," but expressed a willingness to yield to his definitely declared desire, having first made "some suitable provision for our Pastor's remaining years, after the termination of his ministry among us." Such suitable and honorable provision having been made, the Pastor resigned his office, and on the ninth of September, 1865—to a day just forty-one and a half years from the March ninth, 1825, of his installation—he preached a sermon entitled, *The Pastor retiring from his official work*. But how little of a "retirement!" How little Pastor and people foresaw what was before them, or how long still a multitude of the practical services of the pastorate were to be fulfilled by the same beloved man. The event however serves definitely to mark a new period in Dr. Bacon's life and his relationship to this church, and one which presents him to us in an aspect certainly as admirable and lovable as any beside.

Coincident in point of time with the Pastor's resignation of his office, an invitation which he calls a "most unexpected invitation" to a Professorship in the Theological Seminary here was laid before him. He accepted it "reluctantly" and went as he affirmed, "bound in the spirit, under a sort of necessity" laid upon him. And he added correctly: "There is no promotion in going from this pulpit to a theological chair." Certainly there was not for such a Pastor. He carried more with him than in any such transfer he could receive.

But having entered upon it, he identified himself with the Institution with his usual enthusiasm. He contemplated, as he said, a "term of service at the longest very short," but he remained an active worker there for sixteen years.

And in many ways his connection with the seminary marks a new epoch in its history. His association with it was emi-

nently influential in securing the needful funds for its welfare. He took pleasure in its stones. How well I remember the satisfaction which was in his face on one gray day in July, 1869, when he came to my room to invite me to see the first ground broken for the erection of the beautiful edifice which stands on the corner of Elm and College streets; whose unoccupied niche underneath the window of his room could not be more appropriately filled than by his sculptured figure. And at every step of the Institution's history and development since—not a little of which has been owing to the connection with it of the ex-Pastor of this Church—his interest in it has been like that of a man whose whole life, instead of what he called his years of “decadence and decay,” had been given to it. And one effect of that connection with the Seminary was, I think, personally favorable. It brought him into constant contact with young men and it helped to keep him young. It was a matter of frequent remark and possibly may have been true, that Dr. Bacon's preaching in this pulpit was younger and more alert in the years succeeding his resignation than it had been for several years before.

But anyway his youthfulness was surprising. However the body aged the spirit never grew old. The restless mind was hungry to the end. In his fortieth-year sermon he had said: “I know more now than I knew a year ago. I hope to know more next year than I know now.” In his fiftieth-year sermon he said: “I know more than I knew ten years ago, and I am still a learner, and hope to be a learner to the end.” And so he was, the freshest and alertest man there was in Connecticut's ministry to the last.

To this period belongs that other witness to the industry of the only half-retired Pastor's hand and brain, the volume on the *Genesis of the New England Churches*; a volume, however, which being not distinctly pastoral in motive I leave with only this mention.

But another aspect of Dr. Bacon's last period of life has a still closer connection with the history of this church, and exhibits in a yet more striking way this quality of the man. The old Pastor was to sustain the experience—it may be the trial—of a successor, nay of two of them. It is an experience proverbially difficult for a minister gracefully to bear. Two

very eminent pastors in Connecticut had been put to the trial of it only a little while before, and had rather conspicuously failed. But this pastor did not fail. Did Dr. Bacon ever fail anywhere?

In a long and most kindly letter which he wrote to me in September, 1868, while my acceptance of the call of this church given me some months before was still pending, he says—and I quote it with personal reluctance, and only to set his position toward a successor in its true light—"I have no fear that my relations with you will be other than pleasant. Without assuming to be anything more than a *pastor emeritus*, having no official charge or duty in the congregation, I trust I shall always be ready to lighten your burthen if in any way I shall be able to do so. While it will be in some sort a trial for me to see the people thinking more of you and less of me; and loving you more than they have ever loved me, I hope to see it with humble thankfulness, and not with jealousy." And every word of that utterance was more than fulfilled. He was the most magnanimous man I ever knew. Had I been his son after the flesh he could not have been more coöperative or kind. Always ready to help when asked, he never volunteered even advice; he never in any instance or the slightest particular gave me reason to wish he had said or done anything otherwise. Apparently incapable of jealousy—even had there been vastly more opportunity for it than there was—he was to the pastor who followed him a supporter and comfort always. So was he to his immediate successor; so was he I doubt not to mine.

The termination of these two brief pastorates and the interregnum between them devolved upon the elder Pastor, in these sixteen years after his official resignation, a great deal of that parochial work which he had ostensibly laid aside. In his sermon at the laying down of his office he had said: "Till the time comes when you are without another Pastor, call for me as freely as heretofore, when any is sick among you, and where the windows are darkened by death." And while that pastor was yet coming; and in the more than two years interregnum after his departure before the arrival of a second; and in the more than two and a half years again, which have elapsed since that second's removal, the old Pastor has been the shepherd of this

flock. Speaking from time to time from this pulpit with increasing pathos and earnestness; sitting nearly every sabbath on this platform where his presence was a perpetual benediction, he has come at your call, as he did aforetime from the first, to comfort your suffering ones, to baptize your children, to bury your dead. He has fulfilled up to the end—far beyond any duration contemplated when the words were spoken—the promise implied in his tender exhortation when he laid his office down: “Let no member of this congregation think that the tie between you and me is broken, or that it is weakened, so long as you are without another Pastor.” And so he has left you a second time bereaved. So he has twice laid down his trust respecting you, this time forever. This place is lonesome without him. This flock is unshepherded. Many times more than when his successor or his successor’s successor went are you without a guide and comforter.

But for him what a change! and for you what a retrospect!

For him the entrance on that larger life of activity and blessedness for which he yearned and of which he spoke in one of those *Commemorative Discourses* to which I have had occasion so many times to refer: “Not ‘three score years and ten,’ nor ‘four score years’ are enough for the capabilities of our intelligent, affectionate and spiritual nature. The machinery of this mortal body may be clogged and broken, may wear out and be useless, but it is only a life beyond the reach of these infirmities that can satisfy the soul. ‘And now Lord what wait I for? My hope is in thee.’”

And for you what a retrospect! The retrospect of a ministerial life in your service of nearly fifty-seven years duration. The retrospect of as large powers as have in our generation been bestowed upon any man, devoted here to the salvation of souls and the welfare of the kingdom of Christ. The retrospect of a history which is built into the fabric of this old first church of New Haven, and is henceforth an inseparable part of its renown. For in the long catalogue of worthies in the pastorate of this church, from the broad minded and saintly Davenport whom your Pastor so revered and eulogized, to him whose loss we to-day deplore, no name shines with brighter luster, if indeed any beams with so various and effulgent ray, as the name of LEONARD BACON.

ARTICLE IX.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THE NEW INFIDELITY.*—This little book is designed to show that science has subverted Natural Theology and that therefore the *knowledge* of God is impossible to the human intellect; but religion remains important as a matter of feelings and morals—"a matter to be left to the individual temperament." Judaism and the Old and New Testaments are products of the Shemitic race; Christ attempted only a reformed Judaism. "As our religion is a borrowed one, the most of our religious phrases do not belong to us as a race, and have been adopted from a literature not our own." The Aryan race gave us heathen conceptions and out of these our natural theologies have grown. Christianity, as it exists in the Aryan nations, is only a "veneering" of heathenism. "We die Pagans after all. The genius of our own religion, the religion of nature, with Jupiter, Apollo, Pan, and Venus, is too strong for Amos, Malachi, and Christ to root out, and the rest is all words, words, words!" His idea of race-separation is so dominant, that he repeatedly sets forth as preposterously false the opinion that any covenant of God with Shemites can have any reference to Aryans. "Neither in body or mind do we particularly resemble those wandering peoples, and with their special covenants we can in reason have nothing to do." It seems not to have occurred to him that, if there is a God, he is the God of all men, and that a true religion must transcend the differences of race.

There is a general coincidence between the author's opinions and those of Matthew Arnold; he holds that religion "is a feeling and an expression to which we are all subject and accessory, and therefore something to be reformed, not abolished;" he is somewhat dogmatic in his assertions; his conclusions are derived from a radical misconception of what Christianity is, and often from hasty generalizations not justified by facts. He has added nothing to the familiar arguments in support of the form of agnosticism which he advocates.

It is said, "curses like chickens always come home to roost."

* *The New Infidelity*. By AUGUSTUS RADCLIFFE GROTE. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 27 and 29 West 23d street. 1881. xx and 101 pages.

The same is true of errors in the conception of truth and invalid arguments in its defence. The conception of the Bible current in the controversy with English Deism, that it is a revelation of doctrines and precepts attested by miracles, and the consequent use of it by theologians as "an arsenal of proof-texts," is the basis of a large part of the current objections against it. The revelation was made by God's action in human history redeeming man from sin, establishing his kingdom of righteousness, and culminating in Christ and the pouring out of the Holy Spirit. Against this conception of revelation many of the current objections have no force.

THOUGHTS ON THEISM.*—The Theism of the author rests on Agnosticism like that of Hamilton, Mansel, and Spencer. The knowledge that absolute being exists is a necessary intuition of reason; it is "a condition of thought which prompts to a belief in the existence of a Deity, and this appears to be ineradicably rooted in the native substance and structure of the mind." But while necessarily knowing *that* it is, we have no knowledge *what* it is. It is "never known as possessing faculties, or properties, or qualities." We may worship the Absolute as Truth, Wisdom, Love, Spirit, or by whatever names express to us that which is purest and best. Religion and worship are necessary from the constitution of man. But while we praise, adore, give thanks, and bow in submission to the supreme power, we are to expect no answers to prayer nor to enter into real communion with God. The creed proposed for the new Catholic church is: "A belief in the existence of God and in the Religious Nature of Man; and the two great commandments, the Love of God and the Love of Man, as the condition of membership or the regulative principles of the church life." He puts the question in passing whether Calvinism is not more hurtful than atheism. The author proposes that the movement begin by building in London a handsome Gothic church, with stained glass in every window, with suitable paintings and statues, and a choir equal to that of St. Paul's or Westminster Abbey, and that it be open daily as the center of all the benevolent work of the church. He proposes the follow-

* *Thoughts on Theism, with Suggestions towards a public religious service in harmony with modern Science and Philosophy.* Eighth thousand. Revised and enlarged. London: Trübner & Co., Ludgate Hill. 1880. Paper covers: 81 pages. Price one shilling.

ing order of public worship. Organ voluntary: Hymns: Dedication to higher religious life: Adoration, praise, thanksgiving to God, acknowledgment of dependence, resolves to be more truthful, just, generous, &c.: Anthem: Silent devotion: Two reading lessons, one from the Bible and the second from "another religious literature:" Anthem: Sermon or discourse: Hymn: Benediction: Voluntary by the organ. The writer is evidently serious and earnest, and is a well-read and able thinker.

WESTCOTT'S REVELATION OF THE RISEN LORD.*—This volume is intended as a supplement to the author's "Gospel of the Resurrection." It consists of eleven short studies of the various appearances of our Lord after his resurrection. The articles are spiritual and practical rather than historical and critical. The author attaches a distinct and peculiar significance to each appearance; that to Mary Magdalene was the revelation through love, that to the two disciples going to Emmaus was the revelation through thought, that to Thomas was the conviction of faith, that to the disciples assembled in the evening with the doors shut was the giving of the commission and charter of the church, and so on. Some of these suggestions seem fanciful and far-fetched.

STUDIES IN THE LIFE OF CHRIST.†—This volume consists of eighteen "studies" on the prominent events and aspects of our Lord's life on earth. They were originally prepared as a series of Sunday evening discourses, while the author was a minister in Aberdeen. They appear to be published in the form in which they were originally delivered and retain the characteristics of such discourses. They are not exhaustive and critical discussions on the gospel history, but, at most, attempts at reaching points of view from which the life of Christ may be understood in its true significance. They are excellent reading for the household.

* *The Revelation of the Risen Lord.* By BROOKE FOSS WESTCOTT, D.D., D.C.L., Regius Professor of Divinity, Cambridge. London and Cambridge: Macmillan & Co. 1881. xvi and 199 pages. Price \$1.75.

† *Studies in the Life of Christ.* By the Rev. A. M. FAIRBAIRN, D.D., Principal of Airdale College, Bradford, and author of "Studies in the Philosophy of Religion and History." New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1, 3, and 5 Bond street. 1882. viii and 359 pages. Price \$1.75.

THE CONFLICTS OF THE AGE,*—This volume comprises four articles, published in different numbers of the *North American Review*, and republished, “with a few additional paragraphs, because they reflect the opinions of the age.” The anonymous author shows himself well read on the subjects discussed, and presents clearly and forcibly the theories in question and their necessary issues. The discussion is sprightly, incisive, and witty; and whoever begins to read it will be likely to read it through.

BELIEFS ABOUT MAN.†—This volume is a companion to “Belief in God” published by the same author last spring. The topics discussed are, What is Man? Origin of Man: Sin and Salvation: Is Man Free? The Motive Forces of Human Life: The Law of Progress: The Earthly Outlook: Is Death the End? They are discourses preached Sunday mornings to the congregation to whom the author is minister. The author is a vigorous thinker and has a striking way of putting things. He is sometimes mistaken as to the facts on which he rests his arguments. He does not acknowledge man’s free-agency beyond the power, like that which a brute has, to do as he pleases. He advances no further as to the future life than to say that existence after death is not impossible, and to present some reasons why we may hope for it. He says, “I have no belief in *spirit* which means nothing,” but thinks an ethereal body may be developed within the present body and live after death. One’s faith and spiritual insight must be at a minimum, if he can be lifted by the book to any higher spiritual trust and hope, or to any greater moral purity and power. To us its moral and spiritual influence is depressing and deadening.

BARTH’S RELIGIONS OF INDIA.‡—This work is based on an article published in 1879, in the *Encyclopédie des Sciences Religieuses*. It is here presented in an amplified form, and with num-

* *The Conflicts of the Age*. 1. An Advertisement for a new Religion. By an Evolutionist.—2. The Confession of an Agnostic. By an Agnostic.—3. What Morality have we Left? By a New Light Moralist.—4. Review of the Fight. By a Yankee Farmer. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 743 and 745 Broadway. 1881. 90 pages.

† *Beliefs about Man*. By M. J. SAVAGE. Boston: George H. Ellis, 141 Franklin street. 1882.

‡ *The Religions of India*. By A. BARTH, Member of the Société Asiatique of Paris. Authorized Translation, by Rev. J. Wood, Edin. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1882.

erous annotations which add much to its value. The author calls attention to the peculiarity of his view that the Veda is of sacerdotal and not of popular origin. Into the question of the origin and antiquity of caste he does not enter, but describes the system as it came to exist. Another question which he avoids is that of the relation of the Aryan Religions of India to other systems of faith, as Christianity and Islamism. The main topics are: The Vedic Religions, Brahmanism, Buddhism, Jainism, Hinduism. These are handled with great ability and erudition. The work is probably the best on the subject.

INDEX TO NEANDER'S CHURCH HISTORY.*—Index-makers who do their work well, belong with dictionary-makers, with accurate chronologers, and with other benefactors of the world to whom scholars are duly grateful, let mankind, generally, be never so oblivious of their services. In the volume before us, some diligent hand has set down, with considerable fullness, the topics noticed in the great work of Neander on the History of the Church. The book contains a third more references than are found attached to the several volumes of that work. Students need not be told that they will find in this copious and well-printed Index a faithful and valuable aid in their researches.

THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION AND BUDDHISM.†—This volume includes six Lectures with an Appendix. The special titles are: The Place of Buddhism in the Development of Religious Thought, The Pāli Piṭakas (Buddhist Scriptures), The Buddhist Theory of "Karma" (the Substitute for Transmigration of Souls), Buddhist Lives of the Buddha, Gotama's Order (the Buddhist Ascetics), and the Later Forms of Buddhism. Of the learning of the author of this volume on the themes which he handles there is no doubt. He is a clear writer and brings forward information of much value. We are not so well pleased with his theories respecting the origin of religion, and his comparison of Hindoo beliefs with other creeds. He adopts the theory that Animism was the earliest form of religion, and appears to be an adherent of the unverified hypotheses of Tylor and his school of Anthropologists.

* *Index to Neander's General History of the Christian Religion and Church.* Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1881.

† *The Hibbert Lectures*, 1881. The Origin and Growth of Religion, as illustrated by some points in the History of Indian Buddhism. By T. W. RHYS DAVES. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1882.

PROF. D. CADY EATON'S TRANSLATIONS OF SELECTIONS FROM FRIEDERICH'S "BAUSTEINE" will be found by students of Greek sculpture in this country, who have not access to the original, to be of great value. The work of Friederichs is but a collection of simple descriptions of the plaster casts in the Berlin Museum, yet, as that museum contains casts of all well known ancient statues, the Bausteine is, in fact, a critical history of all Greek sculpture from the beginning—gradually unfolding the principles that led to its perfect development, and following it through its degeneracy to the end. Prof. Eaton says of Friederichs, that, "better than any other writer, he hit the happy mean between prolixity and barrenness. His descriptions are satisfactory and do not fatigue. Moreover, his mind was so well-balanced and his disposition was so modest, that his writings are free from controversy and egotism. His statements are always calm, because he loved art better than his own opinions of it." Prof. Eaton is publishing these "Selections" in numbers, two of which are before us. In the second of these numbers will be found Friederichs' description of the sculpture of the Parthenon. Prof. Eaton's notes add materially to the value of the book to students of art in this country.

RICHARD GRANT WHITE'S "EVERY DAY ENGLISH."*—Even those who do not by any means accept all the dicta of Mr. White upon the subjects upon which he writes, can wish for this book a wide circulation. It is lamentable that with all our schools, and all our educational apparatus, so many errors in grammar, and in pronunciation, are to be heard every day, even from persons who suppose that they belong to the educated classes. Fortunately, at the present time, a fresh interest seems to be awakened in the correct pronunciation of English words, and the correct use of the English language, and it is to be hoped that this book will help to instruct the multitudes who are sadly in need of its teachings.

THE ART AMATEUR.—The frontispiece of the February number is a "Decorative Dream" of St. Valentine's Day. Other noticeable illustrations are a full-page drawing of Vibert's "Roofers," owned by W. H. Vanderbilt; a page of pencil studies by Gérôme; fifteen engravings of Minton pottery, including a

* *Every Day English*. By RICHARD GRANT WHITE. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston. 1881. 12mo, 512 pp.

dozen tiles decorated by Solon, and pictures of the studio scene in "Esmeralda," an old German kitchen, and some very curious Spanish embroideries. The designs for china painting and embroidery are fresh and attractive. Noteworthy features in the table of contents are "An *Æsthetic Pretender*" (Oscar Wilde), "The Dudley Gallery," the picture "Collection of John Jacob Astor," "Tapestry Painting," "Embroidery for Bedrooms," "La Chaumière Indienne" (the cottage home of two artists in rural France), "A Boudoir of the Eighteenth Century," and "Artists' Views on Woman's Dress." Four dollars a year: 35 cents a number. Montague Marks, publisher, 23 Union Square, New York.

MAGAZINE OF ART.—The number for March contains engraved pictures of the Nuremberg Madonna and of Delpérée's painting of "Luther at the Diet of Worms." The other articles are "Alnwick Castle;" "Book Decorations, historical and artistic;" "Belgian art;" "Unfulfilled Renown;" color in dress; antique spoons; Nuremberg art; each fully illustrated with the finest of wood cuts. Cassell, Petter, Galpin & Co.: New York. Yearly subscription \$3.50, single numbers 35 cents.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

Divorce and Divorce Legislation, especially in the United States. By Theodore D. Woolsey. Second edition, revised. 12mo, 328 pp.

William S. Gottsberger, New York.

Higher than the Church. An Art Legend of Ancient Times. By Wilhelmine von Hillern, author of "Ernestine," etc. From the German by Mary J. Safford. 74 pp. 1882.

Geo. H. Ellis, Boston, 1882.

The Duties of Women. A course of Lectures. By Frances P. Cobbe. 193 pp.

D. Appleton & Co., New York.

The Verbalist: A manual devoted to brief discussions of the right and the wrong use of words, to some other matters of interest to those who would speak and write with propriety. By Alfred Ayres. 12mo, 220 pp.

Phillips & Hunt, New York.

Chautauqua Library of English History and Literature. Vol. II. The period of the early Plantagenets. 124 pp.

G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

Arsiesis and other Poems. 113 pp.

The First Book of Knowledge. By Frederick Guthrie, F.R.S., Professor of Physics at the Normal School of Science, South Kensington. 130 pp.

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The Literary Life. Edited by William Shepherd. Authors and Authorship. 258 pp.

Sensation and Pain. By Charles Fayette Taylor, M.D. A lecture delivered before the New York Academy of Sciences, March, 1881. 76 pp.

Suicide. Studies on its Philosophy, Causes, and Prevention. By James J. O'Dea, M.D., formerly one of the Medical Board of Examiners of Ontario, Dominion of Canada, etc., etc. 12mo, 322 pp.

Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, Mass.

American Men of Letters; Noah Webster. By Horace F. Scudder. 12mo, 302 pp.

Orations and Essays: with selected Parish Sermons. By Rev. J. Lewis Diman, D.D., late Professor of History and Political Economy in Brown University. A memorial volume. 416 pp.

Aspects of Poetry, being lectures delivered at Oxford. By John Campbell Shairp, LL.D., Professor of Poetry, Oxford. 401 pp.

Every-day English: a sequel to "Words and their Use." By Richard Grant White. 512 pp.

E. Steiger & Co., New York.

The Dictionary of Education and Instruction; A Reference book and Manual of the Theory and Practice of Teaching, for the use of parents, teachers, and others; based upon the Cyclopædia of Education. By Henry Kiddle and A. G. Schem. Also an Appendix: a select list of Educational Works, English, French, and German. arranged by W. H. Payne, M.A.

Fords, Howard & Hulbert, New York.

The Life of Christ according to the Gospel of Mark. The Triple Comparison. The King James Version; The Anglican revised Version; The American revised Version. Arranged for the use of schools and classes. 96 pp.

The Use of Tobacco. By J. I. D. Hinds, Ph.D., printed by the Cumberland Presbyterian Publishing House.

Whites & Stokes, New York.

Esau Hardery; A novel of American Life. By William Osborn Stoddard, author of the "Heart of It," etc. 12mo, 405 pp.

A. S. Barnes & Co., New York.

The Opium Habit and Alcoholism. A Treatise on the Habits of Opium and its compounds; Alcohol; Chloral-hydrate; Chloroform; Bromide Potassium, and Cannabis Indica; including their Therapeutical Indications; with suggestions for treating various painful complications. By Dr. Fred. Heman Hubbard. 12mo. 259 pp.

THE
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ARTICLE I.—SPIRITISM (SO-CALLED) A SCIENTIFIC
QUESTION. BY H. ULRICH.

[Translated by Rev. J. B. CHASE, Cherokee, Iowa.]

Scientific Discussions, Vols. I., II. By FR. ZÖLLNER, Leipsic.
Staackman. 1878.

The New Spiritualism, Its Value, and Its Delusions. By J. H.
VON FICHTE, Leipsic. Brockhaus. 1878.

THE question of so-called Spiritism, or Spiritualism, as others call it, is a question quite recent, and yet really a matter of dispute that has come down to us from the ages. It is really a question of preëminent philosophical interest, whether there is a spiritual kingdom related to our earthly existence, and which can exert a perceptible influence upon it. For it touches not only upon the chief problem of Psychology, the relationship of soul and body; but it also trenches upon Metaphysics, and the general philosophic theory of the Universe. Hitherto philosophy, especially German philosophy, has had

no occasion to enter upon a closer discussion of this subject. For although quite a number of prominent English, American, and Russian physicists and physiologists (Wallace, Crookes, Butlerow, etc.) have rigorously examined the facts to which spiritists appeal, and have acknowledged their scientific accuracy: still on the other hand these facts were in themselves neither so definitely established nor of such convincing character as to bar the suspicion of intentional or unintentional deception; which, as heretofore in the case of animal magnetism, has in so many ways attached itself to spiritistic manifestations: and, still further, the influence of foreign scholars has been too widely remote from German inquirers to induce them to follow in the track already marked out.

At present, however, this state of affairs is essentially changed. Since Professor Zöllner, the renowned philosopher in astral science, with several associates of equal renown from the Universities of Leipsic and Göttingen have taken the matter in hand, and through the introduction and management of experiments in an exact scientific way have sought to settle the dispute; and, since Zöllner in the above mentioned volumes has exactly described these experiments and the conclusions to which he has arrived; and since he and his comrades have unanimously endorsed the philosophical validity of these spiritistic facts: now, in my judgment there can be no question but that Spiritism has acquired the dignity of a scientific question.

I think it is now the duty of every scientific man, be he an explorer in the realms of Nature or Philosophy, to take some position with reference to these conclusions. It is now no longer admissible to dismiss the subject under the pretence that it is either a jugglery, swindle, deceit, or, at best, an illusion and self-deception. And now the wider a man's philosophic fame may be, and the greater his talent for investigation, by so much the more is it his duty to use this extended knowledge, discipline, and experience to examine these results and decide on their scientific value: and through these very advantages he is bound to exact truth and verity to put forth his hand and assist in the solution of this problem.

I greet it as a good beginning that my friend Fichte, in the

treatise also above cited, has already entered upon the discussion of the question from a scientific standpoint, and on the basis of his psychological investigations: and so has sought to forward the final decision. My intention in the present article is, by comparing and examining Zöllner's experiments only, to prove that the scientific obligation which Fichte has already recognized is indeed such beyond dispute. I shall accept, as a matter of course, only provisionally the theory commonly held, that these manifestations are the work of spirits from the other world, and leave the question open as to whether they do or do not manifest themselves in this way.

These manifestations, as it is well known, only take place when some so-called medium is coöperating, or at least present; this medium possessing the peculiar property, gift or power of being able to influence the spirits to definite manifestations of their power. It is also well known that there are many such mediums. Zöllner, however, has experimented with only one, an American, Henry Slade by name, of late quite famous or notorious, whichever appellation suits best. Slade is an M.D. and has, since the development of his power as a medium, given up a lucrative position as a well-accredited physician, in order to devote himself to the study, spread and proof of Spiritism.*

Zöllner considers him an honorable man incapable of deceptive arts; and Slade's intercourse with Zöllner and his friends, as well as in the management of the experiments, goes to confirm this judgment. The very first experiment to which Zöllner challenged him, soon after his arrival in Leipsic, gave a significant result as wonderful from a physical standpoint, as from the spiritual manifestations connected with it. Casually remembering Reichenbach's "Sensitive," who according to Th.

* Hence it appears that for admission to his sittings or séances (so-called) he was accustomed to take pay. These sittings were by no means public, but in accordance with special announcement limited to a few persons, not more than ten. I will also notice here that Slade was condemned on a charge of deception by the London police court, but in a second trial acquitted on account of error in the indictment, and in the application of the law. At Berlin he was not driven away by the police, but he was advised to leave rather sooner than he would otherwise have done, to avoid unpleasantness between himself and the police on account of popular feeling against him. "There was no talk of expulsion." To both these facts Zöllner has given written testimony.

Fechner's testimony* possessed the power to deflect the magnetic needle, Zöllner asked him the question whether he had observed the same power in himself, Slade answered, that a few days previously he had been asked for the first time respecting this peculiarity, and that this power hitherto unknown had been pointed out to him. Zöllner invited him the next evening to his own house, in order to test the matter in company with Th. Fechner and Wilhelm Weber. Slade not only accepted the invitation, but declared himself at once ready in company with one of Zöllner's friends then present to go to Z.'s house. A celestial globe on the frame of which was a compass was there placed on the table. In consequence of the horizontal motions of Slade's hands over it, the compass actually acquired "exceedingly wild variations which could only be corrected by the use of a powerful magnet."

The test was again repeated in Zöllner's house with the use of every precaution and in the presence of Professor W. Weber and Professor Scheibner (Professor of Mathematics). "A compass covered with glass," says Zöllner, "was laid upon the table by Professor Weber. We joined our hands with Slade's. Both were in sight, and more than a foot distant from the compass. After about five minutes the needle began all at once to swing violently in arcs of from 40° to 60° until finally it revolved several times entirely around the circle. Slade now arose and went from the table to the window. He was hoping that the needle without his presence would keep up its motions which were remarkable for repeated, sudden revolutions, followed by moments of rest. This, however, did not prove to be the case. But when standing he again brought his right hand in contact with our hands which still remained joined together (in consequence of which his hand was not less than one and one-half feet from the compass) the needle suddenly resumed its agitation and at last whirled round and round."

On one of the following days in which the experiment was again repeated, Slade was asked by Zöllner to attempt to magnetize permanently an unmagnetic steel needle.

"Slade was staggered at first, and seemed to consider the result doubtful; nevertheless he was ready at once to make the

* *Recollections of the Last Days of Odic Teaching and its Founder.* Leipsic, 1876.

attempt. Zöllner procured a quantity of steel darning needles and he and Professor Weber selected one which before the test was unmistakably proven to be free from the slightest magnetic power, insomuch that both poles were attracted by it. Slade laid this needle on a slate and held the slate under the table in exactly the same way that he did to produce writing. After about four minutes, when the slate with the darning needle was laid on the table, the needle was so strongly magnetic at one end (and at one end only) that iron filings and little sewing needles clung to this end, and the compass needle could be readily moved about in a circle by it." During the following days the same attempts were many times repeated "with always the same result." (Zöllner, vol. ii, pp. 325, 329, 340.)

In this experiment the trial concluded with two Nicolé's prisms, showing the revolution of polarized light, the results of which, as Zöllner records (342), were most astonishing.

All must confess that not only this test, but also the previous magnetic experiments, absolutely preclude any intermixture of jugglery, and are moreover of great importance in physical investigation. For these experiments show, as Zöllner remarks, "that under the influences which visibly surround Slade the real molecular currents in the interior of all bodies can be turned about, and their conditions changed, a fact on which, according to Ampère's and Professor Weber's theory, the magnetism of bodies especially rests."

The experiment with the self-writing slate pencil, on which, par eminence, Slade's reputation rested, and which also was alleged against him as the strongest proof of juggling deception, was exhibited frequently at Zöllner's house in presence of his friends. I will mention only a few instances of specially striking interest.

Says Zöllner: "On the 13th day of December, 1877, two slates, bought by myself, specially marked, and carefully cleaned, were bound together crosswise with cord about four millimeters thick, after a piece of a new slate pencil about three millimeters thick had been placed between them. These slates were laid close to a corner on the flat surface of a walnut table, which had only a little time before been purchased by

me. (The sitting took place in Zöllner's residence.) Now while Professor Weber, Slade, and myself were sitting at the table and busied with experiments in magnetism, in which our six hands were lying on the table, and Mr. Slade's were more than two feet from the slate, writing suddenly began quite noisily between the two untouched slates. When we separated the slates the following words in nine lines were standing on it: '*We feel to bless all those who try (?) to investigate a subject so unpopular as the subject of spiritualism is, etc.*'"

Now this experiment according to my judgment must convince every one who has not once for all determined to consider spiritualism as a humbug that here there can be no charge of deception. Two other examples were just as wonderful. "A double slate previously bought and cleansed by Zöllner, and in which a bit of slate pencil was shut up was held by Slade over the head of one of the company (Professor Braune). Very soon we heard the well-known scratching, and when the slate was opened a much longer writing was found upon it." (331). Another time one of the slates that were always kept in readiness, was picked up and cleansed by Zöllner, and with a piece of slate pencil on it laid on the floor under the table. "Now while Slade had both his hands joined with ours upon the table, and being stretched sideways were constantly in sight, writing began upon the slate loud enough for us all to hear. When we had lifted it up, these words were on the slate: '*Truth will overcome all error.*'"

In order to refute the obvious and oft repeated explanation and accusation that the slates were prepared beforehand, and that the words had been written on them beforehand in such a way that they were at first invisible, Slade proposed at one of the sittings that Zöllner should tell him beforehand what should be written on the slate. Zöllner answered: "Littrow, Astronomer."

"Immediately scratching began as usual upon the slate, which Slade had shoved half way under the table in such a manner that his hands could be carefully watched. And when Slade lifted up the slate both the above-mentioned words stood written upon it, perfectly plain with the letters widely separated one from the other."

With reference to the oft repeated explanation and accusation referred to above, Zöllner remarked that at these numerous experiments which were performed in the presence of W. Weber, Fechner, Scheibner and other companions at his residence, all the slates used by Slade had been purchased by Zöllner, and in part marked with private marks; and that Slade had left behind more than a dozen such slates with writings on them, so that any chemist or physicist could further test them by the use of reagents to try the so-charged prepared surfaces.

Zöllner lays special stress upon the experiment of tying knots in an endless cord, which he mentions in the first volume of his scientific treatise. In the second volume he describes it with all desirable minuteness. "The thickness of the new, strong hemp cord bought by me was about one millimeter, and the length of the cord before the knots were tied in it, about 148 centimeters (approx. four feet). Before the application of sealing wax the ends of the cord were tied strongly together in a common knot, then the free ends of the knot were laid on a piece of paper and fastened neatly onto the same with common sealing wax, so that the knot was plainly in sight at the edge of the circular bit of wax. Then the paper was cut off around the wax. The sealing in this manner of two such threads took place on the evening of the 16th day of December, 1877, in my own house, under the eyes of several of my own friends and associates, and not in the presence of Slade. Two other cords of the same make and size were the next morning sealed by W. Weber in his residence and with his seal. With these four sealed cords I then went to the residence of a friend hard by, who had the kindness to receive Mr. Slade into his house eight days as a guest. The sitting here described took place in my friend's sitting-room, immediately after my arrival. From the four cords I chose out one and that I might never lose sight of it, before we sat down to the table, I put it carefully around my neck, so that the sealing wax was in front of my body and constantly in my sight. During the sitting, Slade sat on my left hand, and I saw the undisturbed sealing wax constantly before me. Slade's hands were every moment plainly in sight. With his left he several

times grasped his breast, complaining of painful sensations; with his right he held under the edge of the table top a little piece of wooden board accidentally found in the room. The down-hanging end of the cord lay plainly visible on my lap, and Slade's hand which held the board was constantly in my sight. I noticed no disappearance of Slade's hand nor change of place by it. He exhibited throughout a passive appearance so that we could not suppose that of his own intelligent will he had tied the knots, but only that they were made in his presence under the aforesaid conditions, without visible touching of the cord." (ii. 214.) After the performance of the experiment, according to the photographic delineations mentioned in the first volume of Zöllner's Treatise, four, not closely tied, but loose, knot-formed loops were found in the cord. (i. 726.) Every possibility that the knots were made before the sealing of the thread, or by pushing the thread into some other place (at least by the intervention of Slade) is here shut out. This demonstrates the impossibility of an explanation being made any more clear by a second like experiment.

"At a later sitting," says Zöllner, "two strips cut out of soft leather from five to ten centimeters wide and forty-four centimeters long, were tied by myself, and sealed with my seal in the same way that the cords had been. These two strips, thus made each entire in itself, were laid singly upon the card table (in Z.'s house) by which we were sitting. Then I laid both the strips in one place and covered them with both my hands. Slade, who was sitting at my left hand, passing his right hand over, laid it lightly on my hands, while I could constantly by the sense of feeling detect the presence of the straps under my hands. Slade declared that flashes of light were visible above my hands, and that a cool wind was felt. I felt the wind myself, but could not detect the light. Meantime while I was feeling the breeze pretty strongly on my hands, and Slade's hands were not then touching mine at all, but were lying two or three decimeters distant, I felt a perceptible movement of the two leather straps under my hands. Immediately there came three raps on the table, and when I lifted up my hands the two straps, previously separate, were joined together knot fashion. As anyone may notice (from the photographic illus-

tration in Z.'s Treatise) the bending of the straps about their longer axis can be plainly seen in the picture. The time during which the leather straps were under my hands was at the most about three minutes" (ii. 912). The last mentioned as well as the magnetic experiments, were never produced by any mediums before Slade's visit to Leipsic; but were, so to speak, devised by Zöllner and proposed by him to Dr. Slade. They were, however, accompanied by a number of other spiritistic manifestations, all of which were produced spontaneously, or at least without the assistance and desire of Zöllner. They are kin to like phenomena already very widely known through the description of spiritistic séances by other mediums in America, London, etc.

It happened in one of the above mentioned meetings (in Z.'s house) in which experiments with the self-writing slate pencils were tried, that Slade laid on the slate the pocket knife which Zöllner had given him that he might cut off a piece of slate pencil. He pushed the slate a little way under the edge of the table top, when suddenly the knife was thrown upward as much as a foot, and fell upon the table, but to the great astonishment of the spectators *opened*. The experiment was again repeated with the same result; and in order to prove that the knife was not thrown upward by the motion of the table, Slade laid at the same time a little piece of slate pencil on the slate, and to define its location made a little cross on the slate. Immediately afterward the knife was again thrown up, and Slade exhibited the slate on which the bit of slate pencil still lay in its place by the side of the aforesaid mark. At the same sitting during the second writing experiment, in which Slade held the slate over Braune's head, a bed behind a screen suddenly began to move, and advanced two feet out from the wall, shoving the screen before it. Slade was on this occasion more than four feet from the bed; had his back towards it; and his legs constantly visible, were lying one upon another, and turned in a direction away from the bed. Immediately after this, another sitting took place, in which Professors W. Weber and Scheibner participated. While the above described experiments were being conducted in the ordinary way, suddenly a loud report was heard, about as loud as the discharge of a loud battery of

Leyden jars would make. "As we startled looked in the direction from which the report seemed to proceed, the aforementioned screen fell apart into two pieces. The wooden pins at the top and bottom of the screen, more than half an inch in diameter, were torn asunder. Slade had not made the slightest move with reference to the matter. The places of fracture were at the least more than five feet distant from Slade, and he had his back toward the screen. But even had he wished to rend the screen asunder by a jerk from one side, he should have laid hold from the opposite side. Then, moreover, since the screen stood perfectly disconnected from every thing else and since the direction of the needle-like slivers, standing out from the wood are parallel to the axis of the round wooden pins, the breaking asunder could only have been accomplished by a power which acted longitudinally on the affected part."

"We all," continues Zöllner further, "were astonished by such unexpected and powerful mechanical manifestations. We asked Slade what it meant. He shrugged his shoulders at that, and remarked that such manifestations were sometimes manifested in his presence, but not often. He was standing on his feet, and while saying this, he threw a bit of slate pencil on the polished surface of the card table, and laid a slate which had been previously cleaned by me upon it; and with the five fingers of his right hand spread apart and pointed downwards, he apparently pressed the slate down to the surface of the table, while his left hand rested on the center of the table. Writing began on the underside of the slate, and when Slade lifted up the slate, the following sentence in English was found written on it: 'We did not intend to do you harm; excuse the accident.'" (ii. 331.)

Notwithstanding the apology, like incidents happened at later sittings. Once, while Professors Weber, Scheibner and Zöllner, and Dr. Slade were sitting around the card table, so often mentioned before, and which was entirely disconnected from every thing else in the apartment; while they had their hands touching, while Slade's feet were upon one side, one upon the other, and constantly visible to those who were sitting by the side of him, a large hand-bell which had been placed under the table began to ring and was violently shoved horizontally along the floor, before all eyes, about *ten* feet.

After a little pause, during which manifestations like those before narrated took place, a little fancy table, fastened to a door post by a movable iron support, was moved so violently that a chair standing before it was thrown down with a great noise. At the same time a book rack weighted down with many books, oscillated violently, although it and the tables as well were not less than five feet distant from Slade (ii. 335). At a second sitting on the same day the experiment described by Crookes and Huggins was successfully attempted. Slade held over the table an accordeon which he had never before had in his hands. It was all in sight, as with his right hand he held fast of the keyless end, while his left hand lay on the table. The accordeon began suddenly to play, and the bell which had been again placed on the floor, began to ring violently. The accordeon again resumed its playing, after Slade had given it into the hands of Scheibner. Prof. S. held it as Slade had done, above the table, yet not touching it (ii. 536.)

I am amused with some incidental occurrences. The hands of Slade and Scheibner, with which they were unitedly holding a slate under the table, that it might be written upon, were made very wet, as was also the slate, instead of receiving the writing (ii. 337). At another time in a like attempt Zöllner's hand was severely pinched (ii. 213). At another sitting in which Professors Weber and Zöllner were busied in the previously described magnetic experiments, suddenly under the table Weber's coat was unbuttoned, his gold watch taken out of his vest pocket and laid quietly in his right hand under the table (ii. 913). I am pleased that these incidents are briefly narrated. Although astonishing enough, they seem to have no purpose, and to be like idle frivolities. On the other hand, another experiment suggested by Zöllner, or for which he gave occasion, is full of interest.

Zöllner himself had made two wooden rings, each turned out of a single piece of wood, one of oak, and the other of alder wood, and also an unbroken ring 4 to 5 millimetres wide, and 400 millimetres in circumference, cut off from a dried intestine. The last mentioned ring and the two wooden ones were then strung upon a catgut 1 millimeter thick and about $1\frac{1}{16}$ metres long. The ends of the catgut were then tied to-

gether and sealed with Z.'s own hands as had been done with the cord. The expectation in this experiment was that both the wooden rings would be joined together without break or damage and a knot would be tied in the ring of intestine. While the expected result did not take place, that which did appear was marvelous enough. "After I had taken my seat," said Zöllner, "in the usual way, at the well known card-table, near which a little round table was standing, I laid both my hands tightly upon the upper side of the sealed catgut. After several minutes had passed and Slade professed to have seen the lights which usually accompanied physical manifestations, a faint smell of fire, which seemed to come from beneath the table, diffused itself through the room and called to mind somewhat the smell of sulphuric acid. Shortly after a rapping was heard to proceed from the little round table over against me, as of two wooden substances striking one upon the other. When I asked whether we should bring the sitting to an end, and whether the work was accomplished, the rapping was repeated three times in succession. Then we rose up immediately and set to work investigating the cause of the rapping in the round table. To our great astonishment the two wooden rings, which about six minutes before were strung on the catgut were found unhurt at the foot of the little table. The outer diameter of the rings is 105 millimetres, and the inner diameter 74 millimetres. The height of the table is 77 centimetres and the breadth of its top 46 centimetres. At the same time there were two loops in the catgut which passed around the uninjured strip of intestine." (ii. 921, etc.)

Very properly Zöllner was pleased with such an abundance of enduring result; for these objects are still in existence (the rings, the catgut and the table) and can still be examined by all methods of observation, and their unimpaired condition scientifically determined. The experiments thus far described with their dominant physical and chemical elements can receive such examination as it is hardly possible to make in the second class of manifestations.

We will now notice the fact, many times repeated, that objects great and small were made many times to disappear, and after a little time reappear. It had already happened in one of

the previously described sittings that a little thermometer case made out of pasteboard was laid by Slade upon a slate and shoved half way under the table. Suddenly it disappeared and after about three minutes reappeared upon the slate. (ii. 325.)

Afterward on the occasion of the reception of a letter from Vienna which was telling of a similar instance, Zöllner definitely expressed the wish to Slade and afterwards repeated it in a very emphatic manner, that he desired to witness the disappearance and reappearance of some material object. Instantly ready for such a trial, Slade asked Mr. Hoffmann (at whose house the sitting took place) to give him any book. Hoffman took an octavo volume from a little bookcase on the side of the wall. Slade laid the book on a slate, held it partly under the edge of the table and drew back the slate without any book on it. "Afterwards," says Z., "we examined the table thoroughly in every part outside and inside. The little room was also looked through but in vain; the book had disappeared. After about five minutes we again took our seats at the table to make further observations. Slade sat opposite me and Mr. V. Hoffmann between us on my left hand. We had scarcely become seated when the book fell from the ceiling of the room down onto the table, after it had given me a pretty smart blow on the right ear. The direction from which it came down seemed therefore to be in a diagonal line from a point above and behind me. During this performance Slade was sitting before me and held both his hands quietly on the top of the table. Just before the event he declared that he saw lights, as he ordinarily did when such physical phenomena were being performed. The lights seemed either sweeping through the air, or clinging fast to substances. Neither my friend nor myself however were able to see the lights." (ii. 916.) "In a sitting on the following day at 11.30 A. M. in bright sunshine, I was unexpectedly, and when I was least prepared for it, witness to a much greater manifestation of this same kind. I had taken my seat as usual with Slade at the little card-table. Opposite me and close by the card-table, stood the little round table previously mentioned and described. It might have been about a minute after Slade and I had seated ourselves and

joined hands, when the round table began to make slow vibrations. We could both observe these plainly on the top of the round table, which stood higher than the card table, while the lower part of it through the intervention of the card table was invisible to my eyes. The motions soon became greater, and meanwhile the whole table drew nearer to the card table and laid itself under it, the three feet being turned towards me. Neither Dr. Slade nor myself knew in what manner the manifestations would appear, since for about the space of a minute there was no change. Slade was on the point of making use of his slate and pencil to enquire of his spirits whether we were to expect anything more, when I wished to take a closer view of the round table which as I supposed was lying under the card table. To my surprise and also that of Mr. Slade we found the space under the card table absolutely empty. In the whole remaining part of the room we could find nothing of the table which a moment before had been present to our senses. After we had remained for five or six minutes in anxious expectation of the reappearance of the table, Slade remarked that he again saw lights appear. As usual I could see nothing of the lights. As with dread and anxiety I was gazing upward in all directions into the air, Slade asked me whether I could perceive the great gleams of light. I answered negatively but following the direction of Slade's eyes kept my head turned toward the ceiling of the room somewhat behind me, and all at once saw from a height about five feet in the air the missing table with the legs turned upward, descend rapidly onto the top of the card table." (ii. 917.)

To this department of appearance and disappearance belongs finally a similar and yet peculiar incident. In one of the subsequent sittings, Zöllner had laid upon the table, at which he, V. Hoffman and Slade were sitting a couple of shells which he had provided for another experiment. He had laid them down in such a manner that the small one was entirely covered up in the hollow of the larger one.

"While Slade was now in the customary way holding a slate under the edge of the table to receive writing upon it, something rapped suddenly upon the table as if a hard body had fallen upon it. When the slate was brought again at once

into sight, the small shell was lying on it. Since the two shells had been lying exactly in the middle of the table, untouched and constantly under my observation, here was an instance of the oft-observed phenomena of bringing one substance through another, verified by an astonishing and wholly unexpected physical manifestation. While I reserve the narration of many other manifestations of this kind, I mention here this very remarkable circumstance. Immediately after Slade pulled out the slate with the little shell on it from under the table, I seized it in order to establish the fact that a change had been made. It was so powerfully heated that I dropped it at once. I then placed it in my friend's hand, and he also bore testimony to its very great temperature." (ii. 926.)

At last Zöllner and the friends who were experimenting with him became witnesses of so-called "materialization" or "incorporealization"; i. e. the sudden appearing of individual members of the human body; as, for example, a hand or a foot. In that sitting in which the self-playing accordion was attempted, suddenly a little reddish brown hand appeared close before W. Weber, on the edge of the table and visible to all. The hand moved nimbly and after two seconds disappeared. This manifestation was repeated several times." (ii. 387.) In the sitting in which the two leather straps were tied under Zöllner's hands, a great hand came up close before him from under the table. "All the fingers of it were moving rapidly, and I could see it distinctly for at least the space of two minutes. The color of the hand was somewhat tawny, bordering slightly towards an olive green. In the meantime, while I saw Slade's hands lying before me on the table, and he himself sat on a chair at my left hand, the hand described above raised itself up as quick as an arrow, and grasped the upper part of my arm with a quick pressure for more than a minute." Then it disappeared and immediately thereafter happened what was before related about Zöllner's right hand being violently pinched while under the table. (ii. 913.) "During all this time Slade's hands were lying in sight on the table, and his feet, extended in a sideways position, were constantly visible. When we felt the touch of hands under the table (as in all our sittings it was the regular custom to try experiments

to verify the phenomena presented) I wished to try an experiment by which evidence of the existence of such hands might be obtained in a more convincing way. So I proposed to Mr. Slade to have a porcelain jar filled to the brim with wheat flour set under the edge of the table, and then express a wish to the 'spirits' that before they touched us they would first dip their hands in the flour. In this way must evident traces remain after the experiment was done of the touching of our garments; and so in this way we might examine Slade's hands and feet for any residue of the touched flour. Slade declared himself ready to give evidence in this way and I brought a great porcelain bowl filled evenly to the edge with flour, and set it under the table. While we were not troubling ourselves at all about the eventual results of the experiment, but had been engaged more than five minutes in our magnetic experiments (during which time Slade's hands were constantly in sight and lying on the table), I suddenly felt my right knee under the table strongly grasped and squeezed by a large hand for about the space of a second, and at the very moment that I was telling of this occurrence and was about to rise up, the meal jar without visible assistance was moved along about four feet from its place under the table. On my pantaloons I had the mark of a large powerful hand, and on the surface of the meal in the bowl was the impress of the thumb and four fingers, with all the niceties of structure, even the creases of the skin plainly marked. An immediate examination of Slade's hands and feet did not show the slightest traces of flour, and a comparison of his hand with the imprint in the flour showed that the latter was considerably larger. (ii. 340.)

This experiment in another form was many times repeated. Zöllner pasted a half sheet of writing paper on a tolerably large piece of board, and held it over a smoking kerosene lamp without a chimney so that the paper was uniformly covered with smoke, and then laid it under the table at which he, W. Weber and Slade were sitting, "In the hope of getting once more the impression of the hand as in the preceding case we gave our attention again to the magnetic experiments. Suddenly the board under the table was pushed about three feet away and I picked it up. The impression of a naked left foot

was found upon it. I immediately asked Slade to stand up and show me both of his feet. He did it most willingly, then took off his shoes and we examined his stockings for any traces of soot that might be clinging to them, but in vain. Then we required Dr. Slade to set his foot on a measuring rule, by means of which we found that his foot measured 22.5 centimetres from the heel to the great toe, while the length of the foot print between these points only measured 18.5 centimetres." (ii. 345.)

Two days later this experiment was again repeated with only this difference that instead of a board a slate was used. On the surface of the slate a half sheet of letter paper was pasted and this paper immediately before the sitting and in the presence of witnesses was covered with soot as before. "The slate was then placed on the floor as the board had been before, under the table at which we were sitting, with the sooty side up. After about four minutes on a given sign we rose up, and on the slate found the impression of the same left foot that we found two days before on the board." Zöllner remarks that according to the judgment of his colleague, the Hon. Thiersch (member of the Common Council, and an eminent surgeon), "the impression was that of a man's foot which had been badly contracted by the wearing of shoes, so that, as could be plainly seen, one toe had been pressed up and rested on its two neighbors in such a manner that when the foot was set down only four toes touched the underlying surface." (ii. 346.)

Although these experiments to an unprejudiced person were entirely convincing, still since they might be doubted by some "scientific men," Zöllner devised a third which shuts out all doubt. He bought a double slate: i. e. two slates bound together on one side by brass hinges so that they would shut together like a book. On each of the two inner sides of this slate he pasted as before a half sheet of this writing paper, and immediately before the sitting covered them with soot. Then he remarked to Slade that in accordance with his (Slade's) theory of the existence of intelligent beings, having four dimensions, it must be an easy thing for them who had only made foot-prints upon open slates, now to impress them also on the

inside of this when it was shut up. "Slade laughed and thought that this must be absolutely impossible. Even his 'spirits' which he asked about it seemed considerably disturbed at the proposition, but finally returned the usual stereotyped answer, 'We will try it.' To my great surprise Slade consented that I should during the sitting hold the slate, now shut up, on my lap, and which by the way I had never let go out of my hands since the paper had been covered with soot. I laid it on my lap so that I could constantly see half of it. We might have been sitting five minutes around the table in the brightly lighted room, my hands being joined with Slade's in the customary way on the top of the table, when I felt twice, one time soon after the other, that the slate was being pressed down on my lap, without my being able to detect the slightest visible agent. Three raps upon the table indicated that every thing was finished, and when I opened the slate I found on the inside, on one-half of the slate the impression of a right foot, and on the other that of a left foot, which was the same that we had seen on the preceding evenings." (ii. 349.)

I think Zöllner is correct, and that every unprejudiced person will agree with him when he remarks: "My reader must judge for himself, how far it is possible after such facts, to reckon Mr. Slade a deceiver or juggler." It appears that the experiments which have occupied twelve sittings were performed in the presence of his friends, Professors Fechner, W. Weber, and W. Scheibner, and that he was expressly authorized by them to publish this. This means that these good and true scientific men attest the reality of the reported facts. Under these circumstances there remains for those who deny or doubt only one of two alternatives: either by their silence to admit that they have no foundation on which to base their doubtings, and that they are not willing to believe what is abundantly worthy of belief; or else they are to show how it could be possible to deceive so remarkably these men and many other witnesses of undoubted credibility.* The reason why the facts that we

* The aforesaid gentlemen, in answer to my written inquiry, have kindly stated that they do, since the sittings at Leipsic, reckon themselves among the number of those who are persuaded of the reality of the spiritic phenomena. According to Zöllner's account, Professors Thiersch, Ludwig (Physiology), and Wundt (Philosophy), were present in one of those sittings in which the experiment took

have now under consideration will still be always doubted notwithstanding their complete attestation, and the actual witnessing of them by so many people, lies not only in the inexplicable character of the things themselves, but still more in their open antagonisms to the foundation principles and theorems of natural science. It is clear that the commonly accepted, partial, mechanical (materialistic) view of nature and its corresponding analysis does not suffice to explain these phenomena. For even if all these spiritistic manifestations were revealed through mechanical (physical or chemical) agencies, still these agencies are not set in motion by blind necessity or accident; and even necessity or accident is dependent on the simple use of the vehicles of power, and all such results are accomplished by the mere union or separation of particles of matter, be the same necessary or accidental.

These spiritistic manifestations consist very plainly in the exercise of a conscious intelligent will; be that either the will of the so-called "medium," or the will of the so-called "spirits" transmitted through the medium. To be sure what we have called the one-sided, mechanical explanation of Nature, as Natural Philosophy itself expressly recognizes, does not suffice for many another manifestation generally accepted as a fact. But still these exceptional phenomena are, to say the least, in harmony with the rest and give hope of future explanation through progressive investigation. On the other hand the spiritistic phenomena lie athwart the line of materialistic principles, and their explanation by any material laws seems entirely hopeless.

Should I now propose the questions: what mean these phenomena? or how are they to be explained? the double form of this question implies that I make no pretension to have found an explanation in the ordinary sense of the term, and only that I mean to discuss briefly the previously given phenomena, and

place, in which the pen-knife was thrown up into the air, and where also the slate pencil shut up in the double slate, was held over the table before all eyes. Nevertheless, these gentlemen, as Zöllner indicates, seem to doubt the reality and objectivity of the spiritistic manifestations that they themselves saw. This, of course, they have a right to do. But is it not their duty as prominent investigators in science, to openly acknowledge what they saw themselves, and tell why they doubt the objectivity of it, and why they think they have a right to suspect fraud, jugglery, deception or illusion?

the probable causes of the same, not excluding the remote designs.

The generally promulgated opinion, held by most mediums and professional spiritists, is well-known. They believe that all these phenomena are the work of so-called "spirits." But here first of all we should need to explain what we mean by this appellation "Spirits." This question, so far as I know, has never yet been entered upon. Let us therefore pass by this question for a time and consider the acts of these spirits. It seems plain that these manifestations are not so largely spiritual in character, as physical or mechanical. The answers and spontaneous communications, which the self-writing slate pencil has hitherto imparted, concern themselves mainly with spiritism, or spiritistic manifestations, or else with matters of very little importance. (In America communications of greater importance are said to have been received; but that branch of the spiritistic world has been so preëminently abounding in traces of intentional or unintentional deception, that we cannot here enter upon the discussion of these reports from America, which are at once doubtful and sometimes contradictory.) The physical manifestations, on the other hand, are important, extraordinary, and astonishing; and to their accomplishment physical powers are absolutely necessary. If a bed moves, a table tips over, a book case sways about, this cannot come to pass without the simple mechanical process of pushing, lifting, or pulling. If, as Crookes testifies, the specific gravity of things is changed through spiritic agency, this cannot take place except through the exercise of real lifting power, so that the things acquire motion; and to this end either a push or a pull is necessary.

The spirits must then either of themselves possess physical power, or else be able to serve themselves with it. But then the question presents itself: can we not dispense with the supposition that these so-called spirits have either existence or power? Is it not conceivable that the medium himself accomplishes these results in some such way that he excites to the action the electric motive powers that we know extends through all nature? We know well that electricity and magnetism possess an active power that is potent to join and hold together

not only atoms, molecules and entire bodies of matter, but also to separate and tear them asunder. Men have indeed for a long time endeavored by electro-magnetic action to overcome the powers of chemical affinity and gravitation. Why should not this same power be able to set in motion a bed, a table, a bell, an accordeon, or tear asunder a bed screen? Why should it not also accomplish this experiment of passing one material body through another? This last is only conceivable if one supposes that the molecules of one body (i. e. the shell, the ring) are strongly pressed together, while those of the other (i. e. the table, etc.) are just as powerfully pressed asunder, and thereby a passage way opened between them. This suggestion is also supported by the circumstance that Zöllner noticed heat in the shell and in the leather strips very perceptibly; and in most of these manifestations of physical power Slade thought he saw gleams of light. Even the surprising disappearance of bodies may be explained on this same supposition. It is at least conceivable, if not more than conceivable, that through electro-magnetic power a body may be resolved into its atoms, and after a time, through reunion, be restored to its original form again. Water disappears from our perception, when through electricity it is resolved into oxygen and hydrogen, and it reappears when the two gases are reunited.

In contrast to this bold hypothesis Zöllner's explanation of the matter by supposing a four dimension state of existence will appear more probable. In this fourth dimension objects disappear. If I understood Zöllner aright he means this. If we in our three dimension state of existence were able to lay hold of the things which a two dimension race had placed, or were desiring to place before themselves, it would be an easy thing in the presence of such beings to make objects disappear by lifting them up from the surface to a higher plane. So easily must beings of a four dimension scale of existence be able to remove objects from the range of our vision, if they place them in a fourth dimension.

However plausible this hypothesis may be, it still lies among the "Inconceivables." For in truth it is not only impossible for us to conceive intuitively a four dimension grade of existence, but we can form no conception of it. Over against the

idea of intuitive (individual) presentation comes only the compound conception of a number of individual objects of like characteristics. In this sense there is no conception of a four or three or even two dimension grade of existence, because it is absolutely impossible for a four or three dimension grade to present itself to the imagination. The scale of being, whatever it may be, is always a unit and no more; or what is the same, the concept in and for itself, the pure mathematical grade of existence, is indeed not a concept at all, but as Kant rightly observes a pure intuition.

But we may only consider it in a realistic, objective way, as the general form of existence by which things have relationship to one another,—in accordance with which we distinguish things in the relationship of place, extent, distance, etc., that is, in their phenomenal relationship. But this idea gives us no idea of a four dimension condition of existence, either intuitively or by representation. For as we are now constituted we can only conceive of an object which has any being at all, as being distinguished from others by its length, breadth, and thickness (or height). Our perceptions give us no clue to a fourth dimension. But now suppose we could conceive of a four dimension state of existence, our conception must fall within the range of the intuitional if we can represent the passing of a visible object out from the three dimension condition in which we intuitively stand into the ideal four dimension state. But since of this last we have no ideal conception, we can by no means represent the disappearance of an object as its transference into the fourth dimension, but rather as the withdrawal of its condition of visibility from us, or the withdrawal of our natural power of seeing the object.

And, finally, if beings of a four dimension state decide to exert physical power upon objects of our three dimension state, manifestly they cannot do this, par distance, out of their four dimension condition, but only within our three dimension condition, and that only by leaving the fourth dimension and coming within the bounds of our three dimension state. From whatever aspect we view it, it is not possible to see how the supposition of a fourth dimension could give the requisite explanation. Just as little does this four dimension hypothe-

sis explain the passage of one material object through another. Here Zöllner explicitly recognizes the fact that his theory furnishes no explanation. (ii. 930.) Manifestly these results could be accomplished by three dimension beings, if they only possessed the necessary power or means.

Since then there is a portion of these spiritic phenomena that Zöllner's theory does not explain, we may still rest upon the previous supposition that the medium himself by the awakening and directing of the psycho-chemical powers of nature may be the efficient agent. There are other facts, moreover, that so strongly contradict Zöllner's theory as to make it untenable. In most instances, for example, those things are accomplished which the medium himself desires. In some instances, however, what Slade desired did not happen, or some things did happen without his will or intention. In most cases he was not sure, but rather doubtful whether the test proposed could be wrought out, and the "spirits," when inquired of, gave the uncertain answer, "we will try it."

Then when the attempt succeeded, Slade was just as much astonished and pleased as Zöllner and his friends. Equally, however, did the accomplishment of what was asked indicate that an intelligent will, that understood what it had to do and the methods by which it could be done, must have set in motion and directed the efficient powers. And it is not conceivable, if Slade had controlled the self-acting slate-pencil, how it could have made use of a number of languages of which Slade was not master, and many peculiar characteristic styles of writing. We cannot then well help admitting, according to the common hypothesis, the spiritistic origin of all the phenomena we are considering.

But then, as above noted, the question comes up, who are these spirits? What must we conceive of their state of being or existence? Manifestly we cannot consider them, as people usually do, as simply pure spirit, or immaterial (bodyless) beings. For the more the opposition between spirit and material nature, between soul and body, is exalted and wrought up towards a negative exclusive contradiction; by so much the more is it inconceivable that such pure spirits could lay their grasp upon material nature and accomplish such material results. We

must assume in our proposition that to them as well as to human souls, there is in some fashion a bodily form in which and by which they live and act. This bodily form we must conceive of as more perfect, endowed with higher powers, approximated more closely to their spiritual nature, and therefore more obedient to the will, fulfilling it more perfectly and promptly. These extraordinary phenomena, which we have related, exceeding, as they do, the physical powers of man, compel us to this step: and then we must conclude still farther, that their nobler, completer bodily forms are in appearance like human bodies. Those manifestations of humanly constituted members,—hands and feet, sometimes directly and sometimes by the imprints—certainly look in this direction. To be sure it is very readily conceivable that the spirits should possess the power to transform a bodily shape otherwise constituted, into a human form. But it is not easy to see why they should have made use of this power, and especially why they should have revealed that human foot deformed by “strong pressure.” On the other side taking for granted their human-like form of body, it is almost as astonishing that they exhibited themselves only by the manifestation of single members; and these in actions that had no apparent object, unless they simply designed to manifest their human form, without revealing the appearance of their individual personality. Perhaps those spirits who were attached to Slade, or obeyed his call, only intended to prove the general fact of their existence to such as doubted or questioned it. Or might they not on purely subjective grounds have been unwilling to expose their personalities to stranger eyes? For, if we admit spiritual beings as participants in these (so-called) spiritistic phenomena, we must also accord to them wills and freedom of will. Perhaps other spirits may choose, as some of the American spirits are said to have already done, to manifest completely and fully the whole bodily form. Perhaps also this may depend somewhat upon their relationship to those who invite their presence and before whom they manifest themselves. You notice these are “perhapses,” and remain only vague “perhapses.”

But it follows by no means that our intercourse is with the spirits of dead men. So much as this only can be said, that

this last conclusion is very probable. For to the manifestation of humanly formed hands and feet, may be added the circumstance to which I have also called attention, that the spirits not only understand several languages but also write in different characteristic styles, as though they might have retained the handwriting which they had acquired in their earthly stage of existence.

Perhaps also from their primitive human nature may be explained the fact that their written communications are uniformly of an unimportant character. For it is very improbable that the departed human souls, if they have attained in the spiritual world to a higher stage of bodily and spiritual growth, should attain immediately to a full and perfect knowledge of the truth, or perfect insight into the powers and forces that build and sustain the world. After the analogy of our earthly human nature, we must conclude that in the higher supra-mundane sphere of existence, the law of development still prevails, and that we in this manner moving on from step to step shall reach at last to the highest possible perfection of knowledge and desire.*

We shall therefore feel at liberty to conclude that Slade's "spirits" have not yet attained to a full and perfect knowledge of the truth. Their knowledge of the powers that govern Nature, and their power over the same have indeed reached a plane far surpassing human knowledge and power, as is demonstrated by the astonishingly great physical results that they accomplish. But aside from the manifestation of this power, it is plain that they in no wise make us participators in their higher knowledge. For since they were men they must know that we in conformity to our human nature can successfully attain to an acquaintanceship with nature and her secrets, only through the path of experience, and on that account beyond this experience we have no words, concepts, or ideas by means of which we could comprehend further instructions.

Zöllner therefore suggests that our unprepared condition may

* This difference in time between the first step and final limit of the development process corresponds to the Christian theory (not sufficiently well defined) of a transitional state of departed souls between death and the final bringing of all things into the kingdom of God.

be the reason why the spirits reveal so little concerning the nature of things in their world, as well as concerning their own nature and existence. There is indeed another truth, a fact whose value far transcends the phenomena by which it is taught, which has for its object not the character of the being that exists, but rather the fact of *being*; to prove that existence shall be, so that existence shown shall be not the real but the ideal. But beyond this ethical truth that delineates to us what we should desire and do, and by what motives we should be influenced, a truth which is inseparably united with our religious perception and our knowledge of God, freedom and immortality, the spirits either keep silence, or only through their own presence and deeds give us incontestable proofs of immortality.

On the above supposition their reticence is also explainable. For if the spirits possess ethical (metaphysical) religious knowledge in a higher degree, they must on the other hand also know, since they themselves were men, that an imparting of that knowledge to us from without could avail us nothing, since we must seek ethical religious knowledge of our own accord, spontaneously in order to find it; because we must love goodness, truth, and beauty in order to recognize and understand them; because, in short, our knowledge in these respects depends not merely upon our susceptibility, but principally from the power, direction, and nature of our desires. If mankind ought of their own free will, led by motives which they have freely followed, to strive after goodness, truth and beauty, and if this necessity is the foundation of ethical morality, then it follows from the very conception of ethical morality itself that to no partial revelation should be given the power to corrupt our freedom, bind our wills or pervert them.*

In conclusion, it can be answered, at least hypothetically, from the ethical religious standpoint, why the spiritistic manifestations afford to immortality only a support, and that not a perfect one; and why at the present day these manifestations

* Thence it appears that all religions which claim to possess divinely revealed truth, the Christian not excepted, give their contents in such a form as shall leave room for a doubt as to their verity, and leave room for questions as to the right understanding of that which is revealed, and therefore leave the matter ultimately to the decision of each separate will, whether it will receive their truth or not.

are put forth so abundantly, and with so much positiveness and obtrusiveness.

Immortality is the completest refutation of materialism, and also the strongest supporter of faith in a God who rules according to moral principles. This is true, because this is the condition under which man's moral character is attainable, and man's ideal realized. These mean the perfect upbuilding and education of the human mind, in special accord with the subjectivity of the individual, just as each one naturally puts forth his powers, however little or much he may be mistaken as to the form or contents of this perfection.

If there is a divine providence, a moral ordering or government of the world;—and since it is conditional upon the realization of this ideal, and also a human freedom of will which may strive against it;—so under the circumstances, according to the course of human history, faith in human immortality must be specially active, and necessarily strengthened, that the goal may be finally attained.

This necessity manifests itself with appalling force, when we take into consideration the widely dominant influences of the present day. To-day throughout all civilized nations there is a propensity toward sensualism and materialism: a skepticism, or at least an indifference towards everything transcendental or ideal; a constantly widening selfish seeking after enjoyment or property, despising all the laws of right or morality, and degenerating into roughness and brutality; a tendency which if it is not stopped, must weaken the powers of the soul as well as those of the body, and in the end bring to utter ruin all culture and civilization. At the time when for these same reasons, the ancient (Oriental, Greek, Roman) civilizations went to ruin, new nations in the freshness of youth and with plastic character (Celts, Germans, Slavs), were coming onto the sphere of action, who took up the broken threads of culture, and on the ideal loom which Christianity proffered, were prepared further to weave in the webs of science and civilization. To-day there are no more such peoples. We are now sufficiently well acquainted with the peoples of the earth to know that its unused peoples (i. e. the wild races) standing as yet in their youth may indeed be capable of receiving culture, but

they are in no condition to take it up and carry it forward. If the present civilization shall go to destruction in like manner as did the ancient civilizations and from like reasons—so far as human foresight can go—culture and civilization must be destroyed. The only alternative is the Hand of Providence reaching down to help and to save.

I need scarcely remark further that this attempt to explain spiritic phenomena does not attempt to be an explanation in a scientific sense; but only to set forth a scientifically possible hypothesis. This explanation however, to my mind seems to have as much value as many other hypotheses equally uncertain, yet accepted and adopted by the so-called exact sciences. If in them there is only a feeble hope that they will ever become anything more than hypotheses, it seems equally hopeless to find an answer to the question, why the spiritic manifestations as we find them, should be confined to the apparently unnatural condition of the presence and coöperation of the (so-called) mediums. But the deeper the darkness is which rests upon this whole subject, and the more important the revelations it promises respecting the other side, when the light shall penetrate this darkness, so much the more is it in my judgment a duty that cannot be refused by men of science to coöperate so far as in them lies for the reading of the riddle which now once for all is given to them.

ARTICLE II.—THE PROGRESS OF HUMANE ACTION
IN CHRISTENDOM.

JESUS conspicuously ministered to the needy and the distressed, and he declared that love to Him was to show itself in part by regard for the sick, the prisoner and the stranger. The simplest lessons of the Christian faith are to feed the hungry, heal the sick, care for the stranger, visit the prisoner, unfetter the slave, teach the ignorant, be merciful to the child, take care of woman, to "visit the widow and fatherless in their affliction." Our faith has restrained those evil passions which produce suffering; has softened and purified the character; has enlarged the sympathies; so that they who dwell in its light have shown an increasing regard for the weak, the incapable, the helpless, the tender, the unfortunate, the failing; for those who cannot struggle and endure; those who cannot meet force with force, skill with skill, cunning with cunning.

The whole body of the sympathetic affections owes much to Christianity. It has illuminated, empowered, exalted and diffused them. Only where it has prevailed, have general good will, kindness and benevolence, has universal fellow-feeling controlled the public mind to any great extent. Parallel with its history we have a historic movement of philanthropy, of generosity of soul, effort and money, for the suffering. Christ has come to the help of the weak things of this world. More and more deeply has humane sentiment been settling down into the life of men in Christendom, reaching their consciences, their hearts, coming out into their actions, going through all classes of society, all departments of the life of society, and getting to be one of the noble characteristics of the whole civilization. It has taken ages to have this correct and noble sentiment and principle thus diffuse itself through the whole Christian population.

Apparently, for the first and only time in the world's history, there has been a real perception of the general misery of war, famine, pestilence, epidemics, and the collapse of industries; a

real perception of the general misery of slavery, despotism, polygamy, bad laws, and bad policies of government; a real perception of the general misery of crime, vice and improvidence; and a strong, continuous, growing effort, on a large scale, to relieve this vast suffering.

This great historic movement of charity is not capable of dramatic treatment; its many individual efforts are each devoid of brilliance. The splendor of intellectual achievement is often wanting to humane achievement. The courage often required has not the credit and the remembrance given to that of the soldier. The heroic deaths scarcely appeal to the imagination as do those of the stake. The work has in it nothing of dash or spectacle. It is conducted after the fashion of him who "did not cry, nor lift up, nor cause his voice to be heard in the street." Quietly in hamlet or town, in alms house or hospital, or refuge or reform school, the work has gone on; a work with things neither beautiful nor paying; a work with the loathsome, the poor, and even the vicious; a work the majesty of which while it is being done is veiled, as was the majesty of Jesus while doing His work on earth. Yet this reaching after the vast common and exceptional suffering of men, this effort to cure or to alleviate misery, is one of the noblest works which the history of men has witnessed. Let me try to evidence and illustrate Christendom's progress in humanity.

First, the ancient Jews through whom came Christ and his religion were more or less characterized by humanity. It was one of those traits which eminently distinguished the Jew. His law was eminent in its regard for the poor, the helpless, the distressed. In this respect nothing can be found comparable to it in ancient Egypt, Persia, Sparta, Athens, or Rome, or even in the modern heathen world. It thoroughly sympathized with the poor, the widow, the orphan, and him that had no helper.

Every seventh year a release from debt was given. Every year gleanings for the poor were to be left in the harvest field, the olive yard and the vineyard. Every third year a tenth part of the produce of the fields was to be given to the poor. Each family's portion of land, if sold, had to come back on the fiftieth or jubilee year. No working man was to be kept waiting for his

wages. In contracts a pledge could not be mercilessly exacted and in certain contingencies must be restored. No one was to take interest of his fellow Israelite. No extraordinary punishment was permitted, no torture. The wife and children were not punished with the father, as was universal among the heathen. Nor could a father have the power of life and death over his children, as was generally the case elsewhere. The slave was to be held as a member of the family; was to partake in religious services; was to have his Sabbath rest; had openings for emancipation; in short, was considered and treated as a man. Family feuds were not allowed to go on beyond a certain limit. The cities of refuge put a stop, in space and time, to the bloody quarrels so common and so terribly evil among all nomad or partly civilized people. Strangers were well treated, so contrary to heathen usage and law; were even invited to the religious places and assemblages; old age was an object of especial reverence, in marked contrast with heathen custom; even the brute creation was remembered. The ox was not to be muzzled when treading out the corn. The mother bird was not to be taken with her young. The kid was not to be seethed in its mother's milk.

Secondly, the early church was characterized by humanity. By the word and example of Christ, the duty of charity was more deeply impressed and was extended further than by the law of Moses.

In the first place, under Christianity the reverence for human life began to increase, and this reverence has more power to protect life than the most barbarous penalties. To this reverence in the human soul a great part of the safety of life is due. By this reverence far more than by law, be it ever so severe, men are kept from murder; and the more the reverence with which life is regarded the less will it be taken in any form. For what follows concerning the humanity of the early church, I am indebted much to "Lecky's History of European Morals," where the whole subject is treated at length.

The extinction of gladiatorial spectacles, spectacles of human beings fighting to death for the amusement of others, is largely due to Christianity. There was an unwavering, uncompromising consistency in the unqualified denunciation of such

spectacles by the preachers and writers of the church. The pagan, in the spirit of philosophy, denounced these games as inhuman or demoralizing or degrading; but the Christian called them dreadful sin, outright murder. There is a delicious plainness in the clear emphatic statements of these Christians. Spectators and actors were told that they were directly accountable to God for murder; and Christianity, in time, put an end to the games. No mere progress of philosophy or of social civilization was likely for a long period to have done this. "In the very latest days of the Roman pagan empire magnificent amphitheaters were still arising. Constantine himself condemned numerous barbarian captives to combat with wild beasts." But the Christians steadily refused to admit any professional gladiator to baptism till he had pledged himself to give up his business; and every Christian who went to the games was excluded from communion. So, in time, the combats of men were excluded from the games and they remained merely games of cruelty to animals, until at the end of the seventh century they became extinct, with the exception of what appears to be a survival of them in the bull fights of Spain. With their extinction before the new barbarian kingdoms were established, a great obstacle to the progress of humane feeling was taken out of the way.

Again, in the matter of humanity in the family, Christianity from the first exerted a most salutary influence; it restrained the tyrannical power of the father; it taught the value of the child,—he had an immortal soul. From the beginning the church denounced with unwavering consistency the practice of abortion; and this not simply as inhuman but as murder, the murder of an infant. The church emphasized her sense of the enormity of the crime by inflicting a severe penalty upon those guilty.

The church also took decided ground against infanticide. By discipline and by the earnest exhortations both of her preachers and writers, she labored to give her sense of the wickedness of the act of infanticide; and also to convince men that its guilt attached also to those who abandoned their children. At length "a law of Constantine, intended principally and perhaps exclusively for Africa, where the sacrifices of children

to Saturn were still very common," made the murder of a child by its father to be similar to the murder of a father by a child. "Finally, Valentinian in A. D. 374 made all infanticide a capital offence, and especially enjoined" punishment upon those exposing children. Thus the "publicity of the trade in exposed children became punishable, and the sense of the serious nature of the crime was very considerably increased. The extreme destitution which was one of its most fertile causes was met by Christian charity. Many exposed children appear to have been educated by individual Christians." The epitaphs in the catacombs abundantly prove the multitude of foundlings that were sustained by Christian charity.

Christian foundling hospitals gradually grew up. "It is certain that one existed in Milan in the eighth century. The convent of Rouen in the ninth century invited women who had secretly borne children to place them at the door of the church; and undertook to provide for them if they were not reclaimed." "About the middle of the twelfth century we find societies at Milan charged among other functions with seeking for exposed children. Towards the close of the same century, a monk of Montpelier whose very name is doubtful, but who is commonly spoken of as Brother Guy, founded a confraternity called by the name of the Holy Ghost, and devoted to the protection and education of children; and this society in the two following centuries ramified over the great part of Europe." Though pauper infants yet perished by hundreds in the hands of hirelings, and far too large a proportion of human beings still perished in infancy or childhood; yet the crimes of abortion and infanticide came to be under public, as they long had been under ecclesiastical, reprobation.

In the second place, there was a great improvement in the care of the destitute sick. In an early day the church, as always since in every age, was adorned by many women who devoted their lives to assuaging suffering, to diminishing the sum of human wretchedness. Noble ladies devoted their time and fortunes mainly to founding and extending institutions of charity, some of them of a kind before unknown to the world. The Empress Flacilla was accustomed to attend with her own hands the sick in the hospitals; and a readiness to discharge

such offices was deemed one of the first duties of a Christian wife. "During the pestilences that desolated Carthage, in A. D. 326, and Alexandria in the reigns of Gallienus and of Maximian, while the pagans fled the Christians attended to the sufferers and buried the abandoned dead."

In the fourth century, a Roman Christian lady named Fabiola introduced what was comparatively new to the classic world—she founded a public hospital. "Another hospital was soon after founded by St. Pammachus and another of great celebrity by St. Basil at Cesarea. St. Basil also erected at Cesarea what was probably the first asylum for lepers." After the Crusades a vast system of hospitals was organized over Europe, and there were a multitude and great variety of institutions for the relief of wretchedness. The Hospitalers or Knights of St. John were at the outset no more than hospital nurses. The monastery also extended hospitality to the wanderer and the sick. Then, too, refuges for strangers were erected on the roads, especially those traversed by pilgrims, and were used as hospitals for the worn and the sick. "St. Pammachus founded one at Ostia. Paula and Melania founded others at Jerusalem. The Council of Nice ordered that one should be erected in every city."

In the third place the humanity of the Christian Church was also shown in its redemption of captives from slavery. In no other form of charity was more good done and more constantly than here. "During the long and dreary trials of the barbarian invasions; when the whole structure of society was dislocated; when vast districts and mighty cities were in a few months almost depopulated; and when the flower of the youth of Italy were cut down by the sword or carried away into captivity; the bishops never desisted from their efforts to alleviate the sufferings of the prisoners. St. Ambrose sold the rich church ornaments at Milan, to rescue some captives who had fallen into the hands of the Goths; and this practice which was afterwards formally sanctioned by St. Gregory the Great, became speedily general."

In the fourth place, there was shown a new regard for the poor. The early Christians ever ministered to them. To an extent the Christians at Jerusalem divided their property with them. Deacons were appointed to look after them. Paul

gathered contributions for the poor saints at Jerusalem. It came to be a part of the duty of every church, to provide for widows and orphans. The fathers declared, that aiding the poor is but justice, and affirmed that a Christian should devote at least one-tenth of his profits to them. "The Agapæ or feasts of love, were intended mainly for them; and food saved by the fasts was devoted to their benefit." Even in the days of persecution, collections were gathered for them at the sundry meetings. The rule became general, that one-fourth of the gifts to the church belongs to the poor. Cyprian sold an estate and divided the proceeds among the poor. The Church at Rome in the third century supported more than fifteen hundred widows besides the afflicted and needy. This liberality led an officer at the time of the persecution, to believe that the Romish Christians had great treasures at their command. "In the time of St. Chrysostom the Church at Antioch supported three thousand widows and virgins, besides strangers and sick. Legacies for the poor became common; and it was not unfrequent for men and women who desired to live a life of peculiar sanctity, and especially for priests who attained the Episcopacy, as a first act to bestow their entire properties in charity."

A vast organization of charity, presided over by the bishops and actively directed by the deacons, soon ramified over Christendom, reaching even the most distant sections of the Christian church. The emancipation of numerous slaves, the increasing misgovernment, taxation, and civil disorder, largely increased the amount of pauperism, and gave free scope to every exertion of charity.

Thus in the early church, Christian churches were constantly employed in nursing the sick; succoring the distressed of every kind; relieving so far as private effort could, the prevalent social maladies; ministering to a world diseased, to a society failing and dying through vice, crime, misgovernment, and general want of piety and morality.

Even the Pagans caught the spirit of charity, and instead of their customary legacies for games in honor of the dead, left legacies for the poor and suffering. This spirit of humanity, aided by a Stoic leaning this way, so penetrated the classic world, that the better Roman emperors began to direct their

attention to the diminution of crying evils; though the best legal enactments would never have been able to root them out, without the spiritual influence of the church.

The various services of humanity were taxed to the utmost in the horrors of the barbarian conquests. There was the very chaos of war and civil dissolution. Burning cities, wasted country-sides, massacre, neglect, famine, and pestilence were everywhere, and everywhere there were the ministrations of Christian humanity. The Christians tried hard to lighten, so far as possible, the calamities around them. "The frequent famines and the frightful distresses caused by the invasions of the barbarians and by the transition from slavery to freedom were met by the most boundless though lavish benevolence. The Fathers were ceaselessly exhorting to charity and in language so emphatic that it seemed sometimes almost to ignore the rights of property and to verge upon absolute communism."

In their situation as standing between the conflicting forces, the Christian ministers were almost indifferent to the issue; and thus exempt from the passions of the strife, were able to do good service for humanity, to save cities from sack, to avert massacres, to shield fugitives, to succor in various ways the distressed. When Alaric plundered Rome he did not touch the churches. When Attila was about to sack Rome, Pope Leo restrained him. "When, twelve years later, Genseric entered Rome, the same Pope obtained a partial cessation of the massacre." When afterward Totila captured the city, the Arch Deacon Pelagius saved its people. It is said that in like manner St. Lupus saved Troyes in Gaul; and St. Agnan, Orleans; and St. Germain averted an invasion of the Picts into Britain. Similar humane interferences occurred between rulers and their subjects. "When Antioch was threatened with destruction on account of its rebellion against Theodosius, anchorites poured forth from the neighboring deserts" and saved the city, "St. Ambrose imposed public penance on Theodosius on account of the massacre of Thessalonica."

Thirdly, the Church of the Middle Ages was characterized by humanity. In those times Christians were a class of men whose habits and manners were as a rule on the side of humane feeling. The Church taught humanity, by her Bible, her

prayers, her hymns, her doctrine, and the example of her saints. The only and terrible exception was in the case of persecution. She demanded forgiveness of injuries; she preached love; she quickened conscience.

And the church worked as well as taught; she sought in various ways to temper the terrible inhumanity then prevalent. She opened her edifices as refuges for the pursued. She used her discipline to punish cruelty, threatening, and if need be enforcing against it, her terrible excommunication. She labored most anxiously and constantly to soften and abolish the system of private war, by establishing truces and interruptions, and by assisting the civil magistrate on every possible occasion.

In one sense, the medieval monastery was a humane institution; in ages of intense confusion and ruthless tyranny, it was an asylum for the weary and heavy laden; a retreat for the great in their misfortunes and for sinners in their repentance, a refuge for the humble; a home for eccentric souls, for enthusiasts, fanatics, madmen, or peculiar men of any sort. It kindly treated all such. It kept them from mischief and made them useful so far as possible. The monasteries had a general work of entertaining strangers, of relieving the poor, of ministering to the sick, of consoling the miserable and helping religiously the penitent.

Again, the Christian spirit created chivalry, a kind of Christian effort peculiarly adapted to those Christians and times; recognizing fighting and wandering and not working; but giving the idea of fighting for the right, for the weak, for woman. Chivalry tended to soften what was hard; tended to refine what was coarse; tended to make the rude barons gentlemen in spirit and in manners; tended to give a sense of justice, courtesy, and humanity; tended to make men less criminal, less violent, less vicious, less self-indulgent, more sympathetic with the weak, more helpful to the sick, more charitable to the poor, more merciful to the fallen; tended to bring the rulers of society into friendly instead of hostile relations with one another. Thus violence and oppression decreased when public opinion turned against them; it came to be esteemed meritorious to check and punish them.

Fourthly, the church and the Christendom of modern times

are characterized by humanity. Within the last two centuries, greater attention than ever has been paid to the afflicted classes. So much has this been the case that the period has come to be called humanitarian. The sentiments of pity, of mutual sympathy, and the feeling of the claims of men upon each other, have been growing, have become broader and at the same time deeper. The perception of suffering in others has grown acute. Sensibility is now shocked at the sight of suffering. Churches and States look after the persecution of their co-religionists, wherever it may occur. Men give sympathy and moral support to people rising against cruel despotism. Never was there, as now, such a going unto the ends of the earth to help the victims of famine, pestilence, and war. Acts of cruelty on the great scale or on the small, at home or in Turkey, or in China, are reprehended; and public opinion with other pressure, is frequently brought to bear to stop them. In India, in Africa, in every land and on every continent, where a poor man's life has been worth little to him or to any body else, the case is now being altered.

But to descend to detail; war has been invaded by the spirit of humanity. War, that concentration and combination of all the abominations, crimes, and sufferings of men, is being regulated by humane feeling. Once the conquered were always treated with cruelty, and frequently with a cruelty which was extreme and crushing. Think of Charles the Great beheading four thousand Saxons in cold blood. Think of Charles the Bold riding with delight through a town heaped with corpses, congratulating himself on his "good butchers." Think of Richard Coeur-de-Lion massacring his Saxon prisoners wholesale; and the Black Prince looking on unmoved while men, women and children were murdered in the streets of Limoges. Think of Philip Augustus drowning his captives; John of England starving them to death; and Frederick the First's grandson flaying them alive. Coming down to the XV., XVI., and XVII. centuries, think of the horrors attendant upon Burgundian warfare, think of the Italian wars of the Renaissance age, and the Spanish wars in the Netherlands, think of the thirty years war, think of the sack of Rome, of that of Magdeburg, think of the situation of those who fell into the hands of Alva or of Tully.

In all wars until within a century or two, houses were destroyed and every species of wanton ravage indulged in, in the ordinary march through the country. Until recently, armies have lived at free quarters among the people. Even as late as the last century it was the rule that the army should plunder the people of conquered provinces, and invasion was almost equivalent to devastation.

In the treatment of the vanquished there is, for instance, in Great Britain, improvement on Sir Richard Greville, when we come to Cromwell, and improvement on Cromwell when we come to Marlborough; improvement on him when we come to Wellington, and to English commanders of to-day.

Now reputable generals require their men to respect private property, and although an army in hostile territory will always be guilty of violence and plunder, the evil is far less than formerly. Private persons are getting to be exempt from the sufferings of war. Private rights are somewhat acknowledged. There is a generous code of warfare respected alike by both belligerents. In armies there is a system of severe discipline. The military arrangements have all been greatly improved, the surgical attendance of the wounded is more careful. Now international law makes surgeons and hospitals sacred in war, the victor in battle permits surgeons of the defeated army to attend its own wounded, while the surgeons of the victors aid, after taking care of their own wounded.

Again, great improvement has taken place in the matter of oppressive laws. The range and severity of the former laws has been greatly diminished. After the removal to Byzantium the Roman Empire became more orientalized, the spirit of the ancient heathen east, seemed to prevail. The principles of the Roman criminal law were not amplified in a spirit of justice and equity, but rather during the reign of the emperors, the changes made were for the most part only an increase in severity. New and cruel modes of punishment were added, such as whipping, condemnation to the mines, and to wild beasts; besides which, the scope of high treason was largely increased.

In the west, we know how inhuman was the civil and criminal legislation of the new Barbarian Governments of Christian Europe. We know of the trial by ordeal, the trial by battle,

the cruelty, the various violence, caprice and ignorance of barbarism. Take the crime of murder; only the damage done seemed to constitute the crime, punishment was sought for in a fine, while also one man's murder was not half so much thought of as another's. When the Roman law came to be studied and partially introduced, it rather increased cruelty. While in Rome torture was originally only permitted to be applied to slaves and strangers, but never to Roman citizens; now among the Germans, free men and women were subjected to it, as, for instance, in the inquisition against heretics and those accused of witchcraft.

Throughout the Middle Ages an exaggerated belief in the power of outward law seemed to exist; and a disposition to bring that power to bear everywhere and with terrible penalties. A great iron system of church laws, royal laws and trade laws, encompassed the people, and with punishments so terrible, that the code of Charles V., the details of which are horrible, was looked upon as an alleviation.

Look for instance at the game-laws created by nobles who practically made themselves among other things into a great hunting society, and considered all the land as their hunting park. They protected the wild animals without regard to the consequent injury to farmer or peasant in crops and live stock. The game too, was guarded from all free hunting, trapping, or fishing. However much a poor peasant might for himself or his sick child, want a fish or a rabbit, it could not be touched, under severe penalty, and frequently the game abounded all around him.

Take the game laws of England as a first illustration. From the time of William the Conqueror, until after the Commonwealth, vast tracts of country were reserved exclusively for game. The penalties for violation of these game laws were terrible. William the Conqueror "destroyed sixty parishes and drove out their inhabitants, that he might turn their lands into a forest. He punished with death the killing of a deer, wild boar, or even a hare without permission." And this barbarity was simply the transfer to England of French customs in kings, vassals, and even inferior gentlemen. In both lands the death of a hare, a plover, the spreading the net for a pigeon was a

hanging matter. He "who had drawn a bow upon a stag was to be tied to the animal alive." A man's property could be confiscated if he refused to attend upon a chase when summoned. William the Conqueror decreed that the eyes of any person should be pulled out who killed either a buck or a boar in the royal hunting grounds. Rufus had any man hanged who stole a doe. Several successive kings made no distinction between him who killed a buck and him who killed a man, except that at one time the former died without the benefit of a clergy. Thousands of hungry serfs had their eyes put out, their legs chopped off, their arms torn out for taking small game which ran at large. The feudal lords enforced these laws with unrelenting vigor and frequently took the law into their own hands. Among them it was a standing excuse for having killed game on forbidden grounds, that they had aimed at a serf.

And now turn to France, the desolation and depopulation resulting from the extension of the forest, and the enforcement of the game laws induced several French kings to consent to some relaxation of the latter. Francis I., however, revived their barbarous provisions, and "even so good a monarch as Henry IV. reënacted them and signed the sentence of death upon peasants guilty of having defended their fields against devastation by wild beasts." The cutting of an ox goad, for instance, was severely punished. It brought down vengeance for peasants to drive game animals, a herd of deer or wild boars, from off crops that were the sole hope of a family for a year.

Even after the Reformation, the criminal law everywhere remained brutal. In Germany soon after the peasants' war, the prince bishop of Bamberg published a popular criminal book for the benefit of his subjects, his poor crushed peasantry among others; and the amount of capital punishment therein supported is fearful. As a rule, the judicial penalties of all the European codes were terribly excessive. In England the deaths by capital punishment, generation after generation, century after century, continued to be startling, and in the aggregate are prodigious. A multitude of crimes were punished by death. "Blackstone states that there were one hundred and sixty crimes declared by act of Parliament to be felony without benefit of clergy, that is, punishable with instant death.

Holinshed states that no less than seventy-two thousand persons died by the hand of executioners during the reign of Henry VIII." At the end of Elizabeth's reign, the annual executions were still almost four hundred. In the middle of the 18th century, however, though the population had greatly increased, the executions had fallen to less than one hundred. "More, in his 'Utopia,' raised his voice in favor of substituting other punishment for death. Cromwell followed in one of his speeches. Bishop Berkeley wrote in favor of the same. But all through the reign of George III. the code was aggravated and its severity was carried to such a point, that when Romilly began his career, the annual number of capital punishments was no less than two hundred and thirty." It is only within a century that this state of things has been changed.

The great excessiveness of punishment was also terrible. Thousands of peasants and other laborers, quite likely most of them out of work, were hung simply for "sturdy begging," as it was called. Many were sent on from parish to parish and were thus driven from place to place by circumstances. By laws of George I., and George II., it was death to break down the mound of a fish pond, so that any fish escaped; it was death to cut down a cherry tree in an orchard. By other English laws, to steal from a dwelling to the amount of forty shillings was death; to steal from a shop to the amount of five shillings was death. It was death to steal a loaf of bread or a piece of meat worth twelve pence, even to save one's self or family from starvation. It was death to be found upon the highway with the face blackened or to be found in company with gypsies. Many other like offences were punishable with death.

Moreover, the unnecessary cruelty of the modes of punishment was fearful. For a period those convicted of treason were horribly tortured, and persons to be executed were drawn to the place by the tails of horses. Wallace was thus drawn through London. A judge in the time of Edward III. especially commanded that no friar nor other should help the culprit with anything to rest on when he was drawn to the gallows. A woman who murdered her husband or even who counterfeited, was burned alive. This law was carried into effect in London so late as 1770. Prisoners who refused to plead were

pressed to death, and that law remained on the English statute book until this century. Men were imprisoned for debt in a manner that sometimes amounted to imprisonment for life. So cold and hard-hearted in some respects, so unjust and merciless was society in Christendom within modern times.

Even in the old Roman days the intercession of Christian bishops occasionally intervened to temper and alleviate too violent sentences. And in the middle ages the church in her canon law made effort to improve the humanity of the times. She built up the most powerful outward restrictions upon passion and lewdness, that human reason could devise. In the canon law, punishment was much better proportioned to the offense than in the barbarian law. For example, in the case of murder, something more than the damage was looked to, to wit: the intention of the perpetrator, which if wrong was punished, and various shades of guilt were distinguished, involuntary homicide, chance medley, homicide, justifiable homicide, unpremeditated homicide, and willful murder. Yet the canon law was cruel—as witness the dreadful persecutions which took place under it.

Yet notwithstanding all that the church did for humanity, notwithstanding every age furnished proofs “of concessions obtained, of victories won, in this holy cause,” still the church did not do all she could have done. Those who held the office of Christian teacher, for centuries, failed to protest against torture; against the punishment of persons for alleged witchcraft; against diabolical modes of execution; against religious persecutions; failed to take the stand they should against the cold-blooded course of society, the horrible pitilessness.

It was unbelievers who first advocated the removal of inhumanity in law; who first came out against intolerance, torture, the trial of witches, diabolical modes of execution, and persecution for religious views. Unbelievers took a stand which ought long before to have been taken by the Christian church, in the name of Christ. In France, Montaigne, the great sceptic, was probably the first marked opponent of torture. Next, Charon and Bayle of the same school of scepticism took up the opposition; it was then carried forward by Voltaire, Montesquieu and the Encyclopediasts, and it finally triumphed in the

revolution. In Spain torture began to fall into disuse under Charles III. In Italy, Beccaria, friend of Helvetius and Holbach, was the first great opponent of torture. He wrote a work against it, which work was translated into French, and going over Europe, did much to put an end to the evil. In Russia the Emperor abolished it. In Prussia, Frederick the Great did so. In Tuscany, Duke Leopold took the same step. Maria Theresa, Joseph II., and Catherine II., adopted a like humane course.

Again, the excessive working of young and feeble persons is being done away with. In England for a long time there extensively prevailed a most brutal practice of forcing small children to the cruel task of sweeping chimnies. Proof of the barbarities committed is in evidence laid before the House of Commons. From this evidence it appears that a vast number of children were tortured into premature graves by this terrible business. Some were purchased, many were stolen, and some were taken from the parish work-house. This was stopped. Similarly it was discovered that young and feeble operatives were overworked in mines and factories. This also was stopped.

Further, within a century and a half there has been great improvement in the general condition of prisoners; excessive severity is largely done away, while scandalous neglect has ceased. When Howard began his labors, the state of the prisons in Christendom was desperate. Matters have greatly mended in this respect.

Again, within this same period there has been a great improvement in the treatment of the insane. The destruction of the belief in witchcraft has helped this, many lunatics having been supposed to be simply witches, persons possessed with a devil. Until within a century the general belief was that insanity was some sort of evil possession. The general belief now is that the mind depends upon the brain and nervous system as its organ, and that insanity is a disease or weakness of these; that with a healthy brain and nervous system there will be no insanity. Until within a century the processes of treatment were, as a rule, crude not to say cruel. But certain strong men arose and successfully advocated an improved treatment of lunatics,—Morgagni in Italy, Cullen in Scotland, Pinel in

France, and others. Also until within a century the vast majority of the insane were entirely neglected. In convents and bedlams something was done for them; but insane asylums proper date from the beginning of this century, and these have greatly improved, being at first quite like prisons in appearance and discipline. Now the semblance and much of the reality of coercion is abolished. Brute force with its cruelty and terror has largely given away to the influence of religion, occupation, education, recreation, kindness, and rational discipline.

Yet to within a comparatively short period the lunatic was liable to get the dungeon, the lash, and the fetters; and even to-day he is liable in some asylums to get the strap or the camisole and the crib; to get forcible feeding; to get ignorant and brutal attendance, and to be at times abominably abused. But a revolution has begun. Old and cruel methods of treatment are being laid aside. Science and humanity are both pointing to the non-restraint system of treatment.

About a century ago new departures were made in relation to other of the afflicted classes. Take as an illustration the effort for the instruction of deaf-mutes. For centuries in Italy, Germany, Spain, France, and England, isolated attempts were made, at long intervals, to instruct one or two deaf-mutes at a time; a bishop, a monk, a professor, or some other would make the effort, and some works of considerable merit were written on the subject; but in the middle of the eighteenth century a great and marvelous change began. In 1760 the Abbé de l'Épée collected a little group of deaf and dumb children in the environs of Paris; and in the same year Thomas Braidwood in Edinburgh opened a school of the same kind. In like manner began since then Heineche in Germany and Gallaudett in America. These were followed by a body of excellent workers in the same line, the names of whom are on record. And now there are in Christendom more than two hundred institutions for these "children of silence."

Take as another illustration the efforts for the instruction of the blind. While now and then an institution was founded before, not until within a century have institutions begun to exist in any number. Or take the case of reformatories for depraved and vagrant children. The movement to train such

to industry and virtue, beginning a century since, has made rapid and sure progress in various Christian countries. And now, by the State or by voluntary agency, the movement to care for destitute vagrant, criminal or vicious children is with varieties and improvements quite general. Or take the great hospital and sick-poor work of Christendom, with the trained doctors and surgeons, nurses, superintendents, and visitors, and with the training of such.

These are illustrations of a movement that takes in all the afflicted classes, the idiotic, the ruptured, the aged poor, the consumptive poor, the sick poor in general. Christendom now has a great variety and extent of humane institutions to meet all the ills, the wants, the deficiencies of sinning and suffering man.

Furthermore, there is now, of late a new care for, a new appreciation of animal life. The old long continued apathy to animal suffering in Christendom is giving way. The people are getting to treat their domestic animals much better than a generation or two ago, and even there is a new humanity towards various of the wild animals. Bull and bear fighting, cock fighting and dog fighting, and many other amusements of a similar kind, were once the favorite pastimes of Europe; were pursued by all classes even the most refined, and were universally regarded as perfectly right and proper. Men of the most distinguished excellence are known to have delighted in them. Gradually, however, a profound change passed over public opinion. Such barbarous amusements, once universal, passed from the women to the men, from the upper to the lower classes, from the virtuous to the vicious, until at last public opinion and the law has suppressed them. Bear fighting, cock fighting, and the like, are virtually extinct. Even field sports, like fox hunting, "are becoming the scorn of many educated men and of all educated women, and are morally and politically doomed." And the question of vivisection is receiving very careful consideration and should be considered as to its rightfulness even if valuable also to the number who may practice it and as to its value in certain cases.

There is an increase of humanity in the training of the animals that man uses. The latest methods are invariably the

kindest. The change in this respect is great. There is also an increase of humanity to animals in their general treatment. At least in the English-speaking lands we have societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals. Men have become sympathetically aware that other animals beside themselves feel pain, and that it is shameful to inflict pain unnecessarily upon them. There is now some hope that animal barbarities may in general be done away with.

Such has been the development of human sympathy in Christendom. Such has been the change in respect to humane feeling throughout this large body of the human race. Humanity is now in the ascendant here, in moral life, in domestic, social, and civil life, and even in war. It has incited much effort and devised all sorts of means for the redress of wrongs, for the diminution of sickness, poverty and calamity, misery and unhappiness, and to increase the amount of happiness.

The days of the worst inhumanity are numbered in Christendom. We have, for example, no more room for the blood-thirsty or the relentless. For a century their opportunity has been largely only in the danger, the dread, the heated passion, the policy, of war or of beleaguered governments. Compared with what has been there is now but little of the bastille, of the guillotine, of going into exile; but little of massacre, of military execution after a revolution, or of fleeing from the exactions, the passions, and the undefined terrors of war. We have had these things in Christian lands too often during the century past, but far less of them than formerly. There is but little cutting down of the defenceless after the battle, but little dragooning of the conquered province. The anathema and the ban fall no more as once. The oppressor and the persecutor have received notice from the public opinion of Christendom. The old stolid inhumanity of men is certainly shaken to its foundations. Who is not quickened in the view that this helpfulness to the suffering is growing in the world; that those who have means, health, strength, and wisdom, are more and more helping those who have not; that human misery is decreasing.

Something, however, still remains to be done. There is

government's shutting out unoccupied territory or opportunity from the poor of some other nation, say of China; there is the neglect or maltreatment of some foreign race within its borders, the Indian, the Jew. There is the going into needless complications with other nations and thereby running the hazard of needless war. Then there are certain theories of government and society, or of trade, that need to be guarded against. There are also the improvident and the thriftless. There is intemperance. Further attention will also probably be given to the animal creation; to pigeon shoots and the like; to the slaughter-animals on their way to the village butcher, or to the city, or the foreign port. All these questions, whatever else they may be, are questions more or less of humanity.

We have also some alarming neglects and mistakes of the charitable. Perhaps the incurably sick-poor are not sufficiently provided for. Hospital and asylum for those who can be cured are often shut against these others. Perhaps those who leave prison and hospital and asylum are not sufficiently looked after. They certainly are often in a pitiable condition. Again, some efforts at charity seem rather to aggravate than to cure the malady. For example, our public charity to the poor seems absolutely necessary, and yet it tends to demoralize some and to overlook others of the poor, while also it shuts us out from personal contact with the poor. We need all wisdom possible in our humane activity.

ARTICLE III.—THE CHARTER OF YALE COLLEGE:

THE IMPORT AND REACH OF ITS SEVERAL CHANGES.

THE question has lately been started whether the provision of the original Charter of Yale College, requiring that the persons selected to fill the vacancies which may occur among the original trustees or their successors should be ministers of the gospel residing within Connecticut, is or has been still in force since the Act of 1745, entitled "An act for the more full and complete Establishment of Yale College, in New Haven, and for enlarging the powers and privileges thereof." The question is a novel one, made for the first time as the College is approaching the close of its second century. An unbroken and uniform practice has continued of filling vacancies in conformity with that provision ever since it was enacted, down to the present time. One hundred such vacancies have occurred, twenty-one before the year 1745, seventy-eight since, and one in that year. Upon filling every vacancy the question must have been presented, from what class or out of what number the person to be selected must be chosen, and that question has, without an exception, been decided in one way. No layman, so far as is known, or we can learn, was ever proposed or voted for as a candidate, nor was there a suggestion ever made that one could be chosen. This long-continued and unvarying usage cannot be accounted for by a supposed blind partiality of the clergy for their order, for, among other reasons, that would not account for the selections being always made from ministers of the gospel residing in Connecticut. Since 1792 eight laymen have been members of the corporation, including distinguished jurists, such as Oliver Ellsworth, late chief justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and several Attorneys-General of the United States, but it does not appear that the question ever occurred to them or that they ever suggested to their clerical associates that their construction of the charter in this respect

was erroneous, or tried to increase the number of the lay minority. Such a practical construction by the Corporation, with the acquiescence of the State and the community, reaching back one hundred and thirty-six years and far into colonial times would seem, in the absence of express words of repeal, to preclude the question, and to settle it before it is asked. It appears to show that there could have been no intention to repeal the provision; or, if there were such an intention, that it was never understood and utterly failed of any effect. For nearly a century and a half the judgment of a succession of able and learned men, evinced by their acts, has been against this modern discovery and is entitled to the more weight as it is in favor of a limitation of their own powers, and not an expansion of them.

But as a contrary opinion has been lately given by a jurist entitled to respect, who, from his position, cannot be supposed to have intended wantonly to assail the rights claimed and exercised by the corporation, or a majority of its members, under whose appointment he holds his office, or their definition of their rights, we will proceed to examine the question.

If Yale College be traced to its origin we shall come *ad aquae lene caput sacrae*, to a gentle fountain-head of sacred waters. If there is any truth in history, the project originated with the ministers of the colony and gradually ripened until the College was founded by them in the year 1700. Accordingly in the Triennial Catalogues the term of office of the first president and each of the first trustees, or Fellows, has always been stated to have begun in that year. The time and manner of founding are entirely distinct things; the latter we do not intend at this time to discuss. What was founded was an institution under the protection of the common law, without chartered rights; an incorporated or chartered institution could not be founded prior to the act of incorporation, or grant of the charter. During the first year the College was undoubtedly in an inchoate and imperfect state, but instruction could be given to the very few scholars who may have been received under its care, some of whom may have been graduated and others not.

When it is said the project originated and was carried into effect by these ministers, it is not meant that no other gentlemen

were consulted or contributed to the result, nor is it to be inferred that no others were fit to become members of the governing board of such an institution. The colonies of Connecticut and New Haven, composed of Englishmen of deep religious convictions, had in 1635 and 1638 settled in the country, had established churches and schools, had formed regular societies and governments, and in 1665 were united under an organized government with governor and representatives in the General Court, which administered justice and performed the ordinary functions of political society. In the early days of the colonies there was among the colonists a considerable number of the graduates and late members of the universities of Cambridge and Oxford,* and then and afterwards the sons of the colonists were sent to the University of Harvard for an education. If the clergy were "learned men," a New England people under their instructions so long could not fail to furnish many laymen who were competent for public trusts, and that the clergy were "the only learned men," as is alleged, appears to be an unsatisfactory explanation of the selection of trustees from their number. The office of trustee was not that of teacher.

In 1701 an act was passed by the governor in council and representatives in general court assembled, bearing date on the 9th of October, in that year, by which a charter was granted and the trustees incorporated. It is entitled an "Act for Liberty to erect a Collegiate School." The trustees mentioned in the act appear to have been proposed in the petition for it. The right is given to them of perpetual succession and they are authorized to take and hold lands and to sue. They are also authorized to make such rules and orders, not contrary to law, as to them shall seem meet. In the act of 1745, section 2, former grants are mentioned, "expressed to be made to the President or Rector and the rest of the incorporate society of Yale College." The trustees therefore, did not remain mere trustees. The name proves nothing. The corporation of Union College in the State of New York is entitled, "The Trustees of Union College in the town of Schenectady in the

* John Winthrop, Jr., afterwards governor of the colony of Connecticut and then of the united colonies, was graduated at Trinity College, Dublin.

State of New York." The trustees of the collegiate school is a name equally appropriate.

The preamble of the act of 1701 is important, because without it the act is unintelligible and by it the intent of its provisions is clearly shown. It is as follows: "Whereas, several well-disposed and publick spirited persons, of their sincere regard to and zeal for upholding and propagating of the Christian Protestant religion by a succession of learned and orthodox men have expressed by petition, their earnest desires that full liberty and priviledge be granted unto certain undertakers for the founding, suitably endowing and ordering a collegiate school within his Magesties Colony of Connecticut, wherein youth may be instructed in the arts and sciences, who, thorough the blessing of Almighty God, may be fitted for publick employment, both in church and civil State. To the intent therefore, that all due encouragement be given to such pious resolutions, and that so necessary and religious an undertaking may be sett forward, supported and well managed; be it enacted," etc.

It will be seen that it is declared, that the act is enacted to the intent to give encouragement to the pious resolution, or religious purpose of the petitioners, and that the undertaking, for which they seek liberty, which is described as necessary and religious, may be set forward, supported and well managed. These three things are provided for in the act. The Governor and the representatives of the people, by whom the charter was granted, concur with the petitioners. The college was not imposed by the clergy but sprang out of a religious community, who desired for their sons a Christian education in conformity with the principles of the Protestant Reformation. The inspiring motive and desire of the petitioners were their regard and zeal for the support and advancement of the Christian religion according to the Protestant interpretation, by means of a succession of learned men, who should be orthodox in belief. They therefore asked that liberty should be granted for a collegiate school, not a theological but a literary institution, wherein young men might be instructed in the liberal arts and sciences. This does not exclude mental or moral science, or natural or revealed religion. The present professional schools of jurisprudence and theology stand upon precisely the same

basis under the charter. What was desired was liberty to found, endow, and order a Christian Protestant college, wherein young men should be educated, who should be prepared to be members of a learned clergy, or for an educated civil service in the largest sense of the phrase, leaders of society in its two great divisions of church and state.

The act proceeds to grant "full liberty" "unto the reverend James Noyes, of Stonington" and nine others, who are named, "being Rev^d Ministers of the Gospel and inhabitants within ye s^d Colony proposed to stand as trustees, partners or undertakers for the s^d school, to them and their successors to erect, form, direct, order, establish, improve, and att all times in all suitable wayes for the future to encourage the s^d school in such convenient place or places, and in such form and manner, and under such order and rules as to them shall seem meet and most conducive to the afores^d end thereof, so as such rules or orders be not repugnant, to the laws of the civil govern^{mt}, as also to employ the moneys as any other estate, which shall be granted by this Court or otherwise contributed to that use, according to their discretion for the benefit of the s^d collegiate school from time to time and att all times hence forward." Thus the most ample powers of management are granted and by a familiar rule of law all incidental powers necessary to carry the same into effect. By a subsequent clause this is clearly expressed and authority given to appoint a rector or master and other officers. The act then enacts "that the before-named trustees, partners or undertakers, together with such others as they shall associate to themselves (not exceeding the number of eleven, or att any time being less than seven, provided also that persons nominated or associated from time to time to fill up s^d number be ministers of the gospel inhabiting within this colony and above the age of forty years) or the major part of them, the s^d Mr. James Noyes, etc., undertakers, and of such persons so chosen and associated as above, and att any time hereafter, Have and shall have henceforward the oversight, full and compleat right, liberty, power and priviledge to furnish, direct, manage, order, improve and encourage from time to time, and in all times hereafter the s^d collegiate school so erected and formed by them in such ways, orders and manner, and

by such persons, rector or master and officers appointed by them, as shall according to their best discretion be most conducive to attain the afores^d mentioned end thereof."

The provision in regard to the qualifications of persons eligible to become members of the corporation is in its nature an independent provision. It provides, first, that they must be ministers of the gospel; secondly—as to residence, that they must reside within the colony and, thirdly, as to age that they must be of the age of forty years, reduced by the act of 1723 to thirty years. All these qualifications are supposed to have been annulled by the repeal of the clause. The requirement of age was undoubtedly intended to secure maturity of mental powers and of judgment.

What objection there could have been to the requirement of thirty years of age, it is difficult to imagine. That of residence within the colony was appropriate to the circumstances. It was undoubtedly because Connecticut was an independent colony under no common government in America with any other. It is difficult to conceive upon what objection this should have been repealed by any Colonial act. The neighboring colony of Massachusetts had its own university. If any other reason were necessary, convenience of access to the college would have had much more force in colonial times when travel was slow and difficult and sometimes dangerous, than it has at present. The ministers of the gospel in New England were perhaps then as now generally liberally educated men but they were not then any more than they are now necessarily learned men. The first trustees of the college were all graduates of Harvard, except the Rev. Thomas Buckingham. He was not we believe the graduate of any college. If the legislature had intended simply to provide that the trustees should be graduates of a college, would it not have said so, and not have taken an imperfect and circuitous way to secure this object? The obvious intent of the requirement, that the trustees should be ministers of the gospel, was to secure the end, which pervades the act, that the college should be, and remain a Protestant, Christian college, that in the words of the preamble, "so necessary and religious an undertaking may be . . . well managed."

The act next grants to the trustees "one hundred and

twenty pounds in country pay, to be paid annually and at all times hereafter until the [General] Court order otherwise," to be faithfully disposed of by them "for the end aforesaid according to their discretion," to be raised and paid in such way and at such a value as the usual country rates.

It then provides that the trustees and their successors may "have, accept, acquire, purchase, or otherwise lawfully enter upon any lands, tenements, and hereditaments to the use of the said school not exceeding the value of five hundred pounds per annum, and any goods, chattels, sum or sums of money whatsoever, as have heretofore already been granted, bestowed, bequeathed or given, or as from time to time shall be freely given, bequeathed, devised or settled by any person or persons whatsoever, upon and to and for the use of said school towards the founding, erecting or endowing the same; and to sue for, recover and receive all such gifts, legacies, bequests, annuities, rents, issues and profits arising therefrom; and out of the estate, revenues, rents, profits, income accruing and belonging to said school to support and pay as the said undertakers shall agree and see cause the said rector or master, tutors, ushers or other officers, their respective annual salaries or allowances."

It will be seen that full power was given to the trustees to take and hold real estate and personal property, subject to the limitation only, that the real estate should not exceed the value of five hundred pounds per annum. The act also retro-spected to gifts of property made prior to its passage for the use of the school. This accords with the historical statement, if it do not conclusively prove its truth, of the prior existence of the college. It so far existed that, not subscriptions or agreements to give, but executed gifts, grants or bequests are supposed to have been made for its use, and are provided for. "A General Court assembled [at] New Haven" could not be ignorant whether such provision was needed. The statute finally grants to the trustees authority "for the encouragement of the students, to grant degrees or licenses as they or those deputed by them shall see cause to order or appoint."

Such is the original charter which, although simple in form and wanting some details supplied by subsequent acts, has all the vital elements of a good one. Under it, or the same as

amended by the act of 1723, the college flourished for forty-four years during the terms of office of four presidents and three years of that of the fifth. Within that period distinguished men were graduated at the college, as Jonathan Dickinson, Jonathan Edwards and Aaron Burr, the first three presidents of the college of New Jersey, Samuel Johnson and William Samuel Johnson, presidents of Columbia College, Eleazer Wheelock, first president of Dartmouth College, Dr. Bellamy, Chief Justice Dyer, Jared Ingersoll, Philip Vanburgh Livingston, Philip Livingston, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, and Governor William Livingston, of New Jersey. The charter appears to have proved a pretty good working charter.

It was drawn after much deliberation and with much caution, and upon legal advice. The draught of a charter made by Ch. J. Sewall, of Massachusetts, and Secretary Addington, was followed, but with important alterations. In that the Collegiate School was founded by the legislature, and the original trustees were to be ministers of the gospel, and laymen resident in the colony, with power of naming their successors, without restriction as to class, age or residence. The degrees to be conferred were such as were accustomed to be given at Harvard and the Westminster Confession of Faith, and Ames's *Medulla Theologiæ*, were prescribed as studies. This clause was apparently not omitted in the actual charter from any objection to the books, for at the organization of the college, November 11, 1701, the trustees prescribed that the rector take effectual care that "that the students be weekly . . . caused to recite the Assembly's Catechism in Latin, and Ames's Theological Theses." Perhaps the books to be studied were properly considered matters of administration and perhaps for other reasons it was deemed advisable to omit any denominational or sectarian reference in the charter. There was evidently a fear of the crown or its representatives or the authorities in the mother country. An attempt had already some time before been made to suppress the charter of Harvard University. The charter of Yale College was granted near the close of the reign of William III., which may account for its prominent though sincere avowal of Protestant sentiments. Messrs.

Sewall and Addington, when sending their proposed charter say under date of October 6, 1701: "We on purpose gave your academy as low a name as we could [Collegiate School], that it might better stand in wind and weather, not daring to incorporate it lest it should be liable to be served with a writ of quo warranto."

The University of Oxford, like others, was originally called a school, and according to Chancellor Kent it was not until the thirteenth century that colleges and universities began to grant degrees (2 Kent's Com. 218, Angell & Ames on Corporations, Sec. 50). The humbleness of the name and the limited power to grant degrees were not therefore inconsistent with the character of a college. It is a curious fact that though the act of 1745 gave power to confer all such honors, degrees or licenses as are usually given in colleges or universities, no honorary degree or degree in course above that of A.M. or M.D. was conferred by Yale College before 1773.

Whether the Collegiate School as constituted by the proposed charter of Sewall and Addington would have been incorporated is not important.

A corporation is an artificial person, created by the law, having the attribute of immortality, as it is called, or perpetual succession for an indefinite or definite period and an artificial unity, by which it is capable of distinct legal acts and legal responsibilities. *Dartmouth College vs. Woodward*, 4 Wheaton (U. S.) R., 636. The powers and right of succession granted by the original charter of Yale College are given to a collective and changing body of men in their collective capacity, and expressly to "the major part of them," or the majority, and not to the trustees as individuals, having separate interests and uniting in separate concurrent acts. Such was the contemporaneous construction. The order made by the trustees November 11, 1701, whereby they "order and appoint that there shall be and hereby is erected and formed a Collegiate School wherein shall be taught the liberal arts and languages," and prescribe rules for its management, recites who were present, and the record of the names shows that there were only seven present. So at the meeting on the 17th of October, 1716, when the trustees voted to remove the school

to New Haven and settled it there, only eight trustees were present. So when the matter came up again for consideration, at a meeting at New Haven on the 30th of October, 1717, and the trustees finally settled the college at that place, seven only put their signatures to the decisive vote. A minority it is known dissented. Were these acts respecting the founding and removal of the college invalid? But the act of 1723 is decisive. That enacts as follows: "And it is hereby further declared and enacted to be the true intent and meaning of the act aforesaid [the original charter], that the said trustees shall be empowered and they are hereby declared to have power to meet together for considering, advising about and resolving upon all matters belonging to the trust of the said college committed unto them as aforesaid, and to agree and conclude, order and determine concerning them by the majority of the said meeting and by the same majority to choose and appoint a clerk, who shall in a fair book prepared for that end, register and carefully preserve the acts of all such meetings." This is the way in which a corporation acts as distinguished from individual trustees. There appears to be here an artificial unity or body, which not only has perpetual succession but has the legal right to act by a single will determined by a majority of the members composing it, respecting its affairs and its property. The reason of the thing and the impossibility of successfully managing the affairs of the college in any other way are strong arguments to prove the intent of the legislature, which is the true point of inquiry.

The Colonial act of 1745 does not create a wholly new corporation, but continues and modifies an old one, giving it a new name and additional powers. That act, after referring to the previous acts of 1701 and 1723, recites that "the Rev. Messrs. Thomas Clap [and others named], the present trustees, partners and undertakers of the said school, and successors of those before mentioned, have petitioned that the said school with all the rights, powers and privileges and interests thereof may be confirmed, and that such other additional powers and privileges may be granted as shall be necessary for the ordering and managing the said school in the most advantageous and beneficial manner for the promoting of

all good literature in the present and succeeding generations," and does "enact, ordain and declare," "That the said"—[the same persons being the said trustees], "shall be" [not are incorporated, but] "an incorporated society or body corporate and politic and shall hereafter be called and known by the name of the President and Fellows of Yale College in New Haven, and that by the same name they and their successors shall and may have perpetual succession," etc. By the second section all gifts of lands or chattels to the trustees by whatever name, style or title, for the use of the school, "are confirmed and shall be and remain to and be vested in the President and Fellows of the College aforesaid and their successors as to the true and lawful successors of the original grantees."

Thus the title to the property is not divested from the trustees but is confirmed and continued in them as the President and Fellows of the college as the true and lawful successors of the original grantees according to the terms of the original charter and the amendatory act of 1723. The title to the President and Fellows is derived under the perpetual succession created by the charter of 1701. Even if this interpretation were erroneous, a simply legislative construction of the prior acts would not be controlling. The original charter for prudential reasons we suppose did not expressly incorporate the trustees but that was unnecessary. It gave them the essential attributes of corporations, of which, says Ch. J. Marshall "among the most important are immortality and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality; properties, by which a perpetual succession of many persons may be considered the same and may act as a single individual." *Dartmouth College vs. Woodward*, *supra*. Banking associations formed under the free banking law of the State of New York were not expressly incorporated or declared to be corporations by the statute, but for the like reason it was settled by decisions in the Supreme Court, the Court for the Correction of errors and the Court of Appeals of that State that they were corporations. *Sesa. Laws of 1838*, ch. 260; *Robinson vs. The Bk. of Attica*, 21 N. Y. 408; and cases cited, 7 Hill 504, 15 N. Y. 79, *Id.*, 183. It was not necessary for the Legislature to say: This being, which we create is a corporation. That is to be determined by its properties.

So it has been held that a corporation organized under a special charter and reorganized under a general law with a change of name and to some extent of its powers is essentially the same, so that a judgment against it in the latter name may cover the acts of the original corporation. *People ex rel—Barton vs. Renssellaer Ins. Co.*, 38 Barb., 323.—At common law a special denomination is necessary but as that is for identification it need not be formally stated. In the free banking law of New York of 1838, it was enacted that suits might be brought and prosecuted in behalf of a banking association in the name of the President. The Supreme Court of the State, Allen, J., says: "Actions brought by or in behalf of a banking association may be prosecuted in the name of the president thereof (Act of 1838, sec. 21; 2 R. S., 5th ed., 560, § 194), or the action may be brought in the name by which the association is known (Delafield agt. Kenney, 24 W. R. 345, Carr, agt. Mich. Banking Association, 1 Sandf. 693. They are both corporate names." *Root vs. Price*, 22 How. (N. Y.) R. 372, affirmed at General Term. Such is the accepted law in that State. *Angel & Ames on Corps.*, § 234, *Minot vs. Curtis*, 7 Mass. R., 444, 1 Kyd, 254, *Hammond agt. Shepherd*, 29 Howard's (N. Y.) R. 191. Without repeating the argument, contained in the cases to which we have referred and in which the subject is fully discussed in a way which seems to us closely applicable to the question, these views and authorities and the facts stated will suggest the grounds on which we consider that the trustees under the original charter and that act as amended in 1723 were a corporation. See also 1 Kyd, 69, 70; 2 Kent's Com., 224; *Angel & Ames on Corps.*, §§ 110, 111. No vote or resolution was passed by the trustees accepting the act of 1745. It was originally presented by them but in its passage had been amended in the article of taxation. Upon the passage of the act there was no organization of a new corporation, no reappointment of officers or tutors, of the trustees as officers and tutors of the corporation or any new appointment. There was no special proceeding whatever except that the President and Fellows took the oaths and made the declaration required by the act, being those mentioned in that of George 1st. Everything went on in continuous life as of the same person in a

new dress. But whether the trustees were a corporation or a quasi corporation is perhaps only of historical importance, except so far as an argument is sought to be constructed, from that source, in disparagement of that charter and in support of the assertion of its entire repeal.

The original charter had several apparent defects but for the most part they were more apparent than real. It did not provide the mode in which meetings should be called, the majority by which votes should be passed, nor the quorum necessary. But as the trustees had power to make by-laws (Charter, Angel & Ames on Corpns., sec. 110, Kyd, 69) they could direct how the meetings should be called, when and where the regular meetings should be held, what majority should be necessary or in default of such direction the usual rule with respect to corporations that a majority of those present is sufficient would prevail. Angel & Ames on Corpns., secs. 499, 488; *Story vs. Wise*, 7 Conn., 219. The subsequent explanatory act also declares it was not necessary except as a safeguard that any quorum should be prescribed. But it has been held, that where a corporation has the power to make by-laws, it can prescribe what number shall constitute a quorum. *Hoyt vs. Sheldon*, 8 Bosw., Superior (N. Y.) R., 267; *Smith vs. Law*, 21 N. Y. 296; *Hoyt vs. Thompson's Exr.*, 19 N. Y. R. 207. In the absence of such regulation or any by statute, the presence of the majority of the whole number of the trustees at the time would seem to be requisite. The last case, *Ex parte*, Wilcocks, 17 Cow. N. Y. R. 402, *St. Mary's Church in Phila.* 7 Sergt. & Rawle (Penn.) R. 517, A. & Ames on Corpns., sec. 501. The charter did not specially provide for the rare cases in ministers of the gospel of incapacity and neglect or misconduct, neither of which in a body of ten members would be likely to affect its action. The act of 1723 however provided for all these apparent defects except the cases of neglect and misconduct. Difficulties and perhaps difference of opinion appear to have arisen from a want of direct legislation on these points and possibly from the restriction of the choice of trustees to those of forty years of age. "The power of motion or removal of a member for a reasonable cause is a power necessarily incident to every corporation." 2 Kent's

Com., 238; 1 Sid., 14; 2 Strange, 891, 1 Burr, 517; 2 Term R. 412; Commonwealth vs. St. Patrick's Society, 2 Binney, (Penn.), R. 448; 13 Wend. (N. Y.), 473; 24 Barb. (N. Y.), 572; 18 Abbot's (N. Y.) R., 271. So is the power to have and use a common seal (Angel & Ames on Corporations, 217), which is not expressly conferred by the charter.

The college stood thus upon the original charter, which had, as we have said, certain deficiencies of detail, more apparent as we have shown than real, and subsequently remedied, but until remedied leaving an opening especially in a new country for doubts and differences of opinion. This charter, with a change of the name of the corporation and certain modifications and enlarged powers is in substance the charter accepted and acted upon to this day. It has never been repudiated but corporate powers have been scrupulously exercised in conformity therewith and for the great end for which it was enacted.

At a General Assembly held at New Haven, October 10th, 1728, an act was passed entitled "An act in explanation of and in addition to the act for erecting a collegiate school in the colony." After reciting that certain trustees in pursuance of the powers and privileges granted to them for erecting a collegiate school "erected the said school in New Haven, which school is now known by the name of Yale Colledge," and that it appeared "that an explanation and enlargement of the powers and privileges granted by said act is necessary for carrying on the affairs of the said Colledge for want of which it has labored under great difficulties," it enacts "that the said act which provides that the number of the said trustees be not under seven nor above eleven is not to be understood or taken so as to be restrictive of the power of the said trustees never to choose any person to be a trustee, when there is of such persons as have been chosen and acted as trustees eleven persons living in the colony or elsewhere, but that in case any person so chosen be by Providence incapacitated from attending that service or shall himself decline the same through the necessity of his own affairs or for any other such reason as he shall judge requisite, the trustees in any of their meetings lawfully called may be understood to have and it is hereby enacted and declared that they shall be taken to have full

power by the majority of such meeting to proceed to the choice of another trustee in the room of any such person."

The incapacity mentioned, like the inability of the President mentioned in the Constitution of the United States, is not defined nor is it stated by whom it shall be determined but it is pretty plain that it must be by the trustees, who are to name the successor. It will be noted, first, that the act in the paragraph quoted, like the sixth section of the act of 1745, defines the occasions on which the right of election may be exercised, viz: death, resignation, and incapacity. Secondly, that like that sixth section it makes no mention of the qualifications of the persons to be elected. Yet, thirdly, it would not be pretended that this omission operated to repeal or tended in the least degree to repeal the provision on that subject in the charter. On the contrary the act by confirming the power of election confirms it as given in the charter. The qualifications of the persons to fill a vacancy are not the subject of the act (except that at the close of it the age required is reduced from forty to thirty years), for the obvious reason that no further legislation on that subject was necessary, the provisions already made being plain and satisfactory.

After stating that matters may be determined by a majority of those trustees present at a meeting, it proceeds to provide that a meeting may be called by due notice being given to the trustees of such meeting at any time and place by consent of any three of them, that seven shall be a quorum, that thirty years shall be a sufficient age for a trustee otherwise qualified according to the charter, and that "whosoever shall be chosen and made a rector of the said college shall by virtue thereof become a trustee of the same and be so esteemed and taken during his continuance in the said rectorship."

Now it is alleged, that less than twenty-two years later a Colonial act was passed in the same colony, by which, in the first place, the provision as to the qualifications of trustees contained in the original charter and virtually ratified by the act of 1728 was repealed; that thereafter laymen of any age, having their residence in any place within or without the colony, not being of any of the learned professions or graduates of any college might be chosen as trustees, also that this change

was made in a charter proposed by the clerical corporation and their clerical president and upon their petition.

In the second place, it is alleged that at the same time and by the same act, the original charter and the amendatory act were entirely repealed, including of course both the provisions as to the qualifications of trustees and all those provisions of the charter, which declare the end or object, for which the college was to be founded and managed, as a Protestant, Christian college. And the want of any religious allusion, as is said, in the later act is appealed to in support of this position. This is alleged to have been done by the representatives of a Puritan colony, at the instance of a corporation of Congregational clergymen, without there being left in the history or records of the college or the colony the trace of any dissent on the part of any person whatsoever.

To say the least, very strong evidence is necessary to support either proposition. The act of 1745 contains no words which express the intention to repeal the prior acts, or the requirements as to the qualification of trustees. It is not pretended that it does. If it were the intention of the legislature to repeal them, nothing could have been more easy or more natural than to express that intention. It was highly important that this should be expressed. It would have prevented the error and misconception which are supposed to have prevailed ever since. But the legislature did not express that intention. Perhaps it did not have it. This would satisfactorily account for the omission.

There being no express repeal of the prior acts, or of the provision, in question, if there is any repeal, it is by construction or implication, that is by necessary inference from the act or some part of it. We say necessary inference, for repeals by implication are not favored. *McCartee vs. Orphan Asylum Society*, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) R. 437; *Williams vs. Potter*, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) R. 316; *Hayes vs. Symonds*, 9 Barb. (N. Y.) R. 302; *Dwarris*, 674.

The courts have no power to repeal a statute, which is the expression of the legislative will. There must be a plain subsequent manifestation of such will or a constitutional enactment to annul the force of that will as already declared.

The general rule is that where there is no repealing clause in the later statute, in case the later and the former statute or a particular part of the former statute can stand together and both have effect, they will both remain in force. *Potter's Dwarria*, 154 and note 42 and cases cited. Unless the later statute is manifestly repugnant to and inconsistent with the former, there is no repeal by implication. *McCartee vs. Orphan Asylum Society*, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) R. 674; *Williams vs. Potter*, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) R. 316; *Van Rensselaer vs. Suydam*, 9 Barb. (N. Y.) R. 302; *Hayes vs. Symonds*, 9 Barb. (N. Y.) R. 260; *Pease vs. Whiting*, 5 Mass. R. 380; *Bowen vs. Lease*, 5 Hill, 225; *Goodman vs. Leavitt*, 24 Conn., 589; *Norean vs. Story*, 25 Conn., 47). So far as a plain repugnancy extends there is a repeal, for the legislature has manifested a different will; but no farther. *Livingston vs. Harris*, 11 Wend., 329; *The People vs. Deming*, 1 Hilton's (N. Y.) R. 271; *The Hartford Bridge Co. vs. East Hartford*, 10 Conn. 175; *Baldwin's Digest*, *subdn.*, repeal. There is no repugnancy between the power of electing successors and a provision defining the class from which such successors may be taken. Both stood together in the original charter, and both can stand together in different acts, nor is there any repugnance between such power of election and an enactment defining the occasions on which such power can be exercised. Both stood together in the original charter, and the act of 1723 and both can stand together in the original charter and the act of 1745. "All acts in *pari materia* should be taken together as if they were one law." *Brady, J.*, in the last N. Y. case, 5 Hill, 225, 9 Cow. 347.

So there is no repugnancy between the unaltered provisions of the prior acts and the act of 1745. For example the college was founded and was to be ordered and managed as a Protestant, Christian college for the instruction of youth in the arts and sciences. The act of 1745, in calling it a college and authorizing the appointments of tutors, and professors and "all such other officers and servants, usually appointed in colleges or universities as they shall find necessary and think fit to appoint for the promoting good literature and the well ordering and managing the affairs of said college," enacts nothing inconsistent therewith; if it do, the scientific department it would

seem must fall to the ground. Under this general rule then there would be no repeal by implication.

Upon questions of construction, statutes in *pari materia* are to be considered and weighed. They show the course of legislation, the policy of the government and what is necessary to the harmony of the system adopted or inconsistent with it. *Smith vs. People*, 47 N. Y. R. 839. Allen, J., says, "One part of an act of the legislature may be referred to in aid of the interpretation of other parts of the same act. So in case of doubt or uncertainty, acts in *pari materia*, passed before or after, and whether repealed or unrepealed, may be referred to in order to discern the intent of the legislature in the use of particular terms. . . . Statutes in *pari materia* relate to the same subject, the same person or thing or the same class of persons or things, and are to be read together for the reason that a code of statutes relating to one subject is governed by the same spirit and are intended to be harmonious and consistent." *Ib.* and cases cited, 1 Kent's Com. 433, *United Society vs. Eagle Bank*, 7 Conn. 456.

The original charter and the act of 1723 are in this case statutes in *pari materia*. It was of course theoretically possible for the legislature by an act passed a few years later instead of "the more full and complete establishment" of a Protestant Christian college to enact in effect that it should no longer be such, but thereafter a secular college, unknown to those times either in this country or Great Britain. But an intention to do this is altogether unlikely, it would have been revolutionary, and if existing cannot be supposed to have been unexpressed. So it was possible at the same time to throw open the corporation to the election of laymen, non-residents of the colony and under the age of thirty years, but such a reversal of the policy previously pursued, we may be pretty sure, would not have been left to lurk in inference and an omission to treat of the subject at all and open to dispute and litigation as to the meetings of the corporation being called and held, and the acts being done and the titles of property acquired, or the property disposed of, by members legally qualified. An intention to make such a change would have been openly and clearly expressed as in the acts of 1792 and 1872. We have already

called attention to the similarity of the language of the act of 1728 and the sixth section of the act of 1745, and the former tends strongly to give construction to the latter.

The act of 1792, which is an act in *pari materia*, appears to negative the supposed repeal with great force. It introduces laymen into the corporation by way of addition to the clerical members, leaving them and their successors undisturbed. It provides that "in case the grant therein mentioned shall be accepted in the manner thereafter provided, the Governor, Lieutenant-governor, and six senior assistants in the council of this State, [afterwards six senior Senators,] shall ever hereafter by virtue of their said offices, be Trustees or Fellows [the words are treated as synonymous,] of said college, and shall, together with the present President and Fellows, and their successors constitute one corporation, by the name and style mentioned in the charter of said college. . . . And that in case of vacancy by the death or resignation, or in any other way of any of the present Fellows of said college and their successors, every such vacancy shall forever hereafter be supplied by them, and their successors, by election, in the same manner as though this act had never passed." Here the right of election of the successors of the clerical members is reserved solely to them and the lay members are wholly excluded therefrom. Can any reason be assigned for this, if laymen were eligible as such successors? On the contrary it is obvious, that there would not only be no impropriety but the greatest propriety, if laymen might be elected, in the participation of the lay members in such election. Their exclusion shows that in the judgment of the legislature laymen were not eligible as such successors. This act gives a legislative construction to the act of 1745, and in effect declares that there has been no repeal of the provision in question. It shows a continued, uniform legislative policy in regard to it from the time of the grant of the original charter down to this act, corresponding with the actual practice, which it virtually ratifies.

If we refer to other rules of construction the application of them tends to the same result. The intention of a statute should be followed, for that is the legislative will. So far is that rule carried that such intention when discovered will even

prevail over the letter of the statute. "The real intention, when accurately ascertained," says Kent, "will always prevail over the literal sense of terms." 1 Kent's Com. 432, *Smith vs. The People*, 47 N. Y. (Court of Appeals), R. 336; *The People vs. Deming*, *ubi supra*, *Murray vs. N. Y. Central R. R. Co.*, 4 Keyes, 274, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) R., 89, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) R. 211. "Where the words are not explicit, the intention is to be collected from the occasion and necessity of the law, from the mischief felt and the remedy in view:" 1 Kent's Com., *ib.* "If in reading a statute in connection with other statutes passed at or about the same time a doubt exists as to the force and effect the legislature intended to give to particular terms, that is as to the meaning which it was intended they should bear and have in the connection in which they are used, it is also competent to refer to the circumstances under which a statute is passed to ascertain the intent. The ground and cause of making a statute explains the intent, Com. Dig. Parliament R. 11," per Allen, J., *Smith vs. People*, *supra*. No one can say that there are any explicit words of repeal. That the corporation, which proposed the law, did not intend any repeal of the provision or provisions in question, is obvious from the fact that their practice continued uniformly after the act as it had been before. That the legislature never intended a repeal appears to be obvious from the fact that it never interfered with such practice, but silently acquiesced. If repeal were intended, it must have been for some practical purpose.

No mischief had been experienced or felt from the provisions in the charter making the college a Protestant, Christian College, or from that making only clergymen residents of the colony and as amended by the act of 1723, of thirty years of age, eligible as successors of the founders. No evidence has been produced or appears that any such mischief had been felt or experienced. None has been experienced to the present time.

The object of the act of 1745 and the mischief intended to be remedied is shown by the express provisions of that act. In regard to the power of election the mischief or supposed mischief was, that, in the case of misdemeanor, unfaithfulness or default in a rector or trustee, there was no vacancy to which

the trustees could elect nor had he been made by statute removable by the trustees; and in the case of incapacity it had not been expressly enacted how the incapacity was to be determined.

The act of 1745 therefore enumerates the occasions on which the power of election may be exercised, and adds removal for these causes to death and resignation. The act provides: "6. That the President and Fellows of the said college and their successors, in any of their meetings assembled as aforesaid, shall and may from time to time, as occasion shall require, elect and appoint a President or Fellow in the room and place of any President or Fellow who shall die, resign, or be removed from his office, place or trust (whom the said governor and company hereby declare, for any misdemeanor, unfaithfulness, default or incapacity, shall be removable by the President and Fellows of the said college; six of them, at least, concurring in such act)."

There is no repeal here, but a defect supplied in regard to the occasions on which the power of election might be exercised. The subject of the qualifications of persons eligible for election is not treated of or mentioned in the act.

It may be conceded that if there were no restriction elsewhere in this or any other act, limiting the selection to any particular class or persons, the right of choice would be unlimited. But it would not be if such restriction were contained elsewhere in the same act, and it makes no difference that it is in another and previous statute. The construction of the section is to be governed by its evident object and the mischief to be remedied. If it had been thought desirable to connect the colony, as it was in 1792 to connect the State more nearly with the College, the repeal of this provision would not have effected the object. To assume that the provision is repealed and therefore the discretion of the corporation is unlimited, and then to argue that because that discretion is unlimited the provision is repealed would be to argue in a circle.

We have already shown, as is the familiar rule, that, in case of doubt as to the construction of a statute, "it is also competent to refer to the circumstances under which a statute is passed to ascertain the intent." The same is true of contracts;

even the most solemn, *Bridger vs. Pierson* 45 N. Y. (Court of Appeals), R. 601, 604. The supposed repeal is attempted to be accounted for by the liberal spirit, which then prevailed. But unhappily the reverse is true. In regard to religion, never was the administration of the college so illiberal and intolerant as during the time President Clap was in office. It should be remembered that the act was passed more than one hundred and thirty-six years ago. In 1722, Rector Cutler, who at the time of his entering upon the rectorship was a Congregational clergyman and professed his assent to the doctrines and ecclesiastical government of the Congregational denomination, announced that he had changed his opinions and believed that the Anglican theory of church government was correct, and that the orders of the New England clergy were invalid. The trustees thereupon voted to "excuse the Rev. Mr. Cutler from all further service as Rector of Yale College." He had never been a trustee. The resignation of Mr. Brown, a tutor, of his office, which was made for like reason, was also accepted. And it was voted that all persons who should be elected to the office of rector or tutor in the college should, before they should be accepted "declare their assent to the confession of faith, owned and assented to by the elders and messengers of the churches in the Colony of Connecticut, assembled by delegation at Saybrook, September 9, 1708; and confirmed by act of the General Assembly." Mr. Samuel Johnson, a graduate and formerly a tutor of the college, afterwards Dr. Johnson and first president of Columbia College, and Rev. Mr. Wetmore, of North Haven, participated in this change of opinions and they all agreed to go to England for Episcopal ordination. There was no bishop in this country from whom they could receive orders. The first Episcopal church in Connecticut was founded at Stratford, in 1723. Mr. Cutler returned to Massachusetts, where he was born and educated, and settled in Boston, where he died. Mr. Johnson was settled over the Episcopal church at Stratford. Dr. Woolsey says that "these gentlemen, who thus left the Puritan platform were not inclined to array themselves in hostility to the college."—Dr. Woolsey's *Historical Discourse*, p. 26. The son of Dr. Johnson, William Samuel Johnson, himself afterwards

president of Columbia College, was graduated at Yale College in 1744, and the grandson in 1779. The Dean of Derry, afterwards Bishop Berkeley, made the gift of his farm of ninety-six acres to the college in 1732, and of a large number of books, partly procured by him from others, in all of about one thousand volumes, of which eight hundred and fifty were given by him in 1734. He wrote to President Clap, July 25, 1751: "The daily increase of religion and learning in the seminary, under your auspicious care and government, gives me a very sensible pleasure and an ample recompense for all my donations." The old manuscript laws of 1720 and 1726 prescribe, "All students shall, after they have done reciting ethics and rhetoric on Fridays, recite Wollebius' Theology; and on Saturday morning they shall recite Ames's Theological Theses, in his Medulla, and on Saturday evening the Assembly's Shorter Catechism in Latin, and on Sabbath morning attend the explanation of Ames's Cases of Conscience." The Latin Laws published in 1748, of which an English original was and may still be extant in manuscript under the date of 1745 prescribe: "Every Saturday shall especially be devoted to the subject of divinity, and the classes through the whole term of their college life shall recite the Westminster Confession of Faith received and approved by the churches in the colony, Wollebius, Ames's Medulla, or any other system of divinity by the direction of the President and Fellows." President Stiles in his diary mentions as among other books recited by the senior class at his accession to the presidency, eleven years after the close of President Clap's administration, "Wollebius, Amesii Medulla, Graec. Testament (or Edwards on the Will, sometime discontinued)". In 1753 a "resolution of the Fellows required that members of their own body, with the President, the professor of divinity and tutors should give their assent to the Westminster Catechism and Confession of Faith, and should renounce all doctrines and principles contrary thereto and pass through such an examination as the corporation should order," "and also give his consent to the rules of church discipline established in the ecclesiastical constitution of the churches of this colony." Woolsey, p. 40; *Id.*, pp. 58, 60, 119; Baldwin's *Annals of Yale College*, p. 68, where the resolution is set forth at large.

In this resolution the President and Fellows declare, without entire accuracy, as we have seen, but in language which shows how alien their spirit and views were from any notion of a secular College and any secularization of the Corporation and eliminating or lessening of its clerical members, that "the principal design of the pious Founders of this College, was to educate and train up youth for the ministry, in the churches of this colony, according to the doctrine, discipline and mode of worship received and practiced in them." In the previous October of that year the General Assembly had resolved "that one principal end proposed in erecting the College, was to supply the churches in the colony with a learned, pious and orthodox ministry; to which end, it was requisite that the students of the College should have the best instruction in Divinity, and the best patterns of preaching set before them. And that the settling a learned, pious and orthodox Professor of Divinity in the College, would greatly tend to promote that good end and design." They therefore recommend, "a general contribution to be made in all religious societies in the colony, for this purpose." This legislative resolution, which is in *pari materia* with the act of 1745, tends to show how steadily the Legislature endeavored to keep in view the original design of the College in regard to its religious character. The first Professorship founded in it was the Professorship of Divinity, and the first Professor of Divinity became such in 1756. This was during the administration of President Clap.

We mention some things occurring soon after the passage of the act of 1745, not as circumstances existing at the time, but as with other evidence tending to show the unity of the spirit of the corporation and of the Legislature before and after and at that time, and that there had been no change of the kind alleged.

In 1742, Rev. Thomas Clap, of Windham, Conn., a most able man, distinguished in his day as a mathematician and inclined to scientific studies, but stiffly orthodox and intensely denominational, was chosen President. President Stiles says of him: "Westminster Calvinism was his theology and he was a perfect master of it—I think he was rather a supra- than a sub-lapsarian and the doctrine of the decrees in the most absolute

sense was the basis of all his ideas of God's moral government." . . . "He was . . . quiet, resolute, firm, immovable, even to absolute despotism."

In 1742, David Brainerd was expelled from the College. One of the charges against him for which he was so expelled, was that he had disobeyed college law by going to a 'separate' meeting.* "President Clap with the Fellows committed" . . . says Dr. Woolsey, "in another case the error of persecuting by college power, dissenters from the legally established church order." He refers to the case of the Clevelands, who near the close of the year 1744, the action being confirmed in January, 1745, were expelled from the college, because in the town in which they resided, they attended in vacation a Congregational church other than the regular Congregational parish church. The Clevelands sent a memorial to the Legislature at its May session in 1745, praying for a redress of their grievances and to be restored to their standing in college. In this "well written" memorial, they say among other things that they are of the Congregational persuasion. But their petition produced no effect and was dismissed by both houses. Woolsey's *Hist. Dis. and Appendix*, pp. 28, 105, 106, 108, 111-114, 2 Trumb. *Hist. of Conn.*, ch. 8. The Clevelands afterwards became clergymen and received their degrees, John in 1768 and Ebenezer in 1775,—a late reparation. In 1742, a committee was appointed by the Legislature in regard to the condition of Yale College. They reported censuring some of the students in respect to certain irregular practices on the subject of religion, and advise that the instructors of the College "be very careful to instruct the students in the true principles of religion, according to our confession of faith and ecclesiastical constitution, and to keep them from all such errors as they may be in danger of imbibing from strangers and foreigners, and to use all such proper measures as are in their power, to prevent their being under the influence of such as would prejudice their minds against the way of worship and ministry established

* "Brainerd might have been restored to his College during the year 1743 on condition of residence [during the completion of his college course], but being old and already engaged in missionary labor [among the Indians of New Jersey], he declined so doing." Woolsey's *Historical Discourse*, 105. His brother John was graduated at the college in 1746.

by the laws of this government." This report was concurred in and accepted by both houses. In 1745, the old light or conservative, not the reform element, was predominant in the corporation. Rev. Samuel Cooke, one of the Fellows, favored the formation of the New Light or Whitehaven, now the North Church in New Haven, by persons who had seceded from the First Church, and presided at a council of four ministers who approved of the purpose. In September, 1845, and of course after the passage of the act in question, the corporation in his absence, on account of sickness in his family, took measures looking to his expulsion and appointed a committee to submit to him in writing the charges against him. He does not appear to have made any answer, but resigned in the following April. 2 Trumbull, 344, Id. 340 to 350, Yale Book, Art. Corporation, 177-8.

This perhaps rather tedious historical statement of details carried down to the very session at which the act of 1745 was passed, shows the disposition of the Rector and the rest of the trustees and of the Legislature at that time, and that it is not possible to import into their action in the first half of the eighteenth century, the spirit of the last half of the nineteenth. It seems impossible, with these circumstances in view, without prejudice to believe, in the absence of express words to that effect, that it was intended to repeal the provision, which the founders established as the prime security for the college being a Protestant, Christian College; those provisions which made it such or which made it a place where youth might be instructed in the arts and sciences. In the resolution to which we have referred, adopted in 1753, the President and Fellows say: "We the successors of the said founders, being in our judgments, of the same principles in religion with our predecessors and esteeming ourselves bound in fidelity to the trust committed to us to carry on the same design," etc. That the Protestant character had not changed, appears from the oaths exacted by the act of 1745, of the President and Fellows and their successors, and all professors, tutors and officers of the College, of allegiance to the house of Hanover and support of the Protestant succession with the subscription of a declaration against the ecclesiastical jurisdiction or authority of any foreign potentate within the realm.

It is said that there were bitter controversies. We know of none which affected this question or which were abated by the act of 1746. They were controversies within and not without the Congregational and Presbyterian denominations or with wild fanatics who belonged to none. The inhabitants of the colony may be said, with substantial, though not perfect accuracy, to have been wholly Congregational. Dr. Trumbull says, that nearly twenty years later or at the close of the year 1764, there were thirteen ministers of the Episcopal denomination in the colony, but that few of them were confined to one church only, and that they were missionaries from the society for propagating the gospel in foreign parts. 2 Trumb. Hist. of Conn., 537, and see Contributions to Eccles. Hist. of Conn. (Kingsley's), 267. The first Bishop of the Episcopal Church in Connecticut and in the United States, Samuel Seabury, was graduated in Yale College in 1748, as was Bishop Jarvis in 1761. Bishop Seabury was consecrated as such in 1784, at Aberdeen, Scotland. The first Methodist Society in Great Britain is said to have been organized in 1739, and the first Methodist Church erected in this country, John Street Church in the City of New York, was built in 1768. The Baptists and Quakers in the colony were insignificant in numbers; if there were any Roman Catholics, there were hardly any and they may be said to have been unknown. Episcopalians, Baptists and Quakers were not molested in the college, so far as appears, on account of their denominational preferences. See the Cleavelands' memorial. How it is possible, that clerical trustees, anxious to throw every safeguard round their officers in respect to the Puritan faith and so zealous in the same direction in regard to their students, with such a President, or the Legislature of such a colony should have had the intention imputed to it, is very difficult to understand. President Clap, in his farewell oration at the Commencement of 1766, says, that with zeal and the most ardent endeavor, he had labored to promote the honor and greatest advantage of the college "*præsertim ut religionis puræ principiis juvenum mentes imbuantur.*"

The college record shows, that "at a meeting of the Trustees of Yale College, in New Haven, Sept. 12, 1744, a draught of a

new charter for this college being read and approved by this board, voted, that the rector, with any two or three of the trustees, do present the same to the General Assembly, desiring that they would be pleased to pass it into an act." The draught of the act is said to have been made by President Clap, and afterwards revised by Thomas Fitch, a graduate of the college, afterwards Governor of the Colony. The phrase, "new charter," used by the register in the record, may have given the impression that it is a new charter entirely superseding the old, though it is not said so, and the expression is only a general, elliptical, convenient designation, the draught being of a bill for, etc., and may have been intended as an abbreviated form for a bill for a new act relating to the charter and has no legal effect, a name thus used not determining the properties of the act but its own language rightly construed. The act was not amended in its passage, except in the tenth section relating to exemption from taxation, by striking out the words "in any town" after the word "lying."

Upon the point whether the title of an act is part of the act, there are numerous authorities each way, but "it has been held that the title of an act explains the meaning of an act (*Bailie's Case*; 1 *Leach's Cases*, 442;" *People ex rel. Cooke vs. Wood*, 71 N. Y. R., 374; *U. S. vs. Fisher*, 2 Cranch, 386; *Same vs. Palmer*, 8 Wheat., 681). "The title of the act and the preamble to the act," says Kent, "are strictly speaking no parts of it. They may serve to show the general scope and purport of the act and the inducement which led to its enactment. They may at times aid in the construction of it. . . The title, as it was observed in *U. S. vs. Fisher* (2 Cranch, 386), when taken in connection with other parts, may assist in removing ambiguities when the intent is not plain. . . The true rule is, that the preamble may be resorted to in restraint of the generality of the enacting clause, where it is inconvenient if not restrained, or it may be resorted to in explanation of the enacting clause if it be doubtful." 1 Kent's Com., 430, 431. If preambles are sometimes loosely and carelessly drawn, that is not the present case. In *Crespigny vs. Wittenoom*, 4 Term R., 790, Buller, J., says: "I agree that the preamble cannot control the enacting part of a statute, which is expressed in clear and unambiguous terms.

But if any doubt arise on the words of the enacting clause, the preamble may be resorted to to explain it." Grose, J., says: "Though the preamble cannot control the enacting part, we may compare it with the rest of the act in order to collect the intention of the legislature." *Claim to Dukedom of Sussex*, 8 Lond. Jur., 795; 15 John. R., 116; *Furman vs. City of N. Y.*, 5 Sand., 18. The solution of the difference of opinion as to the title is obvious. The title and the preamble form not any part of the legislative mandate to the citizen or subject, but they are not therefore worthless. They are parts of the transaction, belong as their names indicate to the statute, are inseparably connected with it, are passed, attested and recorded with it. At the very lowest, they are contemporaneous recorded declarations of the legislature, so recorded by its express direction. It is a familiar rule, applicable to every document, be it statute, deed, contract or will, that in the construction of it every part is to be considered. *Holbrook vs. Holbrook*, 1 Pick. (Mass.) R., 258. This is for the reason, that in every deliberate act there are harmony and consistency of mind and purpose.

The act is entitled "An act for the more full and complete establishment of Yale College in New Haven, and for enlarging the powers and privileges thereof." It is an act to perfect the establishment of something already established, and to enlarge its powers and privileges; not to create a new college or a college upon a new basis, but to confirm and strengthen that already existing, by completing it, and giving larger powers and privileges. The preamble recited that "Whereas, upon the petition," etc., the original charter was granted on the 9th of October, 1701, and the trustees in pursuance thereof "founded a collegiate school at New Haven by the name of Yale College," and the act of the tenth day of October, 1728, was passed, "as by the respective acts reference thereto being had more fully and at large may appear," and "whereas, the present trustees, naming them, have petitioned that the said school, with all the rights, powers and privileges may be confirmed, and that such other additional powers and privileges may be granted as shall be necessary to the ordering and managing the said school in the most advantageous and beneficial manner for the promotion of good literature in the present and succeeding generations, therefore," etc.

It is suggested, that this petition was not complied with; that only the title to the property was confirmed. That could not have been the opinion of the trustees who proposed the act and presented the petition, nor of the legislature who gave the petition as a reason for their action. The word "confirm" is indeed only used in respect to the title, but the former statutes are recognized as valid, and the persons named as the present trustees and the legal successors of the founders. The implied incorporation is confirmed by an express declaration of the corporate character, with the usual corporate powers, implied powers by being turned into express ones, and wherever the old provisions are reenacted or referred to with or without alteration or modification, they are confirmed except as to such modification or alteration.

It would have been very remarkable, if the petitioners for the confirmation of the rights of the college had drawn, presented and procured to be passed an act which did not confirm them. Thomas Clap and his associates were expressly recognized as the present trustees and legal successors of the founders, and when the former, the present head of the college, was "established as present President" and the latter, present trustees, were "established as the present Fellows," they might well believe that their rights were confirmed. The original charter provided that the number of trustees should not exceed eleven nor be less than seven. The existing number, eleven, adopted by the trustees, was perpetuated. The duties of the Rector were not defined by the original charter nor are those of the President by the act of 1745. These must in a great measure be regulated by the statutes and usages of the college. The ordinary duties of the rector were not changed when under the act of 1728 he became a trustee, and the ordinary duties of Thomas Clap, Rector and Trustee, do not appear to have been materially changed when he was established as President. He did not think that they were, if we may judge from his conduct. The President is the head of the corporation and we suppose is entitled to preside at corporate meetings, and he is only removable for the causes specified, while "the humble rector," as he is called, as the humble professors and humble tutors at present, might be removed by the trus-

tees or corporation for any cause by them deemed sufficient. But the President is not the mere presiding officer of a board of managers any more than the president of a bank is a mere chairman of a board of directors, nor besides this can it be inferred from the title that the function of either is only to govern. The former is the president, or master, or principal of a college, a seminary of learning, not an honorary chancellor of a university, the financial agent, who is the treasurer, nor merely the chief executive officer. His duty as it has been conceived and practiced by every president of the college, is to teach as well as govern, and he is elected for that purpose. Such was the nature of the office according to the usage of the older colleges.

In the choice of a president the offer has necessarily come first from the corporation and has been upon the express or implied and well understood conditions of residence and a compliance with the statutes of the college. Every president has become such in compliance with those conditions. Until 1823 those statutes required a precedent or contemporaneous declaration of faith. No one has become and acted as president who has not been a minister of the gospel, residing in Connecticut, and of the age of thirty years and upwards. If any technical errors or irregularities have occurred in the manner of carrying out the provision in question, they are nothing to the purpose. This is not a case upon *quo warranto*.

The act of 1728, when it made the rector a trustee during his term of office did not repeal the provision as to the qualifications of trustees and there does not appear to be any reason why the act of 1745 should have greater effect in this respect, by enacting that the head of the college, designated as president, should be a member of the corporation and by prolonging his term of office until his death or resignation or his removal for "any misdemeanor, unfaithfulness, default or incapacity." The charter of 1701 imposed no limitation upon the appointment of a rector and under it the trustees might have appointed a layman, but whether they might have done so after the act of 1728, when the choice of a rector was also the choice of a trustee, is another question. Might eleven trustees have been elected besides the rector, or did he become

one of the eleven provided for by the charter? In point of fact, he was always during his term of office a resident minister of the gospel. But if the case of the rector was exceptional, that did not repeal the provision, for it is amended by the act of 1728, and if the case of the president be also exceptional, that does not any more repeal it but only modifies it as to him or excepts him from it. In determining whether the president is exempt, these things are to be considered, the object and intent of the provision, the fullest force of which applies to the president, the design of the college as viewed in 1745, "the principal design of the pious founders" of which, or "one principal end proposed" was declared by both the legislature and the corporation about that time to be "to educate and train up youth for the ministry," or "to supply the churches in this colony with a learned, pious and orthodox ministry," and a layman would have been thought inappropriate as the head of such an institution, that every rector had been a resident minister of the gospel, that President Clap, rector and trustee, is declared by the act to be one of the successors of the original trustees and his successors sit in his seat, and the assimilation of the president as a corporator, except as to his right to preside, to the other members; his rights being the same, and his term of office and his liability to removal the same. The uniform usage is also entitled to great, if not controlling, force. The words of the statute are "associate," "nominated or associated." No reason readily occurs, why the colonial act should permit the president to be a layman if the other members of the corporation must be ministers of the gospel. It does not say so unless it is implied in the mere title and office of president. It is not easy to infer an intention to make a distinction. If there were such intention, why was it not clearly expressed? The provision, if applicable, must of course be reasonably applied to carry out its object and intent, and consistently with the nature of the office of president. That office was intended by the act to be permanent "during life" or until resignation or removal "for any misdemeanor, unfaithfulness, default or incapacity," and the president to be a permanent part of the corporation and no temporary officer or evasion by a new name would seem to satisfy the terms.

By the reference in the preamble to the former statutes, they are incorporated therein as completely as if they were set forth at large. So it is with pleadings, contracts, wills: *Matter of comrs. of Park Av., Albany*, 52 N. Y. R., 131, 136; *Rogers vs. Kneeland*, 10 Wen. R., 218, affirmed 13 Id., 114; *Studwell vs. Terrett*, 4 Bosw. (N. Y.), 520; *Jackson vs. Babcock*, 12 John., R. 389; *Tonnelle vs. Hall*, 4 N. Y. (4 Coma.), 140; 1 *Jarman on Wills*, 88, and cases cited. In *Furman vs. The City of New York*, 5 Sandf., Superior (N. Y.) R. 16, the preamble and the petition referred to therein determined the construction of a statute.

Assuming this, let us read so much of the preamble as is pertinent in connection with the 6th section. Whereas on the 9th of October, 1701, the Governor and company in General Court assembled, granted, etc., by an act, which is in part as follows: "And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that the before named trustees, partners or undertakers with such others as they shall associate to themselves not exceeding eleven or at any time being less than seven, provided also that persons nominated or associated from time to time to fill up said number be ministers of the gospel within this colony and above the age of forty years or the major part of them the said [trustees] and of the said persons so chosen and associated as above said at any time hereafter Have and shall have henceforward the oversight," etc., [of said collegiate school]. And whereas by the act of 10th of October, 1823 [in substance the right of election was declared to extend to cases of resignation and incapacity, and the age required was reduced from forty to thirty years] and whereas the present trustees have petitioned "that the said school with all the rights, powers, and privileges, and interests may be confirmed and that such other additional powers and privileges may be granted as shall be necessary," it is enacted as follows:

"6. That the President and Fellows of the said college and their successors, in any of their meetings assembled as aforesaid, shall and may from time to time, as occasion shall require, elect, and appoint a President or Fellow in the room and place of any President or Fellow, who shall die, resign or be removed from his office, place or trust (whom the said

Governor and company hereby declare for any misdemeanor, unfaithfulness, default, or incapacity, shall be removable by the President and Fellows of the said college; six of them at least concurring in said act)." The preamble thus read with the sixth section throws a clear light upon it. If any one can see any inconsistency between that preamble, incorporating the prior acts and that section, or discover any intention to repeal, when the two are compared, he must be more lynx-eyed than ourselves. The result is similar if the statutes are simply compared as being in *pari materia*. The plain intent of that section as regards this subject is merely to state the cases in which the right of election may be used and to add to the others the case of removal for the causes therein mentioned and to give such right of removal to the corporation. The act itself makes eleven Protestant clergymen, who resided within the colony and who were of the required age, the first corporators under its provisions.

We do not understand why so weak an argument should be used as that the act makes no allusion to religion, except as it speaks of the benefactions of many liberal and piously disposed persons. If that were true, as in respect to the enacting clauses to some extent it is, it would tend to prove that it was not intended that the act of 1745 should be complete without the aid of the prior legislation, it being considered at what time, at whose instance, and in what community the act was passed. But the preamble, which not only refers to the prior acts "at large" but recites that the college has received the gifts of many "piously disposed persons and under the blessing of Almighty God has trained up many worthy persons for the service of God in the State as well as the Church," is an answer to the argument. That the college had fulfilled the "pious resolutions" and "so necessary and religious an undertaking" of the founders, spoken of in the original charter is assigned as a reason for the present act. Did the Colonial Legislature at that very time intend to subvert that religious character and original design? Who can believe it? The "benefactions" mentioned were on the sacred trust, upon which the college was founded. In 1745, the year when, to use a well known expression, the friends of the Pretender were

out, the voluntary proposal and the requirement of the oaths mentioned in the 7th section, of the President and Fellows and their successors and all professors, tutors, and officers of the college, of adhesion to the reigning dynasty and the Protestant succession and against the Pretender, in effect, all his open and secret abettors, with the subscription of a declaration against the ecclesiastical or spiritual jurisdiction or authority of any foreign prince, prelate, or potentate, within the realm, were characteristic of Protestants and likely to make the college for an indefinite period a Protestant college. 1 Black, Com., 217, 868. The extraordinary and now happily obsolete power is given at the close of the 6th section "to prescribe and administer such forms of oaths (not being contrary to the laws of England or of this colony) as they shall think proper, to be administered to all the officers and instructors of the said college or to such and so many of them as they shall think proper, for the faithful execution of their respective places, offices, and trusts." We do not know for what purpose this power was given except a religious one,—to subject such instructors and officers to such religious tests as the Corporation might impose.

The rule has not been overlooked, that "where a later statute not purporting to amend a former one, covers the whole subject, and was plainly intended to furnish the only law upon the subject, the former statute must be held repealed by necessary implication." *Heckman vs. Pinkney*, 81 N. Y., 211. That was the case of successive lien laws. It was held of the latter that "it covers the whole subject of liens in the city of New York and provides a complete scheme for creating and enforcing them. It does not in terms repeal the former act, but it was the manifest purpose of the legislature, that it should have that effect." But the present case does not fulfill the conditions of the rule. It does not cover the whole subject and it was not plainly intended to furnish the whole law on the subject. The reverse is true. The subject is the college as founded and conducted in conformity with the charter, as "a school wherein youth may be instructed in the arts and sciences," a Protestant, Christian college, under the government of a body composed of ministers of the gospel, residing

in the colony, of mature age, having the right of election of their successors from the same class only. These parts of the subject the act does not cover. In the enacting clauses, it does not mention the object or end of the college, made so prominent in the original charter. It does not speak of the college as a school or seminary of the arts and sciences, except in the preamble, which we are told is of little consequence, and which certainly has no enacting force. It does indeed authorize the appointment of tutors and professors "for promoting good literature" but it would seem to strain that phrase very much from its natural and usual meaning to include in it the sciences. It says nothing of the college being a Protestant, Christian college; nor of the qualifications necessary for those elected to be successors of the Fellows or members of the Corporation, except by the general reference to the prior acts in the preamble. These parts of the subject are not touched. The rule where the new law covers the whole subject and is plainly intended to be a substitute for the whole previous law, proceeds upon the ground of a presumed intention to repeal the particular provisions omitted. But here there is no such intention or presumption of intention. The design of the founders and of the original charter, the history of the college, the character of the parties proposing the act and of the community in which it was passed, the times, the circumstances, the prior law, the true construction of the act itself and the nature of the provisions omitted forbid such a presumption. These were fundamental in themselves and in the view of the founders and of the successive governments of the college and of the colony. Suppose that it had been proposed by any one in express terms to the Legislature, that the former acts should be repealed, that the college should no longer be required to be a Protestant, Christian college, or a school of arts and sciences, that the persons eligible to become members of the Corporation should no longer be only ministers of the gospel, or residents within the colony, or of the age of thirty years, but might reside anywhere, be of any age and be ministers of the gospel or not. How can we presume an intention indirectly to do that, which we know that, if proposed to the Legislature, it would at once have rejected; to do that upon

the proposal of a select body of Protestant clergymen and of a scientific president? The act is plainly amendatory. Dr. Woolsey says of it in his *Historical Discourse*: "The charter was amended and improved."—*Hist. Dis.*, p. 29.

In the 11th section there is an express repeal of the grant of a sum of money yearly in the charter by the substitution of £100 annually "in lieu of all former grants." Why this specification of a part, if the whole charter were repealed?

In the *People vs. Deming*, *supra*, there were successive pilot-acts relating to the East River, adjacent to the city of New York. The act of 1830 inflicted a penalty of thirty dollars upon any person, not being a branch or licensed pilot, who should act as a pilot for any vessel on said river, to be sued for in the name of the master warden of the port of New York. The later pilot acts repeated the penalty but omitted the provision in regard to the name in which it was to be sued for, and repealed all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with them. But it was held that this provision was not repealed by the omission. The court says that there is no repugnancy and the intention must prevail. In *Smith vs. The People*, 47 N. Y. (Court of Appeals), *supra*, it was held that an absolute repealing clause of former specified acts was qualified and restrained by the intention, so that it did not repeal a provision in them that a judge of the Supreme Court might hold the Oyer and Terminer in the city of New York alone. This was a decision of grave importance, for if it did repeal the provision all the judgments for two years in the criminal trials in that court were invalid. And a like decision would follow as to the Court of Sessions in that city and county. There are numerous cases where a statute universal and absolute in its terms and extending to the whole State has been held not to repeal a previous special statute. *Pease vs. Whitney*, V. Mass. R. 380; *Capen vs. Glover*, IV. Mass. R. 305; matter of *D. & H. Co.*, 69 N. Y. R. 209; *People. etc., vs. Quinn*, 59 N. Y., 88; matter of *Commissioners of Central Park*, 50 N. Y. R. 493. This is upon the intention. All the force of a statute is in its intention and it cannot have a larger operation. If the express letter of a statute can be thus overcome, it must be comparatively easy to overcome its silence. We repeat that

the legislative will once declared cannot be annulled or repealed except by a clear declaration of that will to this effect, or by a constitutional enactment. No court can do it. The usual, or as it is sometimes expressed, the invariable rule, is that if the earlier and later statutes, or parts of statutes, can stand together (as they can here), and are not inconsistent with one another, they both remain in force.

It would not be candid to deny that if the act in question were looked at as a recent and not an ancient statute, if the title and preamble or their legal effect were rejected, if the history of the college and of the colony, the attendant and precedent circumstances were overlooked or disregarded, an argument might be drawn of considerable apparent strength upon a superficial examination in favor of repeal, of greatest apparent strength of course to those who desire such repeal, from the omissions and largeness of the provisions of the act of 1745. That act might be put in force as a college charter without reference to the prior acts or if those acts were repealed, although conscientious persons might be embarrassed by the limitation of the appointment of tutors and professors to "the promoting good literature," and the Sheffield Scientific School and the professional schools might find it difficult to live under that unqualified limitation. But upon a close examination of the act, in its place in history, whatever apparent strength at first sight there is in the argument on that side disappears, overborne by other considerations.

As an original question, therefore, we think that there is no such repeal as is claimed, and that the provision in the original charter, as amended by the act of 1828, as to the qualifications of the Trustees or Fellows of the Corporation remains in full force and must be obeyed.

But the question does not rest here. The practical, contemporaneous construction, the fact that the act did not alter in the slightest degree the practice in regard to the succession of members of the corporation and was not claimed to have been intended to alter it, and the unbroken usage in respect to the exercise of the right of election decides it beyond appeal. Where an old statute has received an early practical construction, which, if it were *res integra*, it might be difficult to main-

tain, yet it will be supported on the ground that long and continued usage furnishes a contemporaneous construction which must prevail. *Rogers vs. Goodwin*, 2 Mass. R., 475; *Packard vs. Richardson*, 17 Mass. R. 144.

Long and uninterrupted usage under a statute is evidence of its construction. *Fort vs. Burch*, 6 Barb. (N. Y.), R. 69, 73; 5 Cranch 22, 32. *Vaugh.* 169, 4 Term R., 819; 2 Barb. Chan. R., 269; 3 Barb. Ch. R., 577. This is emphatically true of charters. Where franchises are claimed and there is continual possession with use according to the claim, 2 Inst., 282, 4 Term R., 819, 821; 6 Term R., 398, *Livingston vs. Tenbroek*, 16 John. R., 18, 23 and cases cited.

Ancient statutes have often received a construction, which would not now be made, but which is yet held valid. Immemorial usage has made the common law, and though a question of statutory construction is not a question of the common law, yet in case of doubt regarding it a similar usage may well have a like weight.

In this case the legislature and the people have not only by acquiescence participated in the construction followed by the corporation, but in the act of 1792, as we have said, have virtually ratified it. The acts of May, 1819, and of 1871 and 1872, substituted "six senior senators" in the place of the "six senior assistants in the council," added to the members of the corporation by the act of 1792, and six graduates elected by the alumni "in the stead of the six senior senators," of course with the same reservation as to the election of the successors of the original trustees, and seem thereby to have confirmed the construction of the former act. The act of 1838 distinguishes and guards still further the rights of the successors of the original trustees by requiring that a majority of them must be present to make a quorum at the meetings of the corporation. Why, if such successors might be laymen? This practical construction by the legislature begun so long ago and continued through so many years, acquiesced in and acted upon and never before so far as known questioned, is entitled to great weight and has almost the force of a judicial decision. *People vs. Dayton*, 55 N. Y. R., 367, 378; *Story on Const.*, Sec. 408, *Cooley's Const. Lim.*, 67. See *supra*.

We therefore conclude that the acts subsequent to 1701 are amending acts and do not repeal the original charter, but that that charter with the amendments or the original charter and the subsequent acts taken together in their proper place and application, form the Charter of Yale College. We do not regret this. We would not remove any security for the Christian character of the college, although we would have its administration large hearted and generous. The lay element in the corporation is sufficiently large to secure the wise counsel, assistance and influence of able men, if the right of election be discreetly exercised by the graduates, while the clerical members will give steadiness and fidelity to their sacred trust and to that historical character, which, notwithstanding the errors of less enlightened times, has made Yale College what it is. The clergy are by their vocation teachers, and are interested in the cause of education. Those of them who are graduates of the college have been the firm and faithful friends and supporters of it. Under the government as at present constituted the college has prospered, is prospering, and may be expected to prosper. As of old—

*"Sunt quibus unum opus est intactae Palladis urbem,
Carminē perpetuo celebrare et,
Undique decerptam fronti praeponere olivam."*

But as our wise and venerated friend, who yet survives to teach us the simplicity of wisdom and what may be accomplished by devotion to high pursuits, who unites so admirably the spirit of conversatism with the spirit of progress, Dr. Woolsey, has said, "There may be new [or other] institutions better than Yale; we claim no superiority nor suppose that we have reached perfection. But we love our college better than we can the result of some modern experiment, because it is venerable, because it is deserving of love and because it is ours."

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ARTICLE IV.—HISTORIC STAGES OF THE THEORY OF THE ATONEMENT.

THE primary meaning of the word Atonement as given by Webster is agreement, concord. I wish it understood at the start that throughout the discussion which follows I shall use the word atonement in that broad and comprehensive sense. Theology has suffered greatly in the attempt to confine this word to its narrower signification of expiation, which is only one among several moments in the complete work of atonement.

The doctrine of the Atonement treats of the mediation required in order to restore the union between God and man which has been destroyed by sin. This mediation is accomplished in Jesus Christ. In the person of Jesus Christ, God and man are *at-oned* or atoned. Christ is the Atonement.

In the Scriptures and in the writings of the Christian fathers we look in vain for anything like a systematic statement of the theory of the Atonement. At first the truths of Christianity were handled experimentally and practically rather than philosophically. But by and by men began to go back of the historic fact of the Atonement and to enquire why it was necessary and how it was accomplished. So a soteriology or philosophy of the scheme of salvation began to be constructed.

In the early patristic writings the germs of most of the later theories of the Atonement are to be found. But these germs are scattered and are put forward, if at all, only incidentally and without logical clearness. In the course of the centuries, however, these germinal ideas one after another have been taken up and systematically developed by the theologians of the church. So that it is now possible if not to state the theory of the Atonement completely, at least to mark the chief aspects under which it has been viewed, to trace the development of certain theories based upon these several aspects, and perhaps to indicate how these partial theories unite toward the forming of one harmonious whole. The present paper is an essay in that direction.

In a discussion of this kind it is helpful to begin at the beginning and to note the first rude and vague attempts of man, apart from the revelation recorded in the Scriptures, toward accomplishing atonement. These attempts may be traced in the customs of heathen sacrifices.

It seems natural to man to regard the superior powers in whose existence he believes as more or less hostile to himself. "It is the instinct of the savage" says Mr. Tylor in his *Primitive Culture*, "to conceive of the external world as on the whole evil rather than good." The Hottentots, for example, according to Thunberg "have very vague ideas about a good deity. They have much clearer notions about an evil spirit whom they fear, believing him to be the occasion of sickness, death, thunder, and every calamity which befalls them." Savage tribes in general regard their deities very much as they do powerful chiefs who demand homage and tribute and whose avenging wrath will be kindled if the homage and tribute are withheld. To keep on good terms with the invisible powers and when they are angry to propitiate them is the general endeavor among barbarous peoples. In these rude efforts of savage men to secure the favor of their deities we may discover the first faint foreshadowings of the Atonement between God and man which the consciousness of the race declares to be necessary.

As one studies the heathen customs of sacrifice certain prefigurements of the rationale of the Atonement emerge. The following instance from Guinea will illustrate what may be regarded I think as the fundamental principle in such sacrificial offerings: "Once, in 1698, the sea being unusually rough the head men complained to the king, who desired them to be easy and he would make the sea quiet next day. Accordingly he sent his fetishman with a jar of palm-oil, a bag of rice and corn, a bottle of brandy, a piece of painted calico, and several other things to present to the sea. Being come to the sea-side he made a speech to it, assuring it that his king was its friend and loved the white man; that they were honest fellows and came to trade with him for what he wanted; and that he requested the sea not to be angry nor to hinder them to land their goods; he told it that if it wanted some palm-oil, his king had sent it some; and so threw the jar with the oil into the sea as he did

with the same compliment the rice, the corn, the brandy, the calico, etc." In the African sacrifice thus picturesquely described is shown very clearly the common feeling among savage races that a god, like a chief, can be propitiated and persuaded to confer benefits by a gift of something which is precious. The foundation of sacrifice thus appears to be propitiation. Propitiation in the primary and broad * sense of securing the favor of the superior being, appeasing his wrath by a gift if his wrath appears to be kindled.

Of course there is present also the anthropomorphic notion that the god will take pleasure in the meat and drink and clothing which are offered to him just as a man would be pleased by such gifts. From the offering of things like food and drink which it is supposed the deity can make use of, the sun for example drinking up the libation and the sea swallowing up the gift dropped into it, the transition is easy to offerings made as a simple token of respect. Thus the Guinea negro drops a leaf or a sea-shell and the Hindoo holds up a little of his rice and offers it in thought to Siva or Vishnu before he eats it. Here in addition to the element of propitiation by a gift emerges very distinctly the idea of simple homage or worship.

But besides this advance from the propitiatory gift to an act of homage there is apparent even among heathen nations the idea that the essential value of sacrifice lies in the worshiper's surrender of something which is precious to him rather than in any substantial benefit which the deity derives from the sacrifice. Thus, for example, it is said that the Assinoboin Indians do not object to friendly parties of Indians carrying off for their own use the kettles and blankets which have been left in the woods as "medicine offerings." They seem to consider that the prime end of the sacrifice has been attained by the mere surrender of something which the votary held precious. So in ancient times the Phœnicians for their yearly sacrifice offered only-begotten sons of their parents, holding apparently that the efficiency of the sacrifice lay in the sacrificer's grievous bereavement. In II. Kings iii. 27, we have it recorded that Mesha,

* It should be said, by the way, that propitiation does not necessarily involve the allaying of anger on the part of the god, but only the securing of the divine favor.

king of Moab, when hotly beleaguered offered up his eldest son upon the wall in the sight of both armies as a burnt-offering—so intending to propitiate the god Chemosh by the costliest offering that he could devise. In such sacrifices certainly the idea of self-abnegation appears very plainly as an element in the work of Atonement between man and God. It is not surprising then that in the Divine Providence the sacrifice of the fruits of the earth and of animals as a religious rite in existence from the earliest times, of world-wide prevalence and intrinsically of deep significance should appear as the main feature of the Mosaic ritual; should in that ritual be organized, enlarged in the scope of its meaning and solemnly sanctioned in the Jewish law as a representative and provisional agency of Atonement.

For, in general, it is a principle of that process of Divine Revelation which obtains in the Old Testament, that modes of thought already established by the Spirit of God working among the Gentiles, are used so far as they can be consistently as vehicles of religious instruction for the Jews. Through channels already worn, fuller and fuller tides of truth are poured. Reverently it may be said that the Divine Mind is always compelled to limit and narrow its utterances to the capacity of those to whom the message is to be brought. As we to our children, so the Heavenly Father must needs speak in the language of childhood, and under the limitations of childish conceptions, to races yet in the estate of childhood.

Therefore, when the doctrine of the Atonement is studied in the Old Testament, we must expect to find the Jewish ideas based upon and developed out of the fundamental elements in the Atonement which we have found appearing under the fainter illumination of the Holy Spirit, even in heathen systems of worship. The light from above is manifest in the souls of men from the beginning. But as we come down the centuries we find it shining brighter and brighter unto the perfect day. The Old Testament doctrine of the atonement is a development of germs already divinely implanted in the heathen sacrificial system—the heathen distortions and corruptions and being lopped off—and a whole influx of new and higher significances and powers being brought in.

Proceeding now to study this divinely guided process of devel-

opment, let it be remarked that, in the heathen customs of sacrificial atonement, three ideas appeared prominent.

1. The idea of Propitiation.
2. The idea of Homage or Worship.
3. The idea of Self-abnegation.

Now, precisely these elements in the heathen customs of sacrificial atonement are the three prominent elements in the sacrificial system of atonement instituted by God through Moses.

The Law of Leviticus unfolds three general forms of sacrifice.*

- a—The Expiatory, } Sin Offering,
or Propitiatory, } Trespass Offering.
- b—The Eucharistic, or } Meat Offering (unbloody)
Offering of Worship, } Peace Offering (bloody)
- c—Self-Dedicatory, } The whole Burnt Offering.

It will be my object in what follows to show that these three elements, viz: the propitiatory or expiatory, the eucharistic, and the self-dedicatory, are three constituent and permanent elements in the theory of the atonement. I shall attempt to show how, in the doctrinal progress of the ages, each one of these elements has steadily acquired clearer form and profounder spiritual significance; and, lastly, I shall seek to indicate how these three movements of thought upon the atonement seem likely to be gathered, in the theological systems of the future, into a substantial and vital unity.

I. The Propitiatory or Expiatory Element in the Theory of the Atonement.

To propitiate, in the broadest sense of the word, means to secure the favor of the being addressed. It is not necessarily implied that the superior being has been angered by some act of the worshiper, and that his wrath must be appeased. As commonly used, however, propitiation means "the act appeasing wrath and conciliating an offended person."

In the word expiation, however, is involved necessarily a measure of guilt. Unless wrong has been done there cannot be any expiation.

In this connection it is worthy of note that in the ante-Mosaic period, before the establishment of the Law, the words specially

* See the excellent article on Sacrifice, by Dr. Barry, in Smith's Bible Dictionary.

denoting expiatory offerings were not applied to the sacrifices. The sin offering and the trespass offering do not appear. As Dr. Barry has remarked: "This fact does not at all show that the early sacrifices were not actually expiatory, nor even that the offerers had not that idea of expiation which must have been vaguely felt in all sacrifices; but it does justify the inference that this idea was not then the prominent one in sacrifice." "The law entered," says St. Paul, "that sin might abound." Before the coming of the law, then, we need not be surprised that the endeavor of the worshiper lay rather in the direction of securing the favor of the Deity than of appeasing His righteous indignation against sin. The ruling desire in the hearts of the early sacrificers, spoken of in Genesis, appears to have been to procure the favor of the Supreme Being by bringing to Him gifts which they deemed would be precious in His sight, as in their own. They seem to have had very much the same notion as the childish heathen peoples about them, that God would take a human pleasure in the smell of the roasting flesh of the victims. When Noah offered his burnt offerings we are told that "the Lord smelled a sweet savor," and the one reason which is given after every sacrifice enjoined in the first chapters of Leviticus is that it shall make a sweet savor unto the Lord.

Under the Mosaic economy, however, the consciousness of sin increases; the distinctly expiatory sacrifices are instituted and invested with great solemnity. The ritual of the great day of Atonement was calculated to make a profound impression on every Jewish mind. The covering of the iniquity of the nation and of individuals came to be the sovereign element in the sacrificial system.

This deepening sense of the exceeding sinfulness of sin indicates the Divine guidance of the chosen people. At first the sin-consciousness of the children of Israel was faint like that of the heathen nations round about them. But by the law came the knowledge of sin and the sense that God was angry with the wicked, and that the wrath of the Holy One must be appeased by expiatory offerings. But the advance of the propitiatory sacrifices of the Jew beyond those of the heathen is indicated in this: that the heathen seek to appease a wrath in

the Divine mind, kindled they know not how, unless by some slight rendered to the Deity, while the Jew was led to recognize more and more clearly that it was transgressions of the moral rather than the ceremonial law which displeased the Divine Being and made a breach between Him and His creatures and necessitated an atonement.

What an immense gain in religious thought and worship was involved in this single new conception, it is now difficult for us to realize. We need not be surprised that the advance along this line was made only gradually. It is not strange that in Leviticus the injunctions of the ceremonial came into curious juxtaposition and apparent equivalence with the injunctions of the moral law; that, e. g., the solemn sanction, "I am the Lord thy God"—stands not only after the command—"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," but also in the same chapter, after the command, to count the fruit of all trees for three years as uncircumcised.

But as within the chrysalis is hidden a life which by and by shall stir and come forth in freedom, leaving the dead cocoon behind, so within the ceremonial law of Moses was hidden a spiritual law which was destined to come forth into newness of life, leaving the ceremonial integuments behind when their work of protection had been fully accomplished. As we read in the prophets we see the stirrings of this new life. It appears conspicuously in the profounder sense of sin and the truer conception of the needful propitiation for sin which are revealed in the prophetic books.

But before passing to the theory of the atonement as it appears in the prophetic books, let us note that concurrently with the development of the expiatory element in the Mosaic system, came the development

II. *Of the Eucharistic Element.*

In the heathen sacrifices, and to a less extent in the patriarchal sacrifices, the three distinct forms of sacrificial atonement, the expiatory, the eucharistic, and the dedicatory, were not clearly differenced from each other. In the Mosaic ritual these three elements in the atonement are brought out clearly and distinctly. In particular, the eucharistic sacrifice, the meat offering was enjoined as a part of the daily, morning and evening

sacrifices, as well as of the Sabbath offering, and of the offerings at the great festivals, and of the offerings on the great day of atonement. It was thus organized into a stated order of worship. Its meaning is expressed in the words of David, "All that is in the heaven and in the earth is Thine; all things come of Thee, and of *Thine own have we given Thee.*" It was a worshipful recognition of the sovereignty and goodness of God, an institution of praise and prayer regularly uttered in action instead of words. The homage thus rendered to the Divine Being eventuated naturally in due time in the songs of praise which were sung in the temple worship. These amplified and elevated the worship which had been earlier expressed only by the meat offering. How the sacrifice and the music united to produce one common expression of adoration, is vividly illustrated in the book of Chronicles: "And Hezekiah commanded to offer the burnt-offering upon the altar; and when the burnt-offering began, the song of Jehovah began also, with the trumpets and the instruments of David, king of Israel. And all the congregation worshiped, and the singers sang, and the trumpets sounded, all until the burnt-offering was finished." It is easy to imagine how the souls of the devout there present were borne up into communion with the Eternal, upon the wings of song, more than upon the smoke of the altar. We behold thus in the progress of divine revelation, that eucharistic element of the atonement, which had at first appeared in occasional offerings of fruits of the earth and victims from the flock, becoming refined and spiritualized. The fruit of the lips making confession of God's name becoming a sacrifice of praise.

Our study of the theory of the atonement, as it is presented in the Mosaic system, will not be complete unless we observe also the prominence which is given in it to

III. *The Self-dedicatory Element.*

This element finds its embodiment under the Levitical law in the burnt-offering. "The burnt-offering was wholly consumed by fire on the altar, and the whole of it, except the refuse ashes, ascended in the smoke to God." It was rendered every day, morning and evening, and in connection with it was noteworthy provision, "The fire shall *ever* be burning upon the altar; it shall never go out."

The burnt-offering thus became a vivid and ever present reminder of the duty of every soul to make an entire and eternal consecration of itself to the service of God. The devotion of the soul to God was to be as a fire that never should go out. Self-dedication was represented as the normal state of the soul. By it the atonement with God was fully accomplished. The burnt-offering followed upon the sin-offering, as indicating that while all must pass through the gateway of expiation—self-dedication was as it were the inner shrine of the temple where all the servants of God must abide.

Turning now to the later history of the Jewish Church, as recorded in the historical books, and especially in the Psalms and the Prophets, let us trace the further development of these three fundamental and permanent elements of the atonement, the expiatory, the eucharistic, and the self-dedicatory, and observe how the conception of them gains in breadth and freedom.

The first impression made upon the mind in this line is, that the whole sacrificial system is spoken of by the prophets in language almost of abhorrence. "I spoke not unto your fathers nor commanded them, in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt-offerings or sacrifices"—"Sacrifice and burnt-offerings Thou didst not desire." "I delight not in the blood of bullocks, or of lambs, or of he goats."

But this language doubtless is not to be understood as some have interpreted it, as expressing a desire for the abolition of sacrifices—but only a desire that the people shall understand the true spiritual import of their offerings. If we seek to ascertain what the prophets held the true spiritual significance to be, we shall find that they discovered a new and deeper meaning in each of the three elements of the sacrificial atonement which have been alluded to.

1. In the direction of Expiation. Whereas the law had ordained a system of sin-offerings by means of which guilty man might make an expiation for his transgressions—the prophets rather taught that it was God who moved first to bring about a reconciliation. This idea was indeed implied in the Mosaic cultus inasmuch as it was represented that God had

ordained the sacrificial system and so opened up the way of atonement for transgressors. Indeed this appears to be one of the distinctive features of the Jewish view of sacrifice as contrasted with the heathen. Whereas the heathens conceived of their gods as being subject to human passions and liable to ebullitions of wrath and malice, which man must appease as best he can by efforts of his own. Scripture represents God as himself approaching man and compassionately providing for the sinner a way of escape from the guilt of his sin. God as well as man is participant in the sacrificial atonement. But in the prophets this thought of God's being the prime mover is much more powerfully brought out. In the various prophetic books we find such clear and decisive utterances as the following: Lam. v. 20, 21, "Wherefore dost thou forget us forever and forsake us so long time. Turn *thou* us unto thee O Lord and we shall be turned. Ezek. xxxvi. 25-27, and 29, "*I will sprinkle clean water upon you and ye shall be clean; from all your filthiness and from all your idols will I cleanse you. A new heart also will I give you and a new spirit will I put within you and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh and I will give you an heart of flesh. And I will put my spirit within you and cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments and do them. . . I will also save you from all your uncleanness.*" And again that remarkable passage, Isaiah lvii. 16-19, "*I will not contend forever neither will I be always wroth. For the spirit should fail before me and the souls which I have made. For the iniquity of his covetousness was I wroth and smote him. I hid me and was wroth and he went on frowardly in the way of his heart. I have seen his ways and will heal him. I will lead him also and restore comforts unto him and to his mourners. I create the fruit * of the lips.*"

Such utterances as these stand out in sharp contrast to the idea which the heathen cultus fully conveys and the Levitical cultus seems partially to convey that it is man who must propitiate an angry God by arts of his own. In the law it is man who is required to make the expiatory sacrifices necessary to an atonement. In the prophets on the contrary God is repre-

* Compare Heb. xlii. 15.

sented as himself performing the work of expiation which is necessary to the atonement. In Jeremiah, and Isaiah, and Ezekiel we find already anticipated in a measure the teaching of Paul, that "God reconciles the world unto himself not imputing their trespasses unto them."

2. But the advance made in the prophetic doctrine of the Atonement is also evident as regards its Eucharistic element.

To render thanks to God for all his benefits is an act evidently adapted to bring the soul of the worshiper into communion with the Giver of every good and perfect gift. Under the early Hebrew ritual this gratitude of the worshiper was eminently expressed by the meat-offerings or sacrifices of thanksgiving. Stanley appears to go too far when he says in his *Essay on Eucharistic Sacrifice*, that "In the ancient Jewish and Pagan worship there was properly speaking no prayer and no praise. Whatever devotion the people expressed was only through the dumb show of roasted flesh and the ascending smoke and fragrance of incense." On the contrary indications are not wanting that, from the days of Moses downward, prayer and songs of praise formed a constituent part of public worship. It remains true however that prayer and psalmody played a very inconspicuous part in the earlier as compared with the later worship of the Jews.

But, in process of time, to the adoration expressed in the slaughtered sheep and cattle, was added the infinitely more expressive adoration of the voice of prayer and praise. In the 141st Psalm, the Psalmist says: "*Let the lifting up of my hands in prayer to thee be as the evening sacrifices.*" And in the 50th Psalm, Jehovah is represented as crying, "Will I eat the flesh of bulls or drink the blood of goats? Offer unto God *thanksgiving*. Whoso offereth *praise* glorifieth me."

After the captivity the worship of the synagogue which consisted only of prayer and praise was added to the sacrificial worship of the temple and finally superseded it altogether. The higher medium of communion between God and man took the place of the lower. The prayer and praise provided a more perfect atonement than the sheep and cattle laid all bloody upon a pile of burning wood.

3. Once more the self-dedicatory element in the atonement is much more powerfully brought out in the teaching of the prophets.

Under the law the soul's consecration of itself to God was inadequately expressed by the whole burnt offering, which was offered, as we have seen, every day and on stated occasions as well, and was so established as a very conspicuous part of the sacrificial system. But this solemn ritual of the burnt offering the prophets declared to be of very little account if it was no more than a ritual observance. They set slight store by the form and insisted mightily on the inward dedication of the soul to God, which the whole burnt offering was intended to signify. It would appear that the Israelites were in especial danger of forgetting the truth which lay at the bottom of this form of offering. Canon Barry, in his admirable article on Sacrifices, in Smith's Bible Dictionary, remarks: "The Israelites, while they seem always to have retained the ideas of propitiation and of eucharistic offering, even when they perverted these by half-heathenish superstitions, constantly ignored the self-dedication which is the link between the two, and which the regular burnt offering should have impressed upon them as their daily thought and duty."

But this dedication of self to God as the sovereign duty of man formed the staple of the prophetic utterances. Samuel declares, "To obey is better than to sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of rams." David says: "Thou desirest not sacrifice, else would I give it. Thou delightest not in burnt offering. The sacrifices of God are a *broken spirit*; a broken and a contrite heart thou wilt not despise." Again: "Sacrifice and burnt offering thou didst not desire. Then said I, *Lo, I come to do thy will*." Hosea makes Jehovah affirm: "I desired mercy and not sacrifice." Isaiah avers: "The Lord delights not in the blood of bullocks, or lambs, or goats," but to those "who cease to do evil and learn to do well" it is said: "Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be white as snow." Micah enquires: "Shall I come before the Lord with burnt offerings, with calves of a year old? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams or with ten thousands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit of my body

for the sin of my soul? He hath showed thee, oh, man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?"

The Old Testament theory of atonement as it culminates in the prophetic utterances appears then to consist of three moments.

1. The Expiatory. Man, who has been alienated from God by sin, is represented as being cleansed from sin, not through acts of sacrifice on his own part, but by the operation of the Divine Spirit upon the heart through the agency of a sin offering, who is at once sent by God, yet who offers himself voluntarily. See Isaiah liii. 5, 6, 10 and 11.

2. The Eucharistic—the communion of man with God through the medium of prayer and praise.

3. The Self-Dedicatory. Atonement with God through entire consecration of self to the service of Jehovah.

But the Patriarchal Dispensation, the Law, and the Prophets all looked forward to a fulfilment of their partial revelations in one who was to come. In Christ all the types and prefigurations of the Old Testament found their living embodiment. "At length, God having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners, at the end of these days spoke to the world through His Son." Christ is the atonement. Turning then to the portrayal in the Gospels of the life and work of Christ, and to the comments made upon the life and work of Christ by the apostles, we find the three elements of the Atonement, upon which I have dwelt, all along exemplified in perfection.

1. *The Expiatory Element of the Atonement.*—The New Testament presents Christ as the expiation for the sins of men. "Him who knew no sin, He made to be sin on our behalf." "Jesus Christ, whom God set forth to be a propitiation that he might Himself be just, and the justifier of him that believeth." "My blood which is shed for many for the remission of sins." "The Son of Man came to give his life a ransom for many."

Such utterances as the foregoing, figurative though they are in form, seem to set forth to the spiritual imagination the truth—that in order to a free and full forgiveness of all repentant sinners, there must be a manifestation of the divine justice

coincident with and indeed involved in the manifestation of the divine mercy. The evil of sin must be testified to by the costliness of the effort required to wipe it out. God Himself makes a sacrifice which thus vividly expresses to the human mind the evil of sin. "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son." The voluntariness of the sacrifice on Christ's part relieves it from all imputation of injustice. "The Son of God," writes Paul, "who loved me and gave Himself up for me." It is the perfect innocence of Christ while suffering for the sin of the guilty, that makes that sin appear exceedingly sinful. "Christ also suffered for sins once," writes Peter, "the righteous for the unrighteous, that He might bring us to God." Explain it as we may, it remains an ethical fact that the voluntary suffering of the innocent and injured party in behalf of the transgressor is wont to be a powerful means of reconciling the offender to the one whom he has injured. The preëminent example of that ethical fact is the Cross on Calvary. The end of punishment is not merely the reformation of the sinner, but also the stigmatizing of the sin. Sin is never so powerfully stigmatized as when an innocent person voluntarily suffers some of the consequences of sin in behalf of the guilty. Then we deeply feel the heinousness of the transgression. Christ makes expiation for the sin of the world, by affording in His death a supreme illustration of the woe which sin brings in its train. "God sending His Son *as an offering* for sin, condemned sin in the flesh." By that condemnation, God Himself in Christ made an expiation for the world. The expiation thus effected is not a complete atonement between man and God, but it is one step in the atonement.

2. But again in the life and work of Christ we find perfectly exemplified the second element in the atonement, viz: the eucharistic. In Christ the eucharistic sacrifice of the Old Testament ritual is fulfilled. For Jesus expressed in the fullest degree that sense of dependence upon God which is the essence of prayer, and that gratitude to God which is the essence of praise. His sense of dependence appears in such utterances as "I do nothing of myself." "The words that I say unto you, I speak not from myself; but the Father abiding in me doeth his works." His last utterance upon the cross

was an expression of His dependence upon God. "Father, unto Thy hands I commend my Spirit." One of His last sayings before His ascension was to the same end. "All power is *given* unto me in heaven and earth. His life was also an unbroken utterance of praise. He himself summed it all up in saying, "Father, I have *glorified* Thee on the earth." So Christ is made manifest to the world as the eucharistic sacrifice.

3. In Christ is offered the most complete illustration of the self-dedicatory sacrifice. He laid down His life for men. He emptied Himself of the glory which He had with the Father before the world was. He gave Himself, body and spirit, for the redemption of mankind from sin. In Him self-sacrifice has its perfect exemplification. His whole life is summed up in His own words: "I came not to do mine own will, but the will of Him that sent me." "Not my will, but Thine be done." Thus by this complete and entire sacrifice of Himself, He put an end to all the merely prefigurative dedicatory sacrifices which had been offered under the Hebrew ritual. "When He cometh into the world He saith, In whole burnt-offerings and sacrifices for sin, Thou hadst no pleasure; Then said I, Lo, I come to do *Thy will*, O God. He taketh away the *first* that He may establish the *second*."

In Jesus Christ then we see the old Hebrew ideas of atonement through sacrifice enlarged to their fullest scope and completely spiritualized. We still see an expiatory offering for sin, but now it is not a dumb beast, but the Son of God, who is also the Son of Man, who is led as a lamb to the slaughter, who is wounded for our transgressions, who dies that we may live.

Again in Christ we discern a eucharistic offering consisting no longer of fruits of the field or slain animals, no longer of the imperfect prayers and praises of sinful men, but of the perfect faith of One who can be the author of faith to all His brethren, and of the praise of One whose whole life was one unbroken glorifying of the Father in Heaven. To trust in a Divine Person implicitly and to love and continually praise Him for His goodness; these things unite us to Him most closely. As Tennyson sings:

"By prayer"—"The whole round world is everywhere
Bound by gold chains fast to the throne of God."

In such bonds humanity in Christ is united in closest communion with God.

Also in Christ we find a dedicatory offering, but now it is not a dedication of external things which are only possessed, but it is a dedication of the whole self to God. So complete was Christ's dedication of self, that he could say: "I and my Father are one." The at-one-ment of man with God was complete in Jesus through this identification of His own filial will with the will of the Father.

As we leave now the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments and set ourselves to consider the theory of the atonement, as it has been developed in the Christian consciousness, and set forth by the theologians of the church, we shall find that the same three elements which we have traced from the beginning have been each elaborated with great detail by different schools of theology, each school, unfortunately, so magnifying one element and minimizing the others, that in the smoke and din of the conflict, it has been difficult to see that all three parties of disputants were partially right, and that the complete truth lay in the line of combining all three of these differing but not antagonistic aspects of the atonement. All three of these aspects have been recognized by Christian theologians from the earliest times, while, as the centuries have gone by, the truth involved in each has been evolved with increasing explicitness and clearness.

In the first place we find the doctrine held all along down the centuries that the sacrifice of Christ was an expiatory or propitiatory sacrifice.

The early form of the satisfaction theory was very crude, and, to our modern ideas, offensive. It was briefly this: Man by his sin had become the slave of the Devil. Christ by His death paid a sufficient ransom to the Devil and so delivered man from his bondage. This opinion substantially was held by Irenæus, Origen, and even Augustine and Jerome. Not until a thousand years had elapsed was the doctrine of a vicarious satisfaction rendered to the justice of God, clearly and logically set forth. This honor belongs to Anselm, of Canterbury. He propounded a theory which is still held by many theologians. He held that sin is a debt—a debt which sinful man cannot discharge.

Christ, by his perfect obedience, paid that debt, and rendered the satisfaction that was due to the justice of God.

Duns Scotus affirmed that the sufferings of Christ are not *intrinsically* the equivalent of the penalty due to sinful man, but that they take the place by the divine acceptance or consent, deriving his idea from a fiction of the Roman law known as *acceptilatio*. Some 300 years later Grotius developed this idea of Scotus elaborately, maintaining that Christ did not suffer all the punishment which a sinful world deserved, but only endured suffering enough to show the divine abhorrence of sin and to serve the ends of a moral government of mankind. This theory of Grotius, known as the governmental theory of the atonement, has been the favorite one in New England, and has been developed with great minuteness and much metaphysical subtlety by the New England theologians.

The difficulty with the Satisfaction theory, in general, has been that it has cultivated a forensic rather than a filial habit of thought toward God; that by attaching too exclusive importance to the expiatory element of the atonement it has tended to make men think more about being delivered from the guilt of sin than from its power, and has cultivated a reliance upon the death of Christ for salvation, to the neglect of the endeavor to imitate the example of His life. It has failed to take in the whole scope of that Pauline text: "If while we were enemies we were *reconciled* to God through the *death* of His Son, much more being reconciled shall we be *saved* by His *life*."

Concurrently with the Satisfaction or Expiatory theory of the atonement went the Self-dedicatory theory. "Origen," says Neander, "believed that by a hidden law pertaining to the moral government of the universe, the self-sacrifice of a perfectly holy being must serve to cripple the power of evil and to free therefrom the beings subjected to it. He found proof of this in the prevailing belief of mankind that innocent individuals, by a voluntary sacrifice of themselves, had saved whole populations and cities from threatening calamities." There is a text in the Epistle to the Hebrews which was doubtless present to Origen's mind: "Now, once, at the end of the ages, Christ hath been manifested to *put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself*."

Abelard follows in the same line. Says Neander: "To

kindle the flame of a love prepared to make any sacrifice, Abelard often declares to be the highest purpose of the work of Christ." It is Christ, the Self-Dedicatory Sacrifice, that Abelard contemplates. He denies utterly the necessity of a satisfaction to be furnished by Christ, and looks upon the work of Christ "as simply a manifestation of divine love, and refers everything to the subjective impression wrought upon men's minds by this love. "We love Him because He first loved us;" and so loving God in Christ we obey Him, and become conformed to His likeness, and come into perfect communion with God.

Abelard was a cotemporary of Anselm, though a younger man. It would seem as if Anselm's powerful but one-sided presentation of the Satisfaction to Justice theory of the atonement had stimulated the mind of Abelard to thought upon another, and, as it wrongly seemed to him, a contradictory theory. The progress of human thought moves in an ascending spiral, now off to this side, now over to that. As Anselm had dwelt upon the objective aspect of the atonement, the propitiation of the Divine mind that was necessary, and had seemed to represent that as almost the sole element in the atoning work, Abelard, going to the other extreme, dealt with the subjective aspect, viz: its operation on the hearts of men. Abelard regards not the justice of God but the love of God as the sole attribute manifested in the redemption of sinners. God by His manifestation of love in the gift of His Son awakens a responsive love in sinful men, and disposes them to repentance and faith and obedience. This general theory has been known, historically, as the Moral Influence theory. It is a setting forth, it will be perceived, of the self-dedicatory element in the atonement. In this general line, though with various divergences and amplifications here and there, followed Socinus, Coleridge, and our own Bushnell in his "Vicarious Sacrifice." Bushnell was too profound and sincere and docile a teacher to rest satisfied with the partial though immensely powerful presentation of the operation of the atonement, given in his "Vicarious Sacrifice." In his later treatise, the "Forgiveness and Law," he confesses that the view presented in the "Vicarious Sacrifice" is not "sufficiently and scripturally true," and he proposes to supple-

ment his former treatise, and present "a whole of doctrine that comprises both the reconciliation of men to God and of God to men."

But concurrently with the "Satisfaction to Justice" or Expiatory theory, and the "Moral Influence" or Self-dedicatory theory, has been developed through the Christian centuries the Eucharistic theory.

This theory has not been so clearly formulated and denominated as the other two theories, but it has been in very real existence and operation nevertheless.

This theory manifests itself in the view early entertained in the church of the Lord's Supper. Since the prayer of praise and thanks, which had formed a part of the Jewish passover had been perpetuated in the Christian rite, and was made an important part of the ceremonial the name of Eucharist or "Thanksgiving" was given to the Holy Communion. "The presiding officer of the church" says Neander, speaking of the celebration of the Lord's Supper, in the third century, "taking up the bread and wine from the table that stood before him, gave thanks to God in the name of the whole church that He had created *the things of nature*, which were here represented by the most essential means of sustenance for the use of man; and that he, the Lord of nature, had also, for the sake of man, given His Son to appear in *human nature*. . . . The members of the spiritual community themselves offered the wine and the bread as a free gift, and *from these were taken the elements for the celebration of the Lord's Supper*." These gifts were regarded as the spiritual thank-offering of the church. In part these gifts of the Christians, in part the prayer of thanks of the presiding church officer with which they were consecrated to God, in part, finally, the entire celebration of the Lord's Supper was called, at first only in *this* sense, an offering or sacrifice, *προσφορὰ, θυσία*. In allusion to this Justin Martyr says: "The prayers and thanksgivings offered by worthy men are the only true sacrifices, well pleasing to God; these *alone* have the Christians learned to offer." (Neander, vol. i., pp. 329-30).* In the Roman Missal concerning this offering of the bread and the

* For full and interesting details of the early observance of the Lord's Supper see Stanley's *Christian Institutions*, the essay on the Eucharist.

wine it is said, "We beseech thee that thou wouldest graciously accept this offering of thy whole family, and also we thy servants and also we, thy holy people, offer to thy glorious Majesty a pure sacrifice." And in the intercessory prayer of oblation the priest is instructed to say, "Remember thy servants and thy handmaids and all who stand around and who offer to thee this sacrifice of praise for themselves and all their relations."

So in the English communion service the sacrament of the Lord's Supper is called "a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving." Now this early conception of the Lord's Supper as a eucharistic offering led the way to the later belief that in the act of presentation by the priest when he lifted up before the people the bread and the wine as an offering to God, a sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ, was ever anew presented by the priest to God. So was established the custom of the elevation of the host (*hostia*, a sacrifice, a victim). So arose the dogma of transubstantiation. In the wafer the recipient actually partakes of the body of Christ. The sacrifice of the Mass becomes the central act of worship, and is preëminently a eucharistic act.

By this conception of the sacrifice of Christ as a eucharistic sacrifice preëminently the Roman Catholic doctrine of the salvation of men from sin has been largely shaped. As appears in Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo*, the one thing necessary in order to an atonement is that due honor shall be rendered to God. Christ more than satisfies the demands of the law. Christian saints have also more than satisfied the demands of the law and laid up a store of merits which may be drawn upon by others. Thus the representation of the sacrifice of Christ as mainly a eucharistic sacrifice became fruitful in evils which Protestantism has risen up to oppose.

Yet after all in the Roman doctrine there is an underlying truth which Protestantism cannot afford to neglect. As F. W. Robertson has remarked, "Wherever there is a deep truth unrecognized or misunderstood, it will force its way into men's hearts." The remarkably original book of the Rev. J. McLeod Campbell, issued a few years since, is an endeavor, it appears to me really, though not on his part professedly so, to set forth

from a Protestant standpoint the atonement of Christ as a eucharistic sacrifice.

Dr. Campbell represents the atonement as being effected in the first place through a witness-bearing for the Father a vindication to men of the goodness and love of the God from whom they were turning away—in fine an honoring or glorifying of God before men. Another element in the atonement appears in the perfect confession of the sin of humanity which as one standing up in prayer Christ makes to God. Here I quote his own words that I may do justice to his thought.

“That oneness of mind with the Father, which towards man took the form of condemnation of sin, would in the Son’s dealing with the Father, take the form of a perfect confession of our sins. This confession as to its own nature must have been a perfect *Amen in humanity to the judgment of God on the sin of Man.*” . . . “It was not in us so to confess our sins.” But, “he who so responds to the divine wrath against sin—is *that perfect response.* Still further Christ’s confession of sin is followed up by intercession, in which his entire dependence upon and faith in the Father, is fully expressed. One chapter in the book is entitled, “The Intercession,” which was an element in the atonement considered as prayer. So much as regards the retrospective work of true atonement, that is the removal of the guilt of past sin. But the atonement is designed not only to remove the guilt of sin, but also to subdue its power over the heart and make the sinner holy. In this prospective work of the atonement, “We must be,” says Dr. Campbell in the light of Christ’s honoring His Father’s name in all that He presented in humanity to the faith and spiritual vision of men. “The mind of Sonship toward the Father is the righteousness” which Christ confers. Still further Christ’s intercession brings the forgiven soul into fuller and fuller communion with God. “That no man cometh to the Father but by the Son,” is the great and all-including necessity that is revealed to us by the atonement.

The foregoing is a brief and necessarily imperfect summary of the views of Campbell. I have tried to state them so far as possible in his own language. But the summary is ample enough, I trust, to show that his conception of the atonement

is essentially a eucharistic conception. It is at least the eucharistic element which he has most prominently put forward.

Under these three forms of speculation concerning the atonement, viz: the satisfaction to justice theory, the moral influence theory, and the theory which as yet has not been formally denominated, but which is illustrated in the Roman Catholic view of the Lord's Supper, and the sacrifice of Christ as therein represented, and also in J. McLord Campbell's work on *The Nature of the Atonement*, we may find, I think, the modern presentation of the three elements of the atonement, which we have traced all along down the ages, the expiatory, the self-dedicatory, and the eucharistic.

It is not to be supposed that any one of these three theories has as yet received its perfect form, or that there are no other elements in the atonement than those which have been indicated in this paper. But this essay will be of some service if it shall avail to point out the persistency in the Christian consciousness through the whole history of the church of three very prominent elements of the atonement, and if it shall make it evident that these elements are not antagonistic, but are capable of being brought together under one theory in a consistent harmony.

That may be said of these three theories which Canon Barry has so well said of the three ideas of sacrifice. "Any one of them taken by itself would lead to error and superstition. The propitiatory alone would tend to the idea of sacrifice for sin as being effectual without any condition of repentance and faith; the self-dedicatory taken alone, ignores the barrier of sin between man and God, and undermines the whole idea of atonement; the eucharistic alone leads to the notion that mere gifts can satisfy God's service and is easily perverted into the heathenish attempt to bribe God by vows and sacrifices." I have not now space to indicate how these remarks of Canon Barry find illustration in the three great, yet partial theories of the atonement which have prevailed in the church. I can only suggest how the view of the atonement, as merely propitiatory, has run into the dangerous excesses of Antinomianism—how the merely self-dedicatory theory of the atonement, often held

in the Unitarian Church, runs out to atheistic altruism, how the merely eucharistic theory has borne evil fruit in the Roman Catholic doctrine of indulgences and purgatory, and the purchase of remission of sins by gifts of money to the church.

The true way lies in the direction of a broad theory of the atonement which shall include and harmonize these three partial theories, and any other valid elements which may appear. Indications of such a general and comprehensive theory may be discerned all along down the track of the Christian centuries.*

Some of the greatest and most acute minds have maintained the doctrine that the union between man and God, lost by sin, is restored rather by the whole fact of the incarnation than by any expiatory or self-dedicatory or eucharistic sacrifice offered by the Redeemer.

This was the theory held by the Platonizing fathers, by that remarkable man Scotus Erigena in the Middle Ages, by Swedenborg, so many of whose ideas have infiltrated into modern theology, by Schleiermacher and numerous writers of lesser note in the present century. "This theory," remarks Dr. Hodge, "is probably more prevalent now than ever before."

In that fact I believe may be recognized the Holy Spirit's guidance of the church into all truth. We are not, it would appear, to regard the atoning work of Christ as yet wholly effected. It was not ended upon Calvary. "If Christ be not *risen*," writes Paul, "ye are yet in your sins." The atoning

* This position of the necessary combination of all three of the elements of the atonement which we have considered appears to me to have been substantially that toward which Dr. Bushnell made his way in the last chapter of his "Forgiveness and Law," finding expression for it in the three utterances of Christ concerning the convicting work of the Spirit in respect of sin and righteousness and judgment—John xvi, 8–11.

The propitiatory element has to do with sin; the self-dedicatory with righteousness; the eucharistic with judgment.

The eucharistic element has been hitherto too much neglected by theologians. But this also is an important element in the full atonement. It is imaginatively portrayed in the Apocalypse in the song of Moses and the Lamb. "Great and marvelous are thy works O Lord God, the Almighty; righteous and true are thy ways, Thou King of the ages. Who shall not fear O Lord and glorify Thy name; for Thou only art holy. For all the nations shall come and worship before Thee; for Thy righteous acts have been made manifest."

work is carried on, as McLeod Campbell suggests, in our Lord's present intercession in heaven; yet more in all His activity for us and in us. How God works in us to will and to do of His own good pleasure, we may not be able fully to understand. But this operation is through the Holy Spirit who "takes of the things of Christ and shows them unto us," and exercises a new creative influence over the soul. It is the indwelling Christ who is the atonement. No theory of the atonement can be ample enough which does not cover the whole work of Christ in the soul whereby we are made partakers of the divine nature.

It may be objected perhaps that I have not discussed what is often called the atonement proper—that is the theory of the mere reconciliation of the sinful world to God. But as I suggested at the beginning, this latter acceptance of the word is a minimized significance of it, which belongs to a vanishing past. The word seems likely to regain its original and larger and more valuable meaning. The thought of the church in the matter of Soteriology has been confined too much to the sacrifice offered upon the cross. We have thought too much about the sufferings which Christ endured and not enough about Christ Himself. We have failed to take in the whole scope and grandeur of the work of our great Mediator. But the word atonement includes the whole work of Christ in making men participant in the divine nature. The word has passed out of the revised version of the New Testament because it was perceived to mean so much more than the word *καταλλαγή*, reconciliation. Doubtless it will also pass out of the revised version of the Old Testament because it signifies so much more than the Hebrew word *Kaphar*, to cover, of which it has hitherto stood as the translation. Why did our old English translators introduce this word at-one-ment into the English version of the Bible? I think there was an unconscious spirit of prophecy at work in them in their selection of this word. The deep inwardness and spirituality which are characteristic of the Teutonic races, finds adequate utterance for itself as regards the relation of the soul to God, which is attained through Christ, in that word. The word atonement may drop out of our English scriptures, but I venture to say it will not drop

out of theology. It will remain and take on a larger significance than it has commonly carried in the past. It will cover the whole of the great work of Christ the Mediator, in restoring fallen humanity into full communion with God. "What is the atonement?" asked Livingstone of his own solitary soul, in the last month of his African wanderings. "It is *Himself*. It is the inherent and everlasting mercy of God made apparent to human eyes and ears. The everlasting love was disclosed by our Lord's life and death. It showed that God forgives because He loves to forgive. He rules if possible by smiles and not frowns. Pain is only a means of enforcing love."

ARTICLE V.—THE PRINCIPLES OF CHURCH POLITY.

The Principles of Church Polity. Prof. Geo. T. Ladd. Chas. Scribner's Sons.

It is difficult just now to develop much enthusiasm on questions of church polity.

Some of the reasons for this apathy are not far to seek. In general, the more thoughtful mind of our time being pre-occupied with the things that are essential to the faith, is somewhat deaf to discussions which concern external and often merely transient forms of procedure. Intent upon the attainment of the spirit and the life, it does not willingly lend itself to what it regards, however unjustly, as the mere vesture of religion.

Probably the Christian public is also so confident in its assured ability to protect itself against all comers, and to find servants to do its bidding, as its varying moods may require, that it is not careful to answer all who call it to account for its tolerance of variety, or to explain grosser inconsistencies. It can afford to smile at any of its workmen who give themselves airs, and attempt to lord it over the rest, so long as in these classified departments really important service is under such conceit the better done; but they know, and it knows, the thus far and no farther. If they should ever begin to beat the men-servants and the maidens, it would speedily cut them in sunder and appoint them a portion with the unbelievers. There is in effect, if not in theory, a more settled agreement touching some of the prerequisites of outward existence among all the sects, than one would suppose from the diversity of their creeds and operations. Certain prerogatives of private judgment and of local administration having been acquired at great cost, once and for all, have become the universal and inalienable possession; the substance of liberty exists even under the most unlikely exteriors, and will never again be forfeited nor suffered to lapse. If loaned it is always on call. The hierarchical spirit may be just as self-asserting as ever. But the civil freedom, which our church and others have done

so much to propagate, meets it with so stern a look and steady a front, that we are impatient of much debate about it. There is not much open resistance. Men have nearly all the right to be by themselves, which they know what to do with. So far as discussion is concerned, they have well nigh talked themselves out. Nobody in any of the sects is heatedly preaching up his own distinctive tenets or throwing up the ominous parallels. Protestantism has done its work effectively and forever. Why weary us, we say, with your patent in it, as if you could recover a monopoly in it, or your little communion could ever reappropriate the whole of it.

While this is true of discussions of Polity in general, special forms of prejudice await those who think they have a message concerning its more vital ideas.

One of these is the growing practical instinct of the Anglo-Saxon mind against theorizing as such, much more against uncompromising deductions from abstract principles. Human nature cries out against systems, and craves some one redeeming inconsistency. Perhaps the French more than others, are responsible for the low esteem into which a spirit of generalization has fallen in other countries. Large and sweeping maxims being made into ultimate premises have been turned loose on society, like the ancient chariots whose every felly gleamed with swift revolving swords. No wonder the calm student of religions becomes profoundly distrustful of magnificent inductions. They have a terrible habit of resolving themselves into their parent mist. The more perfect and the more logical your creed, the more assuredly it professes to explain every or even any one thing, the more he knows it can be no true transcript of the mind of God. The more fundamental and consistent the principles of church government which you present to his reason, the more cogent they are in their large and lucid reasonableness, the more he sniffs at them as unpractical, and braces himself lest ere he think it, you wind him up to the level of your dogma.

The Historical method, moreover, which is now so much in vogue, has in its perverted use tended to demoralize all first principles and growths, discrediting ours with all the rest. That method, in brief, is the comparison of a usage

at any given time with the earlier forms from which it is evolved. The question, how it came to be, is all in all. The other question, is it true, and obligatory, falls into the background; and the morality of it fades before our curiosity, as to its origin. Conscience takes its place with the rest, and is a development. The vital matter is its pedigree, and not its proper relation to immediate duty. Find a church ordinance in existence, it is interesting as one form of Proteus, a relic and a study, but to import into it anything like absolute quality is incompetent, because you readily trace it back to when it was but zero. To be positive in holding it, or strenuous in pushing it, is puerile, for to-morrow you are to grow out of it. This results of course in relaxing all moral tone. But what is as bad is that every ecclesiastical organization can be made a novelty if you so please to look at it. All the later forms are thus often patronized and sent to bed like noisy children, that their seniors may sit up and have it out alone. If Congregationalism wants to be heard, they answer: Congregationalism, yes, most interesting: it grew up about two centuries ago or more; it was a thing done in a corner and may be dignified as a very pretty experiment. Let us see, they say: Congregationalism is a recent and transient form of Puritanism, just as Puritanism was of Protestantism, just as Protestantism is a recent and transient form of Christianity.

Of course we all know that this huge pile of assumption vanishes as snow before the spring sun. Congregationalism is not new, so far as its inner life principle is concerned. The more learned of the Anglicans, Bishop Lightfoot conspicuously, declare in substance that it was the polity of the primitive church, just as the Ritualists themselves, in their demand for local option touching vestments, are by their own confession poaching in our preserves. In a broader way they are openly tending towards free churches. Untenable as is this prejudice against us, and unable to stand before a deeper and more candid scrutiny of history, it does the work of an objection, in making us feel conscious and out of place in general religious society—a gawky, though a knowing ism, with no signs of a settled Person. This, whether judged by the grace of a catholic spirit—by the relative numbers of our

distinguished retinue, or by the nameless manners of an old school gentleman.

Professor Ladd is very sensible of all this prejudice, but all the more is he aroused to meet it. He would disarm and conciliate it from the start. This he does by addressing himself directly and in scientific method to the discovery of *fundamental principles*. His aim is to lay bare the greater distinctions in polity, and to show the characteristic features of his own church order. This has been tried before, but not with distinguished success. Congregationalism has been written up on many sides. There have been manuals enough which essayed to be digests of Case law, but sometimes from persons who can lay so little claim to judicial insight, that they quote decision after decision which is obviously against their own school. We have hand-books containing descriptions of symptoms and homœopathic remedies for a common-sense treatment in the home. We have come nigh to being buried with multitudes of sometimes ponderous folios, laden with statistics, ending no one knows why; statistics which, while exceedingly valuable, are often compiled without a just historic sense of the colonial time, and much more plainly yet, without a thorough-going grasp of principles. Now the writer is almost an Independent; now he is well-nigh a Churchman; here and there he huddles together expedients which have no more to do with Congregationalism, than the last year's fashions with a sound sociology.

This work, on the other hand, is the first noteworthy attempt, which we recall, since the days of the fathers, with skillful intuition to discriminate, and with philosophical research to defend the early church form of New England. Assuming, to begin with, the importance of a proper organization of the Christian church; that its ideal government flows forth theoretically from the undoubted relations of redeemed souls with Christ and with one another, he declares that the primary principles of Congregationalism are two. The first, that the word of God is the sole objective authority for the constitution, worship, and discipline of the Christian church. The second: The immediateness and fullness of the access of every congregation of true Christians to the Spirit of Christ. After the manner of the German theo-

logians, who have wrought over these phases of thought for the last half a century or more, the first is called *the formal principle*—that is, the principle which furnishes the norm of our church life, distinguishing it from all others whether Romanist or Protestant. The Reformation, under Luther, e. g. avowed this principle, as regulative of doctrine; but not, like us, as regulative of the constitution of the church. The second is called *the material principle*, because it contains the inmost secret, the substantive and supernatural life of our churches. The first fitly expresses the dependence of the church upon the objective authority of the word of God; the second, its vital outgrowth from the indwelling Holy Spirit, as its source and guide. The originality of Professor Ladd's view just here consists in his transferring to polity, the same elements which the Germans have long assigned to the corresponding truths of christian doctrine. He sees that polity is only the doctrine of the government of the church, and that the source of church authority is one with the source of truth, namely, the Holy Spirit. Or, perhaps, more broadly and more vividly yet, his great merit will appear in the clearness and fullness of the following elements which he associates with them.

From his cardinal principles he deduces seven other principles as essential to the complete idea and correct practice of a true church as the primary, but called *secondary* only because they may be seen to be derived from the former. These seven principles are the following: (1) Christ's exclusive rulership; (2) individual equality and self-control; (3) a regenerate membership; (4) the autonomy of the local church; (5) the communion of churches; (6) the common-law principle, the conserving the results of common experience; (7) progress through individual inquiry. All these secondary principles are most intimately related to one another, and form a system of reciprocal balance. They are a thing of life; are not merely speculative, but real. They all root back in and grow forth from one grand idea—the communion of God with the soul of man. The spirit in the book—the Revelation; and the spirit in the soul—Inspiration—is one spirit. As Goethe, who saw so deep into the Divine energy in Nature, coöperating on its several sides, has sung:

“Wär nicht das Auge sonnenhaft
Die Sonne könnt es nie erblicken.
Läg nicht in uns des Gottes eigne Kraft,
Wie könnt uns Göttliches entzücken.”

We do not abate a whit of our gratitude to Professor Ladd for the endeavor of this admirable book, when in passing we express the following particulars in which it seems open to criticism. His two original principles scarcely stand on the same plane, or recognize each other as peers. To be sure, he nowhere claims for them that they are coördinate all round, nor does he go much into that matter. None the less is the collocation of the two in such necessary connection a trying one, without a more explicit and mutual understanding. He should, by all means, have devoted an entire chapter to his material principle.

For the sake of completeness of analysis it was to be desired that in connection with his two primary principles a *third* should have been more definitely honored and associated, viz: that of the church in history. The word of God, his formal principle, is not the sole objective authority for the organization of the Christian community. There is another external source and guide, in the historic development of the mind of the spirit in the Church. In every age, except the absolutely primitive one, the Christian institutions which have been inherited from the past have always largely determined the character and career of the reformed types. No matter how peculiar may have been the variety which at any point of time was actually introduced, the new embodied much more of the substance of the old, than it ever modified or hoped to change. Protestants, and especially Congregationalists, have greatly erred in giving too little attention and weight to this the voice of the Spirit in the Church universal. While we are not to confess our fault by a return to dead tradition and an inordinate deference to external authorities and decrees of bodies of men—there is in the history of the church at large, and of all time, a wealth of sanctified reason and of christian custom, which, if not to be set on a par with the preëminent Word of God, is certainly not to pale its light before the private judgment of a few denominations, still less that of any local church whatever.

Still further not only alongside of the Biblical and the Rational principles, ought the Historical to have been reckoned with, as a truly present and organizing element, among the fathers of our order, however that element was comparatively dishonored; but for the sake of justness as well as life-likeness in the picture, it should have been portrayed how flowing and relative are the distinctions one among another between the several types of the true church of Christ, as touching these principles. The aim of our author, in finding the germs of principle which the Congregational leaders recognized, was to use these in their bearing upon the true and ideal church polity. To that end, it was therefore very necessary that he should have shown that these original principles of the Word, the Spirit, and the Church are found as a whole and together in every true church life, whether of Old or New Testament time, whether ancient, mediæval, or modern. There is always some external revelation, some experimental spiritual life, some inheritance of institutions; the difference is one of stress, turning now to the legal or to the ethical, or the ritual as the case may be—something which in a rough way corresponds to the High Church, now the Low or now the Broad Church. Not merely so, but in the Protestant church itself, all these several types still exist; its errors and abuses have sprung from an excessive emphasis upon one or another of them; whereas its only safety and ultimate authority lay rather in the correspondence and harmonizing of them all. There are in the Congregational church of to-day those who lay undue accent upon the letter of Scripture, as there are those who give loose rein to reason, and again others who long for more of church forms, for common law, and ecclesiastical authority. The Protestants of the 17th century fell into the hard Lutheran scholasticism, emphasizing the mere theory of salvation in the Bible, a dead orthodoxy: this was succeeded in the 18th century, by a fanatical exaltation of merely spiritual life, to the neglect of the Bible, by the Mystics. It ought to be the aim of the 19th century, to combine in theory, and in practice, the whole of them, and in a juster fullness and proportion.

Lectures on one form of polity could not perhaps be expected to deal much with this larger subject of doctrine. Still as this

work in its whole construction, claims for itself that the principles of polity do reach down deeply into the doctrines of the Bible, the Holy Spirit, and the Church, the three should have been more articulately associated and from the beginning, and their relations have been more fully illustrated.

His principles having been enunciated with particularity and force as related, 1. To our common manhood, 2. to our common faith, 3. to the growth of the kingdom of God on earth; the rest of the work is devoted, first to the inherent fitness of these principles to Man as a rational, social, and civil being, then to the various issues which are now rife in our Zion; the Vermont Resolution, a Regenerate Membership, the Purity of the Ministry, the Ability of Congregationalism to live, grow, and fulfill the true ends of a church, at home and abroad; and last, its Present and Prospective Tendencies.

It is high time that these fundamental principles should be reached, both for their own sakes and for the uses to which they may immediately be put.

(1.) We need them primarily to give unity to our thought. It is of the first importance to every Christian to be confident of his grounds, to be enabled to strike through to the foundations of the church, and to feel not merely the rock on which his house rests, but also to realize the Divine architect's purpose and hand, in the structure which has been built upon it. The call is both for radical truth and for simplicity of system. The philosophical student in his search after principles which carry their own finality, will be reassured to discover here a basis at once so scriptural and rational. And nowhere will church evidences be more welcomed than among ourselves, for nowhere have they been more requisite in order to make us respectable in our own eyes.

(2.) We need these principles in order to confirm to us a well-grounded, though it be but a somewhat circumscribed, liberty. Many are inclined to bind upon us primitive church ways of administering ordinances, as having the force of a commandment, and to insist upon a slavish conformity to the models in our Lord's time. We may now see that *principles* are the vital elements which obligate. What is required of us, is not a mechanical retracing of the exact lines of the original picture—

reproducing the ipsissima of details, but rather the realization of the Divine ideals in the same. Unless there be the specific unquestionable commandment of Christ, we have besides the letter of a crude biblicalism to guide us, a sanctified reason and the increasing agreement of the church. The very genius of the New Testament is one of brotherhood, as communion is that of the church.

(8.) Some such principles as these we need, to emphasize aright the authority of the church, to give point and dignity to obligation. Many are firmly assured that with regard to the constitution of the Christian church, all is arbitrary. Each community of believers is at liberty to organize itself at its own discretion—that there are no authoritative instructions or precedents to bind our consciences. It is claimed that the Saviour felt that by this latitude, the supernatural life of his people would best have room to play and provide for itself such form, as its varying exigencies would develop.

This is not the faith of any who hold to dominant principles. To them, all ecclesiastical organizations are not alike optional nor equivalent. The Christian life is not anomalous. Divine as is the operation, the spirit of life in the churches ever crystallizes after a generic law. The worship of the regenerate host is not a Babel of confusion. Rather will the instincts of the new creature always utter themselves in the native idioms of its king's speech, and commune in the vernacular of one universal tongue.

“ πολλὰ μὲν θνήσκουσιν, μία δ' ἀθανάτουσιν.”

Between the indifference on the one hand, which asserts that the organization of the church is one of the unessentials, that the ground is clear for such structure as you may please to erect; and the literalism on the other hand which declares that all primitive usage in the church is essential—prescribed in the chart of the Divine architect down to the minutest detail; between these extremes of unbounded liberty and indiscriminating obligation, there is a sure and safe path, however difficult it may be to outline all its limits.

It is perhaps impossible on matters which touch men's deepest emotions, for them at present to come to conscious agreement, as to what concrete forms are fundamental. But none

the less are we all assured that there are fundamentals. There is a unity based upon them, though perhaps this unity is a thing to be felt, rather than defined. All is not at loose ends. As the right of private Christian judgment does not mean the right to think of ourselves and of our Christian experience as we please, but always according to the facts, and after the methods of a right reason ; so the vast responsibility of an open Bible is not discharged in bondage to the letter, nor by an utter arbitrariness in handling the word of God deceitfully ; but by an understanding of it under the standard of a sound exegesis, and under the guidance of the Spirit of God.

By these means we may hope to attain to the true polity, to the idea of the church as it lies in the mind of the Lord. That idea must and will determine all the polity. Under its controlling aims, it will no longer be legitimate to organize or to maintain an ecclesiastical system for class purposes, for the sake of gaining a cultivated ministry, or to perpetuate a political form of government. Believers have rights, functions, obligations. These are sacred, inviolable, divine. They may not safely be tampered with by spiritual hierarchies. They can none of them be trampled upon with impunity. By its relations to this idea will every local church be judged, and stand or fall, as to its own master.

Such ruling idea have we in the principles here adduced. These principles we do not make nor govern ; they make and govern us. Ours it is to find them. To them under God the future belongs.

(4.) We need some such principles as these, to justify us as a denomination for our existence and specially to disclose, how through them Congregationalists may be lifted out of the life of a mere sect. The ordinary enthusiast for ecclesiastical principles no sooner secures his position than you are made to feel how solitary he is ; he has shut a door against himself. The rest of us, so far as we are excluded by him, feel like one of old, *pulsus ab urbe, receptus ab orbe*. Disclaim a desire to exclude as he may, you feel that no standing ground has been left for him or any one. Professor Ladd is a loyal, if not always an ardent, son of the Pilgrims. He sees that the true church polity must be a New Testament polity, in its ideas and

aims. He follows hard after his own principles, the way they take him, and yet his is a spirit of much evident humility and reverence. There is no expression or even implication of solitary sufficiency. Not only does he not claim for his own church that it alone is the true church, but it is distinctly declared that other churches may embody some or even all of to give any exclusive definition of the church, or to cramp any these ruling ideas, better than our own. He expressly declines living member of Christ's body within the confines, even of Protestantism; believing, as he evidently does, that the majority of the local churches of every order, possess some of the notes of a true church. His thought seems to be that as in doctrine, the minimum credible retains somewhat of the saving grace, so in polity the minimum incorporatum of New Testament principles, covers and comprehends. That minimum eludes our finite search. That body of believers alone is excluded, which is completely false to them. His last holding ground is that of principles. If you slip from these you drift, you know not whither. We ought to care more for the spreading abroad of the principles which are our true life, than for the mere name of a continuous existence, as a denomination.

To some it may seem that he draws a fine line when he distinguishes avowedly between Congregationalism as a body of principles, and as a sect. As difficult as such a distinction may be to maintain in practice, he obviously thinks it to be clear in theory. If we separate ourselves from the rest of Christendom, on the ground merely of a confessedly formal difference on the question of officering churches, we are but a sect. Similarly, the Congregationalism which is taught as defining the Congregational Church and fixing a creed for it, and telling it with what Christians it can have fellowship, and with what not, is a sectarian enterprise. But his two lectures on the communion of churches, show that this is not "principled Congregationalism."

He manifestly considers the doctrine of Christ as central, and exclusiveness on that basis alone, as free from the imputation of sect. But with that reservation, he would say that true Congregationalism opens the local church to those individuals of whom true churches of Christ (not true sectarian churches of your kind or mine—but true churches of Christ) can be

made. The true church polity holds out the hand of fellowship to all churches of Christ—not to all of its set—but to them all. It limits its communion only by the refusal of any true church to have fellowship with it. It leaves the cutting off, the sectarian part of it, to those who refuse to take part with it. As a matter of fact, we have our limits of communion put upon us by the sectarian attitude of our brethren, and by the corresponding polarization into which we are forced. But the proper Christian polity makes every local church seek and offer fellowship, suited in manner of exercise to conditions of space, time, and circumstance, to every other communion of believers in Christ upon the whole earth.

5. We need these principles to correct abuses. As important as is the establishment of these fundamental principles in the eyes of the writer, on their own merit and in their proper dependence and correlation, his real aim all the while seems to be eminently practical, and to answer some of the burning questions of the hour.

The following suggestions, it may be gathered from the book, lie near the author's heart just now.

As the first of these, we may mention the deplorable state of the feebler and missionary churches as touching their officering and the regulation of their more personal affairs. For years many of these organizations have eked out a dead-and-alive existence, utterly dejected over their condition, physical and spiritual, and believing that there was no "health nor soundness" in them. They have lost heart and hope. They know but little what to do for their relief, or for the salvation of their Zion. Some of them it is true have deacons, and many have none. But even of their deacons, they feel that these were elected more on account of a correct life already past, than for the capacity to discharge the functions which their local church required, especially in such emergencies. What they need, is a body of officers who will more properly represent them, and assume the direction of affairs. Men who, having gifts, will be employing the same to direct the life of the church. But such control and such responsibility savors of encroaching upon the functions of the ministry. Usage and tradition deter them from insuring themselves and officering their own church. So the

tendency arises and grows, for churches to remain for a decade or more, unmanned. Meanwhile no man careth for their soul. In such exigencies, as I understand the Professor, what these churches require is a body of *Presbyter-bishops*, ruling elders, elected from their own ranks, making full proof of their ministry, relieved from all lurking fear of intruding upon the sacred office, administering the ordinances, comforting the sick, burying the dead, feeding the church of God.

A second matter is this, that there has sprung up among the Presbyterian as well as Congregational host, a growing defection from the orderly way of ordaining ministers by Councils. In consequence of this our year books reveal an increasing number of what are called "stated supplies" instead of regularly settled pastors. This procedure has perhaps grown up in part out of the inability of some churches to undertake long ventures; some of it out of a jealousy of a public declaration of their weakness, or divisions; some of it out of the fact, that their financial and moral center of gravity lies outside the church proper; some of it is not only the dislike of formalities, but the fear of exposing their interests to the dictation or advice of any third parties.

Congregationalists have had no little anguish over such rank individualism in the local churches, and the increasing disparagement, if not contempt, put upon the social principle of the communion of the churches. Many devices have been resorted to, to obviate the difficulty and save the church order from utter confusion, not to say defiance and collapse. In these cases so flagrantly threatening the vital unity of our general Zion, and all the more dangerous because merely disusing and ignoring its provisions and safeguards, Professor Ladd would not threaten the local church with discipline or excision, but encourage it to use, as a church, the prerogatives which not merely of right, but in fact, even from the apostolic times, have inhered, and do inhere in it, viz: the authority to ordain its own ministry. Not lay ordination, or through its laymen—but through its church officers; the *Presbyter-bishops*. He would elicit, reinforce, and educate the ecclesiastical consciousness of the local church,—its sufficiency, under Christ, to itself for all its functions,—not merely by having its local officers in every instance, visibly

take part in the laying on of hands, at every ordination by a Council; but in the case of feeble churches and on missionary grounds, he would restore the old and inalienable right of employing the simple means, of ordaining their pastors, themselves, when the more complicated means amount to, or are sincerely felt to be, a great burden.

Of course it is not to be presumed that the rediscovery and employment of such means will obviate all difficulties, but certain great ends will manifestly be reached and more directly than by any means as yet suggested. This method will have to recommend it, that it is a method, an order, and not open disorder. There will be more settled ministers and not so many men hired by the year. The matter of wages will not be so loudly cried in the market — so far dignifying the teaching office. But perhaps more important yet: such churches, as are under a necessity, will be saved from the appearance of openly discrediting their polity, and also from all the moral evils which must come to individuals or churches, from living in more or less avowed antagonism with what is known and felt to be, if not a law, at least a recognized rule and convention. In this case it will be at the sacrifice of no principle.

A third matter on which these principles bear with telling effect, is upon the present uneasiness in our ranks, and the corresponding need of wisdom and charity in the conciliation of all parties. We must at once stop dividing and get hold of the things which make for peace. We must rebuke the spirit of schism wherever it shows its hateful mien. By reason of the gradual change in the statement, and in some cases of the substance, of important doctrines a few pastors are preaching what looks like another gospel. By reason of a lax administration of our polity, irregularities of a more or less scandalous kind have crept in, specially in the frontier States, and the powers of the wisest are being taxed to devise some consistent plan of overcoming or preventing them. Various methods have been tried in certain localities, apparently with the consent of the churches of such districts, and with good effect. To all this there is no fatal objection on the part of those who are remote, and not immediately concerned.

But certain other pastors and leaders are apparently desiring

to make such local checks national in their operation. This with the employment of such means that what in some quarters seems an honest cry for efficiency, in others wears the sinister look of a grasp after power, as well as a determination to commit the denomination, as a whole, to suicidal rules. Ministerial associations are set on to usurp a quasi ecclesiastical initiative. It is suggested that County conferences appoint committees, to take the oversight of neighboring ministers and of the internal administration of the churches. In certain cases, like master Copperfield's obliging waiter, they are to offer to drink off their bitter beer for them; in others, to force them to volunteer a mutual Council. The Nominating Committee of the National Conference is rushed for and captured, as though the places controlled the patronage of an empire. Resolutions are plied as though the age of miracles were not passed, and men by taking thought *could* add a cubit to their stature.

Such schemes, of course, cannot carry, nor such encroachments succeed. Christian principles cannot be filched from us, nor the liberties of the church of God voted up or down by irresponsible persons. None the less is there mischief of no small kind in the attempted threat—not to the truth, but to the harmony of our churches. In a body of believers like ours, there are always the highest securities against a too rapid development of thought, or a spirit of revolutionary speculation. This is found in the intelligence of a free and educated constituency, and in the rational conservatism which has always been the safeguard of republican institutions against daring innovators. Whether the attempt to catch and recover ourselves from undue leaning to liberty in action, by corresponding struggle and reach after restriction upon thought, is in the nature of things, or not, this at least is true. Nowhere is the general sentiment of the community so wary of change on vital matters of doctrine, as among us. Nowhere more profitable bids for a nominal orthodoxy, or more secret crouching before the party whip. With all our boasted independence, it is somewhat surprising that there has been no specially original thinking in theology done on this continent, with the exception perhaps of Edwards. Even the revision of the Bible here waited, and had to wait, for the moving of the Convocation in England.

It would seem, therefore, that for all the lurid portents of the skies, "with fear of change perplexing monarchs," too many of the soothsayers are but the dupes of their own panic. If any vast or soul-destroying advance had been sprung upon us, we must have known it. But the case with us as a denomination is changed, when men will not leave the truth to the natural interplay of conservatism and progress, which is found by laws of temperament among all communities, but assume instead a policy of aggressive reaction in the matter of government, and set about division. It would really seem as though some of them felt they had a revelation and heard, like Gideon of old, "that the people be too many." Where most would be glad to knit more brethren to us, they seem bent on cutting off.

But it so happens that the denomination which is so patient of indirect control on matters of faith, is specially tenacious against the least assumption of authority. The atoms of our organization, which have untold ability to bear a downright and honest pressure, are to the last degree brittle and sensitive to cross strains, particularly at a low spiritual temperature. Everybody is ready for a new creed in the interest of the truth, but who, if it is in the secret interest of discipline.

In general the powers that be, and are ordained of God, are strong enough and conservative enough for all reasonable responsibility.

Break, however, the spell of their recognized independence and authority, by an era of public interference and violent pressure: erect in their stead, e. g. a newspaper tribunal. Assume to coerce now a venerable historic church, now a great benevolent organization, now an ancient seminary of Christian learning, and you have gone far not only to bring your irresponsible organs of ecclesiasticism into contempt, by terrorism safely defied touching its own downfall; but you have roused an antagonism among brethren which may not easily be composed. Open wider and wider this cave of the winds, and you must soon develop the whirlwind. That whirlwind will spend itself, not in reconstructing Christian doctrine, but in rending the churches asunder. A word to the wise ought to be sufficient.

ARTICLE VI.—THE FOLK SONGS OF THE FAROE ISLANDS.

LIKE stepping-stones laid firmly on the ocean's bed by some forgotten giant faring to far away Thule, rise the Orkneys, the Shetlands, and midway to Iceland, the Faroes from the waters of the North Atlantic. Wild and rocky are they all, but while their mountain tops stand seamed and serrate, brown and bare against the sky, the valleys and their sloping sides show greener and friendlier by the contrast, and indicate neither an unfitting nor an unpleasant abode for man. The Faroes, in many places, rise to a dizzy height sheer from the water's edge, and often the black front of the precipice is only relieved by a slender stream of water that is first seen high up the mountain leaping from step to step, and then to plunge at one spring, white and scared, down into the sea. In other places rough and jagged fjords cut deep into the land, their water bluer and fairer than the sky so far above them.

The Faroe Islands—some of them are, however, mere rocks—are twenty-two in number and have in all a population of about 10,000, a sturdy race of shepherds and fishermen whose living is often wrested, rather than gained, from a not always willing land and a stormy ocean; on Strömoe, the largest of them, is the little village of Thorshaven, their capital, with its turf-thatched houses, flag-staff, and grass-grown fort.

Their history is briefly as follows. Monks from the Scottish islands were the first to find and establish themselves in the Faroes; in the ninth century Norwegians discovered and colonized them and retained possession of them until Norway was united to Denmark in 1380, since then, excepting the time from 1807 to the treaty of Vienna in 1814 when they were held by England, they have belonged to Denmark. The glory of the Faroe Islands belongs rather to the past than to the present, and to a past, often as misty as the clouds that cling about their mountains, do the people still look back with satisfaction and pride.

The islands first received a stable population in the ninth century at the time when the adventurous Norsemen, undaunted even by the unknown dangers of the northern seas, found a harbor in every island and made settlements in an unbroken chain from Ireland and Scotland through the Orkneys, Shetland, and the Faroes to Iceland. During this century and the following century and a half the little group of islands played a not unimportant part in Scandinavian history, situated as it was almost in the direct course between Norway and Iceland, and often its names appear in the saga literature of the north; many a viking ship, richly laden with the spoils of some harrying expedition further south, ran into its harbors, and its hospitable jarls held open board to the wandering skald and the banished warrior.

The Norsemen brought with them not only their language and customs, but the religion and traditions of Norway which took immediate and firm root in the congenial soil of the new country. Unlike Iceland, however, the Faroes never developed a literature of their own; nevertheless, when, after two centuries of constant and nervous communication with the rest of the Scandinavian North, a long period of isolation set in, the old myths and traditions brought from the fatherland still lived in the memories of the people, and have been, as folk songs, handed down almost unchanged from generation to generation through many centuries.

The language brought by the Norsemen met in their different settlements a very dissimilar fate. Iceland, preserved by its isolated position from frequent contact with the outside world, retained the old language more faithfully than did Norway itself; when a temptation to use foreign words came with the Reformation, the phenomenal wealth of the old literature was there to check the abuse, so that now, after a thousand years of use, the language is almost absolutely unchanged. In the British Islands, the Orkneys and Shetland, on the other hand, nothing but naturalized words show that Old Norse was ever a medium of communication. The Faroes show a state of things corresponding to their middle position: isolated as they are, they have always been subject to Danish influence and the absence of a national literature has left them without a norm.

Modern Faroese is a Norse dialect showing much similarity to Icelandic,* but with the influence of Danish plainly stamped upon it; it exists only as a spoken language and has no original literature other than its songs.†

The songs of the Faroes owe their preservation, no doubt, to the fact that they have been and still are used in the national dance where they seem to be sung, however, not only in lieu of instrumental music, but also for their own worth as a means of interest and entertainment; the custom, too, was doubtless common to the North, as it is mentioned in Icelandic literature and was still found in Iceland in the last century, but has since disappeared. The Faroese dance is very simple and almost as staid and stateful as the minuet. The men and women, standing opposite each other in an irregular circle, reach each other the hand and take either three steps to the side or forward and back, and then either balance or stand still and bow. At the same time either all sing the accompanying song or some one sings the verses alone and the others take up the stave. This dance is the principal amusement during the long winter evenings and at weddings and other festivals. The subjects of the songs, as has been indicated, are almost all taken from ancient mythology or tradition, and their *personæ* are the gods and giants of Asgard and the champions of the Edda and the hero-songs. Their poetic worth is not great. It is bare narration, description that directly describes without paraphrase, dialogue that distinctly says what is meant and neither more nor less, that characterizes them. Like the true folk song everywhere they have neither lyric grace nor idyllic finish; they are direct, to the point, bare and often disconnected; like other folk songs and ballads they make frequent use of repetition, and of inexact and iterated rhyme. To give a more correct picture than can be conveyed by mere description, one of the best and most characteristic of them all is appended in transla-

* The Faroese still understand Icelandic if spoken slowly and distinctly, as the author had occasion to remark during a hasty visit to the islands in 1879. A young Icelanders of the party was readily understood by a peasant and his wife with whom the conversation was otherwise carried on in Danish.

† The *Færeyinga Saga* is a mythical-historical narration of events in the Faroe Islands from about 960 to 1040; it was probably written, however, at least in the form in which we now have it, in Iceland.

tion which has been made to follow the original Faroese* as closely and literally as possible. The *dramatis personæ* of the song are three gods of the Northern mythology, Odin, Hönir, and Loki, the giant Skrymsli, and a peasant and his son. Odin was the supreme god of the Scandinavians; he is described in the Edda† as follows:—"There [in Asgard] is a place called Hlidskjalf and when Odin seated himself in the highseat, then looked he over all the world and saw every man's deeds, and knew all things that he saw. His wife hight Frigg the daughter of Fjörgvin, and of their lineage is come the race that we call the Ases, who dwelt in Asgard the old and the realms that belong to it, and all that race is akin to the gods. And for this he may be called All-Father, that he is the father of all gods and men, and of all that was made by him and by his might." "Odin is the highest and oldest of the Ases; he rules all things and as other gods are mighty, so to that extent do all serve him as children serve a father." Hönir was, according to the Edda,‡ one of the creating gods—

Erst three Ases, of this race they,
Mild and mighty, all came homeward;
On the strand found they, little potent,
Ask and Embla, each one powerless.

Breath they owned naught of, sense had they neither,
Blood nor motion, nor goodly colour;
Breath gave Odin, sense gave Hönir.
Blood gave Lodur, and goodly colour.

Loki was the evil god; of him the Edda§ says:—"There is numbered with the Ases he whom some call the slanderer of the Ases and the originator of deceits, and the disgrace of all gods and men. He is called Loki or Lopt. Loki is handsome and fair in appearance, but evil in disposition and very false in his manner of dealing; he had beyond other men the craft called cunning and cheats in all things: he brought the Ases

* Cf. Sjórdhar Kvaedhi, samlede og besörgede ved V. U. Hammershaimb, udgivne af det nordiske Literatur-Samfund. Copenhagen, 1851. Pp. 140-145. A second part bears the title Faeröiske Kvaeder *ditto, ditto*. Copenhagen, 1855; both together form a book of nearly 400 pages.

† Snorra Edda. Gylfaginning, i. e., The Fooling of Gylfi, 9; the second quotation is from Gylfaginning, 20.

‡ Saemundar Edda. Völuspá, i. e., the Prophecy of the Vala, 20, 21.

§ Snorra Edda. Gylfaginning, 33.

into great trouble, and equally as well, often helped them out again with his tricks." The giant Skrymsli is the one called Skrymir in both Eddas; in the prose Edda* it is told how Thor once slept in his glove mistaking it for a great hall. The three gods, Odin, Hönir, and Loki, are often associated, and like the Greek trio, Hermes, Zeus, and Poseidon, often go out on wanderings together; so in the second Song of Sigurd Fafnirsbane of the poetic Edda and in the *Ars Poetica* [Skáldskaparmál 41] of the prose Edda. This is the beginning of the history of the Niebelungs and a part which the German Niebelungen Lied leaves entirely unexplained; Wagner in his musical trilogy, the Ring of the Niebelungs, uses the Eddic songs to supplement the German tale. Another tale of their wanderings is the story of Idun and her apples, told in the prose Edda, both in Bragi's Talk [Bragaraedhur 2] and in a song by Thjodolf of Hvin in his poem *Haustlång* in the *Ars Poetica* [Skáldskaparmál 23]. The god called Lodur in the verse cited above, is mentioned nowhere else in either Edda, and it is probable that by him is meant Loki, so that the three also appear together as the gods who created the human race.

LOKI'S SONG.

1.	Giant and peasant with play were done, The peasant lost and the giant won.	6.	"Would that Odin now were near, "How 'twill fare I then might hear."
STAVE:		7.	Scarce half spoken was the word, There stood Odin before the board.
What shall the harp do here in my hand, If no one follows bravely to the other land?		8.	"Hear thou, Odin, I call to thee, "Thou shalt hide my son for me."
2.	"The play is out, my bet I've won, "Now I'll have of thee thy son.	9.	Odin took the boy away, In sorrow the peasant and housewife lay.
3.	"I will have thy son of thee. "Lest thou hidest him from me."	10.	Odin quickly now did hight A field to grow in a single night.
4.	The peasant calls on his two swains thus: "Pray to Odin to come to us.	11.	Odin made the boy e'er morn An ear in the midst of a field of corn;
5.	"To Odin, the Asen-king, now pray, "And he'll be hidden for many a day.	12.	An ear in the midst of a field of corn, In the midst of the ear a grain of corn.

*Snorra Edda. Gylfaginning, 46.

13.
 "Here without fear you may safely be,
 "When I call then come to me.
 14.
 "Here you may safely be without pain,
 "When I call then come again."
 15.
 The giant has a heart like horn,
 He reaps his lap now full of corn.
 16.
 He reaps of the ears of corn a store,
 A naked sword in his hand he bore.
 17.
 A naked sword in his hand he bore,
 Therewith he will wound the boy full sore.
 18.
 Then the boy was filled with pain
 Lest he the grain of corn should gain.
 19.
 Then the boy was filled with fear—
 Odin called to stand him near.
 20.
 The boy and Odin homeward fare,
 The peasant and housewife meet them
 there.
 21.
 "Here's thy young son back to thee.
 "I'll no more his patron be."
 22.
 The peasant calls on his two swains thus:
 "Pray to Hönir to come to us.
 23.
 "I would that Hönir now were near,
 "How 'twill fare I then might hear."
 24.
 Scarce half-spoken was the word,
 There stood Hönir before the board.
 25.
 "Hear thou, Hönir, I call to thee,
 "Thou shalt hide my son for me."
 26.
 Hönir took the boy away,
 In sorrow the peasant and housewife lay.
 27.
 Hönir went to the valley green;
 Seven swans o'er the sound were seen.
 28.
 Eastward took two swans their flight,
 Down near Hönir they both alight.

29.
 Hönir now the boy did hight
 A feather to be on the swan's neck white.
 30.
 "Here without fear you may safely be,
 "When I call then come to me.
 31.
 "Here you may safely be without pain,
 "When I call then come again."
 32.
 Skrymsli ran to the valley green;
 Seven swans o'er the sound were seen.
 33.
 The giant fell upon his knee.
 The first swan in his hand took he.
 34.
 He took to him the first swan there
 And bit its neck from its body fair.
 35.
 Then the boy was filled with pain
 As the feathers flew from his throat again.
 36.
 Then the boy was filled with fear—
 Hönir called to stand him near.
 37.
 The boy and Hönir homeward fare,
 The peasant and housewife meet them
 there.
 38.
 "Here's thy young son back to thee,
 "I'll no more his patron be."
 39.
 The peasant calls on his two swains thus:
 "Pray to Loki to come to us.
 40.
 "I would that Loki now were near.
 "How 'twill fare I then might hear."
 41.
 Scarce half spoken was the word,
 There stood Loki before the board.
 42.
 "Of my needs thou knowest none:
 "Skrymsli seeks to kill my son.
 43.
 "Hear thou, Loki, I call to thee.
 "Thou shalt hide my son for me.
 44.
 "Hide him well as thou dost know,
 "Let him not to Skrymsli go."

45.
 "Shall I hide thy son for thee,
 "To do my will thou'lt promise me.
 46.
 "A house thou'lt build upon the strand
 "While I fare away from land.
 47.
 "Cut within a doorway wide .
 "And lay a bar of iron inside."
 48.
 Loki took the boy away;
 In sorrow the peasant and housewife lay.
 49.
 Loki went toward the sand
 Where rode a boat beside the land.
 50.
 Loki rowed to the fishing-ground
 As is in ancient legends found.
 51.
 Loki speaks not many a word,
 But the hook and stone throws overboard.
 52.
 The hook and the stone to the bottom flew,
 Quickly then he a flounder drew.
 53.
 One he now catches; he catches now two;
 The third one it was black to view.
 54.
 Loki bids the boy to go
 As a single egg among the roe.
 55.
 "Here without fear you may safely be,
 "When I call then come to me.
 56.
 "Here you may safely be without pain,
 "When I call then come again."
 57.
 Loki rowed now back to land;
 Before him the giant stood on the sand.
 58.
 The giant quickly the question hight:
 "Loki, where wast thou during the
 night?"
 59.
 "But little rest is granted me;
 "Was rowing and faring upon the sea."
 60.
 The giant pushes his iron boat off;
 Loki cries that the sea breaks rough.

61.
 Loki calls to the giant there:
 "Giant, let me with you fare."
 62.
 The giant took the rudder in hand-
 While Loki rowed away from land.
 63.
 Stout and long did Loki row,
 Not from the place will the iron boat go.
 64.
 To the giant Loki swore: "I trow
 "Better to steer than thou I know!"
 65.
 Well to row the giant knew;
 Over the sea the iron boat flew.
 66.
 The giant rowed for many a mile;
 Loki sat in the stern the while.
 67.
 The giant rowed to the fishing-ground.
 As is in ancient legends found.
 68.
 The giant speaks not many a word,
 But the hook and stone throws overboard.
 69.
 The hook and the stone to the bottom
 flew,
 Quickly then he a flounder drew.
 70.
 One he now catches; he catches now two;
 The third one it was black to view.
 71.
 Loki spake the wily wish:
 "Giant, give to me the fish."
 72.
 The giant answered and told him no:
 "To thee, my Loki, it ne'er shall go."
 73.
 The fish he took his knees between
 And counted each egg of the roe, I ween.
 74.
 He counted each egg within the fish;
 To get the boy was his only wish.
 75.
 Then the boy was filled with pain
 As the egg crept from his fist again.
 76.
 Then the boy was filled with fear—
 Loki called to stand him near.

77.

"Seat thyself close back of me
 "Where the giant cannot see.

78.

"Thou must leap so light to land
 "That ne'er a trace is in the sand."

79.

The giant rowed now back to land,
 Straight toward the whitest sand.

80.

Up to the land rowed the giant stout;
 The iron boat Loki swung about.

81.

The giant runs the stern to land;
 The boy leaps lightly to the sand.

82.

The giant looked up toward the land;
 The boy stands near him on the sand.

83.

So lightly leaped the boy to land
 That ne'er a trace was in the sand.

84.

So heavy the giant leaped to land
 That up to his knees sunk he in sand.

85.

The boy, as well as he ever could,
 Ran where his father's boat-house stood.

86.

To his father's boat-house now he runs
 And close behind the giant comes.

87.

The giant stuck in the doorway fast;
 Into his head the iron bar passed.

88.

Loki then was far from slow,
 Hewed off a leg at a single blow.

89.

More pleasure than pain the giant found,
 Together grew again the wound.

90.

Loki then was far from slow,
 Hewed the other leg off at a single blow.

91.

Off he hewed both flesh and bone,
 And cast between it stock and stone.

92.

The boy, too, saw with pleasure deep,
 The giant apart and together leap.

93.

The boy and Loki homeward fare,
 The peasant and housewife meet them
 there.

94.

"Here's thy young son back to thee,
 "I'll no more his patron be.

95.

"I'll no more his patron be:
 "My promise have I kept to thee.

96.

"Truly have I kept my vow,
 "The giant his life has lost just now."

ARTICLE VII.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

APOLOGETICS.*—These lectures have been drawn up from Prof. Smith's own briefs and notes of his lectures on Apologetics in the Union Theological Seminary in 1874, '75, '76. They were his last work, and exhibit his final judgment on the principal points in the conflict with unbelief. The editor announces that he has confined himself strictly to what the author left. It is intimated that an outline of his theological system, including his lectures in full on the Atonement and the Person of Christ, will soon be published. It is much to be regretted that he had not prepared his theological discussions for the press himself. But much interest will be felt in the present volume and that which is forthcoming.

THE WORLD'S WITNESS TO JESUS CHRIST.†—This volume contains two lectures, the first course on the Bedell foundation, recently given by G. P. and Julia Bedell to the Trustees of the Theological Seminary of the Diocese of Ohio and Kenyon College. The lectures are a necessarily concise, but well considered review of the influences of Christianity on civilization, and present an unanswerable argument in defence of Christianity.

DR. DYKES' SERMONS.‡—This volume contains twenty-six sermons. They are evangelical and devout, and as heard from the pulpit were doubtless quickening and helpful to the hearers. The silent reader scarcely sees a reason why they, more than many other good sermons which he hears from Sunday to Sunday, should be published.

* *Apologetics*. A course of Lectures by HENRY B. SMITH, D.D., LL.D.; edited by William S. Karr, D.D., Professor in Hartford Theological Seminary. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1882. ix. and 194 pages.

† *The Bedell Lecture for 1881*. The World's Witness to Jesus Christ. The power of Christianity in developing modern civilization. By Rt. Rev. JOHN WILLIAMS, D.D., Bishop of Connecticut. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 27 and 29 West 23d Street. 1882. 79 pp.

‡ *Sermons*. By J. OSWALD DYKES, M.A., D.D., author of the "Manifesto of the Kingdom," "Abraham," "Prayers for the Household," etc. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. viii. and 383 pages.

COVENANT NAMES.*—This volume contains twenty sermons; the six first are on as many covenant names of God mentioned in the Old Testament; the remainder are on Christian privileges. The sermons are short, simple, and devout. A refreshing spiritual influence breathes from them. The book is an excellent companion for devotional hours. It contains a fine portrait of the author.

PROF. SHAIRP'S ASPECTS OF POETRY.†—The principal part of this new book of Prof. Shairp is composed of lectures which he has delivered at Oxford within the past four years. They are characterized by the same originality, and the same charm of diction which were at once recognized in his former work. Perhaps we cannot give a better idea of the fresh interest with which he invests the topics which he discusses than by the following quotation :

“It was nothing short of a new revelation, when Scott turned back men's eyes on their own past history and national life, and showed them there a field of human interest and a poetic creation which long had lain neglected. Since the days of Shakespeare a veil had been upon it, and Scott removed the veil. Quinet has spoken of the impassable gulf which the age of Louis Quatorze has placed between mediæval France and the modern time. It has parted the literature of France, he says, into two distinct periods, between which no communion is possible. Bossuet, Corneille, Racine, Molière, Voltaire, owe nothing to the earlier thought of France, draw nothing from it. Because of this separation, Quinet thinks that all modern French literature, both prose and poetry, is more real and more fitted to interpret the modern spirit, than if it had grown continuously. We may well doubt this; we may ask whether it has not been the death of French poetry—the cause why modern France possesses so little that to us looks like poetry at all. It would seem as if at one time a like calamity had threatened English literature. In the earlier part of last century, under the influence of Pope and Bolingbroke, a false cosmopolitanism seemed creeping over it, which might have done for our literature what the French wits of

* *Covenant Names and Privileges.* By RICHARD NEWTON, D.D., author of the *King's Highway, Nature's Wonders, &c.* New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1882. 374 pp.

† *Aspects of Poetry*; being Lectures delivered at Oxford by JOHN CAMPBELL SHAIRP, LL.D. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Cambridge, 1882. 12mo. pp. 401.

the Louis Quatorze age did for theirs. But from this we were saved by that continuity of feeling and of purpose which happily governs our literary not less than our political life. All through last century the ancient spirit was never wholly dead in England, and it would have revived in some way or other. That immense sentiment, that turning back of affection upon the past, was coming—no doubt it would have come—even if Scott had never been born. But he was the chosen vessel to gather up and concentrate within himself the whole force of this retrospective tendency, and to pour it in full flood upon the heart of European society. More profoundly than any other man or poet, he felt the significance of the past, brooded over it, was haunted by it, and in his poems and romances expressed it so broadly, so felicitously, with such genial human interest, that even in his own lifetime he won the world to feel as he did.

“One among many results of Scott’s work was to turn the tide against the Illumination, of which Voltaire, Diderot, and the host of Encyclopædists were the high priests. Another result was, that he changed men’s whole view of history, and of the way in which it should be written; recalled it from pale abstractions to living personalities, and peopled the past no longer with mere phantoms, or doctrinaire notions, but with men and women, in whom the life-blood is warm. If you wish to estimate the change he wrought in this way, compare the historic characters of Hume and Robertson with the life-like portraits of Carlyle and Macaulay. Though these two last have said nasty things of Scott, it little became them to do so; for from him they learnt much of that art which gives to their descriptions of men and scenes and events so peculiar a charm. If we now look back on many characters of past ages, with an intimate acquaintance and a personal affection unknown to our grandfathers, it was Scott who taught us this.

“These may be said to be intellectual results of Scott’s ascendancy; but there are also great social changes wrought by his influence, which are patent to every eye. Look at modern architecture. The whole mediæval revival, whether we admire it or not, must be credited to Scott. Likely enough Scott was not deeply versed in the secrets of Gothic architecture and its inner proprieties—as, I believe, his own attempts at Abbotsford, as well as his descriptions of castles and churches, prove. But it was he who turned men’s eyes and thoughts that way, and

touched those inner springs of interest from which, in due time, the whole movement came.

"Another social result is, that he not only changed the whole sentiment with which Scotchmen regard their country, but he awakened in other nations an interest in it which was till his time unknown. When Scott was born, Scotland had not yet recovered from the long decadence and despondency into which she had fallen, after she had lost her Kings and her Parliament. Throughout last century a sense of something like degradation lay on the hearts of those who, still loving their country, could not be content with the cold cosmopolitanism affected by the Edinburgh wits. Burns felt this deeply, as his poems show, and he did something in his way to redress it. But still the prevailing feeling entertained by Englishmen towards Scots and Scotland was that which is so well represented in *The Fortunes of Nigel*. Till the end of the last century, the attitude of Dr. Johnson was shared by most of his countrymen. If all this has entirely changed—if Scots are now proud of their country, instead of being ashamed of it—if other nations look on the land with feelings of romance, and on the people themselves with respect, if not with interest, this we owe to Scott, more than to any other human agency. And not the past only, with its heroic figures, but the lowly peasant life of his own time, he first revealed to the world in its worth and beauty. Jennie Deans, Edie Ochiltree, Caleb Balderstone, Dandie Dinmont—these and many more are characters which his eye first discerned in their quiet obscurity—read the inner movements of their hearts, and gave to the world, a possession for all time. And this he did by his own wonderful human-heartedness—so broad, so clear, so genial, so humorous. More than any man since Shakespeare, he had in him that touch of nature which makes the whole world kin, and he so imparted it to his own creations that they won men's sympathies to himself, not less than to his country and his people. Wordsworth has well called Scott "the whole world's darling." If strangers and foreigners now look upon Scotland and its people with other eyes and another heart, it is because they see them through the personality of Scott, and through the creations with which he peopled the land; not through the prosaic Radicalism, which since Scott's day has been busily effacing from the character of his countrymen so much that he loved.

"I have spoken of how Scott has been a power of social and

beneficent influence by the flood of fresh sentiment which he let in on men's minds. But I am aware that to your "practical" man romance is moonshine, and sentiment a delusion. Such an one may, perhaps, be led to esteem them more highly, when he is made aware how much sentiment and romance are worth in the market. The tourists, who from all lands crowd to Scotland every summer, and enrich the natives even in remotest districts—what was it brought them thither? What but the spell of Walter Scott? And, as the late Sir William Stirling Maxwell well expressed it at the Scott Centenary, the fact that Scott has in any of his creations named a farm, or a hill, or a stream, that is to their possessor as good as a new title-deed, which will probably double the marketable value of the spot. So practical a power may poetry become in the affairs of this working world."

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ARTICLE I.—EDUCATION OF MEN OF SCIENCE.

Science and Culture and Other Essays; by THOMAS HENRY HUXLEY.

It is not the purpose of this Article to review Prof. Huxley's scientific theories. What specially concerns us is the subject of "Science and Culture," or Education for Men of Science,—that which gives the title to this collection of papers, and forms the subject of the first paper. The title of the book indicates the importance the author attaches to this and the three other educational essays with which the volume opens.

Here is a theme on which it seems desirable a good deal more should be said than has been said, and something different from most of what has been said.

This is not the first time Prof. Huxley has discussed the subject. In his "Lay Sermons, Addresses, and Reviews," there are three or four essays devoted to the theme of education, and it is to be hoped that his persevering efforts to direct attention to the claims of the Natural Sciences to a place in educational curricula, high and low, have not been without influence on the English public. There seems to have been need enough, even though we might think there were reason to

make allowance, in some of his statements about English Schools and Universities, for the earnestness of the reformer.

The immediate occasion of the address on Science and Culture was the opening of Sir Josiah Mason's Science College at Birmingham. Sir Josiah Mason had been a poor boy, had made his life battle and his fortune, and, wishing to do something for those who, like him, would have to run the gauntlet of the world's blows, he founded a college "to provide them with the means of obtaining sound, extensive, and practical scientific knowledge." From this college party politics, theology, and "mere literary instruction and education" are by express terms excluded. This last exclusion, Prof. Huxley supposes, has reference "to the ordinary classical course of our schools and universities," in other words, to Latin and Greek studies. The institution, we are told, "professes to give a high and efficient education," and the possibility is suggested that, in view of this profession and that exclusion, "the Levites of Culture," by which designation is intended the advocates of classical studies, may set up a sound of trumpets. This furnishes the speaker an occasion to express his convictions on the subject of science education; the relation of science to culture and the education of men of science. Two propositions are laid down. "The first is, that neither the discipline nor the subject matter of classical education is of such direct value to the student of physical science as to justify the expenditure of valuable time upon either." This proposition is further explained in course of the address. ". . . given ample time for learning and destination for ordinary life or for a literary career, I do not think that a young Englishman in search of culture can do better than follow the course usually marked out for him, supplementing its deficiencies by his own efforts. But for those who mean to make science their serious occupation, . . . in my opinion classical education is a mistake." Prof. Huxley is therefore glad to see a provision which shuts out of this institution "the ordinary smattering of Latin and Greek."

The second proposition laid down is "that for the purpose of attaining real culture, an exclusively scientific education is at least as effectual as an exclusively literary education." Mr.

Huxley accepts Matthew Arnold's view that a criticism of life is the essence of culture, but dissents from the proposition, as too narrow, that literature contains the materials which suffice for the construction of such a criticism. "Perfect culture should supply a complete theory of life, based upon a clear knowledge alike of its possibilities and of its limitations." "Nevertheless," he says, "I am the last person to question the importance of genuine literary education, or to suppose that intellectual culture can be complete without it. An exclusively scientific training will bring about a mental twist as surely as an exclusively literary training." But the literary element in a scientific course may be drawn from English, French, and German, "the three greatest literatures of the modern world." "If an Englishman cannot get literary culture out of his Bible, his Shakespeare, his Milton, neither, in my belief, will the profoundest study of Homer and Sophocles, Virgil and Horace, give it to them."

This abstract of Prof. Huxley's views is not given for the purpose of criticism but in order to bring them into light. No one holds a more commanding position among men of science, and no one is more entitled to say what he thinks, of the kind of education needful to one who is about to devote his life to scientific pursuits. From his utterances in "Science and Culture," it appears that he regards an institution, like the Josiah Mason Science College, founded "to promote the prosperity of the manufacturers and the industry of the country," as a properly speaking Scientific College, adequate, at least, to the purposes of scientific culture. "The picked intelligences among all classes" are to pass through it, and no Birmingham child "need fail to obtain" here and in the primary and other schools "not merely the instruction but the culture most appropriate to the conditions of his life." Education then for the scientific man must in its foundations be an education in the English branches, to which may be added the French and German languages, after which comes introduction to the principles of science and to its special applications. The classical languages are excluded—time spent upon them is misspent. Of Philosophy nothing is said; probably it was not deemed worth mentioning. This is the view taken by Prof. Huxley of

education for students of physical science, "those who mean to make science their serious occupation." Discard the classics, probably also philosophy, acquaint yourself with the English branches, get French and German, and then plunge into science, or some special department of it, in a school which may and probably will have a range similar to that of Sir Josiah Mason's College. And this, be it said, not because he does not appreciate the value of classical literature, but because he does not think these studies worth the time to the man who makes science his aim.

In these views Professor Huxley stands as the representative of a class, a large one, an influential one. There is no question but that among the parents of the more cultivated families scattered through this country, among practical men, commercial men, manufacturers, lawyers, and others, many of them men of classical education; there is a wide-spread impression, that scientific schools, based on the ideas of Professor Huxley, can furnish and do furnish, not only practical fitness for the industries of life, but an all-sufficient culture; and that, especially if the aim be science as the serious occupation of life, a technical school like the Josiah Mason Science College is adequate to fit a man for that serious occupation. Not only so, but, for some reason or other, these views have widely prevailed in the opening of so-called scientific departments in connection with the larger universities and smaller colleges in America, as the requirements of the courses of study in them will abundantly show. And it is just this state of things which makes the late utterances of such a man as Professor Huxley important, and makes it worth while to discuss the question of education for men of science. The subject is one of too great moment to be left to the random drift of a popular current. One has only to look at the number of technical schools which are being established in various parts of the country, and the number of colleges and universities which are establishing, in one form or another, courses of so-called scientific instruction, alongside the regular classical courses; and at the great number of students who are giving the preference to these technical schools and scientific courses, to appreciate, in some degree, the importance which attaches to

the methods adopted in them, and to the ideas which they give their students, not only of the material world, but of culture in general and of themselves. It makes some difference how men are taught to regard themselves; but, if that is a relatively small matter, it makes a great difference to them and the world what they actually are. The young men who are now being educated in the various scientific schools are going to take an important part not only in the acting of the next fifty years, but also in their thinking. And when we consider what weight the thinking of men of science has with the masses, and that their thinking is not likely to have less weight but rather more in the future, the kind of preparation they are getting for their future thinking cannot be too carefully scanned. Moreover courses of scientific study are laid out in a large number of technical schools, colleges and universities with reference to growth and future needs. Some of these institutions are now doing very little in the way of special instruction in the sciences, but, if future growth meets anticipations, they will ere long be teaching. If mistakes have been made in mapping out work in these departments, they are not past correction. Add to this the consideration that many of these institutions are likely to receive, in the future, more munificent foundations than they have received in the past, and it becomes exceedingly desirable that correct ideas of the aims of such departments should be so widely diffused, as to prevent the loading of gifts with conditions, which may go a long way towards thwarting the highest purposes of education in science.

Now, in order to a correct view of the elements which must enter into the education of the man who is to make science his life study, it is necessary, first to consider what constitutes science; and second the purposes a man may have in studying it. These questions present no serious difficulties. Science is simply the knowledge of the phenomenal world and the laws which govern it. It properly includes the phenomena not only of matter but of mind. Both sets of phenomena are objects of observation and may be made objects of experiment. Both may be presumed to have laws. But more commonly the term science is distinctively applied to the phenomena of

matter and their laws. The whole range of material phenomena belongs to science, and the laws, ever more and more inclusive as we ascend, by which phenomena are determined constitute the proper object of scientific seeking. Observation, experiment is subordinated to this end.

When we turn to the second question, the purpose a man may have in view in studying science, we find that according to that purpose science divides itself into theoretical and practical or science proper and applied science. What is the distinction? It is very clear. True, both may be combined in one person but both will rarely be present in equal degree. The mind will tend predominantly to the one or the other. Science proper, pure science is *knowledge*. Knowledge of phenomena and their laws, without reference to the use of the knowledge for the material service of life. The ruling idea is that of knowing not of using. The object of observation, experiment, classification, is the determination of thought relations among phenomena; the enlargement of the intellectual view. Material science as science is mind food. The object of its pursuit is to *know*. It is therefore sharply contrasted with applied science. The purpose of the man who makes applied science, practical science his study is to use principles, laws, facts for the material ends of life. He knows in order that he may apply. Knowing is not the end. Thought relations are valuable only as they subserve material interests. Enlargement of intellectual view is sought somewhat as the hawk seeks a wide vision, that he may secure his prey. This use of science is legitimate; it may be noble; but the distinction is positive, radical.

According to this distinction we obtain two classes of students of science whose aims are wide apart; students of applied science or technical students and students of pure science or scientists.

The object of the technical student is to acquire some art, to become master of an industry. The arts or industries which such students may wish to acquire are exceedingly varied and as varied are the amounts of scientific knowledge needful to make them skilled in their callings. A man who wishes to make shoes by hand needs very little science beyond what is

at every man's elbow. Beyond this he acquires hand skill and does good work. A young woman who wants to make good butter might find it desirable to know quite a number of chemical facts not commonly understood, especially if she were going to experiment in new methods; but, ordinarily, the art, though a very nice one, can be acquired out of school. A young man who has considerable farming interests at stake, finds it desirable to know something of a good many things; of chemistry, of botany, of zoology, of meteorology. He goes to a technical school, a school of agriculture. There he seeks such knowledge of these branches as specially applies to his calling, in botany a limited knowledge of grasses, in zoology a knowledge of insects injurious to crops, and so on. He pursues these subjects, not as sciences, but as contributors to a branch of economy. Science is not his aim; his aim is practical. So in the various lines of manufacture, in sugar refining, and even in mining. While all these, and all other technical students must have a certain foundation of scientific knowledge, it differs in extent and in kind from that of the student of pure science. The actual practice with such students in the most discriminating schools is different. After a comparatively short course of preliminary instruction, the technological student, of sugar manufacturing for instance, can advantageously be set at the practical processes which shall acquaint him with the nature, chemical relations, sources of sugar, and the mechanical means of producing it. So with the metallurgist and the miner. No one will contend that the object had in view by the student of applied science will not necessarily exercise a powerful influence, not only upon the range of his studies, but upon the spirit of them. This distinction may be extended much further than would at first be thought. There are geologists who can hardly aspire to rank among men of science. Their aims are practical and utilitarian. They are good collectors, intelligent observers in those fields with which they are familiar, having a practical knowledge of rocks and more rarely of fossils, of the order of strata, and of useful minerals. They work up details for others to systematize into science, but they can hardly claim the stature of scientific men. So a man might be a very fair observer in

meteorology or even in astronomy and yet be of too mechanical and practical a tendency to become a scientist.

I have enlarged upon this point more than I should have done were it not that in this quarter lies the very starting point of error. Science is something different from and more than an art. Science, as such, is pursued for the sake of what it reveals. A student of science has a perfectly distinct aim; he follows science for its own sake. Not that he is not conscious of its utility, but he does not stop to inquire after its uses. He is ready to spend his life on the solution of questions of purely scientific interest, whose practical bearings are not seen or thought of. While he rejoices, equally with others, if material benefits are conferred on mankind, as a result of his work, he often makes it a point of honor not to receive the material benefit himself. His discoveries become the property of the world. Even if he makes practical use of his knowledge scientific truth is ever uppermost among his aims. I will not say, for I do not know, what may be the feelings with younger students, but that generation with which I had the pleasure of beginning my studies in these departments, is still represented by noble souls to whom pure science offers charms which no utilitarian views have diminished, and who, I believe, have steadily refused to feather their nests with the results of their investigations. They stand open-handed, generous, devoted to an ideal, and they have done noble work. The spirit which then prevailed did not fail to express itself with reprobation of those who, while they professed to be devotees of science, were esteemed to have soiled their hands with the profits of their discoveries. And the example was set them by an older generation of great names. When Weber and Gauss, in Göttingen, stretched a wire from the studio of one to that of the other, and sent telegraphic signals through it, they dropped the work then and there. Why? Not because they did not care for the benefits men might reap from telegraphy, but because the work of science was done. The rest was a matter of mechanical detail. That was not their sphere. They turned to further searchings in the fields of pure science.

These illustrations may serve to make the distinction clear.

It would not be surprising if the practical drift of the day were to cry out against this denial of the name of science to what is really art; but only when the distinction is drawn are we prepared to see what kind of training the man of science needs.

First and foremost I would lay it down as fundamental that he shall himself understand the distinction we have been making. He shall radically distinguish in his own mind between science and technology. Only so can he form for himself a proper ideal towards which he may work. Having obtained such an ideal, it will not be difficult for him to see that if he is to realize it, he must begin by securing a broad basis of general culture. If to know is his aim, the unceasing requirement of his very being, he will esteem it a great misfortune not to have obtained at the outset broad glimpses at least of the knowable. He will deprecate, as a blow struck at his ideal of a scientific man, all views of education which shut him out from fields of culture, the beauty and worth of which he never can really know, unless he is permitted to tread them. The demand for a broad and generous culture, as a foundation for his future, will rise immediately out of his perception of the ideal man of science.

If now from this general demand we pass to special requirements, we observe that science, as a study, breaks into two departments, the observation of facts, and reasoning upon facts. Observing, reasoning, this is the work for which men are to be trained, i. e., for a large, accurate use of the senses, for a close application of mind. Here at once arises again the demand for great breadth of training—training of the whole man, training of the senses and reasoning powers. A quick eye, a delicate touch, a sensitive taste, a quick perception, close attention, a command of names to mark objects, of memory to retain, vivid imagination, well-developed discrimination of like and unlike, an inductive power including classification and generalization—these are the belongings of the man of science, besides command of useful languages, instruments to unlock the doors of knowledge, ancient and modern. Here is the general statement. A glance at the powers is sufficient to show that they are necessary and may be cultivated. He would be a great genius who should possess them all in rich measure,

but genius even, without discipline, runs wild. Yet minds of average brightness may acquire these powers under skillful training, and it is the definite purpose of scientific education to develop them. The training of the senses comes by systematic every-day use in the fields, the woods, the waters, the laboratory, the collection at the investigator's table. Perception, attention, discrimination of likeness and difference, memory, come of constant, prolonged contact with phenomena. The logical faculty, classification, generalization, languages come partly of books, guiding to use. Books must everywhere supplement observation and experiment.

This is not the place for a detailed enumeration of special studies for the student of science, but in view of the present tendencies of this particular branch of education, a few things need to be insisted on with emphasis.

And in the first place, if we have been at all successful in this review of the subject, the reader will find some ground for agreement with the proposition that a broad culture, the broadest possible culture, is fundamental to education for scientific pursuits. The need grows out of the very nature of the work in which the man of science is to engage. In view of the commanding influence accorded to men of science, in view of the part they are to play, inevitably, in the future of this country, especially in the future of its thought, it is not only fitting, it is demanded, that they shall prepare themselves for that future by courses of study at least as broad, as refining and as stimulating as those which belong to any other calling. I do not know of a single argument used to exclude the usual college curriculum, with its Latin, and especially its Greek, from the preparation of men of science, which is not equally applicable to the law, to medicine, and in good degree to theology and many departments of literature. It is manifest that the master minds in natural science must take in as broad a range of studies, modern and ancient, as the master minds in any other department. If it is true that the sources of knowledge in law, medicine, theology, literature lie in Latin and Greek writings, so do the sources of knowledge in natural science lie there, so far as they lie in books at all. All of value that was thought and done in the fundamentals of science

from the time of Thales down to the time of Roger Bacon, in the thirteenth century, was thought and done in Latin and Greek—pretty much all of it. The boasted science of Arabia was Greek science translated. The Arabic served mainly as a channel through which Greek science and philosophy were poured into mediæval Europe, and how impure the channel was the men of Europe saw when, in the thirteenth century, they began to get hold of the original Greek writings of Aristotle. From those original writings coming in contact with the fresh minds of Europe, sprung more than we have been wont to believe—the first signs of modern science. And if it be said that those classical writings are accessible now, in reliable translations to all students of science, so are they to all other students. But that is not enough. No true student can be satisfied with even the best translations. It is not enough that we get substantially, at second hand, the facts and ideas of a people to which we turn for intellectual enlargement; what we want is the genius of the nation. That genius is in its speech, and the genius of the Greek was a genius inquiring, imaginative, scientific. It was precisely the genius which we have seen must be exemplified in the modern man of science.

It will naturally appear, from the presentation of the subject in this way, that the best preparation for a young man, who is going to pursue pure science in earnest, will be found in the regular college curriculum. Probably on the whole this is the best source from which to draw the initial elements of culture. The main objections to this course are two.

In the first place it is claimed that scientific students have not time. To which the reply is natural that they have just as much time as any other students. They live as long, they do not need to get into active life any earlier, their professional studies require no longer time for one who is well prepared to take hold of them, than do other professional studies. A large part of our present so-called scientific course is taken up with studies which ought to have been made before entering the school of science.

A second objection is more serious. The whole life of the college student is spent with books, and the habit of depending on observation, so necessary to the student of nature, is

thereby seriously interfered with. This is true. College life develops a tendency to bookishness. But the tendency can be easily corrected by proper management. Let the college student upon entering the school of science be put instanter, for a sufficiently long period, into immediate contact with things. Take books away from him, excepting his two or three reference books, set him at work on minerals, fossils, plants or in the laboratory, and in six months, a year, his habit will be broken up and he will have acquired besides a basis of facts upon which he can begin to read intelligently. Further than these two objections I know of none, except that the methods of college instruction are too unpractical, resulting, in case of the classical languages, for the most part in a mere "smattering of Latin and Greek." There was probably more ground for this charge formerly than now; but that there is still great need of change in the methods of instruction is probably true. This objection, however, which is the one most commonly urged, is really an objection based not on the relative importance of classical studies, but on the method of acquiring them. The objection applies to all classical training for whatever end, and the way for colleges to meet it is by seeking new and more practical methods, rather than encouraging courses of study in which the classics are left out.

That in advocating a broader culture for men of science this paper expresses the feeling of our best and purest scientific minds, we may be confident. They are feeling the stigma, which, in a certain degree, attaches to the science departments in our colleges and universities, while they are obliged to admit that the low standard of culture demanded as preparation for scientific studies, gives an air of justice to the reproach. They are also feeling the defect in a practical way. Only lately, an instructor was lamenting, in my presence, the inability of his classes to command the nomenclature of science, and the utter confusion of their minds over such simple terms as aphelion, perihelion, apogee, perigee, and synodic revolutions.* If students are seriously embarrassed over words which have almost become English, what must become of them when they enter on the vast terminology of other

* This is a leading school of science.

branches of science. And how keenly the lack of preparatory classical education is occasionally felt by men who have made good advances in scientific studies, is well illustrated by an intimate friend who, after having studied in a scientific school, and spent a long term in German universities, found himself teaching science in one of our colleges. He was so keenly sensible of the defects in his early education that, with Spartan heroism, he actually went in with the undergraduates, and recited in their classes to make up a loss which he could not afford to suffer. His subsequent success has been such as might have been expected of his courageous self-humiliation.

When we pass from the preparatory course into the science school itself the main studies naturally determine themselves. But there are two branches at present very generally neglected, and of such importance to the cultivated man of science as to demand special mention here.

The first of these is the general history of science. To know what has been done, and how it has been done, in the various departments of science is a thing of vast importance, and a general but complete outline of such knowledge ought to be furnished. Nothing can be more healthful to the student of science than this. In this way alone can he learn not only as to his own department, but as to all science, how the laws of scientific thought have been developed and illustrated along with processes of discovery. Nothing offers better preparation for the work of a man of right ideals than this knowledge of the past; the century-long, slow processes by which facts have been gathered, ideas have been classified, principles established, laws ascertained. Nothing too can be safer for the morale of the student. The tremendous cost of knowledge is set before him in this way as in no other. And when a young man sees the mistakes of great minds, the fleeting character of theories, the boldness with which speculations have been advanced and the thoroughness with which each subsequent generation reviews the work and the theories of the past, how ruthlessly the favorite dogmas of one generation are overhauled and pulled down by the next, he must be gifted with a large share of conceit who does not learn modesty and caution, and also learn how valuable are facts and how uncertain are

speculations which go beyond the facts. He will understand that all the work of this generation will be as mercilessly reviewed by the next, and that it cannot expect wholly to escape the general destiny; nay, that much of that which is now made the Shibboleth of scientific rank may not pass muster under the keener gaze and deeper knowledge of succeeding generations. But he will also learn that whatever may become of theories, whatever may become of his own name and fame, all the solid material he works out of nature's quarry will go into the reconstructed science of the future.

The second largely neglected branch of study in these schools is Philosophy. It is no extravagant ideal of a man of science which asserts the importance to his training of a sound philosophy. The man who makes a life study of nature will be a philosopher of some school. It is not like a man of high ideals to stop short when he reaches the border line between science and that philosophy which inquires into the deeper nature and source of all that is. The history of the sensible world immediately around us leads up to the history of the cosmos. We cannot contemplate the great whole, or its details, without being drawn into speculations, which lie beyond the determinations of physical sequences. The vast mysteries which lie back of phenomena possess a mighty attractiveness to all who love knowledge for its own sake. Besides this, the question of the origin of things is indissolubly connected with questions concerning the progress of things; those vast processes of mighty change, and the hopes, the destinies of men. We cannot shake off these questions. It is utterly vain to tell men to "leave hoping and fearing alone." Man is too largely a creature of hopes and fears. These questions as to whence and how things came to be and why they came to be as they are, and whither they all and we all tend constitute, to a large majority of minds, the very fascination of science, though they lie beyond science in the realm of philosophy. It is to be observed, that it is over such questions as these, this age is most profoundly agitated, notwithstanding its utilitarianism, perhaps partly in consequence of it. It is further to be observed, that the influence which certain men, especially of the English school of science, have exerted dur-

ing the last twenty-five years over the public mind, has been due largely to that philosophy with which they have transfused their science. Of that philosophy there is here no occasion to speak farther than to insist that it has shaped the thinking and popular power of leading men of science of this day, as the philosophy which such men adopt will always do. And their dealing with such questions attracts the gaze of men, because though science and philosophy are distinct, they are yet so intimate, that men do not always discriminate between them. Hence the hearing, almost credulous, given to men of science when they touch these themes. Hence it becomes a matter of vast importance, that the philosophy held by every man of science should be sound. In order that it may be so he must be instructed in the elements of philosophy and in the history of philosophic speculation from its dawn down to the present time. An intelligent understanding of such history, in its main outlines, would guard the minds of young men, against that power, which the supposed novelty of bold speculations often has over them. They would discern how little there is of originality and of novelty in the ever recurring forms of sceptic philosophy, and would be prepared to measure the conditions and limitations of true science.

It is time for educators to look to this matter as they love the future of our country. A false philosophy is the suicide of thought, and instead of being born of science, as some imagine, it is the suicide of science. It is to be wished the time were not far off, when no corps of scientific instructors should be looked upon as complete without its special representatives of the History of Science and of Philosophy.

It remains, in closing this essay, to revert once more to the importance of the distinction drawn between the school of science and the school of technology. To the confounding of this distinction must be ascribed in great part the present tendency to lower the standard of education for men of science. The large demand of the industrial arts for men specially educated to them has led a great many youths to resort to schools where science is taught, in order to obtain such needful information as science affords to fit them for their special callings. Naturally enough they have been received, with only such

preparation as was deemed necessary for their immediate purposes. Once in such institutions, they have straightway imagined and called themselves scientific students. The schools have been called scientific schools. The greater portion of these students have gone into the arts. But now and then one originally intending to study only some branch of technology has become enamored of a special branch of science, and has made it his life work, perhaps has become a teacher in it. So it has come about that we have schools of science and of technology all in one—students of science and technology mingling together habitually classed together in all minds, and what is worse, sharing equally the honors of the name of science, so they only come up to a certain relatively low standard of preparation. Hence the wide spread impression that to be a man of science does not require that thorough culture and trained scholarship which is necessary to a corresponding rank in other departments. Then the evil is exaggerated and intensified by the conferring of science degrees on those who are really only entitled to certificates of proficiency in some branch of technology. There seems to be no good reason why such degrees as Bachelor of Philosophy and Bachelor of Science should be conferred upon those whose studies have been mainly directed to the mastery of some industry, while they are eminently appropriate to those who pursue science for its own sake. The custom of conferring such degrees has however become wide spread and contributes largely to the unfortunate confusion of ideas which prevails. The degrees have the sound of a culture which is not realized.

And still more do the higher degrees of Master of Science and Doctor of Philosophy which are perhaps reserved for those who have made a real proficiency in some branch of pure science. If we may trust to a careful examination of numerous catalogues for information as to the conditions of these degrees, we are led to the conclusion that with one or two exceptions they as well as the lower ones may be secured by candidates who possess only a mere elementary knowledge of Latin, in whom the knowledge of Greek is either absolutely wanting or is reduced to what the chemist would call a mere trace, while Philosophy has been nearly or quite ex-

cluded from the course of study and the History of Science in its broad range has been ignored.

These things have been brought about by peculiarities of the situation no doubt, among which have been conspicuous the demand for practical education, the decrying of classical culture, the necessity of concessions on the part of institutions of learning to popular demands, and possibly, in some instances, the jealousy of the older classical departments towards the new scientific rivals, and a fear of their supposed sceptical tendencies leading to want of sympathy and encouragement in their efforts to maintain a high standard. However this may be it is manifest that the conferring or withholding of degrees is the key to the situation, and that when schools of science refuse degrees which are significant of broad culture to all except those who have made due efforts to obtain it, the desire and demand for such culture will arise among the candidates themselves.

And it will conduce to the same end if the distinction between technology and science is maintained throughout. False names mislead. A school of technology should not be called a school of science. That name should be reserved for those schools which, though they may have a department of technology, make it their leading aim to cultivate pure science and to furnish opportunities for education in pure science. Nor should students of technology bear the name of scientific students, or receive a title which fosters the impression that the institution which sends them forth looks upon them as fully equipped scientific men. It would be better to enter the different classes of students in catalogues under their appropriate designations, as being, not of unequal honor, but of different destination. Even with these precautions, it will be sufficiently difficult, in an intensely utilitarian age to preserve the proper ideals of science. But whatever it may cost, the lovers of science should be encouraged, by every means, in their efforts to maintain those ideals.

ARTICLE II.—MODERN MATERIALISM.

THIS has been termed a physical age. If we take a retrospective view over the centuries of Christian civilization, we shall not fail to find that there have existed periods, in which ideas of the spiritual and the physical alternately held the supremacy in the mind of man. Our lot seems to have been cast in the time when the latter wields the more potent influence. Not only does this tendency towards the higher exaltation of the physical and the material appear in the loftier realms of scientific investigation and philosophical thought, but even in the humbler walks of daily life. No modern men of true scientific culture are found to dwell with such earnest emphasis upon the discussion of the properties of a merely "brute matter," as did the minds of a few centuries back, but to them, as to the poet Whittier—

"A marvel seems this universe,
A miracle are life and death;
A mystery which I cannot pierce,
Around, above, beneath."

Most of them enter the field of investigation and research, with loftier conceptions and devouter spirits, determined to penetrate as far as possible into the mysteries of the dark unseen, to fathom the depths of the great unknown, and to discover the fundamental natural laws which underlie the workings of our matchless material universe. To the earnest seeker after truth perhaps no vocation is so noble, no employment so satisfactory, no reward so rich as that which accrues to him as a man of science, when, from the contemplation of the operation and outcome of physical forces in the works of nature, he rises to the conception of an immanent, conscious spirit pervading the whole.

Another sign of the times is the prominence which is given to feats of physical endurance and prowess. Aquatics, athletics, gymnastics, and almost every other exercise which tends to the development of our organisms, are more fashionable

now and practised to a greater extent than they were a century ago.

It is a peculiar feature in the civilization of the western side of the Atlantic, that a much higher value is attached to the practical and the useful than to the ornamental and the beautiful. This is doubtless one reason why poetry, painting, and art have not here found as fostering a home and as genial a clime as elsewhere. We have as yet been most fully engrossed with our material development, which, always in any nation, occupies a prior chronological position. The genius of the American people seems to be of a practical cast, and it is a noteworthy fact that, of late years especially, most of the inventions in the agricultural, mechanical, and scientific departments have originated with them.

It is this practical tendency I think, both here and elsewhere, which has developed the taste for physical research, which distinguishes the present era. This is all very well if conducted in the proper way, and if the utility of philosophy is not entirely disregarded, for metaphysics is itself the source whence all physics is derived. We can have no knowledge whatever of external facts of any kind; not even of matter itself, except as presented to us by our internal consciousness.

According to Sir William Hamilton, the too exclusive study of the physical sciences may exert an evil influence in two ways. First, "It diverts from all notice of the phenomena of moral liberty which are revealed to us in the human mind alone." Second, "By exhibiting merely the phenomena of matter and extension, it habituates us only to the contemplation of an order of things in which everything is determined by the laws of a blind or mechanical necessity, and leads us to think that the mechanism of nature can explain everything." If we hold such views as those last expressed, we have duly arrived at the materialistic goal. We have in our own time examples of not a few scientific investigators of this class. They have taken the scalpel and thoroughly dissected the brain and the nerves in order to find the human soul. They have brought the microscope to bear upon the various parts of our physical organisms, and when, after the minutest search, they have failed to see, to touch, or to feel it, they have confidently asserted the

non-existence of a living spirit, forgetting the old angelic rebuke, "Why seek ye the living among the dead?"

The subject before us is in every way worthy of most earnest and careful consideration. Materialism is not a theory of the present. From the time of its first most distinguished advocates, Democritus and Lucretius, down to the days of Tyndall, Huxley, and Bain, its latest exponents, it has claimed more or less of the attention of the scientific world.

At the outset of this discussion we feel almost inclined to ask ourselves the same question as did the Christian poet when he says:—

"But how should matter execute a law,
Dull as it is, or satisfy a charge
So vast in its demands, unless impelled
To ceaseless action, by some ceaseless power,
And under pressure of some conscious cause?"

But to condemn any doctrine unheard is most unfair. Now-a-days we should be people of many-sided culture. If we would know truth we must look at both sides of the question. We must allow materialism as well as theism an impartial hearing, and this we shall now endeavor to give them in the light of modern established science.

In the pursuit of our inquiry let us ask ourselves four leading questions, and see whether or not from the answers to these we should be justified in accepting materialism as our creed. These questions are as follows:

1. What is matter?
2. If matter is the only substance in the universe, whence came it?
3. How came the living from the not-living? Is the mechanical theory, the physical basis of life, an adequate explanation?

4. Has matter a spiritual and a physical side?

1. What is matter? What we might call the orthodox definition, or rather description, is, that it is a substance in which *extension* and *inertia* are two of its essential properties. Bain fixes to the term the appellation of "a double-faced unit, having a spiritual and a physical side." Dr. Tyndall sits down, and under the genial influence of a July sun and a balmy

sea-breeze, muses upon the origin of things. He is carried back in thought to that remote period when the universe subsisted as a nebulous haze, and there his philosophical contemplation is rewarded with the magnificent discovery, that this primordial substance was endowed with "the promise and the potency of all forms of terrestrial life." It will be observed that upon these definitions of Tyndall and Bain, the superstructure of modern materialism has been reared. These men saw that as long as the established definition was adhered to, as long as a certain vital force had to be supposed to account for the phenomena of life and organization, they could make no headway; and so they have constructed a new definition of matter, ingeniously incorporating into it from the start what they wish ultimately to evolve. Is it any wonder then, that if the potency of producing those attributes which we have been accustomed to associate with a separate substance mind, has been already involved, it is not difficult at the proper time to draw forth the fully developed reality? This is what the present materialistic school of thought are striving to do.

2. If matter is the only substance in the universe, whence came it? Is it a self-existent reality, or how and by what agency was it created?

The modern theory of the molecular constitution of matter obtains to-day in the highest scientific circles. If it is not the whole truth, it is at all events the nearest approximation to nothing but the truth. What does it tell you? It tells you simply and plainly this, that matter is a *manufactured* article. How it establishes this fact, we shall now see. According to this theory, all matter consists of an aggregation of smaller particles of the same substance called molecules; and each of these possesses all the properties of the given substance which they combine to form. The physicist tells you that these molecules are endowed with certain properties. There exists, for instance, a force of attraction between them by which they are kept together in the substance, and it is only when this cohesive power has been overcome, that they part company. Each molecule is agitated also by a continual motion, and to this quality is due the solid, the liquid, and the gaseous states of aggregation. The molecules of one and the same substance

are alike, but differ from those of every other substance. Molecular properties never change. From the statement of these facts what inference are we entitled to draw? Can we not give in our adhesion to the views of Prof. Clerk-Maxwell, that "we are unable to ascribe the existence of the molecules or the identity of their properties to the operation of any of the causes which we call natural. The quality of each molecule gives it the essential characteristic of a manufactured article, and precludes the idea of its being eternal or self-existent."

Let us go back a step farther. We are told that molecules may be further divided into almost infinitely small particles called atoms. Have we now come upon anything we might call raw material? The chemist tells us we have not. Each atom has a combining tendency towards some others, but not to all of them. Take an atom of one element, and bring it into connection with an atom of another element, and immediately they will unite to form a molecule of a new substance. But take one atom from each of two other elements and place them in the most intimate proximity, but they will lie perfectly quiescent and neutral, and exhibit not the slightest affinity for one another. Take now two compound substances and pour them together, when, *mirabile dictu*, an entire rearrangement occurs. One set of atoms of the one substance rushes off in hot haste to combine with one set of atoms in the other; the two deserted parties come together; and we have now formed two substances totally different from the original ones. Is not this marvelous? Is it not wonderful? Can we not fully sympathize with the remark of Prof. Tyndall, "who will set a limit to the possible play of molecules in a cooling planet?" No, not thoroughly, for a limit was set as we shall see later on, by the Almighty Creator himself, who had endowed matter with such wonderful properties and such marvelous potency, for when it came to life with its attendant consequences, He interposed His omnipotent fiat: "Thus far shalt thou go, but no farther." Matter is an adequate cause for all the phenomena of the physical and chemical worlds, but it does not suffice to explain the formation of the simplest organism or the production of a living cell.

The indestructibility of matter has also been made to sub-

serve the theory of its eternal existence. This, according to Herbert Spencer, is an "*a priori* cognition of the highest order." We are told that "matter relatively to our consciousness never comes into existence or ceases to exist;" that to conceive of its annihilation in any form, as also its creation from nothing, is unthinkable. Now it is evident that as far as we are concerned, matter is only a reality, as it is revealed to some one of our senses, and it is plainly certain that to us matter is both created and destroyed. We see before us gunpowder for example, the match is applied, an explosion takes place, and to us at all events, the gunpowder has ceased to exist. On a warm summer day we see little globules of moisture gathering on the outside of a glass of water, and immediately we say that condensation of the aqueous vapor of the atmosphere has taken place. This is evidently the first time we have been made aware of the existence of these particles of moisture, and as far as we are concerned they have been created before our eyes. Of the absolute reality itself, we know nothing, nor does it concern us in any way. Our knowledge is a knowledge of the finite, and matter is only matter to us inasmuch as it is a finite reality. We only know of it in relation to our external senses, and according to the evidence they furnish, it is continually created and destroyed. We know furthermore, that from its properties it could not have had an eternal existence.

In our ultimate analysis of matter, in accordance with the molecular theory, we found the sixty or more elemental substances which the chemist now knows, not as rude material, but as the most marvelously manufactured article the mind can think of. These we may conceive as lying sorted and labeled in nature's laboratory all ready for use in the construction of the universe. Generalizing on these facts, I think we cannot escape the overwhelming evidences of a designing mind. We have come face to face with intelligence, and that too as a priority of existence. But if intelligence is prior to matter, and if it must have been exerted in its creation, then can mind in no sense whatever be said to be the product of any natural force or combination of forces, since it existed before them all.

3. How came the living from the not-living? Is the mechanical theory, the physical basis of life an adequate explana-

tion? As we look around us in the world we cannot help being struck with the fact that a vast difference everywhere subsists between the organic and the inorganic, and if we are thoughtful people, we ask ourselves the question, how came this diversity? Is there any possibility by any process whatever of spanning the deep abyss which separates them? Materialists affirm that there is; with what grounds we shall hereafter see.

A few years ago the world was startled by the announcement that Professor Huxley had discovered a slimy, gelatinous mass in the depths of the sea, which was the source of all life. To this substance was given the name of Bathybius. Joy and delight pervaded the whole materialistic camp. Here indeed was a discovery of vast importance. Consequences of the greatest moment would now ensue, and best of all just those very results which they had all along predicted were true. Their rejoicing however, was but short-lived, for soon after this Bathybius was demonstrated to be nothing more than a mass of sulphate of lime, containing a few of the lower forms of life, and also the debris of living organisms that had already passed away. The discoverer himself seeing that he had been mistaken, frankly acknowledged his error and recanted his doctrine.

Spontaneous generation is now the favorite tenet of materialism. This theory supposes, that, from a potency already existing in matter, during the cooling of our globe, a peculiar, fortuitous concourse of atoms took place and life was the result. Now what has this assumption in its favor to recommend itself to us? Chiefly this, that it is *necessary*, because the living must somewhere and somehow have originated from the not-living in order to answer the requirements of the new definition of matter.

At the very outset we are encountered with this objection, that it counteracts what is to us one of the primary qualities of matter, viz: *inertia*. What is inertia? It is the incapacity to originate motion, the utter helplessness of matter to move itself unless acted upon by some force. How then can inert, lifeless mass, "dull as it is," become endued with such marvellous power as to be able out of itself alone to evolve organization and life? This we conceive would be a hard question to answer, and yet materialists do answer it. How? By giving

their preference to a *supposed* potency rather than to the scientifically known law of inertia. That inertia is a law of matter we know, for we see it daily demonstrated everywhere. That spontaneous generation occurred we do not know, we have never seen more than that, we have never heard that it has ever taken place.

We might here also ask the materialist at what particular time did this fortuitous concourse of atoms happen? Was it during the nebulous period of the earth? He will answer "No; for life is entirely incompatible with the gaseous state." Then it could not have taken place until the condition of the cooling earth was such as to sustain life. The materialist pronounces his assent. But since matter has not changed any of its properties, since they are all the same now as they were from the first, how is it that spontaneous generation has never been known to occur; that from all the multitudinous efforts and experiments of scientific men to produce life from purely inorganic matter, not a single case has ever happened. Again he answers: "If the hypothesis of evolution (the atheistic and agnostic forms of it of course), is true, living matter must have arisen from not-living matter." These are the words of Professor Huxley, in his article on "Biology," in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. This looks as if he either questioned the doctrine of evolution or dogmatically asserted that spontaneous generation has occurred. Farther on he says: "At the present time, there is not a shadow of trustworthy direct evidence that spontaneous generation does take place or has taken place within the period during which the existence of the globe is recorded." But Huxley is a pronounced evolutionist of the agnostic type, and so in order to make his position a tenable one, he must accept spontaneous generation against all evidence to the contrary. Let us take his own main argument for the doctrine of evolution, viz: the principle of nature's uniformity, and reasoning from that point, it seems to me to be a hard matter to resist the conclusion, that if no new physical forces have been introduced, that if the same forces which exist now were from the time when nature first began, and if with these same physical forces spontaneous generation cannot now occur, nor has ever been known to occur, it never did happen at all. I

think that in accordance with known facts we may safely arrive at this conclusion, without doing the least violence to logical principles. The whole theory is an unwarrantable assumption which is necessary to supply the wants of an unverifiable hypothesis.

The question of the origin of species would naturally next occupy our attention, but the theme is altogether too comprehensive to admit of treatment in the present paper. Most materialists affirm this to have taken place under the laws of an assumed Natural Selection. There are many things however, which render this hypothesis questionable. We cannot help erecting interrogation points after each of the following facts: the sterility of hybrids, the hairlessness of man when all other animals have been provided with a natural covering, and the almost perfect eye of the trilobite, at a period so remote in the process of animal development. Now if the hypothesis of evolution is true, and spontaneous generation and natural origination of the species took place, is it not a remarkable thing that there is such a break in the chain of animal development just previous to the advent of man? Instead of an abrupt leap, we should certainly expect a gradual progress from the ape, the highest of the purely animal type, to the human being. Our expectations however are not justified by facts; for the chain is broken by one, by more than one missing link. On the animal side the greatest cubic capacity of the brain in the most highly developed ape is thirty-four inches; while on the side of man the lowest is sixty-eight. The lowest human being therefore, has a brain capacity just twice that of the highest ape. How is this? Materialistic evolution is silent, it cannot tell.

We next turn our attention to fossil remains, and though we search most carefully and diligently through all the petrified relics of centuries and ages past, nowhere can we find exemplified the slightest approach to the purely animal type. Man's form then was just as erect, his brain in most cases was quite as large as our own to-day. Materialists may plead the inadequacy of geological records, but Professor Agassiz says, that the periods are not so broken but that we are able to determine their character. If therefore, we are merely the last link

in the chain of lineal descent, to show this progress from the lower animals, there should undoubtedly remain many specimens of the poorly developed human being amongst the stony forms of primeval man. It is a fact, however, that no such remains have ever yet been seen by those who have read most from the rocky pages of Nature's former history.

So far we have not acquired the knowledge which we wished to ascertain, viz: how came the living from the not-living? In order at least to approximate to a solution of this problem we must form a correct idea of what life is. The microscope has of late years furnished invaluable aid towards a proper understanding of the character of vital action, and first among microscopists in the English-speaking world stands Dr. Lionel Beale. The important researches of this gentleman have contributed a vast amount of accurate knowledge to the department of biological science, and it is to him, more perhaps than to any other one man, that we owe the theory of life which is now generally accepted in scientific circles. He has proved that all life comes from a microscopical, transparent, unorganized, gelatinous mass, called bioplasm. This bioplasm exists at the core of the cell or anatomical unit, and occupies about one-fifth of our living organisms. Formerly the cell was regarded as itself the unit of growth and but little attention was paid to the naked throbbing gelatinous matter at the centre. Dr. Beale, in his investigations, showed conclusively that it was by far the most important structure, and that it was the locality where the mysterious transmutations from the not-living to the living occurred. He has demonstrated that the substance of every living organism consists of three parts.

1. Living or germinal matter or bioplasm.
2. Nutrient matter.
3. Formed matter or tissue.

He has shown that in every organic cell there are two currents, one flowing towards the centre, the other outward from the centre. By the former the nutrient matter is conveyed to the bioplasm or germinal matter, and there in the center, by a process entirely unknown to science, the nutrient, lifeless matter becomes living. This change moreover is effected instantaneously, so that no particle is ever half-alive and half-dead.

The current flowing outward throws off the living matter as formed material. Chemistry admittedly cannot explain the process of changing nutrient matter into living, and living matter into formed material.

But this is not all. This germinal mass may subdivide, and to each is given the same functions as to the parent structure; and each will go on absorbing nutrient matter and throwing off formed material as before. The cell-wall is not always found with the bioplast and is not absolutely necessary to it. Sometimes there are present on the bioplasmic mass small points, which frequently detach themselves from the parent matter and become new centers. These are called nuclei. Within these nuclei new centers may again be formed to which the name of nucleoli has been given. Moreover, no bioplast ever arises except from another bioplast. They (the bioplasts) are capable of movement in any direction and also of rectilinear onward motion. When they once die they can never again be resuscitated.

Let us pause here for a moment, and let us contemplate this marvelous structure, a subtler mechanism than which there never was produced. Here are minute, transparent, gelatinous masses, perfectly unorganized when viewed under the highest powers of the microscope, and yet it is these bioplasts which are constantly at work building up our own wonderful organisms. Here a bioplast is seen weaving a muscle, there is one engaged in forming a tendon, and yonder yet another is moving onwards, spinning one of those small, delicate nerve-fibres, and coiling it spirally around another fibre. To any one who has thus beheld the unfolding of the mysteries of vital action, I know not how he can express wonder at those words of approving satisfaction uttered by the Almighty Creator himself: "And God said that it was good."

Here we have satisfactorily answered for ourselves the question, "how came the living from the not-living," for we have seen the process carried on before our own eyes. We next enquire, what is the cause of this almost miraculous transmutation? This leads us to the second part of our query, "Is the mechanical theory, the physical basis of life, an adequate explanation?" These are the words of Dr. Beale on this mat-

ter. "It is not true that the formation of the simplest, or any form of living being whatever, has been or can be explained by mechanics or chemistry." This is a very strong statement when all materialists adhere to the opposite view, but he is certainly entitled to speak with authority because he knows from the most extensive personal investigation whereof he testifies. We shall not for the present accept Beale's data, until we have fully examined the claims of materialism to the proper explanation of the phenomena of life on a purely physical basis.

The human body has been compared to a machine, and just as the latter's action is fully accounted for by the agency of natural forces so is that of our bodies also. This analogy is erroneous. In the steam-engine, for example, if the supply of fuel is stopped the motion ceases, but immediately upon the application of more wood or coal the engine performs its functions the same as before. Put out once the fires of life in the human body, and by no known power can its former activity ever be revived. It cannot be made again to move, and work, and grow, but it will crumble away to its kindred dust.

Materialists affirm that bioplasm is mere molecular machinery, and that the wonderful power it displays in weaving the frame-work of our physical organisms is due to the play of molecular forces. Life according to them is a kind of vital crystallization, and the work of the bioplast is due to the same forces as those which are actively engaged in the formation of a crystal. Tyndall, in his "Fragments of Science," adduces the following example in support of the principle we have just stated. Evaporate a solution of common salt and soon the water disappears. When a certain stage of concentration is reached, "its particles begin to deposit themselves as minute solids," and so small are these deposits that they are invisible under the microscope. As the process of evaporation goes on, these minute solids march one after another, and place themselves the one alongside or above the other, until the whole solution crystallizes in the form of a pyramid. He pertinently asks the question to what is the whole of this process due? Is it not the result of the action of some forces inherent in the molecules of salt, acting upon each other at inconceivable

distances? Was not the potency of this pyramidal form resident in the molecules themselves? We cannot but yield him assent. He continues: take a grain of corn and place it in the ground and let it be subjected to a certain degree of warmth. Heat is, as you know, vibratory motion, and in this case, the molecules of the earth and of the corn will be continually agitated. The result is that the two substances interact and a bud is formed. This bud reaches the surface where it is exposed to the sun's rays, which may also be regarded as a kind of vibratory motion. "The motion causes the molecules of the substances still to exercise their specific attractions and repulsions as before, absorbing the carbonic acid and aqueous vapor of the atmosphere, until the whole frame-work of the plant is built up, and the cycle of molecular action is completed by the production of grains similar to that with which the process began." He says, you agreed with me to call the crystallization in the former example due entirely to the action of forces inherent in the molecules themselves, and so must you also now to be consistent with yourself. The plant *lives*, the crystal is *inanimate*; and as the formation and growth of both are achieved by absolutely the same causes, therefore, the phenomenon of life is nothing but the result of the play of molecular forces.

Of course, what holds good in this respect for the vegetable world, also obtains for the animal kingdom. These are Dr. Tyndall's words: "I must go still farther, and affirm that in the eye of science the animal body is just as much the product of molecular forces as the stalk and ear of corn, or as the crystal of salt. . . . Every particle that enters into the composition of a muscle, a nerve, or a bone, has been placed in its position by molecular force." In his essay on "Vitality," he propounds the theory that the sun is the source of all life, animal as well as vegetable. The plant separates the carbon and the oxygen, and the animal causes them to reunite, the separation and the reunion occurring in a definite manner, so that in the one case a thistle or an oak is the result, in the other a slimy reptile or a civilized man. The only thing which conditions the structure which these molecules will build is the amount of solar energy supplied. Beale good-naturedly asks, why, if the sun can do all

this, does it not perform such comparatively simple operations as building a house or raising a wall.

This is, in substance, Dr. Tyndall's exposition of the mechanical theory of life, and he is unquestionably one of the most able and learned exponents of the new doctrine. This hypothesis is open to at least *six* very serious objections, which seem to me to destroy entirely the validity of the whole assumption.

1. The structural power of living matter is not comparable to that evinced by the crystallization of a substance, for this reason. In a solution of salt, for example, you may dissolve the pyramid as often as you choose, and by evaporation it will crystallize over and over again. Not so with the living matter in the stalk of corn or the human body. Once devitalize it and you may bring to bear on it every known energy, if you like, but it can never be resuscitated. There is here a very broad distinction between vitalized molecules and those capable of exerting only a physical energy.

2. It will at once be evident that if the composition of the bioplasmic mass is known, and if the equivalent is produced, it should exhibit like properties. But is this the case? We find that it is not. The chemical constituents of the bioplasmic mass have been ascertained and mixed together in such a manner as to produce a substance which is chemically equivalent. Moreover this substance has been subjected to the influence of the famous solar energy, but though all the molecular forces of the combination are undoubtedly at work, yet the mixture remains an inert, lifeless mass. All is not there. Something is evidently lacking yet; and that something is the vital power, the animating principle which it first received, and which came alone from the breath of the living God. Molecular forces assisted by solar energy are but a poor, an inadequate, an unverified explanation of the principle of life. This is what Dr. Tyndall says on this question: "They (scientific men) know full well that the chemist now prepares from inorganic matter a vast array of substances which were sometime ago regarded as sole products of vitality. They are intimately acquainted with the structural power of matter, as evidenced in the phenomena of crystallization. They can justify, scientifically, their belief in its potency, under the proper conditions, to produce or-

ganisms." (It is not clear what data of experience they have to support such a belief.) "But they will frankly admit their inability to point to any satisfactory experimental proof that *life can be developed, save from demonstrable antecedent life.*" Now this matter has been brought under the conditions assumed by the hypothesis, but it does not live; all experience tells us it has never lived. Therefore, I think we are justified in refusing to accept the mechanical theory of life, which is not capable of experimental substantiation.

3. There are certain movements in living matter which are essentially different from any exhibited in inorganic matter under the influence of physical or chemical forces. Of these Beale says: "These, unlike the movements of any kind of non-living matter yet discovered, occur in all directions, and seem to depend upon changes in the matter itself, and not upon impulses communicated to the particles from without." These movements never cease while the matter lives.

4. An important argument has been drawn from the correlation of forces. All the inorganic forces of which we have any knowledge are convertible. Heat may be changed into light, light into chemical affinity, chemical affinity into electricity, electricity into magnetism, and so on throughout the whole circle. What can life or organic force be converted into? Science answers that it is absolutely inconvertible into any of the inorganic energies. It therefore bears a diverse character from them all.

5. Another strong point in the refutation of the physical basis of life, is found in the fact that there is no physical or chemical difference between the living matter of a man, an elephant, a whale, or any of the lower forms of life. Bioplasm is bioplasm everywhere, and the bioplast is always the unit of growth. In the light of this truth, we inquire how it is that the functions of some kinds of animals are so different. Some of the lower forms merely absorb nutriment and move, while the offices of man are varied and multifarious. Surely this is not explainable under the molecular theory, for with exactly the same matter and the same kind of forces in every case, the resulting action should be identical.

Let us take another example, and suppose that we have before

us three eggs, one belonging to a hen, another to an eagle, and the third to a crow. They are all subjected to the same influence, heat, and after they have begun to quicken, and the bioplasts have commenced weaving the organic structure of each bird, how can we account for the production of a chicken, an eagle, and a crow, each from the proper egg. With bioplasm, which is physically and chemically the same in each, and aided by the same influence, heat, what is it which determines the form which each will assume? Obviously this cannot be accounted for under the mechanical hypothesis, for with forces that are cognate, there should be no diversity of results.

6. Closely allied with this last point is the coördination of tissues. In the human body one bioplast is engaged in weaving a nerve, another a muscle, and another a tendon. They carry on their work side by side without the slightest interference with one another. It is an important fact, too, that a nerve bioplast never, under any circumstances, forms a muscle, nor can one whose office it is to produce muscle, be made to weave a tendon. Each one has its own peculiar function, and it never exchanges its work for that of another. The play of molecular forces cannot even attempt to explain this fact, for there must be a sufficient cause behind the bioplasts to direct the shuttles of the weavers aright.

After viewing carefully these six strong objections we are in a better position to decide what is the proper answer to the query: "Is the mechanical theory of life an adequate explanation?" We cannot but pronounce it to be inadequate and unsound. The insufficiency of the physical plea has been made very evident. The whole inorganic world has been ransacked without avail to find the correlate of life, and it is only as a last resort that we are compelled to designate an unknown vital force as an adequate explanation for all the phenomena in the realm of organic nature. Materialists may disapprove, but there is no other course left open to us. They may urge that it is entirely unphilosophical, but nothing else will suffice. We have here, at least, a precedent to follow. Light has been demonstrated to consist of the vibrations of the molecules of the luminous body. There was known no medium, however, by which these could be conveyed to the eye, since sound already

occupied that of the atmosphere. There was, therefore, no alternative but to suppose a new substance, ether, us pervading all space, and this substance could not be weighed, or compressed, or analyzed, or made present to the senses by any means. Nothing else would satisfy the exigencies of the case. Now, considering the evidence that has been adduced, is the hypothesis of a specific vital force a more unscientific assumption than that of an universal elastic ether?

4. We have now come to the last question which we asked ourselves at the beginning of this paper: "Has matter a spiritual and a physical side?" Obviously it has not, since no inorganic forces can account for vitality, how much less then can they be satisfactorily employed to explain the workings of man's immortal mind. We cannot believe that this one substance has been so regally endowed, and these are some of the reasons why:

1. If mind is only one force out of many in the inorganic world, why is it that it is not only wholly disassociated with all of them as far as any correlation is concerned, but it also manifests so decided a superiority over them all? 'Tis nothing else but mind that intelligently thinks, and discriminates, and wills. 'Tis mind alone that combines, and controls, and uses the forces of this material universe. 'Tis only mind that is

"Sole judge of truth in endless error hurl'd,
The glory, power and riddle of the world."

2. As far back as the fourth century an objection to materialism was well taken by Gregory of Nyssa, and it holds especially good in reference to the point we are now discussing. His argument is, that "the thinking power does not belong to matter; otherwise matter would generally exhibit it, and in consequence would assume a variety of artificial forms." But all experience goes to show that matter has forever been inert *per se*.

3. Sir William Hamilton rejects the hypothesis that matter has a spiritual and a physical side, on the ground of "the seeming incompatibility of the two substances to co-inhere in the same substratum." They have properties exactly the opposite of each other. Matter is extended; the mind unextended.

Matter possesses weight, inertia, form, color, etc.; mind is characterized by the total absence of any property that would make it an object of external sense. Is there not here the broadest possible distinction? Is there not here a stern, impassible barrier, against which the ordnance of materialistic thought must ever direct their intellectual broadsides in vain. A theory cannot be accepted which affirms that a quality and the absence of the same quality, co-inhere in the same substratum. If we accept the statement of Huxley, who, when speaking of the theory of creation, says: "That such verbal hocus-pocus should be received as science, will one day be regarded as evidence of the low state of intelligence in the nineteenth century," what place will be accorded to the absurd pretensions of this new definition of matter, by the *savants* of future ages?

4. Man's permanent sense of personal identity is also inexplicable in terms of this new definition. Our material organisms undergo complete changes during stated periods, but we know that we are the same persons as before. Tyndall attempts to explain this as follows: "Constancy of form in the grouping of the molecules and not constancy of the molecules themselves is the correlative of this perception."

In the first place it can easily be demonstrated that mind has no more a physical correlate, than has the force of life. Secondly, in the course of a year we may have parted with a limb or lost a portion of our brain, but this makes no difference whatever. We have still the firm, unshaken conviction that we are each himself or herself, and not another. Now if the cause of our perpetual knowledge of personal identity is to be found in matter, when the cause changes there should certainly be a variation in the consequence. But there is not; therefore it must be explained through the instrumentality of some other agent. There is but one other assumption left open to us, and that is the existence of a separate entity, mind, which retains this unit of personal feeling.

5. Mind cannot be due entirely to molecular activities in the brain. Tyndall admits this when he makes the statement that it is utterly inconceivable how consciousness should result from the joint action of a number of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and

nitrogen atoms. He also says: "We cannot satisfy the human understanding in its demand for logical continuity between molecular processes and the phenomena of consciousness."

We are here approaching a very comprehensive and complicated theme, and we can at best merely give in outline a few facts. In the nervous system there are two parts, the upper and the lower, and according to the functions which have been localized in them, the distinction between the two is, that the upper, or influential, or volitional arc has the power of originating movements itself; while the lower, or automatic, or responsive arc, is not capable of self-conditioned activity. The former is concerned with manifestations of the internal world or domain of consciousness; while the latter is occupied with the external senses, such as sight, hearing, etc. Any physical agency such as electricity, when applied to the automatic arc, will produce visible effects in the contraction of the muscles of the body; while the influential arc will not respond to any such influence as electrical stimulation. Molecular activity here effectively operates in the one case, while in the other it is without the slightest potency. But the influential structure is inert in itself, like all other matter; and if a physical cause does not suffice to set it in operation, nothing but a spiritual will.

According to the experiments of leading physiologists the cerebral hemisphere or influential arc of a fish for example, may be removed, and the effect produced will be that its volitional power is entirely lost. It will swim aimlessly about under the influence of the nervous excitation produced by the water, but it will never seek food or rest. In man, however, the case is different, for if one of his cerebral hemispheres is taken away, the thinking power is still preserved intact. The whole of Bain's sensationalism is refuted by this one incontrovertible fact.

Again, in accordance with the new definition of matter, every atom must have spiritual and physical properties conjoined in it. Accordingly, when the one is taken away, the other must disappear also. But since one whole hemisphere of the matter of the brain, (which is admittedly the organ of mind,) may be removed without any interference to the thinking powers accu-

ing from such ablation, we must conclude from the abundance of evidence, both metaphysical and physiological which we have now before us, that matter is not a double-faced unit, having a spiritual and a physical side.

We have now come to a last resource, as we did before, in the case of life, and I believe that here we must accept these words of the physiologist Draper, because nothing else will suffice. "If," says he, "the optical apparatus be inert and without value save under the influence of light, if the auditory apparatus yield no result save under the impressions of sound, —since there is between these structures and the elementary structure of the cerebrum a perfect analogy—we are entitled to come to the same conclusion in this instance as in those, and asserting the absolute inertness of the cerebral structure in itself, to impute the phenomena it displays to an agent as perfectly external to the body, and as independent of it, as are light and sound; and that agent is the soul.

We have thus hastily reviewed some of the leading tenets of the materialistic doctrine, and we have found the whole superstructure to rest upon a basis which is not the result of the most reliable scientific teaching. We have seen that life is not a physical or a chemical force, and that mind cannot be accounted for as the product of molecular changes in the brain. We have ascertained the fact that life cannot come from anything but antecedent life, and that the mind does not cease its activity even after a part of the brain has been taken away. We have been shown that the new definitions of matter are not justified by facts, and that all matter must first have been called into existence by a power not itself. In short, we have proven that one substance is not sufficient to account for all the phenomena of the universe, and we have been led through all the labyrinthine mazes of modern speculative research, out into the radiant light of revealed truth, that there is a conscious mind in the world and a spiritual nature in man.

On what grounds are we asked to accept this new scientific creed? Because, say its exponents, it bears the tendency of thought at the present time. But tendencies of thought are not always reliable. They are often treacherous currents upon which truth cannot with safety embark. The tendency of

thought was at one time in favor of the view that it was the duty of the church to kill all those who chose to worship God after a different manner from its own. To-day we spurn the idea of punishing witchcraft with death, but not many generations since an opposite opinion marked the tide of popular sentiment. Many outside considerations may often enter in to make public opinion an erroneous judgment, and undoubtedly in the present case, the too exclusive devotion to purely physical investigation, and the philosophical desire for unity have contributed more than anything else to the negation of theistic views.

What points has this new doctrine to commend it to our acceptance? Does it present any new truths which may be utilized to effectually solve the problem of man's deepest intellectual, social, and moral welfare? No! It teaches that the very principles of virtue are but evolutions from a nebulous mist. Does it instil in our natures a higher reverence for the great supreme head of all things? No! It knows no God save necessity. Does it endue man with a loftier sense of moral responsibility? No! It looks with contempt upon the idea of his possessing freedom of will, and regards him merely as an intellectual automaton. Does it commend religion? No! It tells us that great fact, that sublime sentiment of the human mind is all very well in its place, which is the domain of emotion; but that it is "mischievous if allowed to intrude on the region of knowledge." Does it satisfy our yearnings after personal immortality? No! If we receive this new belief, as we stand beside the open grave of a departed friend, and ask ourselves the great question of all questions, "if a man die, shall he live again," we can only respond in the cold hopeless words of a modern atheist, "gone to eternal silence! gone to pathetic dust!"

This system essays too much. It sweeps away with ruthless hand all that man has been accustomed to regard as essential to his moral development, and it gives back no firm foundation upon which to rest. If there is a supreme source, says this new doctrine, he is such that we with our limited finite capacities can never know him. If there is an immortality, it is to have our names remembered by generations yet to come.

If there is a religion, it is to worship we know not what, to bow down with mute lips and unfeeling hearts before the altar of an infinite, mystical unknown. Dark indeed would be man's lot with such a creed as this; for let materialism once be thoroughly established, let it remove from his mind all those cherished beliefs of the past, let it take away every prospect of a final recognition of moral excellence, let it yield no past memories, no present solace, no future hope, and the "soul will freeze without religion, the spirit will die without a God."

ARTICLE III.—EXEGESIS OF I. PETER, III. 18-20;

OR CHRIST'S PREACHING TO THE SPIRITS-IN-PRISON.

"For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit, by which also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison, which sometime were disobedient, when once the long suffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was preparing, wherein few, that is eight, souls were saved by water."

THIS passage has long been a battle-field of the exegetes, on grammatical and on theological grounds. The principal question in dispute has related to the affirmed "preaching" by Christ to "the spirits in prison." What was this "preaching?" How was it performed? When did it take place? Who were "the spirits in prison," and when the preaching occurred, were they alive, on the earth, or were they dead men, in the world of spirits? Writers eminent as Biblical critics have widely differed in their answers, and it therefore becomes us to feel our way cautiously and modestly to an interpretation.

The passage is of a parenthetical or incidental character; the mind of Peter moving not so much logically, as by added suggestions, thought branching into thought, and one historic fact leading to the mention of another connected with it. This quality of the Petrine style must be borne in mind in the interpretation, as affecting the grammatical and rhetorical relations of words and of clauses to each other. The writer was comforting and instructing persecuted saints, whom he urges to maintain a holy life, that they might not suffer deservedly, but undeservedly, at the hands of their fellow-men. He reminds them that, in this respect, Christ had set an example; who had suffered not as a personal sinner, but "the just for the unjust." Having thus introduced the sacrificial death of Christ, he could not forbear to follow out the suggestive fact into its relations and consequences, in a somewhat historical and chronological manner; noting the succession of interesting events which occurred in the redemptive process, to wit: (1)

"the being put to death;" (2) the "being quickened by (in) the Spirit;" (3) the "going and preaching to the spirits in prison;" and (4) in verse 22, "the going into heaven and being on the right hand of God." This succession of historic events is marked, in the original, by a succession of aorist participles, each referring to Christ—*θανατωθεὶς*, *ζωοποιηθεὶς*, *πορευθεὶς*, and again *πορευθεὶς*; which thus seem to give the order of events in time. Precisely what these events were will largely be determined by the manner in which we translate certain words and phrases of the Greek original.

The received English version does not express the exact meaning of the Greek, in some respects. Thus it reads: "Being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit." Now as *σαρκί*, in the one clause, is purposely set over against *πνεύματι*, in the other, by way of contrast, neither of them having a preposition, it is plain, that if we supply a preposition, it should be the same one in both cases. Hence we should read either, "Being put to death by the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit;" or else, "Being put to death in, or as regards, the flesh, but quickened in, or as regards, the spirit." That the latter conveys the true idea is now affirmed by all the best scholars; who refer to the New Testament usage of *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* as denoting, in their contrasted connection with Christ, his human and his divine or theanthropic nature. Thus in Romans i. 3, 4, he is said to have been "made of the seed of David according to the flesh" (*κατὰ σάρκα*) and "declared (or demonstrated) to be the Son of God, with power, according to the Spirit of holiness, (*κατὰ πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης*), by the resurrection from the dead." The idea of Peter is not, that Christ died by the hands of men, and was made alive by the Holy Spirit; but that he died *flesh-wise*, or in bodily respects, or in his human nature, and was immediately full of life *spirit-wise*, or in his divine or divine-human nature. He died as regards the body, but was made alive as regards the disembodied spirit.

Our English version continues: "By which also he went and preached." The Greek reads more properly, "In which;" *ἐν ᾧ*, referring to *πνεύματι* immediately preceding. The idea then plainly is, that the preaching was done in the spirit-state

just mentioned; that is either in the person of the Logos, the divine nature of Christ, or in the person of the disembodied God-man: more naturally the latter. It is hardly worth the while, in considering the next clause, to allude to the fanciful idea of Augustine (who was not a Greek scholar) and of others, that the expression "in prison," ἐν φυλακῇ, is to be taken metaphorically, as meaning that the preaching was to the souls figuratively shut up in ignorance and sin. In the forty-five other places in which the word occurs, in the New Testament, it denotes a place of confinement, or else (in three or four passages) a period of watching at night. In no case has it a metaphorical or spiritualized meaning. As the preacher is declared to have spoken "in the spirit," so those addressed are declared to be "the spirits in prison," which can mean no others than those in a condition in some respect similar to that to which Peter refers, in his second epistle, when he speaks of the fallen angels, as "cast down to hell, and delivered into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment."

And this brings us to the much disputed question, whether the preaching of Christ, "in the spirit," was to these "spirits" while they were in prison, and occurred after his own crucifixion, or whether it was to them while they were in the flesh, listening to the inspired warnings of Noah, though, when Peter wrote, they were spirits imprisoned. The most plausible argument in behalf of the latter supposition, with which I am acquainted, is that by President S. C. Bartlett, D.D., an acute scholar and an able reasoner, who, in an Article in *The New Englander* of October, 1872, thinks he has set the question for ever at rest, on purely grammatical grounds. This is truly so, if the translation, which he affirms to be the only correct and possible one, according to the Greek usage of an anarthrous participle connected with a noun which has the article, be forced upon our adoption. He declares the rendering of our English version to be ungrammatical, when it reads, that "he went and preached unto the spirits in prison (τοῖς πνεύμασι, with the article), which sometime were disobedient" (ἀπειθήσασι, without any article); and asserts, that "the proper grammatical and natural translation" is: "He went and preached to the spirits in prison, when once they disobeyed." He says that

"if anyone can produce a clear instance or instances of an anarthrous participle used as an attributive to a noun that has the article, it would be as a singularly rare exception; so much so as to constitute a grammatical error or solecism in the use of the Greek language." He has several pages to prove, by examples and by quotations from the grammarians, that, in Greek, where a noun with the article is to have some added attribute or characteristic expressed by a participle, the latter will always have the article also; but that the participle without an article is never attributive (or as Crosby calls it, definitive), but is predicative, or appositive, or circumstantial, specifying by some circumstance the occasion when the event took place which is referred to in the principal verb. Thus ὁ θεὸς ὁ ποιήσας τὸν κόσμον, would mean, "God, who made the world;" while ὁ θεὸς ποιήσας τὸν κόσμον, would mean, "God, when he had made the world." By this rule of grammar he thinks "that we are fairly shut up" to his translation of the passage under investigation.

His case seems, at first, so well made out, and President Bartlett is usually so accurate in his scholarship, that it might be venturesome to differ. But after reading the argument repeatedly, and noticing the strength of his expressions as to the simple, obvious, and universal principle of Greek grammar, said to be conclusive of the sense, one says to himself, with some perplexity: How, then, have so many distinguished ancient and modern Greek scholars managed to violate an obvious rule, that has no exceptions, and to translate, in this passage, ἀπειθήσασι, in an attributive or definitive sense—"who had disobeyed?" What were such recent scholars as Bengel, Rosenmüller, DeWette, Delitzsch, Stier, Huther, Bloomfield, Alford, Ellicott, Davidson, Mombert, Lange, Hadley, Craven, and Schaff thinking of, thus to forget their Greek Grammar? But worse yet; what was the matter with the Greek Fathers—who, without exception, held to Christ's descent to Hades and his preaching to the spirits, after his death, and who thought, talked, and wrote in Greek—that they also were so ignorant of their own idiom, as completely to misunderstand the passage, in like manner? And the Vulgate fell into the same error, rendering the words in question, "qui increduli fuerant." So

did Rufinus in his Latin version of the famous *περὶ Ἀρχῶν* or *De Principiis* of Origen, whose exact quotation of this passage, in LII. Cap. v. § 3, is given thus: "In quo pergens prædicavit his spiritibus qui in carcere tenebantur, qui increduli fuerant." And the connected reasoning of Origen proceeds on this understanding of the case. And what shall be said, when the Latin version (which alone survives) of fragments from a commentary on this first epistle of Peter, by Clemens Alexandrinus, gives the latter's citation of this passage, as "Adveniens prædicavit eis qui quondam erant increduli." It thus seems perilous, to accept President Bartlett's narrow grammatical rule, without considering carefully, whether it does not admit of qualification, or extension. Does an anarthrous participle, agreeing with a noun having an article, always and simply mark, by the narrated event, the occasion, implying the time when the action of the principal verb took place? May it not sometimes have an attributive power—a fact to be ascertained by the nature of the case, and the accompanying phraseology? And even when it is appositive or predicative, may it not mark the kind of occasion, and thus the reason for the subsequent action of the principal verb, and not mark the date of its occurrence? What say the grammarians, and what are the facts, as indicated in Greek authors?

Professor Stuart, in his "Grammar of the New Testament," § 91, says on this point, that with reference to participles which are not mere adjectives, but retain the meaning of verbs, "no certain rule can be given here, inasmuch as it generally depends on the intention of the writer as to the *prominence* which he designs to give to the participial word, whether the article is inserted or omitted." That the context must determine the exact idea conveyed by the anarthrous participle is also asserted by Buttman, in his "Larger Greek Grammar," § 144, when, citing an example, and actually putting the attributive meaning first, he says: "*ἐπεσχεψάμην τὸν ἐταῖρον νοσῶντα* can mean, according as the context may determine, not only, 'I visited my friend, who was ill,' but also 'when he, or because he was ill.'" And this may be further explained, perhaps, by the principle brought forward by Buttman, § 125, Note 3, where he is discussing the similar case of an anarthrous

adjective, of which he remarks: "When an adjective without the article stands in connection with a substantive which has the article, but not between the two, the object designated is thereby distinguished not from other objects, but from itself in other circumstances." Thus, to apply the idea in the case above cited, the participle *νοσθοντα*, does not distinguish my sick friend from some other person, my well friend, which would have required the article; but it simply emphasizes his ill condition, as constituting an implied reason for the action of the principal verb, "I visited." To say, "I visited my friend, he being ill," much more markedly expresses the reason, than the mere date; amounting to "I visited him because he was ill—an idea which would naturally express itself also in the attributive phrase, "I visited my friend, who was ill." By changing the anarthrous present participle to a past participle (an aorist, for instance), an act based on a past event might be indicated; as "I visited my friend; he having been ill," or "who had been ill." And this seems to be the kind of case implied in this passage of Peter.

Let us inquire on this subject of that eminent scholar, Professor Alpheus Crosby. He remarks, "Greek Grammar," § 584, that "the insertion or omission of the article often depends, both in poetry and prose, upon emphasis, euphony, or rhythm; and upon those nice distinctions in the expression of our ideas, which, though they may be readily felt, are often transferred with difficulty from one language to another. . . . In general, the *insertion* of the article promotes the *perspicuity* and its *omission* the *vivacity* of discourse." This prepares us not to expect a cast iron rule, especially in lively, hortatory discourse, as in the text and context, or in loose, untrained writers, such as Peter. Hence, speaking, § 678, of the Definitive Participle, as "*equivalent to a relative pronoun and a finite verb*," and "most frequently translated by these," he yet makes in its behalf no inexorable demand for the article, but says: "(a) It occurs chiefly with the article (the proper sign of this use, 520); but (b) sometimes without it, if the class only is defined." Winer, in his "New Testament Grammar," § 20, says of attributive participles, that "they take the article only when some relation already known or especially note-

worthy (*is qui, quippe qui*) is indicated, and consequently the idea expressed by the participle is to be made more prominent."

And here the words of Kuhner, in his "Greek Grammar" (1858) are worthy of notice; since even in describing the adverbial idea of the anarthrous, circumstantial participle, he employs the word "attributive;" because it is so obvious that the attendant circumstance may be so described as to amount to the attributive idea. He says, § 312: "The participle is used to denote such an attributive qualification of a substantive as will at the same time define the predicate of the sentence more exactly. In this case the participle expresses the adverbial relations of time, cause, motive, or purpose, condition and concession, manner." I notice also that W. E. Jelf, in his "Greek Grammar" (Lith. Ed., § 680) says that the use of the participle may be "as a remote attributive; the article standing before the substantive, as *ὁ ἀνὴρ παρών*, the man who is present; or in opposition, as *ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ παρών*."

Professor Wm. W. Goodwin, in his revised and enlarged Greek Grammar (1880) gives in § 142, as an attributive participle, this case: *ἡ ἐν τῷ Ἰσθμῷ ἐπιμονὴ γενομένη*—where we have an anarthrous participle agreeing with a noun which has the article—and he translates: "The delay, which occurred at the Isthmus," and not, "When the delay occurred on the Isthmus."

Now let us notice one or two cases in Greek authors which may indicate this less rigorous rule as to the necessity of an article with the participle to denote an attributive idea. Thucydides, I. 59, says of the Athenian ships, that they "made war with Philip, and the brethren of Derdos, who had again made an incursion with an army"—*επολέμουν μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ τῶν Δέρδου ἀδελφῶν, ἀνωθεν στρατίᾳ εσβεβληκότων*. The noun is definite and the participle is anarthrous, but yet the sense is virtually attributive, though it might be rendered "because they had again made," etc.; but no translator thinks of rendering the phrase, "*when* they had again made an incursion," as marking the time of the verb *επολέμουν*, rather than the occasion. Also, in the same author, I. 66, we read that complaint was made by the Corinthians of the Athenians, "because they had besieged the city of Potidæa, which was a

colony of theirs"—τὴν Ποριδαίαν, ξαυτῶν οὖσαν ἀποαίαν. Here also the noun has the article, while the participle has none, and yet the sense is manifestly attributive, describing the circumstance which made the deed unfriendly; and the phrase could not be rendered "when it was their colony," simply as marking the date of the attack. The circumstantial runs thus easily into the attributive. Of this we have also an instance by the author of the passage in dispute; for in 2 Peter i. 18, the anarthrous participle ἐνεχθεῖσαν, which agrees with τὴν φωνήν, points out not the date of the occurrence, which is indicated by ὄντες ἐν τῷ ἁγίῳ ὄρει, but an important circumstance, or attribute of the voice heard, to wit: that it had come from heaven. Hence the Revised Version renders it, a little obscurely: "This voice we ourselves heard come (margin, Gr. brought) out of heaven;" the idea being not "heard to come," but "heard as having come." Hence the Authorized Version squarely renders it in the attributive form: "This voice, which came from heaven, we heard."

Our conclusion from this examination of grammarians, of Greek authors, and of the nature of the case, is that the anarthrous participle may be attributive, though joined to a noun with the article; and that this depends on the point of view of the writer, and the style of the narrative, and will be manifest from the order of the words, and the nature of the statements in the context. Hence we find so minutely critical a scholar as Dr. Samuel Davidson,—who pays special attention to niceties of Greek grammar, and who has given a revised translation of the New Testament into English from Tischendorf's text—rendering our passage thus: "Being put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the spirit, in which also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison, which were once disobedient, when the long suffering of God was waiting in the days of Noah." So also the distinguished Greek scholar and commentator Ellicott, particularly notices the anarthrous participle, as unusual, yet unhesitatingly says: "It is literally, 'To men who, once upon a time, were disobedient.' " And is not this the suggestion of the most bare and literal translation of the participle, to wit: "He went and preached to the imprisoned spirits having been disobedient formerly, when the

long suffering of God was waiting," etc.? Hence Meyers' "Commentary," the highest critical authority (the volume on Peter, being by Huther), corresponds in translation with our English version: "Die einst ungläubig waren." He notices the attempt to make the anarthrous participle, *ἀπειθήσασαι*, mean, "when they were disobedient," and remarks (p. 179): "Das ist aber nicht so, da das dem Substantiv in adjectivischer Weise hinzugefügte Particip oft genug mit demselben ohne Artikel verknüpft wird." "That is, however, not so; since the participle annexed to a substantive in an adjectival sense, is very often joined to it without an article." He goes on to argue, that the previous connection and the order of the words suffice to indicate the attributive meaning, and with reference to the attempt to give here the predicative meaning, of "when," says that it is "grammatisch unhaltbar,"—"it is grammatically untenable." If the article had been here prefixed, it would have had a more strictly partitive sense, as specifying only a certain part of the whole class, "spirits in prison;" to wit: those of them who had formerly been disobedient in the days of Noah. Without the article this is implied rather than stated.

President Bartlett remarks, that "it is not surprising that in the earlier stages of Greek study the translation, 'which were sometime disobedient,' should have found acceptance;" but he wonders that De Wette, Huther, and Alford should have sanctioned that rendering. What must now be his augmented surprise, to find that the large body of eminent Greek scholars in Great Britain, who for ten years have been engaged in revising the translation of the New Testament, sanction the same rendering? For the "Revised Version" reads, in this passage, as follows: "Being put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the spirit; in which also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison, which aforetime were disobedient," etc. And what an addition must be made to his surprise, to learn that this rendering also received the sanction of the learned "American Committee," who coöperated in the revision!

But now a step further may be taken. Even if the phrase in question, *ἀπειθήσασαι ποτὲ*, should be accepted as predicative, that would not shut up the interpretation to a designation of

the date of the action of the principal verb, ἐκφύξεν. Rather, in that case, may it state a fact in the distant past, which formed the occasion, or reason, or ground of the subsequent preaching. President Bartlett limits the idea of occasion too much to a time or date supposed to be indicated by the anarthrous participle, and to be denoted in English by the introductory "when;" whereas, the word or phrase may often be, "because," or "since," or "inasmuch as," or "by reason of," or "in view of the fact that," etc. This idea will often be, practically, the same as if the form were attributive. Thus the words, "I slew him having been my assailant," might with equal propriety take either the form, "I slew him, who had been my assailant;" or "I slew him, because he had been my assailant." Hence we find Winer, § 20, remarking: "Whether the article is to be used or omitted before the participle, depends sometimes on the subjective view of the writer;" and he quotes Rom. viii. 1 (*textus receptus*), in which occurs the anarthrous phrase, μὴ κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦσιν, as meaning "inasmuch as they walk not after the flesh;" in the English version, "who walk not after the flesh." I have already cited Kuhner's statement to this effect.

Hadley, in his Grammar, § 788, 789, states that a participle "may be related in various ways to the action of the principal verb," and, in addition to time, mentions means, cause, end, condition, and concession, and says that "different uses run into each other and cases occur in which more than one might be assigned." Crosby states, § 674, that "the circumstantial participle is distinguished according to the circumstance denoted, as time, cause, means, condition, concession, purpose, consequence," etc. Goodwin, § 277, gives a similar list of ideas expressed, and adds, "any attendant circumstance, the participle being merely *descriptive*," which makes a case nearly like that of an attributive. Similar is the teaching of Stuart, Buttmann, and others.

Let us take a clear illustration. In Hebrews vi. 7, we are told of certain "who were once enlightened," "that it is impossible," "if they shall fall away, to renew them again unto repentance, seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh, and put him to an open shame." The reason of the

case, expressed by the word "seeing," in our version (and also in the Revised Version), is in the Greek simply implied in the use of an anarthrous participle, *δυσταυροῦντας*. This case not only sets forth the reason, rather than the time, but shows the infelicity of the statement, italicized by President Bartlett, "that when a participle alleges a reason or motive, it is naturally and properly a motive lying in the mind of the person referred to by the participle, and not of the writer or some one else." That limitation might naturally apply, where the participle agrees with the subject of the principal verb, but not when it is joined with the object; for the condition of the object may surely furnish a reason of action to the subject. Another instance of a reason, and not a date, being similarly indicated, by an anarthrous participle will be found in the same epistle, vii. 25. "Wherefore he is able also to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by him, seeing he ever liveth (*πάντοτεζῶν*) to make intercession for them." The accompanying circumstance of itself furnishes a reason—"in that he ever lives," etc. And how easily the circumstantial participle slips into a related attributive meaning, will appear in this case from a simple transposition, and the use of the attributive forms: "Wherefore he, who ever liveth to make intercession for them, is able also to save them to the uttermost." The scholarly authors of the Revised Version found a similar case of construction of an anarthrous participle joined to a proper name and a noun with the article, in apposition, in James ii. 21; so that they actually changed the translation from "when," denoting time, to "in that," denoting the reason or argument: "Was not Abraham, our father, justified by works, *in that* (Authorized Version, "*when*") he offered up Isaac his son upon the altar?" Literally, "having offered up," *ἀνεβέχας*. Again, in verse 25, in reference to Rahab, the anarthrous participles, *ὑποδεξαμένη*, and *ἐκβαλοῦσα*, are similarly changed, in the rendering of the Revised Version, from "*when* she had received the messengers, and sent them out," to "*in that* she received," and "sent them out;" marking the reason of the case, and not the time. Another clear case, of a similar nature, is found in Acts xxiii. 18, where we have a definite noun, *τοῦτον τὸν νεανίαν*, and an anarthrous participle, *ἔχοντά,*

marking not at all the time, and making the translation "when he has" utterly inadmissible, but allowing almost equally well, as regards the sense, the translation of the Received and the Revised Versions, "who hath," or that assigning a reason, "for he hath." So in this expression of Peter's, under examination, he implies a reason—either for the imprisonment, or for the preaching—in the very fact of a previous unbelief or disobedience. In the "Critical Commentary" of Jameson, Fausset, and Brown, Mr. Fausset on this passage remarks: "The Greek participle expresses the reason of his *preaching*, '*inasmuch as they were sometime disobedient.*'" This is from an author who agrees with President Bartlett in referring the preaching to the time and agency of Noah. Professor James Hadley held that the reason of the imprisonment was intended, and he wrote: "The natural unforced interpretation of the text is this—that Christ preached (i. e. made the announcements and offers of the gospel) to departed spirits who were in confinement as a consequence of their disbelief and abuse of the divine forbearance during the days of Noah." (Quoted on page 87, Note, of Dr. J. M. Whiton's, "Is Eternal Punishment Endless?")

I conclude, then, that the grammar of the passage does not in any circumstances shut us up to the translation, "preached to the spirits in prison, when once they disobeyed;" and much less so, in case the drift of the words and phrases in the context should be repugnant to such an interpretation. Are they thus repugnant? It appears to me that they are. Take, for instance, the word *πότε*, which immediately follows *πειθήσασι*, and for some reason qualifies it by the idea of "in previous time," "formerly." Now if this little word had only occurred immediately after *ἐχρυσεν*, it would have been claimed to decide its time, and the effort has vainly been made by some, contrary to Greek usage, to refer its power back to that word. But associated as we find it, with *πειθήσασι*, it more naturally gives the idea, that the preaching was to those who, at a former time, had been disobedient, to wit: "when once the long suffering of God waited in the days of Noah." It may be true, in one sense, as President Bartlett says (though Robinson and Buttman, Hadley, Crosby, and Goodwin seem to contradict his

form of statement) that, in Greek, "*ποτέ* is not, as many seem to suppose, the correlative of *δτε*;" which he contends would be *τότε*. Nevertheless it has a general correlation: it marks here, clearly, the idea of a former time, which is then made specific by the *δτε*; just as in Col. iii. 7 we read, *περιπατήσατε ποτέ, δτε ἐζήτε*.

Take, next, the participle *πορευθεῖς*, translated, "he went." This naturally implies a personal movement; a conception to which the operation of the Divine Spirit of Christ on the mind of Noah hardly responds, but to which a personal act of Christ, after his death, and in the world of spirits, perfectly answers. If it be argued that this is only a Hebraistic pleonasm, and really adds nothing to the words "he preached," the burden of proof is on the asserter, and he can adduce no such New Testament usage as to this word; while, what is much to the point, the 22d verse gives us the same word with an obvious personal movement, referring to Christ's ascension to heaven, and completing the specification of events in his history. It is well to heed the remark of Winer, § 65: "In general too many participles in the New Testament have been represented as redundant, and though the decision may occasionally be doubtful, yet very many of them express notions which were they not expressed would be missed;" and he cites this very case from Peter, as in point. If any one wishes to study New Testament idiom as to *πορεύομαι*, used in connection with *κηρύσσω*, let him consult Mat. x. 6, 7; Mark xvi. 15; and used in connection with other words of speaking, teaching, and the like, Mat. xxviii. 7, 19; Luke vii. 22; xiii. 32; Acts v. 20. But is not the idea, that *πορευθεῖς* is a pleonasm, or that it indicates a spiritual but not a local movement, sanctioned by the use of the word *ἐλθὼν*, in Ep. ii. 17, where it is said of Christ, that "he came and preached peace to you which were afar off and to them that were nigh?" Not all; since, although Christ did not in the flesh visit the Ephesians, he did personally and locally "come" to this earth, and "preach" to the class of persons to which the Ephesians belonged, that is, to the human race, a gospel of salvation for Jew and Gentile; a fact which as including the Ephesians would literally warrant Paul's words. Jesus himself said: "The Son of man is come to seek

and to save that which is lost." He personally visited this world. Compare John xvi. 28.

Here it is proper to note the consecution of the three aorist participles, in the statement of the apostle. One can with difficulty avoid the opinion, that *θανατωθεῖς*, *ζωοποιηθεῖς* and *προεβθεῖς*, in their succession, having the same subject, follow a historic order of events, and refer successively to death of the body, quickened energy in the disembodied state, and a consequent visitation of the imprisoned spirits. The case in Heb. i. 1, 2, cited by President Bartlett as a similar case to the contrary, is not at all parallel. That indeed shows three aorists in a sentence, which do not point to events in historical order; but not three consecutive aorist participles with the same subject. The grammatical construction is widely different, being that of an aorist participle, followed by aorist tenses. Nor is this interpretative force of the three consecutive aorist participles to be set aside by the plea of President Bartlett, "that here the connection is broken by the relative clause beginning ἐν ᾧ, and by the καὶ;" for this only gives a turn of expression which serves to confirm and illustrate the idea asserted in the *ζωοποιηθεῖς*, as will be shown hereafter. Indeed Davidson ("Introduction, I. 433) mentions as a characteristic of this epistle, that "new ideas are attached to a word by means of a relative pronoun, which gives the style a limping appearance."

Next let it be considered, what is implied in the words *ζωοποιηθεῖς δὲ πνεύματι*, "but made alive in spirit." The "spirit" would seem to mean that in Jesus which survived the being put to death in the flesh (*σὰρξ*, fleshwise); and thus to include the humanity as well as divinity of Christ, or his theanthropic nature—all that was included in the word "me," when he said to the penitent robber on the cross at his side: "To-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise." A grave theological error would have been introduced into the passage, even the denial of the full humanity of Jesus, if "spirit" here meant only his divinity; for it would have implied that the person of Jesus lacked a human soul, and consisted of a human body animated by divinity. It must have included therefore his complete theanthropic nature.

But how could it be true, that it was in that spirit (ἐν ᾧ) he

preached to the antediluvian sinners, in the time of Noah? Even if by *πνεύματι* could be understood his divine nature alone, and if *ζωοποιηθεῖς* could mean "remaining alive," which it never elsewhere does, serious difficulties occur. Where do the Scriptures teach that the ancient prophets were inspired by the second person of the Holy Trinity? Is not inspiration always referred to the Holy Spirit? Does not Peter himself say, that "holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost?" 2 Peter i. 21. True, in 1 Peter i. 11, he refers to "the Spirit of Christ, which was in them;" but this appellation is harmoniously and naturally explained of the Holy Spirit by such passages as John iii. 34: "God giveth not the Spirit by measure unto him" (Christ). Rom. viii. 9, 11: "If so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his. . . . But if the Spirit of him who raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you." Gal. iv. 6: "And because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying Abba, Father." Phil. i. 19: "I know that this shall turn to my salvation through your prayer, and the supply of the Spirit of Jesus Christ." Rev. xix. 10: "The testimony of Jesus is the spirit of prophecy." A study of these and similar passages will show, that as Christ was characteristically and specially filled with the Holy Spirit, as he made the gift of the Spirit his parting blessing to his disciples, and as the prophecy inspired by the Holy Ghost pointed ever to Christ, so it became easy and natural to speak of the Holy Spirit as "the Spirit of Christ."

But we must also give appropriate force to *ζωοποιηθεῖς*. Literally it signifies "made alive," and would seem to have fuller meaning, wherever used in the New Testament, than "remained alive," or "was alive;" whether the reference in any case be to body or to soul. These passages may be consulted: John v. 21, vi. 63; Rom. iv. 17, viii. 11; 1 Cor. xv. 22, 36, 45; 2 Cor. iii. 6; Gal. iii. 21; 1 Tim. vi. 13, which, with the case in hand, embrace all the instances of its occurrence in the New Testament. If then the idea is, that when Christ's body died on the cross, his spiritual nature had new

quickenings, or activity, or manifested life, what more naturally illustrates and proves the assertion, than his proceeding, in that state, to the prison house of disobedient spirits, to make an appropriate declaration of his Messianic work? How could this "quickenings" be illustrated by a reference to what occurred in the days of Noah? And here it may be noted, that this most pertinent, after-death illustration of the "quickenings," is naturally introduced by the relative clause *ἐν ᾧ* and the *καὶ*—"being quickened in spirit, in which, also, he went and preached to the spirits in prison." There is thus no real break of connected historic statement, in the successive aorist participles.

Next let us ask, what is the natural impression made by the words which describe those visited and addressed—*τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι*, "the imprisoned spirits?" If Peter meant, that Christ preached by Noah to living antediluvians, was it not singular that he should only call them "spirits in prison," when during the preaching they were alive in the body? Where are living men called "spirits?" Could he have meant "now spirits in prison?" What would not those who uphold that interpretation have given to secure the little word *νῦν* after *τοῖς*? How strange that Peter should have omitted to write, "preached to those who are now spirits in prison, but were at the time disobedient bearers of Noah." So strongly does Mr. Fausset feel the pressure of the plain Greek of the passage, that he translates, "preached in Spirit by Noah to the spirits then in prison," and makes the idea to be figurative, and to refer to "the antediluvians, whose bodies indeed seemed free, but their spirits were in prison, shut up in the earth as one great condemned cell," "disobedient spirits fast bound in wrath!" And Archbishop Leighton, too, changes from his first reference of the preaching to the days of Noah, because the hearers were plainly in prison during the preaching, and concludes that Christ did the preaching, after his death and resurrection, through the apostles, to the sinners—captives in sin—who were converted under their labors! Such exegesis refutes itself! Plainly, Peter can hardly be thought to express the idea of preaching to antediluvians during their life, by the words "preached to the spirits in prison." Is it not

evident, on the contrary, as Ellicott notices, that the statement of Christ's having been "quickened in spirit" led naturally to the mention of "the spirits" to whom he preached, while in that state of existence?

If, now, to all this we add the telling omission of Peter to say a word in this connection about the preaching of Noah, to whose inspired utterances nevertheless he is supposed to have had sole reference, the unnatural and forced character of that interpretation is made apparent. Noah is not here referred to as a preacher, but only as calling up, by his well known name and history, the time of their sin and punishment, and as introducing a curious analogy or parallel to baptism. It is hardly sufficient, in reply to this, to allege that, in another epistle and for a totally different purpose, Peter alludes to Noah as "a preacher of righteousness." Practically, then, the interpreter is to decide, whether it is more reasonable to suppose, that, as attributive and predicative meanings often are kindred and run into each other, Peter may have used the anarthrous *ἀπεθῆσασι* in an attributive sense, or possibly in an explanatory sense; or whether, on the other hand, it is probable that he omitted to speak of Noah's preaching, when his meaning all turned on that fact; that he attributed the inspiration of prophets to the second instead of the third person of the Trinity; that he wrote the specific word *πνευθεῖς*, yet intended no actual movement, though employing the same word in verse 22 to denote local movement; that he used, in a historic recital, three aorist participles in close succession and having the same subject, but intended no similar succession of events; that he spoke of what was once done to living men, yet only calls them "spirits," neglecting to say that they were at the time living, but were now spirits; and that he asserted a "quickening" of the spirit of Christ, upon the death of the body, but, instead of illustrating this by the action which occurred in the spirit-realm, went on to tell of the inspiration of the (unnamed) preaching of Noah centuries before.

We are next called to confront the question: What is meant by the "preaching," in controversy? and What was its result? There has been much dispute over the import of *ἐκήρυξεν*. Literally the verb signifies to act the herald, and

then in general to publish or proclaim any thing, good or bad. Most commonly it is followed by some word, as a definite object, which specifies what is proclaimed, e. g. Christ, the gospel, deliverance, baptism, kingdom, etc., or by an equivalent sentence giving the announcement. But the word had become so technical among Christians, in connection with preaching the gospel, that often the New Testament writers use it absolutely, as we do, omitting the specification. (See Matt. xi. 1; Mark i. 38, 39, iii. 14, xvi. 20; Luke iv. 44; Rom. x. 15.) It seems most probable, then, that in this passage it is used in some such sense. The difficulty is, to conceive the exact nature of the proclamation made, in such circumstances, to such characters; or to show why these alone are mentioned. We have no right to dogmatize on a mysterious subject, when Scripture purposely says so little, though we should bear in mind Bengel's words on the passage, in his "Gnomon": "We ought not to dismiss from it the proper signification of the language employed, because it has no parallel passages." God chooses, in some cases, to give us but a single glimpse of certain facts; but it were most unwise and venturesome, to deny or doubt the facts, on that account. Thus in 1 Cor. xv. 24-28, is an express statement of a future event, with reference to the Son of God: "Then shall also the Son be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all." It is not asserted elsewhere, and it suggests grave theological difficulties; but in theology, as in natural science, we must accept the fact, whether or not we can explain it. A few suppositions may plausibly be made. It is plain that Christ, in his theanthropic nature, went somewhere, and did something, during the time his body lay in the tomb. His promise to the penitent robber shows, that he must have visited paradise, the abode of the holy, happy dead. Is it unreasonable to think that he also visited the prison of the wicked spirits? The parable of Lazarus and the Rich Man represents these as in a sense contiguous, and as both included in Sheol, or Hades, the world of the dead. Peter himself argues, in Acts ii. 24-31, that Christ's soul, according to prophecy, was not left in Hades, though it went there. How can we tell what relations his sacrificial work had to all who had previously lived and died;

or what grand announcements might there be made, in the "quickened" energies of his "spirit?" Is it contrary to any Biblical statement, or analogy of divine procedure, that some redemptive opportunity may then have been announced to those who had lived and died in the darkness of the ages prior to Christ's atoning death, and who made part of the race for whom he died? If not, what class of persons might more properly be selected for mention than the sinners of the far off antediluvian age, who constituted a world by themselves, separated from the rest by the waters of the flood, and who were marked out by the peculiarity of their death, as a public illustration of punitive divine justice? What if the atonement could reach even their case, and the fact should be announced by the Son of God himself? If this idea have foundation, does it not gain a degree of confirmation from the hitherto perplexing words of Peter in the next chapter? "For, for this cause was the gospel preached also to them that are dead, that they might be judged, according to men, in the flesh, but live, according to God, in the spirit;"—language closely parallel with that used by Paul as to the treatment to be given to the incestuous Corinthian (1 Cor. v. 5): "To deliver such a one unto Satan, for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus." Does not Peter here go back to the fact which he had just mentioned, in the third chapter, and make use of it, to show how proper it was that Christ should be "ready to judge the quick and the dead," who had made atonement alike for both, and had preached the fact to both? I simply offer the suggestion, making no affirmations, and drawing no inferences. Whatever the fact may have been, and whatever its relations to the past, or the future, it cannot change the clear revelation of the New Testament as to the destiny of those who hear and reject the gospel, and for whom in the judgment it is to be less tolerable than for Tyre and Sidon, or for Sodom and Gomorrah.

ARTICLE IV.—THE OLD TESTAMENT IN THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

SEVERAL historical circumstances contributed to the identification in moral authority and value of the Old and New Testaments in the primitive church.

(1.) The most obvious of these was the fact that Christianity sprang out of Judaism. With the Old Testament system it was organically connected. Its relation to it was that of the fruit to the blossom. But those who had been reared and trained under the old system would not always appreciate the completeness and sufficiency of the New, even though they might acknowledge its superiority to the Old. They would insist that while Christianity was a broader development from Judaism, it was in no way exclusive of the old system, but left it in full force. They would urge that Jesus, so far from annulling the Mosaic law, honored and fulfilled it. Christianity is, therefore, an appendix or supplement to the Old Testament system in which that system reaches its ideal end and rounds itself into completeness.

(2.) Closely connected with this view of the relations of the Old and New Testaments, is the Judaizing tendency of a large part of the primitive Christians. The early Jewish Christians had no idea of ceasing to be Jews. They had been trained in the spirit of rigid legalism, and it was not to be expected that on accepting Christianity, they should be at once emancipated from their strict adherence to the Mosaic law. These views and prejudices would naturally be more or less perpetuated among the descendants and successors of the Jewish Christians.

(3.) Another circumstance of later origin which contributed to this result, was that the divine origin and inspiration of the Old Testament must be defended against the assaults of the Gnostics. The dualistic philosophy of Gnosticism, which regarded matter as essentially evil and as antagonistic to spirit, could not allow that the Supreme God had created the material world. The Gnostics attributed the creation to an inferior

Being,—the Demiurge—from whom, they reasoned, the morally imperfect legalism of the Old Testament proceeded. Christian theology must, therefore, maintain that the Old Testament proceeded from the same God as the New. In the performance of this task, the Christian apologists ordinarily took the traditional Jewish point of view from which to conduct their defense.

(4.) The prevalent heathen ideas of ecstatic inspiration doubtless tended somewhat to shape the early ideas of the inspiration of the Old Testament in these controversies.* According to Platonism the divine power carried those under its spell into an ecstatic condition in which they were but passive organs of the divine utterance. Such was the case in the communication of oracles through the Pythian priestess, for example. With this idea of inspiration agreed substantially the Neo-Platonic notion of Philo. As the great harmonist between Mosaism and Greek Philosophy, Philo sought to maintain the communication by divine ecstasies and dictations of both systems. These Jewish and heathen notions of inspiration, which were mediated through Philo, exercised a wide influence over the minds of the early Christian apologists and tended to perpetuate the idea of the continued binding force of the Old Testament economy and its equal dignity with the New.

This view, it will be seen, was chiefly polemical in its origin. It was not developed in the spirit of calm and unimpassioned exegesis and inquiry. It had its chief roots in Jewish prejudice and in the zeal of defence against Gnostic heresy. The relations of the Old and New Covenants were not historically and exegetically treated; so far as they are defined, they are considered from the Jewish standpoint. We can not, therefore, be surprised to find that during the centuries that followed, while theological methods were predominantly controversial, not historical, the same mode of treatment prevailed.

When we descend to the era of the Reformation, we find that a new motive had arisen for the maintenance of the equal authority and rank of the Old and New Testaments. The Romish claim to authority for the Church and her traditions, must be met by establishing an equal claim. Protestantism must also have an authority infallible and complete. This

* Cf. Neander, *History of Dogmas*, I. 90—93.

authority was asserted boldly and exclusively for the Bible. The historical circumstances attending the origin of the various books were commonly disregarded by early Protestantism. The Bible was treated in the lump. The methods of its study were not critical and historical but chiefly dogmatic and polemic. Scriptural Revelation was not regarded so much in the light of a historical development as of a body of didactic communications from which arguments and systems were to be formed. Even the services of Reuchlin to Old Testament study lay not so much in aiding the historic apprehension of the Old Testament economy, as in analyzing and directing its dogmatic content. The prevailing conception of the unity of Scripture in the early Reformed Theology was not that of an organic unity—a process of unfolding from a few primal germs of truth,—but rather of a unity of doctrinal agreement. From this conception of the unity of Scripture as uniformity of dogma, grew many of the extremes and vagaries of figurative and typical exegesis.

But from these statements it is not to be inferred that the Reformers rendered no important service to the historic apprehension of the Old Testament system in its relation to the gospel. These services we shall note and define in the proper place. It is sufficient for our present purpose that we have shown how long and how generally the two Testaments were confused in the Church; how an unfortunate polemical theological method in the discussion of their relations has prevented both a dispassionate exegesis of the passages of the New Testament which bear on the subject, and, above all, has kept in abeyance the idea of the historic development and progress of Revelation which has transformed Biblical interpretation from a search for proof texts into a science.

The method of treating the Old Testament which we have outlined is still in vogue in some theological circles. "Some recent Old Testament theologians," says Oehler, "still show a tendency to confuse the two testaments after the fashion of the older orthodoxy," though he adds that in general, theology is "far beyond such one-sidedness."* "We are still suffering," says Dorner, "from the after-effects of the identification

* Theology of the Old Testament, I. 3.

of the Old and New Testaments of a former period.”* He then shows in what ways we are suffering from this false view. One is in a reaction to the opposite extreme of indifference as to the internal connection of the two testaments; another is in that sort of identification which compels a resort to allegorical and mystical interpretations in order to expound the unities of the two; still another is seen in the treatment of the New Testament as “nothing more than a purified Judaism.” It will be seen that these results were among the causes which, in a primitive age, tended to foster this conception of the Old Testament. They are now having their reward. Grown feeble now with age, and unable to support themselves, their foster-son supports them.

Let us now outline another method of treating the Old Testament in its relation to Christianity, and when we have determined its aim and spirit, we will examine its defenses.

This method seeks to treat revelation in its historic stages. It believes in the organic unity of Scripture. It lays full stress on the divine authority and inspiration of the Old Testament, but in this is distinguished from the old Judaizing theology that it believes in inspiration, not in dictation. It holds to a providential guidance and training of the people of Israel and to the inspiration of her leaders for their work of teaching and administration. All this legal and theocratic training is preparatory to the gospel—*εἰς Χριστόν*. The work of the prophets constitutes a still more immediate preparation for Christianity. Thus the New Covenant grows out of the Old. “Salvation is of the Jews.” The same God is revealed in both; the same Spirit has wrought in both to the end of man’s salvation. To manifest the same redeemer, Jesus Christ, is the end of both systems—of the Old, indirectly, by preparative methods; of the New, immediately. But the mission of the old Economy is now accomplished. It was but the forerunner, and like its last representative, must decrease as the object of its mission increases.

This view recognizes the elements of permanence in the Old Testament system. It accords to them their full weight of moral value and authority, but it maintains that Christianity

* *History of Protestant Theology*, II. 435.

is complete in itself and that it takes up into itself all these elements of permanence. The spirit of every prohibition in the decalogue, for example, is taken up into Christianity, enforced with higher motives and developed in more positive and universal form. There is not a single element of spiritual truth in the Old Testament which is not incorporated in the New.

In view of the mission and character of the old system, this method of regarding it denies its immediate, prescriptive authority for the Christian and the Church of to-day. As its chief aim was prophetic, its chief value, now that its fulfillment has come, is historic. This view maintains, as Dorner says, that the Old Testament and its religion were "one great prophecy, . . . announcing the existence of progressively higher forms of those ideas which find in it their initiative realization."* The indissoluble historic connection of the two testaments is thus asserted while their distinction in present authority and value is maintained. The development of this view, which both escapes the crudities of the Rabbinic conception of the "older orthodoxy," and avoids the unhistoric severance of the testaments, committed by Schleiermacher, is due in the main to the historico-exegetical labors of German theologians. We could not attempt to assign the credit of expounding and illustrating this method of treatment to those to whom it is due, but will only mention that Oehler, Bleek and Dorner (and to some extent Neander and Delitzsch), are representatives and defenders of the view which we have outlined.

The following considerations are submitted in illustration and confirmation of this method of regarding the Old Testament:

1. The recognition of the progressive character of revelation is necessary to the understanding of the relations of the two testaments.

The idea of progress, of development in the type of revealed religion, is a comparatively new idea and is still regarded with alarm in some theological camps. Some will have it that the Bible must be perfect in its every part and,

* History of Protestant Theology, II. 443, 445.

therefore, a progress from the less to the more perfect in morality and doctrine is, of course, precluded. The difficulties of this view are insurmountable. It commits us to the supposition that the principle of revenge which was sanctioned by the Mosaic law was a perfect expression of divine truth, though Christ expressly repudiates it and teaches us that it was permitted because no higher principle was practicable at the time. So with the Mosaic regulations relating to divorce. Jesus would not re-affirm them, but put the whole subject on a different basis. On the supposition of progressive revelation, these and similar circumstances find a rational explanation. The *lex talionis* was a rude kind of justice, which was better than none. Restrictive enactments, moreover, were ordained to regulate its application. This penal legislation marks a positive advance on the rude and barbarous justice of the neighboring nations. In the conditions of the time the Mosaic enactments were regulative and beneficent. But under the light and law of Christianity, the application of the Mosaic laws of divorce and redress would simply be a return to barbarism.

The traditional view which maintains that every precept and enactment in the Bible must be perfect, regardless of the historical conditions under which it appears, has done more than any other one thing to give plausibility to the attacks of popular infidelity. The principle of progressive revelation and teaching disarms most of the current attacks on the Bible. He who would defend the Bible by maintaining that every Mosaic institute is morally perfect relatively to Christian ethics, paves the way for the exponent of the "Mistakes of Moses," and supplies the best weapons for his attack.

The theory of progressive revelation asserts, as Canon Moseley expresses it, that the end, the completion of a system of teaching is the test of it,—not its incipient stages. To judge Christianity by the laws of Moses or by the Proverbs of Solomon, is as unhistoric and as unwise as to judge Roman law by the Twelve Tables or English jurisprudence by the spirit of the old folk-courts. God does not give to a rude and barbarous age an ethical code which could have for it no practical value or effect, but he prepares the way for the giving of perfect ethical ideals. He begins with the people as they are and

makes them ready for the complete standard by methods which continually look forward to that which is beyond themselves. The whole course of divine teaching is progressive. But the very idea of progress implies that something is left behind. Its law is that when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away.

Let us here acknowledge the service of the Reformers in preparing the way for this method of treating Scriptural Revelation, though only partially applying it themselves. They did, however, reach the principle of the interpretation of Scripture by Scripture, and admitted the limited sphere and pedagogic design of the Old Testament.* But even these positions marked a great step in advance, since before the Reformation the Bible had been chiefly regarded as a repository of proof texts and no distinction was commonly made between the contents of its various parts or between the varying types of doctrine therein contained. The chief service to Old Testament study has been rendered by the Science of Biblical Theology—now about one hundred years old—which discards the supposition of a leaden uniformity of doctrine and moral value in Scripture, replaces that conception with that of an organic unity and proceeds to investigate Revelation in its actual historic progress.

2. It is important to recognize the specific and national character of the Mosaic legislation in determining the present value and authority of the Old Testament system.

On this subject it is common to teach that the ceremonial portions of the Mosaic law were of merely national and temporary import and value, but that the moral elements of the legislation are of permanent application and authority. He who would maintain this position, should be able to show from the New Testament that some such principle is there recognized and should proceed to separate the moral, civil, and ceremonial portions of the law from each other, so that the Christian may know just what portions of the law he is still under and from what portions he is free. Neither of these

* "Here (in the Old Testament) shalt thou find the swaddling-clothes and the manger in which Christ lies. Poor and of little value are the swaddling-clothes, but dear is Christ, the treasure that lives in them."—*Luther, Pref. to Old Testament.*

tasks, we think, has been attempted, and yet both must be accomplished or this common canon of reasoning turns out to be not only a mere assumption in itself, but an assumption which does not even seek to establish and regulate the relations of the Christian to those portions of the law of Moses which are still binding upon him. In fact, this principle is a relic of traditionalism, groundless in theory and impossible in application. No such separation of the elements of the Mosaic legislation is possible. We are either under the whole Mosaic law, in its every jot and tittle, or we are not under it at all. "The traditional division of the law of Moses into moral, ceremonial, and juristic laws may serve to facilitate a general view of theocratic ordinances; but it is incorrect if it seeks to express a distinction within the law, and to claim various dignity for its various parts."*

Much of the Mosaic legislation, enacted though it was under the special providence of God, was applicable and could be applicable only to Israel. It was specific, national, provisional. When now by the same providence, the Jewish nationality ceases to exist and the kingdom of God takes on a new and universal form, the old legal system must lose its direct, prescriptive authority and its chief value become historical.† We are not here speaking of the prophetic and devotional portions of the Old Testament. Its spiritual counsels, noble songs, and wise proverbs will be a treasure-house of truth and admonition for the Christian life to the end of time. Nor are we denying the permanent moral elements of the Mosaic legislation. But we maintain that these elements are all taken up in the teaching and spirit of the gospel and are there enacted and applied in broader and more comprehensive form. They have not therefore any continued validity for the Christian, as elements of the old system, but only so far as they are incorporated in the new. With the old system, therefore, we have nothing whatever to do as a prescriptive moral authority. We are under the law of Christ, which is complete and sufficient in itself,—and under no other. God has taken away the first and has established the second, in which the first is completed. It is no disparagement of the bud or blossom to say

* Oehler, *Theology of O. T.*, I. 264.

† Cf. Bleek, *Int. to O. T.*, II. 349.

that it has fallen away, or passed into its completed form—the ripened fruit.

3. Another important consideration bearing upon our theme is the imperfect morality of the Old Testament, incident to the preparatory character of the old Dispensation.

This point applies not only to the law of Moses, but, in some degree, to other portions of the Old Testament as well, the Psalms and Proverbs, for example. There is small room for any question that the moral tone of the Old Testament, as a whole, is vastly below that of the New; that many specific precepts and sentiments are not only far beneath the ideal of the Sermon on the Mount, but quite incompatible with it. The motives of fear, temporal reward and advantage with which the people were incited to obedience would surely fall below the supreme motive of love which Jesus enthrones. Yet in the conditions in which they were presented, they were useful and effective. The prudential considerations which are often made the incentives to virtue in the Proverbs, and the revengeful character of some of the Psalms, furnish illustrations.* There are scores of moral precepts in the Old Testament to which no Christian could assent. But even the difficulties which these occasion, find, for the most part, easy solution on the theory of historic and progressive Revelation.† Take, for example, such a passage as Proverbs xxxi. 4-7: "It is not for kings, O Lemuel, it is not for kings to drink wine; nor for princes strong drink: Lest they drink, and forget the law, and pervert the judgment of any of the afflicted. Give strong drink unto him that is ready to perish, and wine unto those that be of heavy hearts. Let him drink and forget his poverty, and remember his misery no more."

No Christian ever gave such advice as this, or ever could. In our conditions, it is the worst advice that could be given. We always give the very opposite of this counsel. The view which assumes moral perfection for all scriptural precepts, regardless of their historical circumstances, can only conjure with absurdities in the treatment of such passages. The theory of revelation as historic and progressive, however, recognizes the con-

* E. g. Ps. cix. 7-14; cxxxvii. 9; Prov. xxxi. 6, 7; Jer. xviii. 23.

† See Fisher, *Beginnings of Theology*, pp. 19-25.

ditions of the time under which such sentiments appear, and finds even in the case of the passage in question, a restrictive precept, relatively to the universal drinking customs of that day. Its sentiment is better than the prevailing life of its time, and hence it was, so far, regulative and wholesome advice.

In this view all portions of the Old Testament are valuable as illustrating some phase of the development of Israel. The various stages of her moral and religious training are thus traced and it is found that the divine mode of education is adapted to the condition of those under training, while, at the same time, it aims at the constant improvement of that condition. But shall the moral tone and status of those who lived in the twilight of this enlightenment and training give the law to him who lives in their noon-day? Shall the first stages of revelation be deemed as perfect as its last stage? Shall the principles which were allowed under the law on account of "the hardness of men's hearts," be accorded equal authority with the law of Christ? Shall the utterances of David and Solomon, which reflect the morality of their age, be declared equal in authority and value to the Sermon on the Mount? Such are some of the crude assumptions of a *priori* theology. *Exe-*
unt facts; prepare for our defences.

4. The most important witness for the complete abrogation of the Old Testament law is the New Testament.

An exhaustive examination of the passages bearing on this subject cannot be here attempted. We shall merely quote the more important of them, adding, where it is necessary, comments from the best exegetical authorities.

We refer, first, to the figures of the piece of cloth and the new wine,* on which Godet says: "All that has been called the 'system of Paul'; all that this apostle himself designates 'his gospel,'—the decisive contrast between the two covenants,—the mutual exclusiveness of the systems of law and grace, of the oldness of the letter and of the newness of the spirit, which constitutes the substance of the epistles to the Romans and Galatians, is contained in this figure."†

* Matt. ix. 16, 17; Mark ii. 21, 22; Luke v. 36-38.

† Com. on Luke, *in loco*.

Matt. v. 17. "Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets; I am not come to destroy but to fulfill," (*πληρῶσαι*)—to fill out, to complete, to bring out the universal, spiritual meaning which lies capsule in the provisional system. This process of completion for the temporary and incomplete must be accomplished for the whole law (v. 18)—"until all be fulfilled." "This fulfilling" says Meyer, "is the perfect development of their ideal reality out of the positive form in which the same is historically apprehended and limited,"* with whom agrees Kahnis (*Dogmatik*): "The fulfilling is the development of what is not completed, into something higher, which preserves the substance of the lower."

Gal. iii. 24, 25 (Ellicott's translation). "Lo, the law hath been our schoolmaster unto Christ, that we may be justified by faith. But now that faith is come, we are no longer under a schoolmaster."

Rom. x. 3. "For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth."

Here, we think, *τέλος νόμου* is literally the end, the conclusion. The old system was done away in him. This view was adopted by Augustine and is followed by most modern expositors. Meyer paraphrases the passage thus: "For the validity of the law has come to an end in Christ, in order that every believer may be a partaker of righteousness."

Col. ii. 16. "Let no man, therefore, judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a holy-day, or of the new moon, or of the Sabbath; which are a shadow of things to come; but the body is Christ."

In various passages in Paul's epistles the ordinances of the Old Testament are alluded to as elements or rudiments of the world (*στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου*) and even "weak and beggarly elements,"† and in the Epistle to the Hebrews the law, as it relates to the appointment of priests, is called "the law of carnal commandment," (vii. 6)—i. e., temporary, provisional commandment—and the first covenant is said (ix. 10) to "stand only in meats and drinks and divers washings and carnal ordinances, imposed until the time of reformation," (*διορθώσις*)—and presumably no longer. These passages clearly

* Meyer, *Com. in loco*.

† Gal. iv. 3, 9; Col. ii. 20.

imply that this elementary and provisional system has fulfilled its prescribed purpose, and that its previous validity is lost. In Hebrews x. 1, we are told that "the law had a shadow of good things to come and not the very image of the things," and in Romans vi. 14, that "we are not under the law." In II. Cor., chap. iii., we have a description of the superior glory of the New to the Old and learn (vv. 10, 11), that though the old Covenant was glorious in its time, it has no glory at all when compared with the new, and also (v. 11) that it is "*done away*." On the rendering of v. 14 of this chapter, interpreters are by no means agreed. We venture to believe that the following is its meaning: "But their minds were blinded, for until to-day the same vail (a symbol of their incapacity to recognize the end of the Mosaic ministry), remains in the reading of the old Covenant, it not being made manifest, that in Christ it (the old Covenant) is done away" (*καταργείται*).^{*} With this agrees Heb. x. 9: "He taketh away the first, that he may establish the second."

To us these considerations are conclusive. We are no longer under the law. For us it is wholly abrogated as an immediate, prescriptive *regula fidei*. "The law had a shadow of good things to come—but the body is Christ." This view has, we think, more than mere speculative and historical interest. It has great practical advantages. Among these we note, (1) its advantage to Biblical interpretation. It relieves the interpreter at once from all efforts at making out fictitious and unreal harmonies between the Old and New Testaments, in which the traditional view has been so prolific. It recognizes the difference between the legal and evangelical standpoints and is, therefore, able to expound both in their real spirit. It enables the student of Scripture to discover in the process of revelation analogies to all God's ways in nature and history. "First the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear." It escapes the crudities of atomism which in the interpretation of Scripture has wrought such miracles of misunderstanding. It traces through the Old Testament history a genetic development and thus aids to the discovery of a true philosophy of religion. "He who can not apprehend the Old Testament in

^{*} Meyer adopts and defends this interpretation. See Com. *in loco*.

its historical context may produce in detail much that is valuable and worth knowing, but he lacks the right key to its meaning." *

We maintain, moreover, that this method of regarding the Old Testament accords to it its highest dignity. That dignity is not found in itself but in its preparatory service to the gospel. The true historic position of the Old Covenant is that of a dispensation which has not its end in itself, but which exists only that it may usher in the glory of the New. It is the glory of the moon that it reflects the splendor of the sun; so is it the glory of the Old Covenant that it issues in the completeness of the new and therein loses its direct application and authority.

(2.) Our view has also a great apologetic advantage. The old dogmatic methods of defense can no longer prove successful with thoughtful persons. Apologetics must apprehend the truth and significance of historic development. He who would intelligently defend the institutes of Moses against the aspersions of infidelity, must take up the standpoint of their time, and must compel his antagonist to do the same. If he will do that, the worst of the battle will be over before it had seemed begun. The current attacks on the earlier books of the Bible are rendered plausible and specious to the popular mind, chiefly because the popular mind has no historic sense. And for this fact, false methods of teaching respecting the Old Testament, are mainly responsible. Great numbers of excellent persons are disquieted and puzzled to know how the perfection of this or that Mosaic institute, or the justification of this imprecation or that doubtful precept is to be made out. Others are moved to affect great contempt for objections which they know not how to answer and to assure themselves that they must be quite beneath notice. All the advantage which the assailant gains by attacking the morality of the Old Testament from the standpoint of modern and Christian ethics, is allowed him by the apologist who frames his defence from the same stand-point. The same considerations which make the attacks of the one plausible and harmful make the attempted defence of the other feeble and futile. The untenable views of traditionalism have, in large part, made the current attacks on the Old Testament

* Oehler, O. T. Theol., I. 2.

possible. The indefensible position has invited the assault. When it is thought that, in order to defend the Old Testament, it must be shown that all its laws and precepts are ethically perfect, and in full moral force for us, we may well be concerned to know what the righteous are to do. The infidel desires nothing else so much as to have theology continue to attempt this. It points all his weapons.

But if, on the other hand, we estimate the Mosaic cosmogonies and enactments and the various political and moral precepts of the Old Testament anthologies and Wisdom in the light of their time; if we show how they reflect the age in which they appear, and show, at the same time, how they represent an advance or the common conditions of that age, and how they stand out in history as the landmarks of progress—though now left far behind—the thunderbolts will be quite eliminated from the *strepitus tonans* of infidel orators with which our platforms have recently resounded, and nothing will be left but the harmless noise and its feebler echoes.

(8.) But the chief advantage of this view of the Old Testament is its practical advantage to the Christian life. It proclaims to the Christian that he is not under the law, but occupies a different ground, a higher standpoint. The Christian life is not to be regulated by a system of prohibitions or external enactments, but by the inner life of the Spirit. The Christ-life is the shaping power of all Christian character. The Christian conscience is not burdened with the schoolmaster's rules and prescriptions; it has a higher law,—the law of love—not imposed from without, but reigning within. Christian character has been too often determined by the spirit of an earlier dispensation, which is not for the Christian man at all, and from which he should understand that he is free. We have the law of Christ—the law of love and sacrifice—expounded and illustrated by himself and his apostles. This is God's last and most complete revelation. All preparatory stages which precede this revelation are, of necessity, inferior to it. To these stages the Christian life need not go back for its laws of growth or its ideals of perfection. Christianity is absolutely sufficient in itself. The completion can not be lacking in any element which was contained in the imperfect stages. We should

revere and study the Old Testament as the testimony and record of God's earlier revelations and of his wondrous providential preparation for the manifestation of his Son in the fulness of time. It is the glory of "that which is done away" that it has ushered in "that which remaineth" and "the glory that excelleth." God hath spoken to us in these last days by his Son, who is "the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth."

We close this discussion with a quotation from Professor Dorner which touches comprehensively the whole topic of Old Testament study. Though somewhat lengthy, the passage seems too compact to be abridged.*

"A review of the whole present state of Science with regard to the Old Testament, and of those efforts which have led the way in this respect, scarcely as yet exhibits any definite tendency directing the whole course of individual labors. This shows most convincingly that a Biblical Theology of the Old Testament, corresponding to the claims and needs of the day, is still lacking, because no one with a special vocation for this important work has yet appeared. Still a retrospect of the fate of this science, and the laws of its progress, also points surely onward to the goal. If we do not as yet behold the land in its whole extent, yet peak after peak is coming into sight. It is, however, obviously of the utmost importance to Christian theology, in the narrower sense, that we should take full possession of the land itself. For it is of great moment, both to the confirmation of the historical character of primitive Christianity, especially of the portraiture of Christ, and to the unity and continuity of the history of Christianity, that the distinction between the Old and New Testaments should be duly estimated, while their firm and indissoluble connection is also made evident. If the historical succession is not here very strictly preserved, the misconceived mutual relation of the Old and New Testaments will be turned into a dangerous weapon for attacking Christianity. If, on the one hand, the connection between them is either severed or depreciated, Christianity will, by means of that character of novelty which is thus, in a one-sided manner, impressed upon it, be placed in an insecure position, deprived of its historical basis, and exposed to the suspicion of having originated in subjective arbitrariness. If, on the other hand, the connection of the two is enhanced to actual identity, and not viewed as exclusively the connection between a deeply felt want and its supply (Matt. v. 3), the suspicion will arise—as many recent appearances show—that a transference of Old Testament occurrences, images, and Messianic features to the Person of Jesus of Nazareth, is the source of the gospel history. Such a suspicion it will be difficult to obviate on historical grounds, and all that is new in Christianity will thus be reduced to its carrying out of these principles to universalism. And the more literal the fulfillment of Old Testament sayings found in the New, the more difficult will it be to dispel the suspicion that the former is the source of the latter. But the more we succeed in showing, in

* Hist. Prot. Theol., II., 444-446.

a truly historic manner, that the essentially self-consistent image of Christ, found in the books of the New Testament, is by no means simply identical with the Messianic idea of the Old, and still less so with the discordant and self-contradictory Messianic expectations of His contemporaries, that, on the contrary, the fulfillment, both on the whole and in particulars, far surpassed those limitations by which even prophecy was restricted; that there is, moreover, a real teleological connection between the gospel in general, and the one organic whole formed by the history of the Old Testament, so that what was deposited and prepared in remote ages attains its fulfillment in Christ—the more will both the novelty and originality, as well as the historical basis of the appearance of Christianity, ‘when the fulness of time was come,’ be established.”

ARTICLE V.—SPIRITUALISM, A SO-CALLED SCIENTIFIC QUESTION.

Second Article.

AN OPEN LETTER TO PROF. HERMANN ULRICI, D.D., BY
 PROF. A. WUNDT, OF LEIPSIK.

[Translated by Rev. J. B. CHASE, Cherokee, Iowa.]

MOST HONORED SIR:—

IN the last number of your *Journal of Philosophy and Philosophical Criticism* I see an article from your valued pen in which you deem worthy of notice the recorded spiritistic manifestations which took place here in Leipsic in the presence of the American medium, Henry Slade. You remark that, in your opinion, there can no longer be any doubt respecting the reality of the facts, attested as they are by eminent scientific men; and that therefore so-called spiritualism has come to be a scientific question of the greatest importance. I should not have undertaken to enter upon a review of your opinion, but that in the course of your article, while speaking of some of my colleagues, you make mention of myself in such a way that it seems desirable for me to indicate to you and your readers my position on this subject, which you have been pleased to style a "scientific question."

You state that there were, as participators in the séances held in Leipsic with Mr. Slade, in addition to the learned men who were convinced of the reality of the spiritistic phenomena, certain other members of the university who did not attain to this conviction. You say that these—and among them you mention my name—were free to believe or disbelieve, as they chose; but that it was their duty as scientific men "to publicly declare what they saw, and why they doubted the objectivity of the things seen; and also why they dare suspect jugglery, fraud, deception, or illusion." You add an alternative which remains only to disbelievers and doubters, viz: "Either

through their silence to admit that they have no basis for their doubts, except an unwillingness to believe what is perfectly credible; or else to show how it was possible to deceive those gentlemen and many others of undoubted veracity." I think that I cannot assent to such an emphatic conclusion. In response to your desire, you will certainly permit me to make my opinion public, and still further to address the same to yourself personally. I freely recognize the fact that your article excels all others that I have hitherto seen on this subject, in that you do not confine yourself to the description of a few remarkable examples of these phenomena, but you also discuss the scientific and especially the philosophical inferences which must legitimately follow, as soon as we have decided to admit the reality of the phenomena. And permit me to say that here and in the following remarks I use the word reality or genuineness in the sense in which you have used it, viz: the production of the phenomena without any admixture of deception and trickery. As you rightly observe, these phenomena cannot possibly be accounted for as the mere subjective fancies of the observers. In fact, their objectivity and reality, using these words in their ordinary sense, cannot be denied by anybody who has read even so much as your brief article on the subject. And I must grant with you that the bare facts in and of themselves, granting that they are genuine, possess only a subordinate importance as compared with the deductions which they furnish us respecting the general theory of the universe. If under conditions, or through influences now unknown to us, tables sometimes tip, musical instruments play, or bed-screens sometimes rend asunder, or ghostly hands or feet appear—all this is a matter of very small importance, provided, as previous experience justifies us in concluding, this kind of thing occurs only in a harmless way, and we need not fear any further disturbance of the laws of nature. But these facts do not detract from the importance of the philosophical conclusions to which the genuineness of these spiritistic phenomena necessarily lead us. I consider it therefore a real merit of your treatise that you do not discuss these conclusions in a merely general way. You, at least by way of intimation, seek to develop the special inferences which

have been suggested to you concerning the essential conditions of those phenomena in question; their relation to the world at large, as well as their ethical and religious importance. In this way you have thrown light upon the subject from a side which seems more worthy of consideration than any other.

1. Before I enter upon the consideration of this most original and important part of your treatise, I feel that I ought to say a few words in response to what you have said respecting my participation in these spiritistic séances, and the conclusions which I have drawn from my own personal experiences. I would also preface my remarks with a statement explanatory of my position toward those phenomena of which I was not personally an eye-witness, and concerning which I must rely upon the testimony of others.

You yourself, my dear sir, bear the same relation to the whole of these so-called "manifestations" that I bear to the largest part of them. Your knowledge is based upon the statements of reliable witnesses. It is true also that a short time ago you were found "among the number of uninterested spectators, who were looking on from afar off." You have seen fit to withdraw from this number. You have not only taken sides with the greatest energy for the genuineness of these phenomena, but you require all others who prefer the rôle (now despised by you) of disinterested spectatorship, to declare openly their belief or disbelief. What could ever have brought you to this condition of mind? A condition which I must certainly describe as extraordinary. But you make answer that these phenomena in question have been observed by well known and acknowledged scientists, whose reliability cannot be questioned, and these men have admitted their genuineness so that of course we cannot doubt their genuineness. In brief, your opinion is founded upon authority. Before I attempt to discuss the matter in hand, permit me to ask two questions which I, indeed, must answer for myself, but which I hope to answer in such a way that you can interpose no serious objection. The questions are, I. What are the essential attributes of scientific authority? II. How far should we permit our own mental faculties to be swayed by authority?

I. What are the essential attributes of scientific authority? You will certainly concede to me so much as this, that scientific authority is not an attribute which can be ascribed to any person of a given description. We are further agreed that the authority which any person may possess in some particular department of science does not necessarily pass over with him into another department. Sir Isaac Newton's authority as the discoverer of the law of gravitation has not protected his apocalyptic studies from a speedy oblivion. And the reverence which is justly paid to Ernst von Baer as a scientist hardly served as a letter of recommendation to his Homeric investigations. It is doubtless true, however, that true scientific investigation of itself, in whatever field it may be occupied, develops such an unbiased theoretical interest in the truth, that it tends to give in matters of science unlimited confidence in the conscientious devotion of the investigator. Indeed, it may be reasonably supposed that scientific investigation alone can produce absolute certainty in the discussion of theoretical questions, for this alone can make a right estimate of such questions. And now it follows as a matter of course that this authority which you bring forward, by reason of his high scientific position, as well as his generally recognized personal character, possesses a trustworthiness exalted above every doubt. But then consider that the highest degree of personal trustworthiness is not sufficient to constitute any person a scientific authority. To be an authority one must have special, professional, and ordinarily, technical acquirements; and must have approved himself by unusual attainments in his given department of science. And that man who has not attained these technical and professional attainments through long and unwearied toil, is neither himself skillful to perform, nor entitled to judge the performances of another person.

But now you will certainly reply that the authorities on which you rely are well known explorers in the fields of science, and that the subject under consideration is one of natural phenomena. But here unfortunately I cannot agree with you: for I cannot admit that scientific investigators, whose department has been that of natural science, are at all compe-

tent judges in the field which we are now considering. Nay, I go further, and affirm that these phenomena are so widely different from those traversed by the investigator in natural science, that he finds peculiar difficulties in directions which seem plain enough to other people of ordinary capacity.

All methods of investigation in natural science rest upon the presumption of unchangeable law-abiding character in the phenomena: a presumption, which includes this other one, that where the same conditions obtain, like results are sure to follow. The scientist therefore continues his observations with unwavering faith in the genuineness of the objects he is considering. Nature cannot deceive him. Neither fraud nor chance has the control there. Now you must admit that in the realm of spiritistic phenomena nobody can assert any such law-abiding character. On the other hand the most prominent characteristics of these phenomena lie exactly athwart the line of natural law. Considered simply by themselves they show no trace of law-abiding uniformity. The very man, who of all others ought to hope that some such manifestation of law might still be discovered in them, cannot help confessing, that all hopes cherished in this direction have been thus far blighted; and that in this respect the observations of the spiritistic and the natural have been mutually contradictory. And they cannot but admit on the other side that there is no room for absolute confidence in the truth of objective presentations in a science where the prime question is emphatically as to whether the phenomena are real, or whether they are founded in deception.

And just in accordance with this line of thought I find manifest indications that these recognized scientists, who have honored Mr. Slade with their attention, have brought to the consideration of this extraordinary subject a share of that confidence which they have so rightfully bestowed upon the objects lying within the fields of their own special investigation.

They speak for example of the effects which Mr. Slade produced upon the motion of the magnetic needle. It seems plain from their narrative that the medium was prepared for these experiments, and that others like them had already been performed in Berlin at the suggestion of some scholar in that place. The phenomena themselves are exactly like those

which any man might perform who was provided with a powerful magnet. And you will not deny that the value of these phenomena as an argument in the demonstration depends entirely upon the trustworthiness of the object; that is, the medium. That now these distinguished scientists, who observed these remarkable phenomena, especially the movements of the Ampère or Weber molecular currents, were completely convinced, is quite intelligible. A practical jurist would probably have been much less astonished; since he is much less accustomed to believe in the honesty of the things he investigates, he would hardly have failed to examine the coat sleeves of the medium, while trying to demonstrate his magnetic powers.

Moreover, most honored sir, I find myself unable to recognize as authorities in this department those whom you and I both honor highly as such in the field of natural science. In order to declare anything authoritatively, respecting any such phenomena as we are discussing, a person should be thoroughly conversant with them. Authorities here can only be such persons as are possessed of mediumistic powers; or, if you think them always deceptive, they should be persons capable of producing the manifestations. I would call Mr. Slade such an authority, if he only possessed scientific trustworthiness; also Mr. Bellachini, the court juggler at Berlin, who has notoriously uttered his opinion respecting Mr. Slade, if I could only be convinced that he possessed a conception of the scientific dimensions of the subject. The only person who to my knowledge possesses this ability is Dr. Christiani, assistant at the Physiological Institute in Berlin. He has successfully produced many of Mr. Slade's experiments. Dr. Christiani, however, declares that the experiments tried by him were all performed without any jugglery. Dr. Christiani is not able to perform all of Mr. Slade's experiments; but he declares himself only an amateur in the researches in which Dr. Slade is wonderfully proficient.

II. I now reach my second question. What influence should we allow foreign authority to exercise on our own personal judgments? In the vast majority of things which we accept as facts, we all follow the authority of other people. We know

only a comparatively small number of facts from personal investigation ; and yet, we rely all the more confidently upon foreign authority, when its declarations are corroborated by our own experience. If any new fact is brought to our knowledge, which we are not prepared to verify by our own experience, we are compelled to demand, according to scientific principles now generally recognized, that two conditions shall be fulfilled before we accept the proposed fact as such. First, it must be affirmed by a trustworthy person, who is a master in the field of investigation to which it belongs. Secondly, it must not be contradictory to other well established facts. You will doubtless reply, that this second condition is exceedingly doubtful. Indeed there are many spiritistic writers who have not lacked for an abundance of examples which they cite from the history of science to show that a fact at first accounted false or impossible has afterward been accepted as genuine. Still I would remind you that in all these examples cited, the difficulty has arisen from this source and from this alone, that the facts in question have been endorsed by some scientists and denied by others. Such cases as the above are countless, and the conflict as experience shows is always decided on that side where the conclusions are not found in conflict with other established facts. And in general the best credentials, that an explorer can bestow upon his new discoveries, is to show that they fall into line and harmonize with other facts. To this end I have searched the whole history of science in vain to find an example where a scientific authority had come forth with the assertion that he had discovered a new fact, with the additional assurance that by this new fact all natural laws were overthrown, and that meanwhile in the new fact itself no legitimate relationship to law could be discovered. Now the case under discussion presents the following peculiarities. The laws of gravity, electricity, light and heat, are as we are assured, of only hypothetical value. They are in force only so long as their path is not crossed by that hypothetical spiritistic something, which is so far from being subject to any general law, that it only dogs the footsteps of certain special individuals called mediums. Any authority that requires us to believe this, asks

more than any other scientific authority has dared to ask. It asks that natural science shall give up the presumption of natural causality; on which all methods of investigation depend, and without which nobody can predicate certainty of fact, or law of manifestation.

You will certainly agree with me that this is not the place for any extended discussion concerning the origin of the laws of causality. You will say, however, that the favorable consideration of Spiritualism which we are asked to make, should be founded on a simple experimental basis. I reply that empirical laws may be constantly found in conflict with other empirical law. And I ask now which presents the highest probability of truth, the law of general causality, or these spiritistic phenomena? On the one side stands the authority of all scientific history, the united consent of all known laws of nature, which could never have been discovered but by the presumption of general causality, and which without this law of general causality would all be reduced to exceptional cases. On the other side stands the authority of some highly honored scientists, who have left out of consideration, everything that they, in the absence of this mediumistic influence, have obtained, even by their own experimenting, for the establishment of the general laws of natural science; and under a combination of circumstances that render exact observation extremely difficult, have come to this one discovery that there is a chasm in the law of causality, and that we must give up our previous theories of nature.

I have thus far spoken of the unfavorable conditions under which the spiritic manifestations have been observed, and I ought perhaps to strengthen this position somewhat, lest you should distrust its argumentative value. I call the surroundings unfavorable for scientific trial or observation, because the observers cannot fall back upon their own senses or expedients. It would doubtless give you an unfavorable impression if a person should ask a physicist to watch the movements of a magnet through a keyhole; or an astronomer to select a cellar vault for his observatory. Yet the observer of spiritic phenomena must be content with just such unfavorable conditions. The first condition for the success of the experiment requires

all present to lay their hands together on a table, and that no observer shall stand outside of the circle. In this way the observer is shut out of a large portion of the field of critical observation. Mr. Slade sometimes sat, as the testimony declares, so that his legs were in sight: but this happened when it pleased Mr. Slade, and not when the observers required or desired it. Just as it depends upon the medium as to when a manifestation shall take place, or whether it shall take place at all. The audience ask for some experiment. The medium conducts it. If a new experiment is suggested, the spirits answer, "We will try it;" and sometimes the experiment is successful, and sometimes not. Frequently too, the manifestations asked for by the audience are accompanied by others that were quite unexpected. By this means the watchfulness required for accurate observation is badly distracted into different directions. Purely subjective manifestations are also presented, such as are perceived only by the medium. Sometimes these are manifestations of light on the ceiling of the room, which draw away the attention of the spectators, although they see nothing of it. Sometimes they consist in sudden spasmodic actions of the medium, which of course divert the attention. Thus I cannot quite endorse the expression you use: "Experiments performed through, or by the coöperation of, or in the presence of Mr. Slade." Mr. Slade rather performed the experiments, and if they were performed for anybody, it was for the witnessing audience.

If now, my dear sir, after a consideration of all the surroundings taken from the account of the séances held by Mr. Slade, I put myself in that position of unprejudiced judgment which you so honorably filled but a short time ago; most certainly I should not be able to write such an article as you have done for a recent number of your most excellent Review. And while, as you had the goodness to remark, I do not quite agree with those conclusions, I should be glad to speak briefly of the things which I myself saw. The facts are as follows:—

Two of my colleagues, Messrs. Ludwig and Thiersh, and myself, as you relate, participated in the séances. We sat with Mr. Slade, our hands laid one upon another, around a four-cornered card table, one of us sitting on each side. Several

written communications were produced, written in various ways upon slates held partly or wholly under the table by Mr. Slade. Once a quite long writing was produced on the inside of a closed double-hinged slate. During the experiment this double slate was gently drawn out from under the edge of the table, so that for a short time it was wholly visible. Mr. Slade's hand, however, on which it rested was not in sight. (This is according to my remembrance of the experiment somewhat incorrectly referred to by you in the note on page 260). Most of the writing was done in the English language. Only one specimen was in German, and that was incorrectly written, as though some language-murdering American or Englishman had tried to do it. The experiment with the closed pocket knife, just as it has been described by you, was performed once. During the whole sitting the window blinds were in violent commotion, as though beaten by severe wind-gusts. This explanation was, however, impossible, for the air was perfectly quiet all that afternoon. Several times during the sitting Mr. Slade was seized with violent convulsions, and asked me (I sat next to him) if I felt anything: which I did not. The other persons present felt occasional blows on the legs, and the slates which they held in their hands under the table were violently pushed. I experienced nothing of the kind. At the end of the séance we rose up. Mr. Slade laid his hands immediately upon ours, and the table lifted several inches directly up from the floor and then fell suddenly down. It could be readily felt that the table was moved by a central push from beneath. Mr. Slade would not consent to our wish to have some of the experiments performed with one of the audience standing outside of the circle. He declared that under these conditions the spirits would not obey him; and that he moreover must be a perfectly passive spectator, and absolutely conform to the conditions which he had accidentally discovered to be favorable to the success of his experiments. On convenient occasions Mr. Slade spoke to us of our own capacity to become mediums. He assured me that I was a medium "of strong power." How he got this information he did not say. So far as I am concerned I am free to confess that I have never found anything in my own experience to justify any such diagnosis.

If you now ask me whether I feel competent to venture an opinion as to how these experiments that I witnessed were performed, I must say—No. And I must also say that phenomena of this kind lie quite outside of the limits of the professional education that I have pursued during my scientific career. Now every scientist knows, that before any person can rightly judge of an experiment, he must have experimented himself in like directions, and possess some insight into the necessary conditions of the phenomena. If I were, really, a medium of strong powers, as Mr. Slade declared, I might be possibly able to answer your question. But I am not, and you will therefore justify me in not venturing upon any hypothesis as to the means by which Mr. Slade was able to accomplish the results above mentioned. Mr. Slade himself denied any knowledge as to how they were done; a thing which astonished me very much, and it will doubtless produce the same effect upon yourself. He is a medium, and an experimenter, and he must know under what conditions the phenomena take place. He professes to know nothing except that he must keep himself entirely passive. This last statement, however, is manifestly incorrect, since the phenomena in general do not ever take place except at sittings held by himself; and they take place there uniformly, and in just such order as that in which he may choose to bring them forward.

If now, however, we cannot tell how Mr. Slade performs his experiments, we have no right—and I here agree with you—to let this problem lie before us unknown and uninvestigated. For, as you rightly remark, natural science and philosophy are so deeply interested in the truth or falsity of the spiritistic phenomena, that we must come in some way to some decision respecting them. And this decision, I must admit, after what I have seen, would be a very distressing one for me, if I, really, with you, my dear sir, and the honored gentlemen whose authority you follow, were compelled to forego the possible hope of explaining these phenomena by natural causes, and in a way which would leave undisturbed the general law of causality.

As to the experiments which I witnessed, I do not think that the unsuperstitious reader, who has ever seen the perform-

ances of some skillful juggler, will fail to get the impression of a well-acted sleight-of-hand performance. You, indeed, my dear sir, as I judge from your remarks, do not agree with these conclusions. But such a judgment can be readily accounted for, on the part of a man whose time has been closely occupied with severe study. But before you definitely decide on this question may I not dare to suggest that it would be a reasonable thing for you to observe more closely the performances of some skillful juggler. And since our studies have been in quite different directions, if the independent, experimental performances in this line of action are quite incomprehensible to us, should we not at least endeavor, before we come to any definite conclusion, to become acquainted with those phenomena which the most zealous advocates of spiritualism admit, are most closely allied to the spiritistic phenomena. I cannot now discover that any one of the experiments which I witnessed at the hands of Mr. Slade was more than could reasonably be expected at the hands of a skillful juggler. If this juggler makes favorable conditions for himself, by means of some person chosen by him out of the audience, and by means of his wide range of helps and appliances, can it not also be seen that Mr. Slade has something in his favor from the limited number of experimenters, by seating each one at the same table, and especially since he is not compelled to adhere to any particular programme, and that now and then an attempt may fail entirely without bringing himself into discredit. If the "Professor of Magic" surrounds himself with glitter and pomp in order to distract attention, Mr. Slade accomplishes the same result more effectually by the subjective conditions which he claims for himself.

To be sure much more astonishing things were done in my absence than when I was present. And as I examine the subject critically I am informed authoritatively that the more important manifestations cannot be produced unless all those present are believers in the truthfulness of the phenomena. Whoever, as an unbeliever should essay the rôle of an observer, might demand many more conditions for observation than one might do who was a full believer. The believer might readily pass over unnoticed any one of the accessory

circumstances of the experiment, a knowledge of which might entirely change the decision. I would not throw the slightest reproach upon the observer for this reason. He always acts in perfect good faith in the trustworthiness of his object, and with perfect faith always in the veracity of his perceptions, so that at the same time he deprives himself of the power of discrimination in what he experiences. Therefore I can come to no other conclusion with reference to these phenomena. I prefer the authority of science to that of any esteemed scientist who has made observations here in a field far remote from that of his own investigations.

I might pause here and silently pass over the hopes which you express concerning the reality of spiritistic manifestations. But as I have already remarked, your deductions seem to me so important from a philosophic basis, as well as from an ethical and religious point of view, that they cannot but influence our whole position on the question. Pardon me, therefore, my dear sir, if I pass over to your own side of the question, and for the time put myself into your position. I will accept with you as a fact the undoubted reality of the phenomena. What change will this make in our general theory of the universe, in our judgment of the past and of the future? What bearing will it have on our moral and religious sentiments?

In order to answer these questions, you enunciate in order the hypotheses which are possible in connection with the existence of these spiritistic phenomena. According to your view we can see in these phenomena—

I. The exhibition of merely natural powers, or

II. The operations of beings who belong to a four-dimension grade of existence, and who therefore possess the power of alternately entering by their actions into our three-dimension system, and then disappearing into their own four-dimension system whither we cannot follow them.

III. Or we may see the manifestations of so-called spirits or ghosts. (I prefer the last term because, according to our philosophic use of language, we interpret spirit to denote a bodiless being, while these so-called "spirits" sometimes "materialize" themselves, a peculiarity which can only be expressed without ambiguity by the German word (*Gespenst*) ghost.

Like everybody else who is conversant with the subject you reject the first hypothesis, because the phenomena undisputably indicates the willful action of intelligent beings. The last two hypotheses only, therefore, remain to us for discussion.

You now feel, my dear sir, that you ought to decide against the hypothesis of intelligent four-dimension beings, and in favor of the ghost hypothesis. I will not attempt to follow you in your argument borrowed from Kant's "Theory of the Perceptions." I would, however, presume to call your attention to the fact that there is no real difference in the two hypotheses. By a ghost we understand an intelligent being who is able to enter abruptly into our world of sense perception, and then as abruptly depart without leaving a trace behind. And this is just what we understand by an intelligent four-dimension being. Modern mathematics, as you well know, is astonishingly advanced in its speculations, and has become capable of defining in an exact way numerous ideas, whose definitions have hitherto been confined by necessity to the inexact terms of ordinary speech. Just as the modern geometer speaks of a "three-dimensional, uniform and harmonious manifoldness," and means nothing more by it than this sphere of existence so well known to us all; so by the expression "four-dimensional intelligent being" is meant nothing more than what we common folks call ghosts. I agree with you that this sole remaining theory is indeed the only one which can (admitting their genuineness) explain these phenomena. We can therefore confidently build upon this theory as the foundation for further conclusions. For my own part I would prefer the expression "intelligent four-dimensional beings," on account of its truly scientific character, but for brevity's sake I will hereafter use the more common name, ghosts.

You now propose the question, so well worthy of consideration, Who are these ghosts? Your deductions lead you to the conclusion that in them we meet the souls of dead men, who possess fully or in part the power of reassuming their former bodily form. Although in Mr. Slade's séances only single members were seen, viz: hands or feet, sometimes openly as such, sometimes by impressions, still, according to reports from America, whole bodies have been materialized. I can only

assent to this conclusion. I am also confirmed in this opinion by the impression obtained on the sooted slate of a human foot which you speak of as misshapen from the use of a narrow shoe. To my mind the supposition that the inhabitants of another world unknown to us should resemble us in bodily form, and even in clothing, possesses little probability. I admit that there is something disconcerting in the thought, that hard-hearted shoemakers on "the other side" may still continue to desire to improve the anatomical structure of our feet. I would rather reconcile myself to the idea that enduring results of our trials "on this side" will accompany us into the future. Under this supposition I should not suppose it to be impossible but that an expert in the art of deformity could determine the age in which the possessor of that foot lived, and perhaps the nation to which he belonged. I regret that nobody has thought of entering upon this field of investigation.

Let us also consider the fact that these ghosts belong to dead fellowmen, who in this way are seeking to impart to us knowledge of their continued existence and condition after death. What value, then, have these phenomena in this direction?

You, my dear sir, profess to see, as the foremost meaning in these phenomena, that nothing can so strengthen our faith in a most exalted moral government and so fortify us against the materialism and indifferentism of the age as the certainty of immortality. To-day, "when faith has become weak, when there are no nations in their childhood (Celts, Germans, Slavs), as there were at the downfall of the ancient civilization, prepared to pick up the broken threads of culture and continue the weaving on the ideal loom which Christianity furnished"—to-day, it may perhaps have pleased the Divine Providence to lay His hands in this way upon the course of Nature, in order to recall mankind to remembrance of their moral destiny. To be sure, you recognize the fact that the written communications imparted by ghosts are very trivial so far as their contents are concerned; and all their performances thus far seem quite aimless. But you comfort yourself with the thought that the principle of development still holds good "on the

other side," so that the souls of the dead attain but gradually the highest perfection of knowing and wishing.

Just here, unfortunately, I am compelled to protest most emphatically against your conclusions. I consider them as false as they are dangerous; a fact of which I will endeavor to convince both yourself and your readers.

I would first call your attention to a position that seems to me quite baseless, and which nevertheless possesses no small influence in your argument. You suggest that Providence, looking down upon the deplorable condition of affairs that obtains to-day has been moved to interfere in this particular way. But the acceptance of this statement depends upon the further assumption, that just such phenomena had never been observed in ancient times. Any such assumption is incorrect. On the contrary, so far as I know, there never has been a time when the world has been without manifestations, which more or less resemble the spiritistic phenomena. Oftentimes they have been wonderfully like. Turning now away from these vagrant ghost phenomena, I would remind you of the facts attested in the experience of many races of people and which are recognized by Anthropologists under the name of Shamanism. The people called Shamans are manifestly people possessed of mediumistic powers; and they accomplish results by the aid of obedient ghosts, which are often very wonderful, and frequently in some particular characteristics very like the spiritistic phenomena. I would further call your attention to the fact that in civilized lands from the 14th to the 17th centuries, spiritistic manifestations, recognized under the names of witchcraft and necromancy, attained a breadth and prominence so great that their present extent seems quite diminutive. Indeed the witches seemed to have combined to a certain degree the powers of both mediums and spirits. This however can be readily understood, when we look at the great power with which this wonderful force was openly developed at that time. Remarkable peculiarities in other directions were also observed. At that time as well as afterward the diminution of gravity was a phenomenon so frequently marked, that, as you well know, the divine judgment in the trial of witches was based upon it. [The throwing of those charged with witchcraft into

the waters.] We have abundant testimony even from the magistrates themselves, whose trustworthiness certainly should not be impeached, of cases where the witch did not weigh more than half an ounce, and sometimes even nothing at all.

But you reply:—These things belong to an age of superstition, and the alleged facts were never inquired into by trustworthy observers. But on what do you base your assumption of superstition? Of course, only upon the fact that we consider these occurrences impossible. And yet you now affirm not only the possibility but the reality of phenomena just as wonderful, and indeed of similar character. In fine, we are bound by the rules of scientific investigation to assume that these earlier cases were, without exception, based on deception, when people were said to have been lifted bodily up into the air. Of course there were none to observe those things with scientific accuracy. But don't you believe that Galileo's laws of attraction were operative before Galileo proved them by his observations? And so an entirely new view of the universe is opened up to us by your position. Those phenomena which have been hitherto interpreted as lamentable evidences of pernicious superstition are transformed into a gracious revelation of supersensuous mysteries.

I pass on now to your special deductions. The spiritistic phenomena, childish as some of them are, are valuable in your judgment on account of the certain evidence they give of that other world respecting which they testify, and because they so become a new source of moral and religious conviction. It has been our opinion hitherto that Providence has wisely concealed the future from mankind, and put him under control of a religious nature, that he might construct for himself a moral ideal, which should remain uncontaminated by the sensuous world. But your theory will entirely change this view of affairs. Our future destiny is no longer a question of moral advancement, or religious persuasion; but within certain bounds, at least, is a question of knowledge and apprehension. You indicate however that that side of the other world with which we are acquainted is probably the most imperfect side. This view we might possibly accept if only the merest beginnings of perfection were visible. But before my vision only the fearful

alternative is 'present. What sort of conclusions can we draw respecting the present condition of our dead fellowmen, if your view is correct? I seem to be compelled to adopt the following conclusions, to which, so far as I can see, you cannot possibly object.

I. Physically, the souls of our dead fellowmen are in slavery to certain living men, the so-called mediums. These mediums, at present at least, are uncultivated men and appear to be almost exclusively Americans. Obedient to their commands, the souls perform mechanical operations which from beginning to end seem to have no practical object. They rap, lift tables and chairs, move beds, play on harmonicas, etc., etc.

II. Intellectually, the souls have fallen into a condition, so far as their slate-writing performances enable us to judge, that is simply deplorable. These slate-writings throughout belong to a condition of greater or less imbecility: mostly greater, for they are absolutely senseless.

III. The moral condition of the souls seems to be relatively most favorable. Taking all the manifestations into consideration, nobody could refuse to call them harmless. The fact is betrayed, that they sometimes are compelled to do things of a rather brutal character, which seem even to themselves to be rather blameworthy, e. g., the breaking of a bed screen; but they apologize for it with a politeness quite remarkable for ghosts. This harmlessness leads us to predicate some good in their present moral condition, even though we know nothing more about it.

Pardon me, Sir, if I seem to jest. You misunderstand me, if you think I have considered these conclusions of yours with any other motive than to develop, as thoroughly as I can, the serious, scientific, moral and religious ideas, which your views must necessarily develop. I will not say what a happy thing it will be for that science which we both so dearly cherish, and for philosophy, if your example finds no further imitators. It cannot be without danger of further discredit to her reputation, that one of her illustrious representatives, skilled in almost all of her departments, and especially skilled in logical studies should now, all at once, cast away all the principles of scientific investigation, in order to find in the revelations of rapping ghosts the

means of more perfect insight into the theory of the universe. The special investigator has the privilege of a certain one-sidedness. We give him the privilege of many an idea in his narrow field which will not bear the sharp thrust of criticism. But what will become of philosophy if it surrenders at discretion, the general foundation principles of apprehension by which alone each individual science is made valuable.

But this particular interest is of comparatively little importance when compared with other sad results which will take place if your theory (which may God forbid) should find other supporters in the scientific world.

Whence should the scientific investigator gain courage and patience for his work, if the laws of nature according to your view refuse to harmonize? And who would desire to occupy himself any longer with scientific problems, if he were enticed by the expectation of getting answers to the broadest and deepest questions through the spiritistic phenomena. True it is, that the communications thus far attained are absolutely worthless. But is it possible, that even now individuals and societies would spend their time in this trivial business, if they did not expect by and by to get better results. If the views which you profess should ever gain the general acceptance of the scientific world, the result would be a deplorable scientific retrograde.

We might possibly escape such result, if that moral and religious awakening which you hope for from the spiritistic manifestations could ever be really expected in accordance with the teachings of history and the laws of human nature.

I feel as though I ought almost to apologize to you for saying that the moral depth and power of religion has always advanced coördinately with the abstraction of crude sensuous ideas of the divine, and that, next to the superficial infidelity of every age, superstition has been the most dangerous form of morality. You have long known this to be true. Now you say that these phenomena of which you speak are realities, and that they are different from the objects of superstitious reverence. But every superstition has done this same thing. The wretched results of superstition do not depend upon whether men firmly believe certain phenomena or not, but upon the things themselves which a man believes.

The moral bewilderment, which the belief in witchcraft developed in its day would have been just the same, if there had been real witches. We need, therefore, pay no attention to the question as to whether or no we are justified in believing in the spiritistic manifestations. We can be satisfied with the discussion of this question: do the objects of your belief present the same characteristic attributes which we have already found in those objects of faith, which according to the testimony of history and natural psychology have been proven destructive to the moral development of man? Since we have already shown the intimate relationship of spiritism to the most pernicious forms of so-called superstition, this question must be surely answered—yea. Yourself as a psychologist understood, that the motives, which lead to this moral development, are very easily seen. We should also consider here the danger, before alluded to, of an estrangement of earnest labor devoted, even in a subordinate way, to science, or some practical calling. A still stronger appeal is made to us by the unreasonable assumptions respecting the condition of spiritual beings after death, which are developed by these manifestations, and which can only find their analogy in the crudest forms of Animism of degraded, uncivilized races. But what seems to me the most pernicious of all is the caricature which the spiritistic system presents, in the form in which you hold it, of the government of the higher life. This caricature stamps men, who are in almost every instance, men of feeble spiritual and moral endowment, as possessors of supernatural powers; and as being the choicest instruments of Providence. In all these attributes, and, above all, in the materialization of spiritual beings, there is revealed a gross materialistic tendency, which I would gladly believe is foreign to most of the German spiritists. These spiritists are, as I would fain believe, the lamentable contribution of exotic Shamans, who have planted in Europe the animistic assumptions which have not yet been quite banished from their homes. This materialistic character of spiritualism should not have escaped the attention of a philosopher. Very strangely you seem to see in it a contrivance of that Providence which the materialism of the present day is warring against. This position to me is the most unintelligible in your

whole article. On the other hand, I see in it traces of materialism and the tendency of our time to a culture of barbarity. For a long time, as you are well aware, materialism has possessed two forms. One form feigns the spiritual; the other transforms it into matter. The last form is the oldest. From the Animism of race-mythology it passes over into philosophy in order little by little to be enveloped by it. And just as the culture of barbarism may bring about a relapse into all the primitive forms of existence, so this one will not be left out.

That philosophy could have made in your case such a retrograde, I consider very lamentable, and yet I feel worse about the influence which your example may exert upon our academic students, who look up to you as one of their teachers. What will become of science if the efforts of our students, to whom these theories of yours give very little encouragement, should change their direction? and if the earnest labor and zealous devotion for scientific study, should be forced into an aimless chase after wonders and through ghost-rapping societies? I have an abiding confidence in the sound sense of our youth that these fears will not be realized. And so I consider it my duty to remain no longer a silent spectator, but rather I rise up to answer your call. I hope that my reply will prove so far fruit-bearing, as to lead you to a careful examination of the subject; for I cannot quite give up the hope that we shall yet be found in substantial agreement upon the subject. With this wish I subscribe myself with the highest respect as a Collegian.

Yours, etc.,

W. WUNDT.

ARTICLE VI.—THE EMBLEMS IN THE LORD'S SUPPER.

To all Protestants, eating is believing. To eat the bread and drink the cup, denotes believing in the great realities shadowed forth thereby.

If a man believes there is no God, his whole intellectual and emotional system will adapt itself to that belief, as the body adapts itself to a condition of famine.

If a man believes in a Deity utterly unknown and unknowable, he will thrive mentally and morally, as a man would naturally who knew that a banquet was spread in the next room, but the door was locked and bolted.

If a man believes in "a power above us not ourselves which makes for righteousness"—he will increase in mental and moral stature, as much as the diligent chewing of such chaff is adapted to nourish him.

But if a man believes that God is in reality such a being as these emblems say he is—if he believes it so thoroughly that it pervades all his thinkings, all his feelings, all his willing, then he will inwardly thrive and grow accordingly. What then do these emblems say, *HE* is?—To answer this question, we need first to consider another, namely, what the emblems are. This is the rule of a truly scientific study of all emblems. We must see them. We must know what they are. We must vividly represent to ourselves the drama of which they are a part.

I. WHAT THE EMBLEMS ARE.

The command is, "Do this in remembrance of me." Christendom has exercised a wide liberty in interpreting the command—as to details. The Oriental Churches use leavened bread and fermented wine. The Roman Church employs unleavened bread, and withholds the cup from the laity. Her doctrine is that the whole body and blood of the Lord is alike in either element. According to this theory the Catholic communicant receives the blood, under an unleavened or unfermented form. The priest only receives it under a fermented

form. The sons of Aaron, forbidden under the old Law to drink wine while ministering, under the new are ordained to drink it all, and the people are excused.

In various other points of detail Christians have taken some liberty in interpreting the command. The bread may be of the same kind with that which our Saviour used, or not, so it be bread. The cup may be of the same kind which He blessed, or not, so it contain "the fruit of the Vine." Even this, the practice of the churches seems to say, is not essential, the wines of commerce usually containing no particle that ever grew on the vine. Still charity leads us to believe that these are used under the amiable illusion that they are really wine. Devout esthetic feeling would prefer to use the same element our Saviour used, if possible, even though it might not be strictly essential to the due observance of the rite. We may indeed qualify the intoxicating element (if compelled to think He used such), by mixing a little water—but this liberty Dr. Schauffler thinks "it would be wicked to abuse."*

There is, however, no special necessity for thinking that it was an intoxicating element which our Saviour used. There is a possibility, there is a fair probability, that it was not.

Grapes were a staple article of food fresh from the vines for three months; and preserved in lofts, in jars, in casks in a fresh state, through the year, they could be had in abundance at any time. If not, there were various preparations of the juice by which fermentation was prevented or retarded. See the excellent and instructive article of Mr. Henry Homes,† on the Produce of the Vineyard in the East. If it be said that these preparations are not wine, the answer is that no word for wine is used anywhere in the Bible, either in relation to the passover cup or to the sacramental cup. It is certain that these preparations, still in use all over the East, are what the wines of commerce generally are not—"the fruit of the vine."

This matter has been discussed too much as though it were

* "The argument from Church History which binds us to the use of fermented wine, does not, however, forbid us to mix it with water, which liberty still it would be wicked to abuse."—*Bib. Rep.*, Oct., 1886, p. 308.

† *Bibliotheca Sacra*, May, 1848.

a recondite matter of grammar and lexicon. Let us look at it in a simpler light—as a question of common life and manners.

It would naturally be with a simple pastoral people, in a primitive age, very much as it used to be with us in respect to cider. We boys loved to suck cider through a straw, when first made, when it was really sweet. We loved it less and less when it began to sting the tongue, and disliked it emphatically when it became sour and hard. There are still persons of primitive habits all through New England, who cherish the tastes of childhood. They have their store of apples, they have their hand-press, and make from time to time a quantity of the delicious, salubrious beverage throughout the year. Thus, though cider generally is an intoxicating drink, yet sweet cider is not intoxicating and is the favorite beverage with many. To a healthy, unperverted taste a glass of good cider means a glass of new, sweet, unfermented cider. We do not say there are two kinds of cider, but there are two states, or stages of development in cider. There is cider that is the unchanged product of growth, and cider that is a little decayed, and cider that is spoiled. Just as the housewife has her delicious preserves that are sweet, and those that are a little damaged by fermentation. Or your southern planter has cane syrup that is sweet and that which is injured a little by fermentation. Or your oil merchant has sweet oil and has rancid oil. Or your dairyman has sweet butter and has strong butter. Those that prefer strong butter, rancid oil, fermented syrup, damaged preserves, may also prefer cider that has begun to decay. But a perfectly healthy taste will love all these products of nature best at that point where growth or ascending change reaches its climax, and before descending change or decay begins.

But human nature is the same in all ages. So by the operation of natural laws it would be with the vintage. So history shows it was. It is not a question of high scholarship. It is a question, as Taylor Lewis well remarked, with which scholarship has very little to do. It is a question of history, of domestic life and manners.

In the primitive age of Joseph (and if there ever was a primitive age on earth it is that revealed to us in the story of Joseph and his brethren) the fresh pressed juice of the cluster was a

royal beverage. So it always was because it must be, wherever in the lapse of centuries there was anything of primitive simplicity and rugged, rustic health left.

Yet from the nature of the climate it was difficult to prevent fermentation. But the attempt was made sedulously, persistently, and in a great variety of ways. Some of the wines thus treated were of exquisite flavor and odor—a nectar fit for the immortals—and if more rare, were all the more precious when obtainable, at least to the unperverted taste. Wine then generally was an intoxicating beverage, but there were always those in the community who loved the fruit of the vine best when it was nearest its natural state. “As the new wine is found in the cluster, and one saith destroy it not, for a blessing is in it.”—Is. lxv. 8. This simple view of the necessary working of the natural laws will account easily for all the uses of language on this subject and save a world of controversy.

It has been strongly urged, by Dr. Schauffler and others, that the use of wine by the Greek, Roman, and Protestant churches from time immemorial proves that our Saviour used an intoxicating cup. The argument is inconclusive. We know what was in our Saviour's cup, viz: the fruit of the vine. We also know that the larger part of the wines of commerce are not the fruit of the vine at all. In this, as in so many other things, Christendom may have been beguiled from the simplicity that is in Christ.

But still further it is urged that Jewish tradition, ancient and modern, proves that the passover cup was fermented. “Our educated Jews,” says the *Independent*, “laugh at the idea that fermented wine was excluded under the head of leaven.” This argument also is inconclusive. There are two schools of Jewish thought and practice, in some respects as markedly contrasted as were the Pharisees and Sadducees of old, viz: the Orthodox and the Reformed,—the former more strict, the latter more latitudinarian, not to say sceptical.

These schools sometimes seem to testify in point blank contradiction to each other in regard to the use of fermented wine at the passover, but on one point the Talmud and both these modern schools agree, viz: that the prohibition of leaven did in spirit extend to some fluids. The Talmud enumerates four,

one of them of a partly vinous nature. The writer ventured to consult some of the leading rabbis in New York of both schools, who very kindly responded, giving the desired information.

The following statement is from a distinguished representative of the more liberal, or as some would say more sceptical school. "All fermented liquids made from the five species of grain, viz: wheat, barley, spelt, oats, and rye, are excluded under the term leaven; this is undoubtedly orthodox Jewish law, all statements to the contrary notwithstanding."

From the other side, the stricter, sometimes called orthodox school, we have the following: "Fermented wine, as everything fermented, is rigidly excluded from our passover fare in accordance with the spirit of the divine command, Ex. xii. 19."

Thus then the case stands. There are two schools, or sects of Jews, both schools concede that some fermented beverages are excluded by the spirit of the law. The latitudinarian school deny that this extends to wine. The stricter, or orthodox school carry out the principle consistently, by excluding wine from the passover. Now even if it could be proved that the less strict construction prevailed at the time of Christ, it is not certain he would be bound by it. He might have thought that if the spirit of the law excluded some fermented fluids, it would exclude all, especially those most liable to abuse. But it has never been proved that the stricter, or orthodox view, did not prevail in our Saviour's time. On the contrary, after a somewhat careful search, we venture to say with Dr. Peabody we are satisfied that "in our Saviour's time the Jews, at least the high ritualists among them, extended the prohibition of leaven to the principle of fermentation in every form, and that it was the custom at the passover festival, for the master of the household to press the contents of the cup from clusters of grapes preserved for this special purpose."

II. WHAT THE EMBLEMS SAY.

We are prepared then to study the meaning of the emblem having first tried to ascertain what the emblem is.

Our Saviour selected the two main staples of subsistence of the people, bread and the fruit of the vine. We feel a reasonable assurance that the latter was taken at the point where it

preserved most of its fruity character, not at the point where it had almost wholly lost that character, and contained a new chemical element not present in the vine. The nearer to the vine we take it the more of the vine there is in it, and when He held the cup before them saying, "This is my blood," we feel sure, that the blood in his veins and the blood of the vine in the cup, were alike *Alive*, untouched by decay, as it is written, "The blood is the *Life*."

Let us then, still in obedience to the primary law of interpretation of emblems, endeavor to see with the mind's eye the scenes of which these emblems were a central feature. "As oft as we eat the bread and drink the wine we show," something. What is that "showing?"

To answer this question we reproduce the scenes both of the first passover and of the last. We call them up before the mind's eye, and obtain a lively impression of the drama as a whole. In thousands of humble homes all through that wonderful land, mother of ancient civilization and of mystery, the timorous tribes of Israel are eating the lamb; in haste; sandal on foot; loins girt; staff in hand; on every lintel and door-post the sprinkled blood. All abroad in that land the destroying angel is at his work, save in these blood-besprent abodes, and the death-wail echoes from palace and hovel far and wide; and in the midnight hour, past the base of the mighty pyramid, spectral in its whiteness, move the hurrying multitudes, all Egypt hurrying them away. Such is the first passover night; now for the last:

At a moment when notwithstanding his most explicit prediction of impending death his disciples are all expecting him to throw off disguise and reign in glory; and when they are even contending which of them shall be greatest,* he now, in the midst of their festivity employs language most unheard of. Taking the cup he says: "This is my blood."

How strangely this must have sounded in their ears! How if we can place ourselves in their stead will the words seem more astonishing to us than they possibly could to them! Here, then, is another exodus (of which the gleaming figures spake on the transfiguration mount†) about to be accomplished!

* Luke xxii. 24.

† τὴν ἐξοδὸν αὐτοῦ ἣν ἐμελλεν πληρῶν εἶναι ἐν Ἱερουσαλὴμ. Lu. ix, 81.

This is the true, the real exodus and here is the blood on the door! "This is my blood, drink ye all of it!" See those disciples gaze upon him! How can that be His blood who stands here living, just on the threshold of His coronation? One can almost see them in their simplicity peering into the cup at the red blood of the grape!

But he adds, "I will not drink henceforth of this fruit of the vine; until that day, when I drink it new with you in my father's kingdom."

Here the same emblematic elements are present as in the first passover, though in a modified form. In the passover the unleavened bread is eaten with the slain lamb, now it is eaten in its stead. There the blood was sprinkled on lintel and door post; here it is in the cup.

The two festivals have one meaning. In the first the first-born of the natural Israel are protected by the blood sign from the sword that smote the first born of Egypt. In the second the first-born of spiritual Israel are protected by the blood-sign from the stroke that is to smite the first-born of spiritual Egypt, the kingdom of Satan.

And as the blood is the life, the symbolization presents the overthrow of one kingdom and the redemption of another at the cost of a life. Egypt was first-born among nations in arts, arms, religion. Yet at the zenith of her glory, she was leavened with those elements of national decay that should leave her the basest of kingdoms.

Israel was not a nation; she was a horde of fugitives yet to be organized, and become a nation, a royal and priestly nation, the medium of divine revelation to mankind. It was then a crisis not merely of mercy but of vengeance; not merely of salvation, but of judgment; not of mere organization, but re-organization; not social growth, but social regeneration; the destruction of an old and splendid but corrupt civilization and the substitution of a new and pure one. And the solemn truth is shadowed forth, that no such palingenesia is possible without great cost to whomsoever should undertake the work. In both cases the blood is the life, and shadows forth a fact which all minds intuitively perceive, and which none ever deny, that no being can destroy corruptions and reorganize society, without

bleeding in the act. The principle may be misstated, misunderstood, and so rejected. But to reject a caricature is not to reject the genuine reality. The statement that no being can reclaim a fallen fellow being without painstaking no sane man ever has rejected, or ever will. The idea that in order to overthrow a corrupt social system, and rescue multitudes debased and suffering under it, one must be willing to suffer, even to the extent of dying, is an idea the easiest for all men to believe, though hardest for any to practice. And it is to be borne in mind that important as the salvation of single souls may be the regeneration of a people, a world, or universe, is vastly more important as it is more difficult, so that in the final regeneration will be exhibited "the depth of the riches, both of the wisdom and knowledge of God."

Christ has simply carried out this principle of self-sacrifice most perfectly on the highest, widest scale in time and space. "It pleased the Father by Him to reconcile all things unto Himself, whether they be things on earth or things in Heaven."—Col. i. 20. This means, says Ellicott, "that the absolute totality of created things shall be restored into its primal harmony with its Creator. How the reconciliation of Christ affects the spiritual world . . . we know not . . . this, however, we may fearlessly assert, that the efficacy of the sacrifice of the Eternal Son is infinite and limitless, that it extends to all things in earth and in Heaven, and that it was the blessed MEDIUM by which between God and His creatures, whether angelical, human, animate or inanimate, peace is wrought." The question then is, what occasioned, and still perpetuates this disunion? What are the principles that in all ages, all lands, and in all worlds, have introduced social corruption, disintegration, descending change? There can be but one answer. The principles of social life and health are simple and intuitive as the axioms of geometry, viz: truthfulness, humility, self-denial, not as mere abstractions, but as actual motive powers of individual minds vitalized by contact with God. The principles of social decay are insincerity, pride, and selfishness, as ruling powers of minds alienated from the life of God. These are and must be, the elements of social decay in all kingdoms and empires, in all social organizations, great or small. They are the

principles which we see actually fermenting in our own land and in all the nations of earth, where there is any life left, and where the process of descending change has not gone through to utter putrescence of social death. And it is intuitively certain that if there be other worlds where social degeneracy has existed, these were the elements of that degeneracy.

And there is something about pride, guile, and self-indulgence both intensely corrosive and yet latent and evasive. Individuals and communities leavened by this spirit seem unconscious of the fact, nay, too often, intoxicated with self-righteous complacency. Hence, he who attempts to regenerate society, must be pure from these elements, as Christ was, in whom was no guile, who was meek and lowly in heart, and went about doing good.

But no being, however pure and good, could deal with corruptions in Church and State with sufficient power to overthrow them, without feeling the vengeful reaction of the world and its god. But, in meeting this ordeal calmly, without compromise, or appeal to unspiritual motives, and so laying down his life, he exerted the moral influence necessary to destroy the corrupt powers and enable society to rise from decay and resume the sublime career of ascending change towards intellectual and moral life in God.

On a subject of such vital importance, Christ did not leave his followers unwarned. Foreseeing the corruptions that would enter, in Church and State, he gave the most distinct and unmistakable caution. "The princes of the nations exercise dominion over them; but it shall not be so with you." "Who-soever will be chief among you let him be your servant." Hence having like a menial washed their feet, he said, "Know ye what I have done unto you?" It was a pantomime, exemplifying the profoundest principles of statesmanship, and of social reform. The Kingdom of God (a perfect social organization) can never come on earth so long as pride, fraud, and selfishness inspire your hearts—even in a small degree. You must purge them away entirely. There must be no trace of them, no vestige visible in all your abodes. "Beware," said Christ, "of the leaven of the Pharisees, which is *hypocrisy*."*

* Luke xii. 1.

"Purge out the old leaven," says Paul, "that ye may be a new lump, as ye are unleavened. For even Christ our passover is slain for us; therefore let us keep the feast not with the old leaven, neither with the leaven of malice, and wickedness, but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth."*

Thus the author of the typical system tells us what he meant by this particular feature thereof. It was simply the necessity of purging out those moral elements of decay which caused the despotism of evil it cost His life to overthrow.

Hence the paschal Lamb must be without blemish, the most perfect specimen of vital elaboration; it is indeed subjected to external violence and to the action of fire, but no atom of it must be permitted to decay, or see corruption.

The bread also, was to be made of the ripe grain, a perfect product of ascending change. The wheat has indeed been crushed by mechanical violence and subjected to the action of fire; but no part of it has begun to decay, or ferment. Such must he be who would resist the downward tendency of society and be a bread of life to the world.

So the fruit of the vine fresh-pressed from the cluster was perhaps the most beautiful specimen of a pure and perfect product of ascending change or vital elaboration to be found in the whole realm of Nature. Like the crimson tide then pulsing through His veins, there was in that cup not the first trace of decay. "This," said He, "is my blood!" And His blood, whether in His veins, or in the cup, was the Life—and in it no beginnings of Death. His was a death wholly by external violence and hostility—not by any internal principle or process of decay. Such was the main lesson of symbolization as to Him as the Head of the mystical body. Hence on the day after the paschal supper, we have that beautiful image of the resurrection, the perfect wheat sheaf waved before the Lord. The apostle whose eye read all the emblems of the ritual with unerring glance interprets for us. "Christ the first fruits." He, the true Israel, first-born from the dead, first-begotten, in this his sublime EXODUS (out of Egypt have I called my Son) is Himself a perfect specimen of spiritual life. Although tried, and tempted, and tested, beyond our power to conceive, there

* I. Cor. v. 5-8; Gal. v. 9.

was never in him for one instant the first fermenting movement of pride, or guile, or self indulgence. "Thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity, therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows."

The inquiry has here been raised, why in the typical system, leavened bread was permitted to be offered at Pentecost, if leaven be the emblem of decay.

The answer is, that in that particular instance the reference would seem to be to Christ not merely as an individual but as He is in His mystical body of many members.

The process of fermentation in bread is never allowed to go beyond a certain point. It is arrested at an early stage or the bread becomes putrescent, offensive. At the proper moment, it must go into the oven and be subjected to the action of fire, the fermentation is checked, the fumes are driven off, the bread is wholesome.

In Christ's members that process of moral decay which never found place in Him, did begin, but was checked before reaching a fatal stage. The Church, his body, was indeed leavened, but he by the Holy Spirit and by fire, purges out the leaven, and makes her one bread—a bread of life to the world. The members are indeed one with their Head, and his blood pulsates in their veins; but it is not as it was in Him entirely calm and pure. "Though interested in that glory which He is fully possessed of, and as an earnest enjoying the sense of God's love, peace of conscience, joy in the Holy Spirit, and hope of glory, there abideth still some remnants of corruption in every part whence ariseth a continual and irreconcilable war!" But this moral ferment is to be deprecated. Unless checked and entirely neutralized it changes the precious elixir into a poison. Vainly the conservatism of pride, fraud and self interest untouched by the Eternal Spirit attempts to check the downward tendency. The castes, the aristocracies, the paternal governments, the political parties; the hierarchies and ambitious sectarian organizations; the refined and esthetic upper classes grow more and more exclusive, while the masses rot below. The alcohol of mammon for a time seems potent to resist the inevitable decadence, until the final crash comes, and all goes down together. Of all organizations whose conservatism is of this sort it may be said:

"Their vine is of the vine of Sodom, and of the fields of Gomorrah, their grapes are grapes of gall, their clusters are bitter. Their wine is the poison of dragons and the cruel venom of asps!"

Against this awful result it was Christ's great effort to warn his followers, and in no way more solemnly than by the emblems we are considering. The thought pervading that wonderful conversation and that matchless prayer;—exemplified in His washing their feet, and above all in these sacrificial emblems, is that true unity is possible only by being in Him as He is in God, animated (as His living body), by His true, meek, and self-sacrificing spirit, "filling up" in the words of Paul "that which is behind of the afflictions of Christ," carrying out, as it were, to completion in the members that Vicarious Sacrifice which was personally finished in the Head.

The sacramental bread may thus denote, not merely that body which hung on Calvary, but that which is still broken and anguished, whenever and wherever Christ is crucified afresh in the house of His friends. We are "members of His body, and of His flesh, and of His bones." But we are broken, and suffering, the wide world over, and every pang is His. Our tears, and sighs, and groans are His. If at that very table the twelve could not agree, disputing which should be greatest; if still everywhere we cannot believe because we seek the honor that comes from man more than that which comes from God only, it is not we who bleed and die—it is He whose body we are.

On the contrary, if we in the fires of persecution and tribulation purge out the old leaven, and become humble, loving, sincere—our words are not ours but his—he that heareth us heareth Him,—he that believes our testimony of love to Jesus, feeds thereon. We become the bread of life to his soul—it is still Christ's blood that pulses through our veins. "I live," says Paul, "Yet not I but Christ liveth in me." And if called even to lay down our lives in shame and ignominy our blood is still His blood, "for they overcame by the blood of the Lamb, and by the word of his testimony, and they loved not their lives unto death."

He is not gone so far away into glory as to be insensible to

the ordeal of his members. Personally his ordeal is "finished." Personally death hath no more dominion over Him. But sympathetically, as oft as we eat this bread we show in our own persons a fellowship of suffering, "being made conformable to His death." If in one aspect of the subject we are "risen with Christ" and "sitting in heavenly places," in another aspect of the subject He is sympathetically dying in us, and his death is being "shown" in us. If we love Him, if we love the world he died to save, we will strive against the secret subtle ferment of ambition, guile, self-indulgence, and let the tide of life beat pure and healthful from His heart through every vein. The least taint of the old leaven will work with unsuspected energy. Each to each will communicate the contagion. The world, already decadent and dissolving, deprived of its disinfectant, will sink in corruption and anarchy. But if purged by the Holy Spirit and by fire we are One in Him as He is in the Father, then the world will feel the influence.

. One single sanctified soul fully blest may vitalize a village, ten such may disinfect a metropolis. Sprinkled all over a mighty empire like this, a small minority may sway the majority and so save the Republic, as it is written, "One shall chase a thousand and two put ten thousand to flight."

ARTICLE VII.—THE GREEK TEXT OF THE REVISERS AND ITS CRITICS.

DURING the past ten years many students of the Scriptures have awaited the Greek Text adopted by the Revision Committee with an interest equal that felt for the English Revision itself. When at last this text was made public, the examination of it did not yield unmixed satisfaction. One reason was that it was not formed on any consistent principles of textual criticism. It is, therefore, not a critical text. From the nature of the case it could not be a critical text. Textual criticism was only a subordinate matter in the work of the committee, and they seldom ventured into this domain except as compelled to do so by their duties as revisers of the English. If we have been disappointed it is because we had set our expectations too high. The text before us really gives us the *Textus Receptus* with many modifications which scholars and laymen alike must feel to be necessary. There are in addition a few changes which make no difference with the English Revision. The text is published with the consent of the Revisers. Therefore it must be regarded by outsiders as unofficially sanctioned by them.

In order to estimate the value of this text it is necessary to call to mind the nature of critical texts and to compare this Revision text with them. The aim of a critical text is to present an ancient work in the exact form in which it proceeded from the hand of the author. For this purpose it must give: (1) the very words written by the author; (2) in the order in which he wrote them, and (3) in the form and spelling which he used. Also there is a fourth point to be noticed in New Testament criticism, viz: that arrangement of the separate books which was common in the earliest copies of the New Testament. When these requirements are applied to the long-used *Textus Receptus*, the discovery is presently made that it is far from being a critical text. In every one of the four points just mentioned it is at variance with the earliest text now known.

When we speak of variance we wish not to be misunderstood. There is no vital difference from the original documents, but in the details there are many differences from the earliest known text. The arrangement of the books is not the same as that in the earliest known MSS. This although a minor matter deserves attention. Moreover the Receptus fails to preserve the provincial and dialectic peculiarities of the original. It is well known that the Greek of the New Testament writers was moulded by the Septuagint; therefore this Alexandrian-Hebraistic Greek of the Septuagint must have given its form to the Greek of the New Testament. A text of Pindar in which the language of that poet should be conformed to Attic standards would be scouted. The text of the N. T. has been subjected to similar violence in almost every text from the very first edition of Erasmus. This point also is not of prime importance, yet it is worthy of note, for it reveals the historic position of the N. T. as a part of the world's literature. Of more value is the point respecting the arrangement of words. In many instances the Receptus varies from the older texts. The mischief here wrought is partly in altered emphasis, partly in changed clauses, perhaps even in sentences. Again one word is exchanged for another, and even at times whole sentences are added or (rarely) omitted. In a general view of all the instances in which the Receptus has varied from the older texts the differences will be found to affect not more than an eighth of the whole. In at least seven-eighths of the entire N. T. there is no variance, but in the remaining eighth there are two types of text. The one is that in which the more ancient textual authorities agree, and the other is that in which the later authorities agree. In their general agreement the later authorities are followed by the Receptus. In the disagreements between the earlier and the later authorities there is in no two instances precisely the same amount of evidence for or against any particular reading, but none the less are the two types of readings of about one-eighth of the words of the N. T. clearly distinguishable.

The authorities for textual criticism require a brief discussion. These authorities are—as is well known—Patristic citations, versions, and MSS. of the N. T., either whole, or in fragments,

or of extracts. Patristic citations are the quotations from the N. T. found in the Christian writers of the first few centuries. The passages of Scripture cited are supposed by some to be just as they were found by that author in his copy of the N. T. This supposition must be modified by the following considerations: (1) the scribes who copied the writings of the Fathers blundered as well as those who copied the N. T. MSS.; (2) these scribes sometimes altered the original quotation to agree with their own copy of the Scripture, as has recently been done by the English translator of Godet's "Studies in the Old Testament;" (3) the Father often quoted loosely; (4) even if he made an apparently explicit quotation, it is not certain that the quotation is exact. Even the formulas, "the Scripture saith," "Jesus saith," do not secure an exact quotation. In quotations from John iii. 5, made by Jeremy Taylor, we have the following: "Therefore our Lord hath defined it, unless ye be born again of water and the spirit ye cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven." Again: "And though Christ said none but those who are born again by water and the spirit shall enter into heaven."* These are examples of very loose quotations which are apparently exact. From one or another of the above-mentioned four causes it happens that some Father is often cited as authority both for and against the same variant. Almost every page of the critical apparatus of Tischendorf's eighth edition of the N. T. will prove this statement. In consequence of these facts we state the following principles regarding Patristic citations: (1) When a Father founds a discussion of Scripture on some particular reading, or when there is other contextual indication that the Father meant one particular reading and not another, then we may feel certain that that reading existed in the Father's copy. (2) If there is no such contextual indication we cannot feel certain that the Father quoted the passage as in his copy. We may have great confidence if he habitually quotes a passage in the same way, or if he explicitly states that a passage reads in a certain way, and the context furnishes no evidence for or against the reading, but we can not feel assurance on the subject. The citations thus winnowed are equal in value to fragments of MSS. of the

* *Institute Essays*, p. 158.

N. T. in use at the time of the writer; e. g. such a quotation from Origen is as good as a fragment of a MSS. written as early as 225 A. D.

The early versions are more useful. The best are the Syriac, the two Egyptian versions, and the Old Latin. The N. T. was translated into these languages at least as early as 250 A. D. The same processes of accidental change by scribes have been at work in the MSS. of these versions which have been at work in the transmission of the text of the Greek Testament. Some MSS. of these versions exhibit intentional changes, as they show marks of revision to conform them to a different Greek text from that which was the original basis of the version. Yet these versions are of great value, for by them we can learn a form of text in common use in the third and fourth centuries or perhaps earlier, and among non-Greek speaking peoples. Only the Old Latin is now fully available to scholars. There are about thirty-two MSS. of this version, more or less fragmentary, by which the student may determine very nearly the text in common use in the Latin-speaking churches about 300 A. D. The MS. materials of the Syriac and Egyptian versions are still more abundant, but as yet they are not fully available for textual criticism. While we cannot have entire confidence in the present statements as to the vernacular text current in Egypt and Syria in the third and fourth centuries, we have a benefit of enough MSS. of these versions to gain, as we believe, a tolerably accurate representation of these texts anciently in common use. These versions are often slavishly literal, not only showing the substance of the original but often give strong evidence as to the exact words and even the arrangement of the words of the original. Thus it comes to pass that the poorer a version is as a version the better it is as material for textual criticism.

From the defects of these two classes of authorities for textual criticism it will appear at once that the most reliable authorities are those MSS. which are the avowed transcripts of the sacred writings. These have such varieties that we might well despair of coming to satisfactory results. At this point comparative criticism comes to our aid. Its method is thus described:*

* Scrivener's "Introduction to the Criticism of the N. T." p. 466.

"We have already laid down the axiom admitted by all, that MSS. of the original hold the first rank among our critical materials (p. 21); versions (see p. 270), and yet more, the citations of ecclesiastical authors (see p. 368) being subordinate to them. Yet whatever other disadvantages the Patristic writings may labor under, we are at any rate certain respecting the age in which they were composed, the works themselves being assumed to be authentic. If Irenæus, or Tertullian, or Origen expressly assure us that particular words which they name were in their copies of Scripture we cannot withstand their testimony that such words were really found in MSS. of the N. T. in the 2d and 8d centuries, 100 or 200 years before codices $\aleph$ and B were in existence. If therefore we take a various reading of the text for which any one of these venerable men have vouched, and observe that it is supported perhaps by a few MSS. of various ages, then by a version or two, especially if they be natives of different countries, and flow together into the same stream from sources remote from each other;—rather too if a reading be plausible or even probable in itself;—and if, after having formed an opinion that on the whole it deserves to be respectfully considered, we then turn to $\aleph$, or to B or to both, and discover the same reading in them also;—not only has the variation itself made out an urgent case for our acceptance, but the character of $\aleph$ and B as faithful witnesses is largely enhanced. It is moreover evident, that if the same method of investigation be pursued many times over with the same, or something approaching the same success, the value of $\aleph$ and B as truthful codices will be proportionately increased."

The method is simple, the labor is immense. Where MSS. differ they are to be tested by something outside and certain if it can be found. The result of this method is to show that the best MS. authorities are:* in the Gospels, $\aleph$ B C D L 38; in Acts, $\aleph$ A B C D E₂ 13, 61; in the Cath. Epp., $\aleph$ A B C 13; in the Pauline Epp., $\aleph$ A B C D₂ G₂ 17. While there are many individual variations among the different members of this group of authorities, the group itself furnishes a different type of text from that found in the Receptus for the one-eighth of the words of the N. T. mentioned above. The type in the Receptus is favored by the authorities which are later and of secondary value. In consequence of a recognition of these facts there have been several attempts to form a text of the Greek Testament which should conform more closely to the original text. Lachmann, Tregelles, Tischendorf, and Westcott and Hort have all formed a text with chief reference to the most ancient authorities. The details of the

* See Westcott and Hort's Greek Test., Vol. II. p. 192.

principles on which these texts have been constructed have been unlike in each of these four texts. The general aim has been the same and consequently they have a general likeness to each other. Moreover they have commended themselves to scholars as being the best representatives of the primitive text.

In textual criticism the evidence given by the various authorities, MSS., etc., is called external. Sometimes it occurs that external evidence is not conclusive; then resort is had to internal evidence, i. e. the nature of the text itself. The following is a statement of the generally accepted principles governing the use of these two kinds of evidence.

"I. External evidence.

"1. Mere numerical preponderance of witnesses is of little account. Authorities are not to be counted but weighed.

"2. The relative weight of the classes of evidence differs for different sorts of error.

"3. The more ancient reading is generally the reading of the most ancient MSS.

"4. The agreement of authorities belonging to different regions or families is of far more weight than of those belonging to the same family.

"5. The combined evidence of the earliest MSS. versions and Fathers in favor of a reading gives us confidence.

"II. Internal evidence.

"1. That reading is to be rejected which may be traced with probability to errors of copyists.

"2. In parallel passages the discordant readings are to be preferred to the harmonious.

"3. That reading which may account for all the variations is to be preferred:

"(a) the more difficult is to be preferred to the easier;

"(b) the harsh, elliptical, ungrammatical reading to the more pleasing and grammatical;

"(c) the rarer to the more common;

"(d) the shorter to the more diffuse and explanatory;

"(e) the less expressive to the more emphatic."

It is not to be said that the four critical texts above mentioned were formed exactly according to these principles; yet there is substantial accord with these principles and consequently the texts have a substantial likeness to each other and unlikeness to the Receptus in that eighth of the N. T. of which mention has been made several times. When we compare the text of the revisers with that of these four critical

texts we find that in the most important respects it is as like to them as they are to each other and that it shares their unlikeness to the Receptus. Hence we say that, although it is not a critical text, in its substance it conforms to the best critical texts. This conformity is in the words used and in the arrangement of the words. From this it is seen that the most important features of a critical text are secured in the revisers' text. In minor points, spelling, form of words, and arrangement of books, no change has been made from the Receptus. In these points the editor "adhered closely to the text and orthography of Stephanus in all cases in which the revisers did not express a preference for other readings."* Thus the revisers have given a greatly improved text by following the same rule in fixing the Greek text which they did in revising the English; namely to "introduce as few alterations as possible . . . consistently with faithfulness."† On account of these, the most important features of the text, it deserves most hearty commendation. If it displaces the text at the basis of the Revision of 1611 and becomes the Receptus of the next 300 years we doubt not that a very large majority of competent judges have already decided that a great gain will have been made. So conservative a scholar as Dean Perowne, who dissents strongly from the revisers' change in Lu. ii. 14, says: "English students of the N. T. will be sure that they have in the judgment of the best scholars of the age, a text framed on the most ancient authorities."‡

Almost from the first the work of the revisers has been criticised mainly as regards the English revision, while little attention was paid to the Greek text until publication of the articles in the *London Quarterly* of October, 1881, and January, 1882.§ The *Quarterly* reviewer has excellences, but not those of a critical mind nor those of a judicial temper. He is decided in his opinions, positive and incisive in his statements. These qualities are for the moment more effective than learning

* *Revisers' Greek Test.*, Preface, p. vi.

† *Revised New Test.*, Preface, p. xi.

‡ *Contemporary Review*, July, 1881.

§ The copies of the *Quarterly* used by the present writer are the American reprints and they are referred to by mention of the month and page, as October, p. 161, and January, p. 1.

which the reviewer certainly has), fairness of statement and candor in reasoning; whether the reviewer has these last mentioned qualities the reader is invited to judge for himself. In the opinion of the present writer the readiest mode of revealing the existence or lack of these qualities is to examine the principles and methods of the reviewer. He withholds his name but apparently claims to be a disciple of Dr. Scrivener, for he refers to Dr. Scrivener as "*facile princeps*" "among living Englishmen" in textual criticism.* He says: "Dr. Scrivener's Plain Introduction to the Criticism of the New Testament may be confidently recommended to any one who wishes to master the outlines of textual criticism under the guidance of a judicial, impartial and thoroughly competent guide."† Dr. Scrivener is known among students in textual criticism as a candid critic, but so greatly attached to the *Receptus* that his judgment is occasionally warped. We might therefore take the reviewer as one who has learned textual criticism at the feet of Dr. Scrivener. A careful study of the articles before us will rudely dispel our belief and demonstrate not only that the reviewer has not learned at the feet of Dr. Scrivener, but that the two hold very different principles and follow different methods.

In opening his discussion the reviewer stigmatizes as MSS. of bad character three unnamed MSS.‡ which on examination prove to be B, κ , and 33. After discussing about fifty passages varying in length from single words to several verses, he says: "The reader is requested to observe that if we are right in the few instances which we have culled out of the mass then we are right in all.§ The "mass" from which these instances are culled is the "far more than five thousand times" in which "the Textus Receptus has been departed from" "almost invariably for the worse." It is by no means impossible that there are fifty instances in which the revisers' text might be improved by a return to the Receptus. Suppose we allow for the sake of argument that the reviewer is right in every one of the instances which he has adduced, does it follow that fifty instances "culled" from five thousand (*i. e.*, one out of one hundred)

* *Contemporary Review*, Oct., p. 194.

† Oct., p. 162.

‡ Oct., p. 163.

§ Oct., p. 193.

would prove all the rest or half or even any of the rest worthless? The *non sequitur* of the reviewer is like another which recently met the present writer's eye. "Every new discovery of old biblical texts, every impartial research into biblical lore, has brought about more and more the persuasion that the genuine text can be recovered only by receding as far back as possible from the *Textus Receptus* (or *corruptus*) that underlies the Protestant version. *What is that but going back to the Vulgate?*"*

The principles of the reviewer as nearly as we can discover are as follows:

1. There are three kinds of authorities in textual criticism, MSS., versions and patristic citations.
2. Patristic citations are the most reliable.
3. The *Textus Receptus* must not be departed from except for largely preponderating evidence against it.

The second and third of these principles are so absurd that the present writer feels bound to show the reasons for thinking that the reviewer holds them. He does not state them explicitly, he almost states them implicitly and they are involved in his methods. 2. "It is utterly out of the question to rely absolutely on any single set of authorities, much less on any single document for the determination of the text of Scripture." "Happily our MSS. are numerous Our versions (two of which are more ancient by a couple of centuries than any sacred codex extant) severally correct and check one another. In the writings of a host of Fathers—the principal being Eusebius, Athanasius, Basil, the Gregories, Didymus, Epiphanius, Chrysostom, the Cyrils, Theodoret—we are provided with contemporaneous evidence which whenever it can be had becomes an effectual safeguard against the unsupported decrees of the oldest codices A, B, $\aleph$, C, D, as well as the occasional vagaries of the versions."† A few comments on these statements are in order. "Any single set of authorities." The reviewer seems to refer to one or all of the uncials A, B, $\aleph$, C, D, as constituting a "set." And he avers that these are not to take precedence of all other authorities. He apparently regards these as lions lurking beside his way to the Palace Beautiful. His statement

* *Catholic Review*, July, 1881, p. 508.

† Oct., p. 166.

is in sublime disregard of the science of comparative criticism. It is certain that there is an authority more precarious than any MS.; it is the Receptus itself when it has no MS. evidence whatever for its readings. It is conceivable that two or three of the above mentioned MSS. might be right in the face of all other authorities combined. The reviewer adds:

“But indeed the principle involved in the foregoing remarks admits of being far more broadly stated. It even stands to reason that we may safely reject any reading which, out of the whole body of available authorities,—MSS. versions, Fathers—finds an advocate nowhere save in the one and the same little handful of suspicious documents. For we resolutely maintain that external evidence must after all remain our best, our only safe guide, and (to come to the point) we refuse to throw in our lot with those who, disregarding the witness of *every other* known codex—all the versions—and every other available ecclesiastical writer,—insist on following the dictates of a little handful of authorities of which nothing is known with certainty except that, when they concur exclusively, it is often demonstrably only to mislead. We speak of codices B, or $\aleph$, or D; the 9th century codex L, and such cursives as 13, or 88, a few copies of the Old Latin and one of the Egyptian versions; perhaps Origen.”*

From this we see that a “set” of authorities may be not only a few MSS., but it may be a group of MSS., versions and one Father; even a group of authorities containing the very best members of their respective kinds. All textual critics consider codex D to be seriously defective, and the attempt to class it with $\aleph$ or B is an attempt to bring into the same species MSS. that are generically different. Codex B has been proven by comparative criticism (the reviewer to the contrary notwithstanding) to be the very best MS. now known. The Memphitic or Coptic (Egyptian) version is judged by Lightfoot† to be perhaps the most important for textual criticism. The reviewer apparently regards this version as less valuable than the Thebaic or Sahidic. The Old Latin versions and codex $\aleph$ certainly have very great value of their respective kinds, i. e., the one as a version, the other as a MS. And no Father can give so weighty a sanction to a reading as Origen. The reviewer’s statements concerning patristic citations does not necessarily contain the implication that they are of the greatest value, and

* Oct., p. 166.

† Scrivener’s *Plain Introduction*, p. 345.

it would be unfair so to interpret him if these statements stood alone. The reviewer, however, in his practice gives these citations such value. Whenever he attempts to decide between two or more readings he seems to depend upon patristic citations to turn the scale. He seldom discriminates between direct statement and loose quotation on the part of the Father, and when he can discover a "torrent" of patristic citations he thinks a point gained. As the reader is aware a definite statement or argument in a Father's writings is all that can be relied on, and the reviewer seldom cites such passages in proof of his position.

The reviewer has omitted in his list of the principal Fathers every one who flourished before 800 A. D. He should have added the names of Tertullian and Cyprian among the Latin Fathers and Irenæus and Clement of Alexandria among the Greek Fathers. These all by reason of their chronological position stand in the very forefront among patristic authorities for textual criticism. It is remarkable that the reviewer should omit these, but it is almost culpable that he should omit Origen from this list. He may not have unfairly intended to discredit the earliest and best authorities whether MSS. or Fathers but he could hardly have stated his principles otherwise if he had had such an intention.

3. As to the third principle mentioned above we quote the following from the reviewer:

"The best supported reading must always be held to be the true reading; and nothing may on any account be rejected from the commonly received text except on evidence which shall *clearly* outweigh the evidence for retaining it. Whenever the evidence is about evenly balanced, few it is to be hoped will deny that the text which has been in 'possession' for three centuries and a half, and which rests on infinitely better MS. evidence than that of any ancient work which can be named,—should for every reason be let alone."*

The last affirmation of this statement needs to be observed.

* "Any ancient work"—the writings of Plato, Xenophon, Cicero and the host of ancient writers exist in but few MSS. Seldom can a dozen MSS. be found of any of their works. It is true that the Receptus rests on a larger number of MSS. as its basis. But where the other ancient works have but a dozen or a score of MSS., the New Testament has two thousand, and

* Oct., p. 166.

of these thousands comparative criticism has proved that there are fifty which are worth all the rest, and not more than two or three of the fifty were used in the formation of the Receptus. This statement of the reviewer is one of the many specious statements which mean nothing. He always takes the Receptus as the standard by which MSS. are judged. The ancient uncials* vary from a text printed a thousand years after they were copied, a text based on MSS. which had no existence until five hundred years after the uncials were copied, and this text exhibits a type of text for which there is no unequivocal authority of the first three centuries.

"When the evidence is about evenly balanced." When the evidence is *evenly* balanced we presume most critics would be willing to humor the prejudices of the reviewer. When, on the other hand, "the evidence is *about* evenly balanced," not even Dr. Scrivener, who shares the affection of the reviewer for the Receptus, would give any weight to it except that which belongs to the MSS. which it represents.† Suppose the reviewer had a case in court and the evidence was "about evenly balanced," would he claim that the balance should be turned by the fact that his witnesses had had and used the opportunity to form public opinion? We venture to say that the reviewer would have taken no such ground in that case, why should he do so in this?

Let us turn to other details of principle and method. He appears to enlist Dr. Scrivener in his behalf by occasional appeals to his authority. It is possible that Dr. Scrivener would not wish to be identified in this manner with the reviewer and his cause. Their starting point is the same: given the Receptus, how much must it be changed?‡ What position will they take as the result of their studies? The reviewer says the revisers should restore "the underlying Greek text to very nearly—not quite—the state in which they found it when they entered upon their ill-starred undertaking."§ We do not know the views of Dr. Scrivener on this point, but that they are not identical with those of the reviewer will be seen from the different treatment which these two give that *cruz criticorum*,

* Oct., p. 164.

† Scrivener's *Plain Introduction*, p. 426. ‡ Ibid., p. 5. § Oct., p. 198.

I. Tim. iii. 16. Dr. Scrivener after a pretty full discussion and with evident reluctance gives up *θεός* for *δς*.* Now listen to the reviewer:

"May we be permitted to say without offence that, in our humble judgment, if the Church of England at their bidding were to adopt this and thousands of other disfigurements of the sacred page,—depravations with which the church universal was once well acquainted, but which in her corporate capacity she has long since unconditionally condemned and abandoned—she would deserve to be pointed at with scorn by the rest of Christendom."†

In passing we ask when did the church universal in her corporate capacity unconditionally condemn and abandon *δς* in I. Tim. iii. 16? When did the church universal in her corporate capacity ever perform *any* work of textual criticism? He cannot refer to the Council of Trent, and what other event in Church history approaches so near to his description as that Council? Evidently the reviewer has some interesting chapters of church history which are as yet unknown to the rest of the world.

We noted above that the reviewer regarded the fact that the *Receptus* was "in possession" a reason for holding to it, and that Dr. Scrivener did not. With the principles and practice of the reviewer respecting patristic citations compare Dr. Scrivener's opinion:

"They can therefore be implicitly trusted, even as to the MSS. which lay before them, only in the comparatively few places wherein their own direct appeal to their codices, or the course of their argument, or the current of their exposition renders it manifest what reading they approved. . . . An express citation, however, by a really careful Father of the first four or five centuries (as Origen, for example) if supported by MS. authority, and countenanced by the best versions claims our respectful attention and powerfully vindicates the reading which it favors."‡

Compare this with the way in which the reviewer ignored Origen. Remember, too, that in summing up evidence the reviewer seems to use the patristic citations to support the MS. authorities and to countenance the versions.

Nowhere are Scrivener and the reviewer more unlike than in the estimate which they express of the various MSS. The following is a collection of such estimates, gathered from the two writers.

* Scrivener's *Plain Introduction*, p. 556.

† Oct., p. 198.

‡ Scrivener's *Plain Introduction*, p. 368.

The Reviewer.

B, "A MS. of bad character."¹
 B, N, "MSS. " " "²
 B, 88, " " " "³
 D, N, B, C, A, exhibit a "fabricated text."⁴
 B, "a codex full of blunders."⁵

The Reviewer.

B, N, together with copies of the Old Latin, Curetonian Syriac, Coptic and Æthiopic a "consensus of authorities which ought to be held fatal to any reading."⁶

B, N, C, D, L, Δ, "untrustworthy witnesses of depraved type."¹⁰

B, L, Z, "MSS. without a character."¹²

N, B, L, 33, T^b, "MSS. of bad character."¹⁴

B, L, Z, "three bad MSS."¹⁵

A, B, N, D, 17, 28, 67, "a few MSS. of bad character."¹⁶

B, N, Coptic and Curetonian Syriac, "as untrustworthy a quaternion of witnesses as could be named."¹⁷

Dr. Scrivener.

N, has "grave authority."⁶

A, "yields in value to but one or two at the utmost."⁷

N, A, B, are mentioned as being "of the highest value."⁸

Dr. Scrivener.

B, "we accord to codex B at least as much weight as to any single document in existence."¹¹ "Yet after all codex B is a document of such value that it grows by experience even upon those who may have been prejudiced against it by reason of the excessive estimate of its too zealous friends."¹³

C, "of its great critical value there can be no doubt."¹⁸

The reviewer and Dr. Scrivener manifest an entirely different spirit in regard to Drs. Westcott and Hort.

The Reviewer never once enters into the merits of their theory of the genealogy and relationships of MSS. and versions; but summarily dismisses their statement that a reading is "Western," "Neutral," "Alexandrian," "Syrian," etc., by calling it "their magisterial sentence."¹⁹

Dr. Scrivener says: "Summary and dogmatic rejection of their [Drs. Westcott and Hort] verdict upon any considerable point would be as unjust to the eminent persons who have anxiously arrived at it as it would be a decisive proof of incompetency or of invincible prejudice on the part of those who should venture to set it aside."²⁰

¹ Oct., p. 162. ² Oct., p. 172. ³ Oct., p. 162. ⁴ Oct., p. 164. ⁵ Oct., p. 176.

⁶ Scrivener's *Plain Introduction*, p. 89. ⁷ Ibid., p. 90. ⁸ Ibid., p. 95.

⁹ Oct., p. 177. ¹⁰ Oct., p. 189. ¹¹ Scrivener's *Plain Introduction*, p. 108.

¹² Jan., p. 3. ¹³ Scrivener's *Plain Introduction*, p. 480. ¹⁴ Jan., p. 6.

¹⁵ Jan., p. 7. ¹⁶ Jan., p. 8. ¹⁷ Jan., p. 27.

¹⁸ Scrivener's *Plain Introduction*, p. 111.

¹⁹ Oct., p. 189 and elsewhere. ²⁰ Scrivener's *Plain Introduction*, p. 432.

Dr. Scrivener published this judgment while using the text of Drs. Westcott and Hort in the work of New Testament revision and in connection with criticisms of his own which were couched in terms far different from those of the reviewer. It is evident that the reviewer uses the name of Dr. Scrivener to conjure by, rather than because he is at one with him in questions of textual criticism. The differences between the two prove that the reviewer cannot be numbered among the candid conservatives in the ranks of textual critics. The reader now sees that he ignores the results of comparative criticism. Let us add he ignores its methods. Apparently the older an authority the more it is to be discredited. The present writer finds it difficult to discover by what methods the reviewer would determine the value of MSS. The following quotation shows that he scorns the results of comparative criticism as the ostrich scorns the horse and his rider :

"Who will venture to deny that these codices [Ⲙ, B, C, D] are indebted for their preservation *solely* to the circumstance that they were long ago recognized as the depositories of readings which rendered them utterly untrustworthy."*

There are few critics who would hesitate to deny the truth of the reviewer's charge. And the reviewer cannot furnish a shred of proof that his statement is true as regards Ⲙ, B, C, although it possibly is true of D. To be sure he recognizes differences in value between MSS. but apparently almost any cursive is better than B, C, Ⲙ, and perhaps A. Codex A, which rests in the British Museum and is therefore better than any of the other older uncials, had the wise foresight to come nearer to that *Receptus* to be published a thousand years after its production and hence earns the modified commendation of our reviewer who says :

"Our own A, being beyond all doubt, disfigured by the fewest blemishes of any."†

He quotes from Scrivener's *Introduction*, p. 453 :

"The worst corruptions to which the New Testament has ever been subjected, originated within a hundred years after it was composed . . . Irenæus [A. D. 150] and the African Fathers and the whole Western with a portion of the Syrian church, used far inferior MSS. to those employed by Stunica or Erasmus or Stephens thirteen centuries later when moulding the *Textus Receptus*."

* Oct., p. 160.

† Oct., p. 164.

Then he adds:

"And what else are codices $\aleph$, B, C, D, but *specimens—in vastly different degrees*—of the class thus characterized by Dr. Scrivener."*

If the reviewer had said that D was a representative of the class mentioned by Dr. Scrivener no exception could easily be taken to his statement. The attempt to join $\aleph$, B and C together with D and bring them all under this judgment of Dr. Scrivener is discreditable to the fairness or else to the knowledge of the reviewer. The only way in which D can be brought into the same class with the other three is by dividing all MSS. into two classes—those which follow the *Receptus* and those which do not.

In place of the recognized mode of comparing MSS. and estimating their worth, he substitutes the method of putting the ancient MSS. side by side and making their divergencies prove their untrustworthiness. His method of comparative criticism is that made familiar to us by Strauss in his discussion of the different Gospels. If this method were adopted by all critics the result would speedily be one which he deprecates as accomplished by the revisers. It could "only result in hopelessly unsettling the faith of unlettered millions."†

There are more serious blemishes on these pages written by the Reviewer than intellectual defects. Although shortsightedness, narrowness, and prejudice are possessed in various degrees by all or nearly all men, Christian scholars now seldom make such cold-blooded and even brutal accusations as the following: "We respectfully submit that, strong as no doubt the temptation must have been, to secure the sanction of the N. T. Revisionists for their own private recension of the Greek (printed long since, but published only yesterday)—it is to be regretted that Drs. Westcott and Hort should have yielded thereunto."‡ The unchristian spirit thus displayed will do more to unsettle belief in Christianity than all the failures of the revisers were they a hundred-fold as great as the reviewer represents them to be. The failures of the revisers are not assigned by the reviewer to defects of the heart.§ Even the eye of charity cannot regard this outburst of the reviewer as a defect of the head. One can almost or even quite accept

* Oct., p. 169. † Jan., p. 5. ‡ Oct., p. 190. § Jan., p. 84.

the opinion broached of Canon Farrar¹ that personal rancor inspired these articles of the reviewer. There is certainly all through these articles an undertone of bitterness if not of spitefulness, which in this accusation of Drs. Westcott and Hort, breaks forth into distinct utterance.

The partisan spirit exhibited by the reviewer is manifested in the fact that his dependence is upon "culled"² instances. We suggest the following method: select several pages at random from the N. T., and note all the changes from the *Receptus* and carefully study the grounds for these changes. Whoever will do so will rise from the study satisfied that the revisers have seldom—very seldom erred. If he will study further and compare their texts with the four great critical texts he will regret that they did not make more changes. The reviewer seems more anxious to gain points than to show the truth. In the instances where he appears to sum up the evidence he generally fails to do justice to the evidence for the reading which he does not favor. In proof of this the reader is referred to the critical apparatus in Tischendorf's 8th edition, and in the appendix to Vol. II. of the N. T. of Drs. Westcott and Hort. For this comparison let the reader examine the reviewer's discussion of John v. 2;³ Luke ii. 14;⁴ Acts xviii. 7;⁵ xxiii. 44;⁶ Matt. xiv. 30;⁷ Mark xv. 39;⁸ Luke xxiii. 42;⁹ vi. 1;¹⁰ xxii. 43, 44;¹¹ xxiii. 34;¹² xxiii. 38;¹³ xxiv. 12;¹⁴ Matt. xvii. 21;¹⁵ i. 18, 25;¹⁶ Mark i. 1;¹⁷ John iii. 13;¹⁸ xvii. 24;¹⁹ 2 Cor. xii. 7.²⁰ In some of these instances the omissions are of little moment. In several the omissions are weighty. A plea of inadvertence can hardly be put in for them all. Yet the present writer does not believe that the reviewer had any intention of falsifying or suppressing evidence. The omissions betray rather the heated mind of the partisan who is incapable of seeing more than a narrow range of facts and who can never think that evidence opposing his opinion has any weight. Thus the difficulty is not in the reviewer's intention but in an incapacity brought on perhaps by prejudice and passion to weigh moral or probable evidence.

¹ *Contemporary Review*, March, 1882.

² Oct., p. 198.

³ Oct., p. 162.

⁴ Oct., p. 178.

⁵ Oct., p. 177.

⁶ Oct., p. 180.

⁷ Oct., p. 182.

⁸ Oct., p. 188.

⁹ Oct., p. 185.

¹⁰ Oct., p. 187.

¹¹ Oct., p. 188.

¹² Jan., p. 8.

¹³ Jan., p. 6.

¹⁴ Jan., p. 81.

He shows a singular inaptitude for detecting the real point to be discussed. In his opinion some glamour has so bewildered critics within the last twenty years that Codices B and α have "established a tyrannical ascendancy over the imagination of critics which can be spoken of only as a blind superstition."* He has a glimmering of a fact and misstates it. What is the fact? It is that the last 200 years of investigation have securely established the conclusion that the Textus Receptus is not nearly so accurate a representative of the original MSS. as can be formed from authorities wholly unknown and unused at the time of the formation of the Receptus. The question now is not whether the oldest MSS. are superior to the great mass of the later ones. That has been answered to the satisfaction of almost every scholar in the world, although the reviewer thinks they are deceived. The question is—granted the superiority of the most ancient authorities, what is the text which they authenticate? Whoever studies these authorities and the four great critical texts based upon them will become convinced that the number of defects in any one of them is far smaller than the number of defects in the Receptus. He will be struck by the fact that their agreements with each other are far more frequent than their disagreement; hence comes the conviction that textual criticism is a science far more certain in its results than it is often supposed to be.

In conclusion it must be said that no critical text yet formed is to be regarded as perfect. No general principles can be adopted which can mechanically and invariably insure perfection. Neither can we expect that, in the delicate balancing of nearly equal evidence, any individual mind, or group of minds, will be sure to reach a right decision. We may hope however to find the true text by the general discussion of and acceptance or correction of the critical texts which are proposed. We as Christians may trust that the Holy Spirit will guide all study of the Word of God conducted in a charitable and prayerful spirit and that we shall finally be led into all truth. Doubtless the eminent scholars Dra. Westcott and Hort have erred in some individual applications of their principles. Then, too, they may have erred in the theory of genealogies

* Oct., p. 16.

which they have adopted. It was due to them that the reviewer disprove this theory rather than to scoff at it as though he feared to attempt such an argument. The reviewer should have remembered the words of an eminent writer, "Objections made in a fair spirit are always suggestive."* The world of scholars would have been thankful to the reviewer for his labors had he written in a manner to inspire trust and lead to a correct estimate of the work of the revisers and of Drs. Westcott and Hort. As it is he has aroused discussion (and distrust of his own judgment and spirit). *Non tali auxilio*. He should seek that solace which he commends to the revisers, "it may reasonably prove a solace . . . to reflect that" he has, "although perhaps in ways" he "did not anticipate, rendered excellent service to mankind."†

Our hope and expectation is that the investigations and discussions of scholars for the next twenty years will bring to light whatever of truth there is in the theories of Drs. Westcott and Hort; and decide rightly concerning the points where their text varies from the general consensus of critical texts. The same process will act as a corrective of the Revisers' Greek text and (are we too sanguine?) a later generation than ours will come to substantial unanimity regarding the entire text of the N. T. This result however will be reached only by means of candid and charitable discussion and not as the result of such heated invective as that of the reviewer which can but arouse prejudice antagonistic to that from which it proceeds.

Since this Article was written a third Article from the same pen has appeared in the *London Quarterly Review* for April. The reviewer discusses Vol. II. of Westcott and Hort's Greek Testament. In this Article he exhibits the same pretended and unreal allegiance to Dr. Scrivener, the same narrow one-sidedness and the same inability to deal fairly with the real question at issue. Even if there were time and space for a discussion of this last Article, the discussion would reveal nothing new in the reviewer's spirit or method.

*Principal Shairp.

†Jan., p. 84.

ARTICLE VIII.—CHRISTIANITY AND WAGES.

THE influence of Christianity, in its triumphant progress from age to age, has not been exerted solely in the spiritual realm. Rather, every class and condition of mankind, every sphere of human activity, has felt directly or indirectly the beneficial power of that religion which has its seat in man's inmost bosom. Christianity is to remodel the world, and then will come "the new heavens and the new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness." But the end is not yet. The creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now. The liberty of the glory of the sons of God has not yet fully come. Toward it, nevertheless, the religion of our Lord is carrying the weary nations.

The Church of Christ has special phases of evil with which, in each age, she must contend. Human nature is always depraved and needs the "washing of regeneration." But there are particular evils manifested in society at particular times that must be met by answering lines of conduct. Thus in the early ages of the Christian Church the conduct of the world was marked by great social profligacy. The Church answered it by a severity of demeanor that went over into asceticism. In the Middle Ages the spirit of violence held sway; every man was a warrior. The Church answered it by asserting, even vehemently, its autocracy. To-day it is selfishness that is ruling in society—it is the strong against the weak, only the tyrants are clad in broadcloth rather than in coats of mail, and sit in offices of mills or mines or railways rather than in castle keep. With this evil spirit Christianity must grapple; this demon she must exorcise in the name of Jesus of Nazareth.

I. As matters go in the commercial world selfishness, grasping and pitiless, is the rule. Of course so far as the individual is concerned the selfishness of the employer is no worse than that of the employé. But the selfishness of employers as a class inflicts grievous wrongs for which the selfishness of the employé has no opportunity. Corporations proverbially have

no souls. Individual employers in many cases in these days have become in a sense corporations. In the immense enterprises that are undertaken it is utterly impossible for the employer to personally know his men. To his thinking, oftentimes, this relieves him of a disagreeable responsibility. If he knows no more of the men than of the barrows they wheel up and down the growing embankment—ordering more men or more barrows, as the exigencies of the work may demand; if, sitting in the office of the mill, he is as ignorant of the individual women whom he employs as of the spindles they tend—then the likelihood (in multitudes of cases it becomes the certainty) is that the men and women will be considered simply as parts of the machinery for doing a certain work, that is all. The fact that they have immortal souls, that they have human tastes, and desires, and hopes, that they have an earthly future to be made or marred, and an eternal future for joy or woe,—this does not enter into the consideration. What is the lowest rate at which their work can be secured?—that is the question. The employer cheats himself, if his conscience needs quieting (in too many instances, in spite even of Christian professions, conscience on this point is so seared as to give no trouble) with the thought that he is, paying “the market price.” He honestly pays the stipulated wage. He keeps back no part of the price. Every one working for him gets his dues. Ah, does he? In the narrow, literal sense—yes. In the broad, the Christian sense—no, a thousand times! The employer grows richer. He adds mill to mill. He makes his railroad pay dividends on watered stock. He gains a monopoly in some line of trade. He would not do a personally unkind act. He would cheat no one. He would be just and upright. But “business,” he says, “is business.” He uses other men to subserve his purposes. He is for himself really, first, last, all the time. The man he employs, meantime, is waging a hand-to-mouth struggle for himself and family. His life is a drudgery, and it is embittered with the thought that he has no share in the growing prosperity of his employer. He sees no evidence that that employer cares for him particularly more than the machinery he uses. Ambition dies. He drags along through the years of a hard existence, and his life goes out in gloom.

The natural tendency of all this is to widen the differences between classes, until in time it will become a well-nigh impassable chasm. From the operation of various causes we have not as yet reached that condition of things in this country. But the tendency is strong even here. It will surely come unless the spirit of Christianity operates to avert it. The tension of mind under which the employer in great enterprises works naturally elevates him. But the operative, pursuing only a single narrow round of work, pressed so hard to perform his daily task, with such a narrow income that he has nothing to spare for anything beyond the bare necessities of life, is himself dwarfed not only, but the bedwarfing influences run on down to his posterity. The employer, securing labor not for what it is really worth, but for what the necessities of the working class compel them to take, very easily comes to regard the laborer as not of the same flesh and blood with himself. He is an "operative," a human being who does a certain piece of work, but beyond that of no special interest in the employer's eyes. On the other hand, this "operative," knowing just how he is regarded, becomes embittered and is ready to be easily swayed by the windy harangues of any empty-pated demagogue who will loudly denounce capital. It is selfishness in the counting-room that is largely responsible for Communism among the spinning frames and looms.

This selfishness, moreover, tends directly to promote crime. Every man is responsible, to be sure, when he yields to temptation, be that temptation never so fierce. But every man is equally responsible that he put no occasion to fall in his brother's way.

According to the very valuable testimony of the Mass. Bureau of the Statistics of Labor, in their report for the current year (pp. 254-256) there is a great deal more drunkenness among the mill-operatives in Fall River than among those in either Lowell or Lawrence. In the former place the majority of the operatives ascribed it to the "drive" to which they were subjected, and which led them to take a stimulant in order to recuperate their energies. This "grind" or "drive" is not practiced in either of the latter places. The inference is a perfectly natural one that it is the occasion of much of the intemperance

at Fall River. The drinkers are not excused, most certainly. There is a more excellent way to endure the pressure that is put upon them. But still—woe to them that put an occasion to fall in their brothers' way, and all for a little larger product of print cloth and so of increased profit.

But this is not the worse instance of what selfishness will do. It stands ready to serve itself at the price of a woman's soul. Mr. Joseph Cook in the volume of his lectures on "Labor" (p. 205) gives this incident and vouches for its authenticity. "A young lady, whose family became reduced in worldly circumstances, felt that she must try to do something for herself, and therefore she applied at a large retail dry-goods house for a situation. 'Yes,' said the proprietor, 'we will take you; your salary will be ——' (naming the price.) 'Oh, sir,' said she, 'I can't live upon that.' 'I understand you, miss,' was the reply, 'several of these girls don't live upon what we pay them. Do you see that young lady there? We pay her just what I offer you; a young man pays her the rest.'" You do not wonder, do you? that Mr. Cook was cheered when he asked for a red-hot gridiron that such a miscreant might be grilled in the public presence. His further words are to be quoted: "Let it be granted that this is an exception; but when an exception like this occurs, when there is a possibility of a class of low-paid girls coming into conditions of this sort, where is Massachusetts?" Where, we may well ask in addition, is our boasted Christian civilization?

It would not be true to assert that there are no exceptions to the condition of things as thus far indicated. There are individual employers—it is to be hoped that their numbers are not few;—there are some corporations even, in which the happiest results are attained through a mutual good understanding between employers and employed. But it is entirely safe to say; indeed the simple facts demand that it should be said, that the spirit of pure selfishness rules in the commercial world. The current runs so deep and swift and strong, that even the Christian employer, as a rule, is carried away by it. He will give to Missions. He will subscribe to philanthropies. He will give voice to abundance of "good talk." But when it comes to the question of paying his "hands"—they are conveniently

lumped and their personality hid out of sight under that designation—he asks, “What is the market price?” It would be troublesome if a certain passage from an old book should occur to him: “Masters, render unto your servants that which is just and equal. * * * For one is your Master, even Christ; and all ye are brethren.”

The picture of this shameless greed of gain, of this pitiless selfishness, is well-nigh appalling. The weak are in the power of the strong, and as yet it is not the rule for the strong to be great-hearted. Our mercantile age is vividly depicted in the revelator's vision of the great city, Babylon, in the hour when her judgment came: “And the merchants of the earth weep and mourn over her, for no man buyeth their merchandise any more; merchandise of gold, and silver, and precious stones, and pearls, and fine linen, and purple, and silk, and scarlet: and all thyine wood, and every vessel of ivory, and every vessel made of most precious wood, and of brass, and iron, and marble; and cinnamon, and spice, and incense, and ointment, and frankincense, and wine, and oil, and fine flour, and wheat, and cattle, and sheep; and merchandise of horses and chariots and slaves; and souls of men.” (Rev. xviii. 11, 12.) Christianity has a great work to do, to send sweet streams into this bitter sea, that its waters may be healed. But just this, in part, is Christianity's mission upon the earth.

II. Now how ought Christianity to hold herself in this matter?

It is to be answered in general that Christianity is to set herself to depose selfishness and greed from the throne of commerce, and install in their place general benevolence and brotherly kindness. In Christianity's hands alone is the key that will unlock the difficult, confessedly difficult, “labor problem.” Christianity's law of love is the only law under which both parties can secure their mutual rights, and live together in brotherly kindness.

Christianity is not Communism. Christianity recognizes at the outset the fact that there are inequalities in human conditions. There are differences of environment, differences of endowment. It is only in a limited sense and in certain relations that “all men are created equal.” We have the assertion

of the Great Teacher that the poor are always with us. Christianity never denies to any one the usufruct of his native genius, his trained skill, his accumulating industry. By the very terms of the problem before us there are two classes, employers and employed, whose interests, apparently at least, are to some extent in conflict. Christianity has its word for both of them. Christianity will recognize the differences that exist, and at the same time will adjust the mutual relations of the two parties into complete harmony.

Under the Christian law of love, rights and duties are reciprocal. If the master must render to his servant that which is just and equal, the servant must labor not with eye-service. But the stress of Christianity's law in the present state of things, its prolonged and strong emphasis, is addressed to the employer. Christianity does not say to the employer that he shall reap no benefit from his position, that he shall not receive the full return for his skill. Christianity does not even insinuate that he must make any communistic division of his goods. Christianity does not say that he shall not be exact in all his business dealings; that he shall not hold every one who labors for him to a just accountability. Christianity is not a loose inexactness; it is not a mere unthinking good nature. The Christian business man has a right to take account of "the uttermost farthing."

But while all this is true, Christianity says to the employer—"You are not your own. You are responsible, in some very emphatic sense, for all those whom you employ. Your main object should not be merely to make money from their brains or blood. Using their industry to advance your interests, you will have an eye also to their interests. You will regard these men, and women, and children, not as so many beasts of burden or pieces of machinery, but as your fellow-beings, with natures to be uplifted and hearts to be gladdened and souls to be saved, just as is true of yourself. You will take delight in ministering in every practicable way to their temporal and moral and spiritual improvement."

The fundamental thing in all this is the proper adjustment of wages, not to the "market price" as the sole foundation of estimate, but to the real need of the wage-winner. As Prof.

Hitchcock has expressed it, Christianity claims that "it is due the manhood of the humblest workman, that, with good economic and moral habits, he shall ordinarily have a margin to live upon, lying down at night with something in store for another day." (*Socialism*, p. 99.) Is this done? Let us see.

The Mass. Bureau of the Statistics of Labor in its Report for 1875 gives the most complete statement of the earnings and expenses of workingmen that has yet been compiled. The agents of the Bureau visited 397 families in gathering these statistics, and have spread before us their findings in detail. We are introduced here into these homes and are informed of the various particulars that concern them. We have here the annual "budget" of their resources and expenditures, and we have pictured for us their mode of living. It was a most noble service that the Bureau rendered in collecting and tabulating this information. The figures in detail might be somewhat changed to-day, but they are substantially accurate, and they are essentially pertinent for other localities than Massachusetts.

From these statistics the conclusions of the Bureau as regards earnings are as follows:

"*First*—That in the majority of cases workingmen, in this Commonwealth, do not support their families by their individual earnings alone.

"*Second*—That the amount of earnings contributed by wives, generally speaking, is so small that they would save more by staying at home than they gain by outside labor.

"*Third*—That fathers rely, or are forced to depend, upon their children for from *one-quarter* to *one-third* of the entire family earnings.

"*Fourth*—That children under fifteen years of age supply, by their labor, from *one-eighth* to *one-sixth* of the total family earnings."

Then, in earnest words, the Report proceeds to speak of "the weaknesses, failures and crimes" of the wage-system as it at present exists. It starts with this proposition: "It seems natural and just that a man's labor should be worth, and that his wages should be as much as, with economy and prudence, will comfortably maintain himself and family, enable him to

educate his children, and also to lay by enough for his decent support when his laboring powers have failed."

In contrast with this that the wage-system should do, the Report interrogates it on three points, as follows:

"1. *What does it do?* It enables the workingman, in a minority of cases, to comfortably maintain himself and family by his individual earnings; again, it enables the workingman, in the majority of cases, by the aid of the labor of his wife and children, to do the same. In both instances given above it enables the father or family to keep some of the children at school.

"2. *What does it fail to do?* It fails to pay the father so much for his labor that he can in all cases support his family on his own earnings, educate all his children up to a proper age, buy a suitable home from his earnings, or lay by enough for his decent support when his laboring powers have failed.

"3. *What does it do that is weak and criminal?* It uses men and women when they are strong, and leaves them to shift for themselves when they are sick, infirm, or without employment. This it does by paying no more for labor than the bare cost of existence of the body. It usurps to its benefit the future productive power of the State by employing children who should be in school or at play, setting at defiance the organic law of production by paying to forty-four per cent. of the individuals but twenty-four per cent. in wages. It pays to ten per cent. of the workers such small wages that they are in debt and poverty, and it holds out to such unfortunates no promise or prospect of a bettering of condition, but allows them to become objects of commiseration, and to attribute their sufferings to the prevailing system of labor."

This that is true in Massachusetts is probably only more true in other sections of the country. As the case stands, Christianity is the only force that can successfully battle against the system of selfishness that is entrenched in custom and fortified with power.

But Christianity can have power for good not simply in insisting that the money-standard of wages shall be properly set, but in other things that are involved in the recompense given to the working man. Let the spirit of Christianity actuate any

employer, and his workmen are no longer mere "hands" but *men*. He will do everything within his power to make their condition brighter and more enjoyable. That which is done in this direction becomes in an important sense an increase of wages. It makes life fuller and richer, more "worth living."

For one thing the routine of life under the modern system of division of labor is terribly monotonous. Mr. Joseph Cook tells of talking with some English factory hands. Said one of them, speaking for the rest, "It's the same thing day by day, sir; it's the same little thing. One little, little thing, over, and over, and over. We are weary when we get home. We are so tired we do not feel like reading. We sometimes go to the beer shop, where there is light and cheer." This monotony in the work perhaps cannot be avoided. But where it exists, there the spirit of Christianity would suggest various proper and elevating diversions that might profitably be put into service. Christianity will regard man as man, not as a machine.

In connection with many large corporations tenements are provided, and the employés are expected to occupy them. When this is the case the spirit of Christianity demands that the tenement shall be not simply a place where a family *can* live, but that it be so constructed and arranged that it may be a healthful home. Many corporation tenements, as now constructed, are simply a disgrace to the name of civilization. It is no wonder that those who are compelled to live in them, in the midst of the most imperfect sanitary conditions, and with no conveniences of any sort, should be embittered against his employer who, on the profit of others' labor, as it seems, lives in a "ceiled house," and surrounds himself with comforts and luxuries.

What can be done in the general line of elevating the character and condition of employés is seen from what in a few cases in this country and Great Britain has been done. If it has been done in some cases it ought to be done in all. Hon. John Bright, in 1867, could say of the experiences of his firm in the Rochdale works, founded by his father, in 1809, "With one single exception, and that not of long duration, there has been through these fifty-seven years an uninterrupted harmony

and confidence between my family connected with the business and those who have assisted us and been employed in it." The same friendly relations continue unbroken to the present time. This is the fruit of Christianity. There are model villages where, without pauperizing the working people, various advantages are put within their reach—schools, lyceums, libraries, art-galleries, churches. While the employers make their business pay, they are not so eager for mere dividends that they have no thought for the welfare of those by whose industry they thrive. In these happy places the spirit of practical Christianity rules. In all the relations of employer and employed it should be exclusive and universal sovereign.

It is very obvious that there are difficulties in the way. While it is not true that there is a sort of see-saw relation between wages and profits, so that by as much as an employer increases the wages he pays by so much he decreases his own profits; it is true that this course would somewhat diminish profits. But the question for the employer ought to be, not "am I getting every possible cent of return from my invested money and brains," but, "am I getting a fair return, while at the same time ministering to the welfare of those whom I employ, making them in a way sharers in my prosperity?" We all of us know that this is not the capitalist's way of looking at it. Indeed, he would be very likely to call this a piece of fine sentimentality that was not business. But it is Christianity, and that is enough.

Another class of difficulties that will meet the Christian employer will be those that arise out of the evil that is in human nature. Give some men more leisure or more money or more liberty, and they will only abuse their privileges. Others are lethargic, it is hard work to rouse them. Not every man or every family is eager for self-improvement. The way of the philanthropist is not much more easy than the way of the gospel preacher. Only a few men stand and ask for the uplifting hand. The voice of the multitude says, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." But whatever the difficulties, the spirit of Christianity demands that they be met and conquered.

It will be found—this has been Christianity's experience all through—that as the difficulties are fairly grappled with, they

yield one by one. Profits diminished because wages are increased? Nay, increased wages means increased capacity to buy, and hence increased demand for goods. Is it condescension to have a cordial understanding with those in your employ? Nay, it is the manly, the Christian way, and it prevents those disagreements and bitter contentions that work such untold harm to both parties. Will it cost you something in time and money to plan and give for the general benefit of those in your employ? Undoubtedly. But you will be amply recompensed even in money value by the greater care and industry of those whom you have benefited. You certainly will be benefited by the happy consciousness that you have done your whole duty toward them.

What has been said here has been applied mainly to those employing the class we designate in common speech as working men. But it has a pertinent application to every employer of labor whether that be of brain or brawn. In every department "the laborer is worthy of his hire"—worth a competent maintenance for his station in life. If he does not receive it let his employer beware lest his cry enters into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth. Let that congregation beware that doles to its minister a stipend on which he can only decently starve.

Christianity, let us encourage ourselves to believe, is bound to carry the day against selfish greed with all its ignoble crew. But there is need of much and earnest agitation of the matter, in the pulpit, from the platform, by the press, and in private. All Christianity's enemies die hard. This—selfishness incarnate—not least.

Here are two pictures. Look first at one and then at the other, and then say that the spirit of selfishness exhibited in the one shall, by Christianity's sweet power be cast out, and the spirit of mutual accord and helpfulness depicted in the other shall take its place.

The first picture is from Mrs. Browning's *Cry of the Children*.

"All day we drag our burden tiring
Through the coal-dark underground,
Or, all day, we drive the wheels of iron
In the factories, round and round.

* * * * *

"And all day the iron wheels are droning,
 And sometimes we could pray—
 'O, ye wheels' (breaking out in a mad moaning),
 'Stop! be silent for to-day!'

* * * * *

"Let them feel that this cold, metallic motion
 Is not all the life God fashions or reveals—
 Let them prove their living souls against the notion
 That they live in you, or under you, O wheels!
 Still, all day, the iron wheels go onward
 Grinding life down from its mark;
 And the children's souls, which God is calling sunward,
 Spin on blindly in the dark.

* * * * *

"They look up, with their pale and sunken faces,
 And their look is dread to see,
 For they mind you of their angels in high places,
 With eyes turned on Deity;—
 'How long,' they say, 'how long, O cruel nation,
 Will you stand, to move the world on a child's heart,
 Stifle down with a mailed heel its palpitation,
 And tread onward to your throne amid the mart?
 Our blood splashes upward, O gold-heaper,
 And your purple shows your path;
 But the child's sob in the silence curses deeper
 Than the strong man in his wrath?"

Here is the other picture; it is from Holy Writ: "Servants, be obedient to them that are your masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your heart, as unto Christ. Not with eye-service, as men-pleasers, but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart. With good will doing service, as to the Lord, and not to men. Knowing that whatsoever good thing any man doeth, the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free. And, ye masters, do the same things unto them, forbearing threatening: knowing also that your Master also is in heaven; neither is there respect of persons with him."

ARTICLE IX.—TO A PORTRAIT.

BY EDWARD STANLEY TEACHER.

Deep, shadowed face, surcharged with serious thought,
What secret meanings had the world for thee?
That solemn soul some other school has taught
Than the cheap, flippant life that speaks to me;
Thy lengthened days some hidden mine have found,
Some source of grave delight and grief profound.

A strange, still sadness rests unchanging there,
Yet peace, mysterious, holds as sure a seat;
Thy sorrows silent wait; none here may share
Their gathered burden, nor can friendship sweet
With kindly care their meanings dark explore;
The key is lost, that locked that secret door.

Was it the garnered harvests of the years,
That stored thy soul with such a treasure vast,
Old human loves and griefs, long hopes and fears,
The ever ripening vintage of the past?
Or is the untiring search for truth divine
Sole occupant of that great brow of thine?

We, who, with reverent awe, thy silent walk
Did daily see, and marked thy life severe,
Know not what thoughts outvalued human talk,
What sights, unseen by us, to thee were near;
Yet this we know, man's life, that formed that face,
Has meanings deep, and bounds no pen can trace.

ARTICLE X.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

MEYER'S COMMENTARY: PASTORAL EPISTLES AND EPISTLES OF PETER AND JUDE.—The publication of the English translation of Meyer's Commentary has now been carried so far, and so many volumes have been placed before the public, that those who have not known the work in its original language have come to understand and appreciate its merits. The principles on which the author proceeded, and which are alluded to by his co-laborer, Dr. Huther, in one of the volumes now before us, are more and more widely acknowledged to be the true ones. The commentator and student of the Bible is to "interpret its pure contents as historical facts in a manner simple, true and clear, without bias and independent of dogmatic prejudice, neither adding nor taking away anything, and abstaining from all conjectures of his own." He is to be a calm, impartial investigator, willing to see the truth and to follow it; not a worker at the bidding of some school or authority which warns him, in solemn tones, that its own peculiar doctrine must be defended and sustained. The gain to our American students and ministers from the opening of this work to their use seemed to us, at the first announcement, likely to be very great. As the years have passed on, our view has been confirmed, and even beyond our anticipation. The young men of the present day are finding themselves in a freer and larger sphere, as they begin to know more fully the true methods of Exegesis. Biblical scholarship is passing to a new and higher stage. Our own work in this country, in the coming time will be in a better line and with better results, because we are receiving among us such models of right working from the old world. Drs. Huther, Lünemann, and Dusterdieck, whom Meyer selected as fellow-laborers with himself, are scholars of a high rank. If they cannot be considered as equal to him in exegetical ability and insight they are fully worthy to be his associates in the work. They have been animated by the same principles and have followed the same plan. The volumes recently published are by these scholars, that on the Epistles to the Thessalonians being by Lünemann, who is also the author of the Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, while those on the Pastoral Epistles and the Epistles of

Peter and Jude, as well as that on the Epistles of James and John which will close the work in its English form, are by Huther. The commentary on the book of Revelation by Dusterdieck, as the publishers announce, is not to be translated. With regard to the two volumes on the Pastoral Epistles and the Epistles of Peter and Jude, it may, perhaps, be affirmed that no more thorough and careful works on these portions of the New Testament have, as yet, been published. The annotations are scholarly, able, full of the evidence of wide reading and fair judgment, while they are, at the same time, presented with great clearness of style. The important questions connected with the Second Epistle of Peter and the Pauline authorship of the Pastoral Epistles are carefully discussed, the arguments on all sides being fairly and fully considered. The editions of these commentaries from which the translation has been made are the latest in the original language, and the author has, in preparing them, thoroughly revised his former editions and given to his readers the results of his best judgment and his best work. The Commentary as published in English will, in its complete form, include twenty volumes. Though expensive, and more so than could be wished, or than would seem to be necessary, it will be a most important portion of the library of every scholarly minister who can make it his own.

CURRENCY, OR THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF MONETARY SCIENCE.*—The author of this book was a Canadian, by profession a lawyer, but during the greater part of his active life largely engaged in railroad and other business enterprises. He devoted himself somewhat to literary and scientific studies, and the present work is an attempt to write on the subject of "money," without confusion of terms. He devotes many pages to definitions of the terms of monetary science, and to the laying down postulates which are to form the basis of his arguments in the remainder of the treatise.

He discusses at some length the organization of the Bank of England, and condemns the system of issuing notes on the credit of securities, claiming that the bank in practice treats these notes (its own indebtedness) as good cash reserve. This portion of the book will be found especially interesting.

* *Currency, or the Fundamental Principles of Monetary Science, Postulated, Explained, and Applied.* By HUGH BOWLBY WILLSON. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1882.

When he comes to speak of the banking system in the United States his objections are of the same kind but stronger. He argues against and ridicules the idea of treating the notes issued by the banks as trading capital, and brings clearly to view what is the weak point in our banking system.

A bank organized under the acts of Congress must first invest a large part of its capital in Government bonds, which are deposited with the Government, as security for circulation, and are therefore entirely beyond the control of the bank. Its capital for business consists of its own promissory notes and the deposits, which are made with it, in other words, of its debts, which are payable on demand and may be called for any day.

A more false system of banking can hardly be conceived. Its great recommendation is that the note-holders are secure, but to attain this security every thing else is sacrificed.

The author advocates the entire separation of the issue of notes from banking, which he argues have no connection with one other; and favors an issue of notes by the Government on the deposit of gold by those desiring paper issues.

THE SPEAKER'S COMMENTARY, VOL. IV.*—This volume completes the "Speaker's Commentary," the preceding volumes of which have been noticed on these pages. To say that its parts are of very unequal merit is to express an inevitable fact, seeing that the contributors are possessed of so various degrees of competence for this task. Among them are men as able as Mansel, the Archbishop of York, Dr. Milligan, and Dr. Westcott. What such men have written is sure to interest the Biblical student. The average character of the critical work in this series, is, however, disappointing. An extreme, if not obsolete conservatism, is often exhibited. An example is the opening portion of the volume before us, in which Dr. Kay stoutly contends for the Pauline authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Those who care to see what can be urged in favor of this exploded hypothesis may look into this essay with curiosity; but to scholars generally it will have only an antiquarian interest. A "church" commentary, made by bishops, deans, and "inferior clergy," for the sake of presenting the accepted critical and theological tenets of Anglican orthodoxy, cannot be expected to embody the results of the exe-

* *The Holy Bible*, etc., with an explanatory and critical commentary, etc., edited by F. C. COOK, M.A. The New Testament, Vol. IV. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1882.

getical science of the present age. The wheat is mingled with a large ingredient of chaff.

SPALDING'S LECTURES AND DISCOURSES.*—Bishop Spalding is a vigorous writer. He is acquainted with Protestantism, and does not write in ignorance of the system which he opposes. He has a keen eye to detect the vulnerable points in the adversary's position. His criticisms are sometimes well worthy of the attention of those of whose system he is an opponent. He makes the best of points in the Roman Catholic creed and polity which are justly obnoxious to Protestant Christians. On the whole, his book is one of the most readable of the recent productions of theological partisanship.

MOLINOS THE QUIETIST.†—This is a study in Church History, the record of the life, persecutions, and thoughts, of Molinos the Spanish Mystic, who was born in 1627, and published "*Il Guida Spirituale*" in 1675. Mr. Bigelow has explored his subject with remarkable diligence, and has presented it in a sympathetic spirit. It forms a chapter in the history of "Quietism" of singular interest. The type of religious thought which Molinos represents has appeared and reappeared, under diverse phases, in all religious bodies. Mr. Bigelow has not neglected to notice the relations of his theme to the general history of religion.

PROFESSOR DIMAN'S ORATIONS AND ESSAYS.‡—This volume is edited by Professor Murray of Princeton, whose excellent commemorative discourse forms the introduction. After this follows seven orations and essays, and the same number of sermons, from the pen of Professor Diman. Two beautiful sonnets by his friend, Mr. Hazard, stand at the beginning of the volume. Those who knew the lamented author of these addresses and sermons unite in the judgment that in all the perfections and graces of manhood, as well as of scholarship, he merited the highest admiration. Thorough without a tinge of pedantry, at once learned and eloquent,

* *Lectures and Discourses.* By the Rev. J. L. SPALDING, D.D., Bishop of Peoria. New York: Catholic Publication Society Co. 1882.

† *Molinos the Quietist.* By JOHN BIGELOW. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1882.

‡ *Orations and Essays, with Selected Parish Sermons.* By J. LEWIS DIMAN, D.D., late Professor of History and Political Economy in Brown University. A Memorial Volume. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1882.

full of wit and of spirit, an orator of remarkable force and grace, an original, quickening, instructive preacher, few men of our time have combined so varied powers and accomplishments. It is fortunate that these few memorials exist not only for the gratification of friends, but also, in order that such as never had a personal acquaintance with Professor Diman may gain some idea of his attractive qualities and his solid and diversified attainments.

THE ART AMATEUR for June contains an illustrated notice of the Paris Salon, with special reference to the pictures by American artists and to those coming to this country. Other exhibitions in Paris, New York, and Philadelphia are criticised. There are capital practical articles on modelling in clay and amateur photography, and some timely hints on the decoration of country "boxes" are given, together with the first of a series of articles on illuminated manuscripts, supplemented by valuable hints for amateur illuminators. The departments of Ceramics, Bric-à-brac, Needlework and Art in Dress are well filled, and the usual liberal array of designs for china painting, embroidery and general decoration completes a fine number of this deservedly popular art magazine. Price, \$4 a year; single numbers, 35 cents. Montague Marks, Publisher, 23 Union Square, New York.

THE ART MAGAZINE for June opens with a sketch of the career of an American painter, Mr. J. G. Brown, who has gained his reputation as a painter of street life. There is a portrait of the artist, and groups from two of his pictures. The second article—a man of culture of the 15th century—takes up the life of Gismondo Malatesta, lord of Rimini, and is illustrated with several views of the town of Rimini. The article on "Queen Anne Plate" is full of fine illustrations of cups, tea-pots and candle-sticks of different styles. The "Great Classical Fallacy" is an article on the architecture of the 18th century. "Glass painting in the 14th century" is fully illustrated, and there are the usual number of fine full page steel engravings. The publishers are Cassell, Petter & Galpin, New York. Yearly subscription \$3.50. Single numbers, 35 cents.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

Westminster Sermons; Sermons on Special Occasions; Preached in Westminster Abbey. By Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, D.D., late Dean of Westminster. 12mo, 409 pp.

Lay Sermons. By John Stuart Blackie, Professor of Greek in the University of Edinburgh. 12mo, 349 pp.

The Faiths of the World. St. Giles' Lectures. 12mo, 364 pp.

The Order of the Sciences. An Essay on the Philosophical Classification and Organization of Human Knowledge. By Charles W. Shields, Professor in Princeton College. 16mo, 103 pp.

Epochs of Modern History. The Epoch of Reform 1830-1850. By Justin McCarthy, M.P., author of "A History of Our Own Times." 215 pp.

Re-issue of Dr. J. G. Holland's complete writings. Miss Gilbert's Career; An American Story. By J. G. Holland. 405 pp.

Nicholas Minturn. A Study in a Story. By J. G. Holland. 12mo, 422 pp.

G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

The Naval War of 1812, or the History of the United States Navy during the last War with Great Britain. By Theodore Roosevelt. 8vo, 498 pp.

The Present Religious Crisis. By Augustus Blauvelt. 12mo, 196 pp.

Victor Emmanuel. By Edward Dicey, M.A. 12mo, 336 pp.

Dodd, Mead & Co., New York.

Barriers Burned Away. By E. P. Roe. New and revised edition. Large 8vo, 71 pp.

American Tract Society, New York.

Tempted to Unbelief. By Rev. E. F. Burr, D.D., author of "Ecce Coelum," "Pater Mundi," etc. 12mo, 224 pp.

Autobiography and Memorials of Ichabod Washburn. Showing how a great business was developed and large wealth acquired for the uses of benevolence. By Rev. Henry T. Cheever, author of "Island World of the Pacific," etc., etc. 12mo, 222 pp.

Macmillan & Co., New York.

A Compendious Dictionary of the French Language. (French-English), (English-French). Adapted from the Dictionaries of Prof. Alfred Elwall; Followed by a list of the Principal Diverging Derivations. By Gustave Masson. 12mo, 416 pp.

Wanderings in South America. By Charles Waterton. With one hundred illustrations. Edited, with Biographical introduction and Explanatory Index, by Rev. J. G. Wood. Large 8vo, 64 pp.

The Catholic Publication Society Co., New York.

Catholic Controversy. A reply to Dr. Littledale's "Plain Reason." By H. L. D. Ryder, of the Oratory. First American Edition with Appendix. 12mo, 288 pp.

Porter & Coates, Philadelphia.

The New Testament of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ: Translated out of the Original Greek; and with the former translations diligently compared and revised. Containing the Authorized Version, commonly called "The King James Version" and the New Revised Version, arranged in parallel columns for comparison and reference, also containing The Notes of the New Version: Readings preferred by the American Committee; History of the Committee on Revision; Chronology of the New Testament; Index to subjects; Chapter, headings, and running head-lines. 8vo, 600 pp.

T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh.

Hand-Books for Bible Classes—Joshua—by Rev. Principal Douglas, D.D. 122 pp.

Original Solutions of Several Problems in Aerodynamics. By Eli W. Blake, New Haven.

In Memoriam. Leonard Bacon: Pastor of the First Church in New Haven.

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✎ The Article on "The Old Testament in the Christian Church," in the July number, is by Rev. GEORGE B. STEVENS, of Buffalo, N. Y. It was by mistake credited to Rev. JAMES B. GREGG, of Hartford, Conn.

THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CLXX.

SEPTEMBER, 1882.

ARTICLE I.—THE IMPORTANCE AND THE METHOD
OF BIBLE STUDY.

[Inaugural address of C. J. H. Ropes as Professor of New Testament Literature
in Bangor Theological Seminary.]

IN asking myself what would naturally be expected at this time from one in my position, I have been led to think that no subjects could be more appropriate to the occasion than these: the necessity now laid upon ministers of studying the Bible, and the kind of study which the book and the times demand. I shall thus, first endeavor to express my appreciation of the importance of the interests entrusted to me, and then attempt to sketch the manner in which that trust should be administered.

There has never been a time when the Bible was so widely, so deeply, and so profitably studied as it is to-day. The spread, the thoroughness, and the success of this study are in no small degree the result of the method employed—the Baconian, the inductive method. The inductive study of the Bible has been developing rapidly during the last fifty years, along

four distinct lines, which I may call, in the order of their succession, the critical, the theological, the scientific, and the popular. All four lines are vigorously pursued to-day, but the last, the inductive study of the Scriptures by the people, is the most recent and least advanced.

I. The elementary principles of inductive Hermeneutics were set forth in part, more than a century ago by Semler and Ernesti, but they were first elaborated and extensively applied in the controversy begun fifty years later by Baur and the Tuebingen school. The vigorous attack of these scholars upon the authenticity and genuineness of many of the New Testament writings, and the novel picture which they drew of the early history of the church, aroused conservative theologians to a stout resistance and gave a powerful impulse to keen and careful study of the scriptures by both parties. Most of the extreme positions once occupied by the assailants have now been abandoned. As a school of criticism, that of Tuebingen has ceased to exist; and while the conflict still rages over the later Pauline epistles and the Gospel of John, yet the weight of argument now accumulated on the conservative side, and the number and eminence of its adherents, seem to augur the essential reestablishment of the canon, in the near future. Meanwhile the whole field of biblical study has bloomed under cultivation by the inductive method, and attested anew the advantage which ultimately accrues to the truth of God from the assaults of criticism. The Bible, divested of all *a priori* judgments in its favor, has been made to plead its cause by the inductive method before the bar of the critics, with the result of revealing in the sacred word a beauty and a strength before unknown. Man's work will not thus bear the microscope.

II. The conservative side of the Tuebingen controversy developed the *theological* line of inductive biblical study. Not only the results of exegesis, but through these the scriptural bases of theology and church history were called in question. Hence it was necessary that these should be reëxamined in the light of the inductive method, and the superstructure in all departments, made to correspond to the biblical foundation. When we add to this, that the critics not obscurely aimed at the elimination of the supernatural element from the person

and work of Christ and from the history of his church, it becomes clear that practical theology, the theology of the preacher and the pastor had to take a biblical direction, in self-defence. Thus may be roughly sketched the reasons for the general falling back upon the Bible which characterizes all departments of theology at the present day. The evidences of this movement are all about us. Notice how a synthetic, organic, and biblical theology is replacing an analytic, abstract, and metaphysical system. How vastly of late the theologian has gained in diffidence and modesty in contemplating the silences of Scripture, instead of filling up the gaps with his own speculations until they fairly ran over! Mark how much more study is given to the first century of church history and its connections with the second, than to any other period. As for Homiletics let us glance at one of its latest and best utterances: * The scriptural key note is struck at the very beginning, "a sermon is an oral address to the popular mind, upon religious truth *as contained in the christian scriptures.*" A little further on we find one hundred pages devoted to "the text," full of suggestions which really belong to Hermeneutics, and still later we may read an admirable chapter on expository preaching.

But indeed, the movement of religious thought which has now so exalted exegesis and so impelled church history, theology, and homiletics to seek their materials in the careful study of the Scriptures springs from deeper sources. *Negatively*, it is the natural result of the inquiring spirit of the age. The Bible claims to describe the fundamental facts on which historical Christianity is built. Hence our age which digs round all the old foundations must subject the Scriptures to a severe scrutiny. *Positively*, this movement of religious thought is a revival of our faith, bringing once more to the front the formal principle of the Reformation and of Protestantism—the sole and supreme authority of the Scriptures. From both the negative and the positive sides we may expect similar good results, for both are trying to employ the peculiar weapon of our age, the inductive method, in the search for the truth.

* The Theory of Preaching, by Prof. Austin Phelps, N. Y. C. Scribner's Sons, 1881.

III. The way in which inductive biblical study has been developing from scientific sources is chiefly by the gradual accumulation of facts which bear upon statements in the Bible. A cheap and popular little book published in England has a table of contents which is suggestive in this connection.* The geography, geology, meteorology, botany, and zoölogy of the Holy Land are first treated. Ethnology and archæology follow; and the latter, under the title "The Bible and the Monuments," embraces discoveries in the history, chronology, language, and customs of the peoples of Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, Persia, Syria, and Phœnicia. Thus from all quarters light has been focused upon the Bible by every science, but the places of honor must be given to a criticism of manuscripts now putting into our hands a text of the New Testament which may be trusted as a very close approximation to the original word, and to a philology of Hebrew and especially of Greek which in the departments of grammar and lexicography has endowed us with power to reach with confidence that grammatical understanding of the Scriptures without which, as Melancthon said, their theological comprehension is impossible.

IV. With all the lights of criticism, theology and scientific knowledge thus turned upon the inductive study of the Bible, what wonder that there has begun a popular movement in the same direction. This movement in our churches and Sunday schools is not old, yet it is already strong. The zeal for philosophical theology which used to possess the laity, especially in New England, is being replaced by a zeal for the study of God's Word. Signs of the mass and momentum of the movement are not wanting. Such are the great popularity of Bible classes, though held on a week day, Mr. Meredith's in Boston, for instance; the innumerable multitude of weekly, monthly, and quarterly periodicals devoted in great part to the exposition of Sunday school lessons, and most of all, the world wide adoption of the International Lessons, not by reason of their intrinsic excellence, but because of their convenience as a rallying point for all aids to Biblical study, and as consequently a great help in managing the Sunday school with

* Aids to the student of the Holy Bible. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1881.

cheapness and efficiency. Besides these signs there is another, itself an effect of the enormous increase of Bible study, and destined to be beyond all the rest a mighty factor in teaching to the people the inductive study of God's Word. We have only just begun to feel its power, but it is working a most salutary change in the popular view of the Bible, and its work is destined to increase enormously. I refer to the New Revision, of which it is true we have as yet only the New Testament, and that only for a year past, and yet we can already forecast its mighty influence for good.

For the popular mind is passing through a curious transition of opinion on the subject of the Bible. It may be called a transition from the superstitious view of the Scriptures to that of common-sense, and common-sense leads to inductive Bible study. The root of the superstitious view of the Bible is a gross literalism founded on the mistaken doctrine of Verbal Inspiration and applied to the Authorized Version.

We often hear instances of it in which the meaning of individual words is dwelt upon entirely against their real connection. A preacher in England discoursing on Isa. xxxviii. 14, is reported to have said that God's care never left His servants; even after death he would preside over their obsequies, as he did for Moses of old, for does not the prophet cry, "*O Lord I am oppressed; undertake for me.*" And to my own knowledge a worthy divine in Massachusetts not long ago preached on Ps. viii. 4, "*What is man that thou art mindful of him,*" and dwelt on the idea that God's *mind* was *full* of man! But the worst instance of such literalism for which I can vouch, and which forsook sense utterly, was the utterance of a layman in Eastern Massachusetts. Gen. i. 2 had evidently impressed him as peculiarly forcible, for he testified in prayer meeting, that he had not used tobacco for ten years in any "*form or void.*" Another aspect of the superstitious use of the Bible is the virtue supposed to inhere in "*reading a chapter.*" Many people regularly read a chapter every morning, or morning and evening. Rightly observed, such a habit is a constant refreshment and delight. But a great many people simply conscientiously plod through it, and if you ask them at noon what the morning chapter contained, they will be unable to

recall it. In the words of another, "their daily devotional reading is largely routine; they estimate its value, often, by the quantity read rather than by the thoughts appropriated."* To many such people the mere perfunctory reading, that is, mechanically glancing over, or even uttering, the words, is meritorious. They number their verses as a Catholic tells his beads, and the chapter of greater or less length is their variable rosary. Thus Bible reading, one of the greatest of privileges, being practiced as an *opus operatum*, a good work, becomes a mere superstition. More superstitious is the practice once widely prevalent, and not extinct to-day, of seeking oracles for guidance by opening the Bible at random. Do not even the Mohammedans the same with the Koran?

The New Revision is doing great service in breaking up this superstitious literalism. But it is often rewarded with denunciation. An old sailor in Bangor recently complained to me, that some of us had got a new chart (the Revision), describing, as it seemed to him, a new port, but that according to his conviction, all who sailed by that chart would make soul-shipwreck. The absurd and sentimental objections often made to the New Revision, ignoring that truth and not novelty is its aim, show traces of similar superstition; and the manifest suspicion with which the fearless application of the inductive method to the Scriptures is watched, as though it were sacrilege, springs from the same source. In front of the high altar of Santa Maria Sopra Minerva in Rome is a marble statue of the Saviour, by Michael Angelo. But, in fancied reverence, some one has marred the noble form with tawdry metal drapery, and fastened a large bronze halo to the back of the head, thus rendering the whole figure painful and grotesque. Even so, with pious intent, good people have overlaid the Scriptures with the superstitious marks of a misplaced reverence, which have disguised and distorted the Divine Artist's work.

But all these things are passing away. Superstition and suspicion change to wonder and delight as the meaning is evolved from the words of the Bible, and exalted to its own supremacy. If the ministry is equal to the demands of the occasion, the people will soon be led out into the light of God's

* Prof. Austin Phelps, l. c., p. 87.

truth, and will realize that the Bible is above all a *revelation*. The ministers it is, who stand between all the forces of criticism, science, and theology concentrated on the Bible, and the people struggling out of the misleading superstitions I have mentioned into the new day of Bible study. The ministers must lead, guide, and control this movement in the direction of Bible study, or they will be trodden under foot in the rush for the bread of life like the unbelieving lord by the famished inhabitants of Samaria.

How can the ministers lead this tremendous movement towards the study of the Bible? Manifestly by becoming able and earnest Bible students themselves. For this they must be grounded in thorough scholarship and built up in the method of applying the inductive principles of exegesis to the Scriptures, and then they must use the training, thus acquired, in ways which the seminary cannot prescribe, since they depend upon circumstances.

So I come to the second part of my subject: the kind of study which the book and the times demand.

I. *The Scriptures must be read and studied in the original Hebrew and Greek.* It is true that many texts in the New Testament which used to make prominent illustrations under this head, have been corrected by the New Revision, and in two or three years the same will probably be true of the Old Testament. Still the chief arguments remain unchanged. They are all comprised in "the necessary inferiority of translations (especially of the Bible), to their originals."*

1. Languages as old as the Hellenistic Greek of the New Testament and still more, as the Old Testament Hebrew and Chaldean necessarily move in a circle of ideas, and in a sphere of the development of thought, at a great distance from modern views. It is utterly impossible to understand, and habituate oneself to, such phases and forms of thought without studying them in their *ipsissima verba*, in their original languages.

2. But we have not only to enter an ancient range of ideas, we have also to strip off in many cases a luxuriant growth of modern ideas which have twined themselves round every notable verse in the Bible. These ideas have associated them-

* Cf. Archbp. Trench on Revision, chap. ii.

selves in our minds, for the most part exclusively with the English version of those texts. When we approach the original Hebrew and Greek we find in them an unworn freshness and a freedom from prepossessions, which make an impartial judgment as to their contents immeasurably easier than with the familiar English words.

3. Bible languages differ wholly from ours not only in thought but in composition and structure, and this often renders translations necessarily inadequate. For instance, Hebrew has about ten times as many roots to one-tenth the number of words compared with English. That is, it has relatively one hundred times as many roots. Therefore it is enormously rich in synonyms. "It has fifty-five words for *destroy*, sixty for *break*, seventy-four for *take*."* If you wish to obtain an idea of the difficulties of adequate translation, just try to distinguish seventy-four different shades of meaning in the idea of *to take*.

4. Every one knows that feeling is harder to translate than fact, oratory than narrative, poetry than prose, passion than platitude. Add to this that divine thoughts ever soar above even their fittest expression in human words. And then let us remember that in many important parts of the Bible we do not find its language under the normal pressure of ordinary intercourse, but strained to its greatest tension and taxed to its utmost resources to express feelings which are well nigh unutterable, and thoughts under the weight of which the strongest words bend almost to breaking. The attempt to translate a language thus transfigured with the fire of God, seems almost like trying to measure the heat of the burning bush with an earthly pyrometer.

5. For what is translation? A word most fitly translated is like a flower transplanted into a new climate. Though it flourishes under the new conditions, yet there are generally subtle changes in the habit of its growth, the shade of its color, the luxuriance of its productiveness, the character of its perfume. Some of these will alter, even when it is the very same flower. But often the exotic will not live under alien skies. So the exact counterpart of the word cannot be found, and

* Prof. C. A. Briggs in "God's Word Man's Light and Guide." Am. Tract Soc. N. Y. 1877. p. 54.

then its nearest relation or representative must be taken. We speak of May-flowers and robins, though our migratory thrush is utterly different from the English robin, and our trailing arbutus has nothing in common with "the hawthorn buds that ope in the month of May," which gave their name to the pilgrim bark. Words bear translation often no better than birds and flowers, so that it is impossible for a man to know (what every minister ought to know) the deepest, truest meaning of the Bible, if he trusts to any translation, however good. He is certain to trip sometimes, he is likely to be often mistaken, and he can never be sure he is right.

Illustrations in particular crowd upon us. I will select a few.

A. The scope of a word. The Greek *Psyche* (ψυχή) has a range which includes the meanings *soul* and *life*. Therefore it cannot be adequately translated in such passages as Mark viii. 36, 37, *For what doth it profit a man to gain the whole world and forfeit his psyche? For what should a man give in exchange for his psyche?* So the word *Paraclete*, used four times of the Holy Spirit (Jno. xiv. 16, 26, xv. 26, xvi. 7) and once of Christ (1 Jno. ii. 1) *never* means *Comforter*, i. e. *Consoler*, but should always be translated *Advocate* (as it is in 1 Jno. ii. 1). Even the original meaning of *Comforter*, which comes through the Latin, i. e. *Strengtheners*, is founded on a mistranslation of the Greek.*

B. *Emphasis* of the Greek. I once heard a celebrated preacher discourse on James ii. 14, when he made the main point of his sermon by reading the text thus: *What doth it profit, my brethren, though a man SAY he hath faith, and have not works? Can faith save him?* His Greek Testament ought to have shown him that the emphasis was not on *say*, but on *faith*, the kind of faith, dead faith, not the mere profession, as the Revision shows with its "*can that faith save him?*" This preacher was as really distorting scripture by his neglect of the Greek, as an illiterate man by his faulty elocution, who read 1 Kings xiii. 27, *Saddle ME—THE ASS. And they saddled him.* And being told that was wrong, corrected it thus: *Saddle me the ASS. And they saddled HIM.*

C. The force of a distinction. The distinction between *the*

* Bp. Lightfoot on Revision (Dr. Schaff's Am. Ed.), p. 58 sq.

devil and his subordinate *demons* was introduced by Wiclif, but has not survived in any other English translation; which is to be regretted, as the difference is real and important. Luke vi. 36. Be (literally *become*) ye merciful even as your Father is merciful. "The original expresses the distinction between the imperfect effort (of man) and the eternal attribute (of God)."*

D. The force of a figure. Our language has no place for "the lip of the sea," "the mouths of the sword," (Heb. xi. 12, 34), and it would have been as well to leave out "the calves of the lips," (Hos. xiv. 2).† Only in the original can such figures be fully grasped. In 1 Pet. v. 5, Gird yourselves with humility, the word *gird* has a fulness of meaning which may be thus roughly paraphrased, *put on as the white garment of the slave, humility*.

E. The force of a historical allusion. Matt. v. 22. *And whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of the hell of fire*. Without reading both Greek and Hebrew it is impossible to recognize under this "*fool*" the *Mōré* (*Māps*) of the Greek, and under that, one of the *Mōrím* of Numbers xx. 10, *the rebels* (חַמְרִים), and so to realize that it was for the word in which he called the children of Israel *rebels* that Moses was shut out from the promised land.

F. There is a large class of passages where the English is ambiguous while the original is not. One or two examples must suffice.

(John xvii. 11, 12): *Holy Father keep them in thy name which thou hast given me. . . . While I was with them I kept them in thy name which thou hast given me*. I suppose most English readers imagine that this means the disciples *whom thou hast given me*. But in both verses it is *thy name which thou hast given me*. (John i. 51): *Ye shall see the heaven opened and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of man*. I have heard expositions of this which seemed to identify Christ with the ladder of Jacob's dream to which there is evident allusion. But the Greek shows that Christ cannot possibly figure as the ladder, but only as at its foot, its point of contact with the earth.

* Archbp. Trench on Revision (Dr. Schaff's Am. Ed.), p. 28.

† Ibid., p. 76.

But perhaps it may be said: let ministers with small Hebrew and less Greek find these things in their commentaries. Then the answer is easy.

(1.) Few ministers can afford a large enough selection of the best commentaries to tell them these things and it is just those who most need them who can for obvious reasons least afford them.

(2.) The very best commentaries are most of them unintelligible to the man who does not know as much Hebrew and Greek as he is likely to acquire in the Seminary, many of them being in French, German, or Latin besides.

(3.) If such a student can supply himself with "Commentaries for English readers," some of which are very good, he must live in servile dependence on them for all he can learn. They can give him results of interpretation, but they cannot really make clear to him the reasons which favor one view rather than another, and if they could, he could not comprehend them, much less decide for himself.

(4.) Finally he cannot go a step beyond the commentaries in his approach to God's Word. And to any one who knows the fresh suggestiveness of the Greek and the Hebrew, this tether which allows only of grazing within the scope of his commentator's wisdom, instead of all over the field of God's Word, will sufficiently indicate exclusion from many a rich pasture.

II. I now come to another point. *The sacred text must be subjected to a grammatical, that is a literal interpretation.* "Understand," says William Tyndale, "that Scripture hath but one sense and that the literal sense. That is the root and ground of all, whereunto if thou cleave, thou canst never err; and if thou leave the literal sense, thou canst not but go out of the way."*

Of this sense the grammar and the lexicon are the interpreters and they need to be most diligently consulted by the student, before a commentary is opened at all.

The grammatical interpretation is supplemented by the historical which endeavors to give the words their original setting of time, place, person, and circumstances. In the

* Obedience of a Christian Man. Parker Ed., p. 304.

Protestant churches, the sole validity of the grammatico-historical interpretation is now in theory at least generally conceded. The three- or four-fold canon of exegesis current among the Fathers and the schoolmen is universally repudiated by all who accept the Reformation. Therefore our time need not be spent in directly inculcating these principles, but rather in the consideration of two practical corollaries from them.

(1.) Read the Scriptures for information. This may seem a very commonplace rule, but it is one very seldom observed in its purity. No other book is the victim of so many prejudices as the Bible. Men habitually approach it with all kinds of preconceived ideas, which they seek and are disposed to find in teachings of Scripture. And so men have quoted the Bible in favor of despotism and democracy, slavery and emancipation, moderate drinking and total abstinence, besides adducing it to bolster up all shades of theological opinion ever held on either side of every controversy since Christian theology began to shape itself. In such cases the Bible may lean to one side rather than to the other, but it always really states the truth which underlies the claims of both parties. Take the Temperance question for instance. The Bible does not countenance the denunciation of alcoholic beverages as such, apart from their abuse, nor do I find in it a hint of the existence in Bible times of an unintoxicating wine. Nor is total abstinence anywhere directly taught. The Bible allows only such a use of wine as shall never become abuse of it, and requires such a love of others as shall make their sobriety and safety equally a matter of solicitude with our own. Now if we apply these principles to our own time and circumstances we need seek no better argument for total abstinence from intoxicating beverages than they afford. "*If meat make my brother to stumble, I will eat no flesh for evermore, that I make not my brother to stumble*" (I. Cor. viii. 13) is a much more comprehensive and irresistible text for total abstinence, than "*Look not upon the wine when it is red.*" To learn to read the Scriptures for information is not an easy attainment, but it is one at which every minister should specially aim. The New Revision is a great help in this direction in so far as its phrase-

ology differs from the Authorized Version. But the Greek New Testament and the Hebrew Old Testament carefully studied with grammar and lexicon will best supply the materials of Biblical knowledge. If we seek for God's message to us in the Bible we shall find it.

(2.) The second corollary which I wish to make is this: *treat the Scriptures fairly.* If God has given a message to man in the Scriptures it is not for the minister to obscure, alter, or dilute it. When I say, treat the Scriptures fairly, I mean, interpret their language precisely as you would if it were the language of any other book of like nature, style, and tendency. Interpret the Bible as fairly as a doctor does his authorities on the theory and practice of medicine, and as the lawyer does his revised statutes and his law books in studying them. If the doctor and the lawyer in the pew hear the minister drawing from a Scripture passage an inference which that passage will not bear, they regard him as a quack and a special pleader, not as a wise physician of souls and a just expounder of God's will. Our pulpits and even books of sermons abound in false exegesis, due to lack or neglect of Greek and Hebrew. To take a prominent instance. The first sermon in a recent volume by a great preacher, a discourse on *the candle of the Lord*, is based on an indefensible explanation of Prov. xx. 27. I once heard a well-known Christian worker tell a body of theological students that he never could understand Phil. ii. 12, until the thought struck him *who is your salvation?*—Christ. So the verse means "*work out Christ with fear and trembling for it is God that worketh in you,*" etc. I only wonder he did not make full use of his absurd exegesis by adding that thus the verse supplies an argument for Christ's deity. *Work out Christ, for it is God, etc.*

Furthermore, the unfair use of a scripture text imperils in the mind of the hearer the truths which that text is unfairly used to sustain. If he sees a preacher build an arch of scriptural proofs to sustain a doctrine or an application of truth and afterward finds one or more of those texts to contain no substance to the point, the arch and the teaching based on it lie in ruins for him. If a layman were to hear a sermon preached from Job xix. 26, *and though after my skin worms destroy this*

body yet in my flesh shall I see God on the resurrection of the body, for which doctrine it used to be a standard text, and afterwards should discover that in the original that verse does not support the doctrine at all, but refers distinctly to a disembodied existence; would it be singular if he thought the resurrection of the body an ill-founded dogma.

One of the principal causes of the unfair treatment of Scripture is neglect of the context. Thus (Matt. vii. 14) *For narrow is the gate, and straitened the way that leadeth unto life and few be they that find it*, was explained by the Reformers to mean that the saved should be few in all time. But the context and the answer of Jesus to the question *Lord, are they few that be saved?* (Luke xiii. 23) show that Christ was referring to the historical state of things at the moment, not to any verdict for all time.

Rom. xiv. 23, *Whatsoever is not of faith is sin* has been a standard text for total depravity, from Augustine down. The context shows that the conduct of Christians alone is under consideration. But I have recently read in a religious periodical a much worse application of this text. The writer ventured to assert that to attend concerts, lectures and the like, not directly religious in character was wrong, because "whatsoever is not of faith is sin." Of course what the apostle means is, that concerning which a Christian doubts if he can do it consistently with his Christian faith, and then does it, recognizing that to do it is a break with his faith, that is sin.

Thus a verse is so often treated as if it stood alone, that one is tempted to remind men that the division into chapters is the work of Hugo of St. Caro, the verse divisions in the New Testament come from Robert Stephens, neither of whom was inspired or infallible; and furthermore that there is only one book of aphorisms in the Bible, namely Proverbs.

But perhaps the most fruitful source of the unfairness from which the Scriptures suffer is the temptation to spiritualize indiscriminately. It must be remembered that there are legitimate opportunities for spiritualization in the Bible. But these connect themselves either with language which is plainly figurative, or with a manifest type, or with the careful inference and consequent application of a principle of divine character

and conduct from a narrative text. A general characteristic of such figurative language and evident types, is that the meaning is tolerably clear at least in its general drift, and it should be distinctly understood that it is only a perverted ingenuity which seeks originality in this field. The types of scripture are large and bold, its parables shaped to a conspicuous end, and the mind that attempts to make types, parables, and metaphors "run not only on all-fours but on as many legs as a centipede" (to use Mr. Spurgeon's expression) is simply trifling with God's word. Mr. Spurgeon tells us of a minister who "is great upon the ten toes of the beast, the four faces of the cherubim, the mystical meaning of badger's skins and the typical bearings of the staves of the ark and the windows of Solomon's temple." And Dr. Gill in trying to build houses for doctrines out of the mere scaffolding of the parables, dares to say that the fatted calf killed for the Prodigal, and the beast of the Good Samaritan both stand for the Lord Jesus Christ, while the two pence which were paid to the innkeeper are either the Old Testament and the New or Baptism and the Lord's Supper. And this, mark you, is modern exegesis, not the vagaries of the allegorizing Fathers or the subtleties of the schoolmen. Nor is it the New Testament only which this divine so belabored. On Cant. vi. 11, *I went down into the garden of nuts*, Dr. Gill asks: "Why are believers like nuts?" and answers under ten heads.

One of the most profitable veins of legitimate spiritualizing is that which was mentioned as the inference of a general principle from a narrative text. Robertson especially is a master of this art, and Professor Phelps has given us examples of it in his "Studies of the Old Testament." But care must be taken that this do not degenerate into the arbitrarily fanciful, as when a New York preacher inferred from Paul's summons to Timothy *Do thy diligence to come before winter* (2 Tim. iii. 21) that we ought to come to Christ in youth. Nor must spiritualization degenerate on the other hand into the commonplace, like this comment from Matthew Henry on Gen. xi. 28, *And Haran died before his father*. "Note. Children cannot be sure that they shall survive their parents, for death does not go by seniority, taking the eldest first: 'The shadow of death is without any order'" (Job x. 22). By the way, that quotation

from Job is utterly inappropriate for it really means *a land of darkness and chaos* and has nothing to do with the promiscuous way in which death selects his victims.

Perhaps I can hardly conclude this topic better than by a quotation from one of Macaulay's letters, which conveys a layman's pointed rebuke to a perverted spiritualizer.

"I alighted," he writes, "at a bungalow appertaining to the British Residence (at Mysore). There I found an Englishman who, without any preface, accosted me thus: 'Pray Mr. Macaulay, do not you think that Bonaparte was "the Beast?"' 'No sir, I cannot say that I do.' 'Sir, he was "the Beast!" I can prove it. I have found the number 666 in his name. Why, sir, if he was not "the Beast," who was?' This was a puzzling question; and I am not a little vain of my answer. 'Sir,' said I, 'the House of Commons is "the Beast." There are 658 members of the House; and these, with their chief officers—the three clerks, the sergeant and his deputy, the chaplain, the doorkeeper and the librarian—make 666.' 'Well, sir, that is strange. But I can assure you that, if you write Napoleon Bonaparte in Arabic, leaving out only two letters, it will give 666.' 'And, pray, sir, what right have you to leave out two letters? And as St. John was writing Greek and to Greeks, is it not likely that he would use the Greek rather than the Arabic notation?' 'But, sir,' said the learned divine, 'everybody knows that the Greek letters were never used to mark numbers.' I answered with the meekest look and voice possible: 'I do not think, that everybody knows that. Indeed I have reason to believe that a different opinion—erroneous no doubt—is universally embraced by all the small minority who happen to know any Greek.' So ended the controversy. The man looked at me, as if he thought me a very wicked fellow; and, I dare say, has by this time discovered that, if you write my name in Tamul, leaving out T in Thomas, B in Babbington, and M in Macaulay, it will give the number of the unfortunate Beast.'"*

The last and most important point I wish to make is this. The right interpretation of Scripture is not only difficult, it is simply impossibly without the aid of the Holy Spirit. In other words, the man who essays to expound the Bible whether from the pulpit of the preacher or from the chair of the professor *must* bring to his task above and before everything else, a converted heart. It is not well to lack grammars, lexicons, commentaries and the ability to use them, yet these are but "the dust of the balance" compared with the spiritual qualification of the exegete.

* Trevelyan's life of Macaulay, I., p. 323.

But let it not be thought that there is any antagonism between all these other aids to Bible-study and the help of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit works according to the laws of the human mind, and He will be far more likely to open a text whose letter has been diligently investigated, than one known only on the surface. Piety is better than learning, but learned piety is doubly wiser than sanctified ignorance.

The necessity of the Holy Spirit's help in understanding God's word is a truth emphasized in different forms, by all those who have been mighty in the Scriptures. To take only one instance: When Origen,* that great teacher of the church, who had availed himself of every human aid accessible in his time for the understanding of the Scriptures, was exhorting his disciple, the young Gregory, to diligent "seeking and knocking" in the study of scripture, he added, "Be not content, however, with seeking and knocking, to gain insight into the things of God; prayer is the most necessary means of all."

The Reformers, Luther, Zwingli, Calvin and the rest, particularly emphasize similar thoughts, and with reason; for the necessity of the Spirit's help in understanding the Bible is a most important connection between the material and the formal principles of the Reformation—justification by faith and the supreme authority of the Scriptures. Thus my present point is a vital part of Protestantism. Yet there are two objections worth noticing, advanced against it.

1. Some critics object that a man cannot fairly investigate the meaning of a word to the examination of which he comes with a strong bias in its favor, and they argue that the aid of the Holy Spirit creates such a bias in advance in favor of the Scriptures. This objection is easily met. The Bible cannot be approached at all by the modern exegete without some kind of a prepossession. It is really only a question what kind of a prepossession is most in harmony with the book. This objection is very much like the current objection to creeds. Away with all the creeds! cry some of our reformers; not reflecting that the man who believes little or nothing has the narrowest and most exclusive creed of all, and by seeking to deprive others of their creeds he shows himself also one of the

* Neander, *Ch. Hist.*, I., p. 287 (Torrey's transl.)

most illiberal, intolerant and selfish of bigots. So, if we examine the work of those who profess to study the Bible with a mind free from "dogmatic prepossessions," we find one with a distinct prejudice against miracles, another with a bias in favor of myths, while a third rules out the supernatural altogether whether in prophecy, miracle, or in the person of Christ. It may easily be imagined what work such men make of elucidating the Scriptures. Their only way of letting light into the Bible seems to be to cut large holes in it, through which instead of the sacred word appears only the face of the jubilant critic.

2. But again, it is objected that the comprehension of Biblical language must be a purely mental process, why then should that comprehension be limited to those who are aided by the Holy Spirit? This is a mere sophism. The fact is that Biblical truth underlies the language and it is never purely intellectual, but predominantly moral and religious in its scope. Moreover where the Bible obtains the assent of the reader it also demands action on his part, action utterly distasteful to the unregenerate mind. Therefore the mind which comes unenlightened by the Spirit, really comes armed with an intense prejudice against the results of honest Bible study. I need not say that such a prepossession vitiates a true view of the subject.

Thus these two objections to prejudice both result in disclosing a hostile prejudice behind them. Indeed the guidance of the spirit is the only safety from prejudice. Turning away from this negative proof and assuming, of course, that the Bible is inspired by the Holy Spirit, we notice four things.

1. The aid of the Holy Spirit is necessary for the understanding of the Scriptures on a merely literary basis. In other words, it is here the necessary foundation for that sympathy on which the true comprehension of any literary work must rest.

A German verse runs:

"Who would the poet understand,
Must go into the poet's land,"

and Luther says that one must have lived with the shepherds in order to understand Virgil's Eclogues.

Dr. R. S. Storrs in a recent lecture puts it thus. "I can

understand a proposition, logically stated, whether I sympathize in temper or not with the man who declares it; but I cannot understand such an outpouring as this claims to be from the mind of the Most High, so various, so vast, so full of side-lights as it is, so covered here and there with shadows, so delicate, so tender, so majestic, so holy—I cannot understand it until *my* soul is also bathed in the effulgence of God's own light, until I am in the spirit of my soul sympathetic with him."*

2. The aid of the Holy Spirit is necessary for the understanding of the Scriptures as a moral and religious power. Christ said "Every one that is of the truth, heareth my voice." (Jno. xviii. 37.) "If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God, or I speak from myself." (Jno. vii. 17.) These verses show that a substantial sympathy with the moral purpose of Christ's teachings is necessary to a real grasp of their meaning, and this leads up to the further truth that only the heart possessed by the Spirit can appropriate the truth of God. When he, the Spirit of truth, is come he shall guide you into all the truth. (Jno. xvi. 13.) A man will not fully understand the way of salvation unfolded in the Scriptures until he is saved. As Hawthorne says: "Christian faith is a grand cathedral, with divinely pictured windows. Standing without you see no glory nor can possibly imagine any: standing within every ray of light reveals a harmony of unspeakable splendors."

3. The aid of the Holy Spirit is necessary for the comprehension of the Scriptures, since this alone corresponds to the nature and claims of the Scriptures.

The Bible claims to be inspired by the Holy Spirit. Hence, in the words of Zwingli, "He who spoke the word can alone know surely what he meant. Hence the same Spirit, who is the source of the Holy Scriptures, must also be their revealer and expounder."†

In Rome over the altar of San Lorenzo in Lucina hangs a picture of Christ crucified, painted by Guido and said to be wonderfully sublime and tender. But it can hardly be seen in

* God's Word Man's Light and Guide. Am. Tract Soc. N. Y. 1877. p. 101 sq.

† Dorner's Hist. of Prot. Theology (Eng. Tr.), I., p. 289.

"the dim religious light" of that dark church. Guido could never have painted it in such obscurity. If men could only see it in the light in which it was painted no doubt they would learn to appreciate its worth. It is not until we read the Scriptures in the light in which they were written, the light of the spirit, that we can discern their beauty and their truth. Luther rescued the Bible from the gloom of the dark church, in which no one could read it aright.

4. Finally. The aid of the Spirit is necessary for the comprehension of the Scriptures, because this alone leads to the real object of Bible study. For the study of God's word is not a mere intellectual exercise, not only a pursuit of knowledge, but it is the search for light on the path of human life. It aims not primarily at learning, but at faith. We study the Bible that we may lead men to Christ, and build up his church. Exegesis which loses itself in philological and archeological investigations is like the gleaming rivers of Damascus which finally sink in the desert sand. We come to the Bible to learn God's will, in order that we may do it ourselves, and persuade others to do it. This separates the study of God's word from every other study, this makes self-evident the need of the Spirit as the interpreter of the word.

In conclusion: The outlook for Biblical study was never so promising as it is to-day. The motives for this study may differ, the spirit of it may vary. Some men seem to approach the Bible as Erostratus neared the temple at Ephesus to set it on fire, or as Guiteau followed President Garfield to kill him, in order that by destroying something superlatively great and dear to many hearts, each might win undying notoriety. The temple burned to the ground, Erostratus has never been forgotten; our president has gone, and doubtless his assassin will long be infamous; but the man who is to soar into fame as having hurled the destructive torch or struck the fatal blow at the Bible, has not yet shown himself; nor, unless we misread the purposes of God and the history of man, will he ever be made manifest. Age after age in the storms of doubt the cavaliers have attacked the Bible like the flocks of tempest-driven birds which dash against the light-house lantern. One moment the light seems obscured and we fear that it is extinguished by

their tumultuous rush—the next, the light shines out undimmed, and its assailants have fallen with broken wings on the rocks below. ‘But whether of envy and strife, or of goodwill, whether of faction or of love. What then? Only that in every way, whether in pretence or in truth, God’s word is studied; and therein I rejoice, yea and will rejoice.’”

I trust I am in some degree sensible of the importance of the interests committed to me. I pray that I may be made more and more sensible of it. I thank God that I am permitted to dedicate my life to the study of his word. May He constantly deepen my dependence on the Spirit of truth.

ARTICLE II.—SOME HONEST DOUBTS ABOUT THE SUPPOSED ONLY SCRIPTURAL GROUND FOR DIVORCE.

ONE of the symptoms of bad social omen at the present time is the low views on the subject of marriage and divorce. By the original divine constitution marriage was more than a union of man and woman dependent on their own consent and the civil sanctions. It was a state of conjugal oneness, made possible by the peculiar nature given the parties by the Creator, and realizing itself in a mutual self-surrender under an impulse in accordance with which, for the purposes in view, two hearts, two wills, become one.

This domestic or conjugal oneness is stated in the record of the institution of marriage contained in Genesis, ii. 23-24: "And Adam said, 'This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh. . . . Therefore shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave unto his wife: and *they shall be one flesh.*'" It is also referred to in Malachi ii. 15, where the connection shows the prophet is urging the fact of the creative oneness of the marital state as a reason against divorce. He asserts it was from no want of ability that God originally made the relation a unity—one man united in a peculiar social oneness to one woman, and one woman to one man—but that the object was, through the unity and harmony of the home thus produced, to secure godly offspring. He asks, "And did he not make one?" Not the man one or the woman one; the connection shows that the meaning is more than that; but, the married pair one. Did he not make a domestic unity, in the strict sense—the one man and the one woman, in a higher union, one—the twain one? "Yet had he the residue of the spirit." He had the power to make a married cluster, to have put a number in the marital group; but he put the smallest number possible, and made them one. "And wherefore *the* one?" The article is in the original. "That he might seek a godly seed."

But our Lord is explicit. He says to the Pharisees, Matt. xix. 4-5: "Have ye not read that he which made them at the

beginning, made them male and female, and said, for this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave unto his wife, and *the twain shall be one flesh. Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh.*" The Apostle Paul echoes the same thought, but carries it up to a higher plane, when he illustrates the oneness of the marriage relation and the sacredness and binding force of the tie by the union of Christ and the church. In the epistle to the Ephesians v. 28-31, new version, he says: "Even so ought husbands also to love their own wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his own wife loveth himself: for no man ever hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it, even as Christ also the church, because we are members of his body; for this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and the twain shall become one flesh."

The marriage relation is, therefore, in its idea a sacred and divinely appointed unity, and stands on high and independent moral grounds. The State may recognize and protect it, and legislate about it, but it does not originate it. It exists by the creative act and appointment of God—a unique and peculiar relation, a blending of two human hearts and wills and lives in a conjugal unity.

The State, however, in treating this relation where it comes within its sphere may fail properly to recognize it and deal with it in its high character and on moral grounds. It may thoughtlessly overlook the divine element and purpose in it and treat it simply as a civil institution, looking at it as a matter of social expediency, and adapting its legislation to the moral tone of the community.

This has been the case, especially in the United States, until in the laws of most of the States marriage has lost much of its sacredness; and divorce can be secured for frivolous reasons, with alarming facility, and at little cost.

The sacredness of the relation and a sense of the moral and divine ideas entering into it are cherished and kept alive only by other influences and causes than legislation, and quite outside of it. So wide in fact is the departure of legislation and the practice of the courts from the true idea of its nature and obligations that Christian people have taken alarm. They see

that the very foundation of social life is threatened. They know that if the marriage bond is trifled with the home is gone; and if the home goes, there is no possibility of the moral training of the children; and if the children are not trained, society hastens to destruction. They perceive that this process of fundamental corruption must be arrested or we are sure to go down the abyss, as all nations have done where marriage has not been honored.

Already a reactionary discussion and agitation have begun. It is very important that they should be conducted on grounds of unquestioned truth. There is a temptation to take too strong and radical positions. It is commonly assumed by the friends of this reform that according to scripture the marriage tie is indissoluble, save for one cause, adultery. It is a question whether this is a fair interpretation. The object of this paper is to express some honest doubts on this subject.

The question turns, largely and fundamentally, on the teachings of Christ.

The civil law regulating divorce, introduced by Moses, was a concession to the times and was manifestly far below the divine constitution of marriage. That stipulated (Deut. xxiv. 1-2), as follows: "When a man hath taken a wife, and married her, and it come to pass that she find no favor in his eyes, because he hath found some uncleanness in her, then let him write her a bill of divorcement, and give it in her hand, and send her out of his house. And when she is departed out of his house she may go and be another man's wife."

There were controversies among the Jews at the time of Christ about the meaning of the ground here assigned for divorce. Literally the expression means "the nakedness, or the shame of a thing;" and some of the Jews, as the school Shammai, gave it a narrower and severer meaning, involving some moral delinquency; and others, as the followers of Hillel, a broader and more general meaning, covering almost anything displeasing to the husband. But our Saviour condemned this code as immoral and contrary to the original conception of marriage. When the Pharisees came to him, wishing to entangle him in the controversy between the opposing schools, and asked (Matt. xix. 3): "Is it lawful for a man to

put away his wife for every cause?" he replied by showing the original oneness of the married pair as shown in their own scriptures, and added: "What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder." Wishing now to bring him in conflict with their great popular law-giver, they asked again, "Why did Moses then command to give a writing of divorcement and to put her away?" He answered, showing the temporary and concessive nature of the permission, "Moses, because of the hardness of your hearts, suffered you to put away your wives; but from the beginning it was not so."

The permission of the law regulated the common practice among the Jews. But God had, from time to time, called their attention through the prophets to the higher claims of marriage. On this subject, as on several others, they had now and then risen in sublime solitude above the temporary ethics tolerated in the civil system like single mountain-peaks covered with everlasting snow rising above the malarial plains of the tropics, and proclaimed the eternal will of God. As they had held up God's demand for spiritual worship above the offering of bloody sacrifices and contrition of heart above the forms of fasting, so Malachi held up the sanctity of marriage above the contract of the parties, and the divine hatred of divorce above the permissions of the Mosaic law. One verse has been already quoted. The whole passage (ii. 14-16), is as follows: "The Lord hath been *witness* between thee and the wife of thy youth, against whom thou hast dealt treacherously; yet is she thy companion, and the wife of thy *covenant*. And did he not make one? Yet had he the residue of the spirit. And wherefore the one? That he might seek a godly seed. Therefore take heed to your spirit, and let none deal treacherously against the wife of his youth, for the Lord, the God of Israel, saith that *he hateth putting away*."

Two things are here noticeable; first, the prophet brings out the sacred and moral idea of marriage, for he speaks of it as a "covenant;" and a covenant involved divine sanctions. The marriage was a transaction, according to the prophet, in the presence of God, who held the parties to fidelity to its obligations. And second, he teaches that God hated the practice of divorces or putting away their wives. But these sublime

teachings, going back to the original constitution of the family, took no hold on the popular heart. They presented God's view; they did not change the practice of society. They are, also, too rapt, too obscure, too fragmentary, too much in the high strain of ancient prophecy, to afford us definite instruction on the question of scriptural divorce.

The whole Mosaic code and usage, and the occasional sporadic teachings of the prophets, are, therefore, to be set aside for the higher or more effective authority of Christ and the New Testament, and so pass out of the field of our inquiry.

The teachings of Christ then, come at once into the foreground. How are we to interpret them?

There are four places in the gospels where Christ speaks upon this subject; two in Matthew—v. 31-32, and xix. 3-9; one in Mark, x. 2-12, and one in Luke, xvi. 18. In the two passages in Matthew he specifies "fornication" as the just cause for divorce. In the first passage (v. 31-32), he says: "It hath been said, whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement; but I say unto you, that whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery; and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery." In the second (xix. 9), "Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery; and whosoever shall marry her that is put away doth commit adultery." Here in both of these passages fornication is spoken of as the sole ground. But in the other two gospels no cause for divorce is specified. Luke reads as follows (xvi. 18): "Whosoever putteth away his wife and marrieth another, committeth adultery; and whosoever marrieth her that is put away from her husband committeth adultery." Mark (x. 11-12): "Whosoever shall put away his wife and marry another, committeth adultery against her; and if a woman shall put away her husband and be married unto another, she committeth adultery." In these two passages the marriage bond is spoken of as rightfully indissoluble. The prohibition is absolute. There is no exception or limitation. In the former two the general term *πορνεία*, "fornication"—any sexual violation of chastity—not *μορχεία*, "adultery"—the usual term for marital infidelity—is mentioned as the sufficient reason for divorce.

It has been thought that the deliverance in Mark—one of those in which no exception is made to the binding nature of marriage—was made on the same occasion as the one in Matthew, chapter xix. in which the exception is given; but that Mark failed to record the exception. In this case the fuller record in Matthew is to be the law for interpreting the briefer one in Mark. But this is improbable; for the deliverance in Mark was made to the disciples after they had left the Pharisees and gone into the house, while the one in Matthew was made to the Pharisees. The two statements seem to have been made on the same day,—but the one to the Pharisees, and this was recorded by Matthew; and the other in private to the disciples, and this was recorded by Mark. At any rate, the passage in Luke—the other one in which no ground is assigned for divorce—is a separate and independent record. We are compelled, therefore, to believe that on some occasions our Lord, for reasons known to himself, spoke of marriage as indissoluble, and on other occasions he mentioned “fornication” as justifying the dissolution of the tie.

How are we to understand this? Are we to suppose that he reached his positions on this subject by a process, first taking them in his own mind tentatively, and as he found they needed modification, changing them from time to time to meet his enlarged insight? that he modified his doctrine absolutely, as men often do theirs in the gradual unfolding of their systems? We cannot believe this. We must suppose that his doctrine was settled in his own mind from the beginning of his ministry. It was the same with him here as in relation to other subjects. His system was complete from the beginning. He did not reach his conclusions upon ethical and spiritual matters by a tentative, experimental, zigzag process through trial, but by Divine insight. That is the peculiarity of the record concerning him as a Teacher. The want of completeness in his statements, of full and final words on different subjects at various times, is not to be ascribed to vacillation or crudeness or undigested thought on his part, but to his chosen method in adapting his teachings to those about him. There was never any other teacher who wrapped up such general and universal truth in such special personal forms. We think of him often as speak-

ing to the world in the form of his teachings when the principle involved only was for the world, while the form was for those about him.

We must take this peculiarity of his method as a Teacher into account, to understand what he means on the subject before us. Many of his sayings—and he does not stop to tell us which ones—were intensely and wholly personal, and not designed for all; for example, his pleasure generally was that those whom he had healed should go and tell what he had done for them; but he sometimes said: "See thou tell no man;" "See that no man know it." The first part of his direction to the rich young man was designed to meet his individual needs, and not as a rule for others: "Go, *sell that thou hast, and give to the poor*; and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come and follow me" (Matt. xix. 21). Many of his teachings, also, were not designed to be understood literally. He himself said of his words: "They are spirit, and they are life." Their meaning did not hang in the letter, but in a higher somewhat beyond; and with sublime confidence and daring he uttered his strange sentences, and trusted the good sense of men, the teachings of the Divine Spirit, and the cumulative side-light from his other teachings, to carry them over from the letter to the principle, the "spirit" and the "life" of his words. He was not careful after each utterance to put in the qualifications and limitations. Thus he, who would not have all civil society given up to violence and rapine, yet says: "Resist not evil; whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also;" "Whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain." He, who was thinking of moral and spiritual things, and did not expect his words to be taken with hard literalness, says: "If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee." "If thy right hand offend thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee; for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell." (Matt. v. 29-30.) Again, he says, waiting for the gracious influences he was putting into the world to make the needed explanation: "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, ye have no life in you." (John vi. 53.) And he, who had done so much to impress men

with the certainty of retribution in the world to come, risked the liability of a gross material interpretation and said: "Those eighteen upon whom the tower in Siloam fell and slew them, think ye that they were sinners above all men that dwelt in Jerusalem? I tell you, Nay; but except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish." (Luke xiii. 4-5.)

It was obviously the method of Christ to speak freely, boldly, startlingly, and yet, with Divine discernment, to the wants of those about him. We must interpret him in each instance in the light of the circumstances and of a general concentration of his teachings around that instance. We must look beyond the words uttered to the "spirit" and the "life" of the words.

To apply these remarks: we all believe that Christ did not understand himself as uttering full and final words on the subject of divorce, when taken literally, in the passages in Luke and Mark. There the permanency of the marriage tie only is spoken of, and no reference is made to any cause justifying its termination. We all supply a qualification from Matthew, which he did not see fit to make to those about him, at the time referred to in Mark and Luke. How do we know that he intended to utter full and final words on the subject to those about him when he uttered the two passages recorded in Matthew? Why should we hold his meaning here to the rigidity of the letter, and not look to see whether there may not be a principle or spirit back of the letter?

There is something in the one cause mentioned in Matthew that suggests a freer interpretation. We have seen that the word chosen in both of these cases is *πορνεία*, "fornication," and not *μορφή*, "adultery." It is the broader word. It, of course, includes the more specific offense, but it may include more. It might refer to acts of unchastity before marriage, as well as after, but not discovered till afterwards, as Prof. Hovey suggests, though I do not think this probable. It at least hints that Christ's thought was not specifically and exclusively and pointedly on "adultery" as the only ground for divorce. If it had been, it is most extraordinary that he did not use that term, as it was one he was familiar with, and often used.

Taking all these things into consideration, therefore, may not Christ hint by the peculiarity of his way of speaking on

the subject,—now affirming the absolute inviolability of marriage, and now mentioning a single familiar cause of its absolute disruption as a ground for the formal dissolution of the tie,—that he regards the conjugal oneness as itself properly inseparable by man, the relation when it exists as permanent and never to be abrogated by either party; but that when persons are formally in a marriage state which has been interiorly dissolved by infidelity to a fundamental principle of its existence, and the conjugal oneness has become a conjugal duality, then a separation may take place in form with liberty for remarriage? In this case, the four passages harmonize, substantially. According to this idea true marriage is always binding, conjugal oneness may never be dissolved. May not that be Christ's thought in Mark and Luke, where he is not thinking of cases where the bond is dissolved from within? But when he has occasion to speak of such cases—cases where by a crime against the marriage estate the relation has already been dissolved—then he permits the aggrieved party to seek the formal abrogation of the tie. The conjugal oneness, the divine constitution of marriage, not by a constructive act but by destructive infidelity, is already gone. It is not wrong for the innocent party, where marriage is thus corrupted and vacated in its essential nature, to have release. May not Christ have this thought in mind in Matthew? If both of these things are so, then in Matthew, Mark, and Luke, the same high doctrine of the binding force of marriage is in the background of our Saviour's thought, and marriage is never to be terminated formally unless it is already terminated internally.

But we need to look at this subject from another point of view. We need to look at it in the light of the condition of society to which our Lord spoke. There may have been something in that which gave a local or temporary color to his words. As he often said things which reflected the hue of the times, as concerning the washing of disciples' feet, how do we know but that it may have been so here?

That was an age of frequent and easy divorce all over the known world. The Romans, having degenerated from the severer manners of the earlier days of the Republic and become socially corrupt, put away their wives, and the wives put away

their husbands, on the slightest pretexts. Men, like Antistius Vetus, put away their wives because they had been talking in public with low women; or like Sulpicius Gallus, because they had gone abroad with uncovered head; or Æmilius Paulus, without assigning any reason; or like Cicero, after a long marriage, to marry a rich lady to have the means of paying their debts; or like Cato the younger, lent their wives to a friend and took them back after that friend's death.* In relation to Æmilius Paulus, who put away his wife without assigning any reason, it is related by Plutarch, that when his friends remonstrated with him, saying: "Is your wife not virtuous? Is she not fair? Has she not borne you handsome children?" he replied, showing them his shoe: "Is not this shoe new? Is it not handsome? Yet none of you knows where it pinches."† Speaking of the same period Seneca says: "No woman was now ashamed of divorce, since certain illustrious and noble ladies counted their years not by the number of consuls but of husbands."‡

In Greece there was a still more corrupt state of things. Husbands bought and sold their wives, lent them to their friends, or sent them away with little formality.§ The right of divorce was possessed by women as well as men, though attended with more restrictions. Marriage, says President Woolsey, "came to be regarded only as a convenience or as an evil; population fell off; whatever Greek virtue of the political sort had existed left the race."|| After the Macedonian conquest, the Greeks still adhered to monogamy, still allowed concubinage with scarcely a frown, still granted almost unlimited freedom to the separation of man and woman."¶

Among the Jews, though the general condition of social morals was not so bad, the freedom of divorce, on the side of men, was even greater, being attended with less formality and less liability of cost. All that was necessary, when the husband had found a reason for putting away his wife, was to write

* This and the preceding instances are to be found in Taylor's "*Elements of the Civil Law*," pp. 359-363; also in President Woolsey's "*Divorce and Divorce Legislation*," pp. 20, 45, and 49.

† *New Englander*, Oct., 1881, p. 595.

§ *Ibid.*, 26-9.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

‡ "*Divorce, etc.*," p. 49.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 27.

her "a bill of divorcement," and put her away. The Mosaic law specified as a sufficient reason "the nakedness, or the shame, of a thing;" but practically and according to the general custom this meant almost anything the husband desired. The Pharisees referring to the existing usage asked Christ if men might put away their wives "*for every cause.*" Josephus says, it might take place "*for any cause whatsoever.*"* Wives were put away for spinning in public, going out with head uncovered, or clothes so torn as not properly to conceal their persons, or to make way for a more beautiful woman.

Thus Christ was speaking to this age of free, corrupt, and socially corrupting divorce, and directly to the Jews, among the most lax and indifferent to the moral element of marriage, its divine constitution, the real conjugal oneness; and who sported with the marital rights of their wives as if they had none; though the superior moral condition of Jewish society, generally, compared with that in all pagan lands, preserved the Jewish homes and wives from suffering all the natural effects of the low popular conception of marriage.

To understand the case we must call to mind the position of the Jewish wife. She was in subjection to the husband. His will in the home was supreme. She had no rights of divorce under the Mosaic law; never sought divorce, though about this time foreign influences began to infect certain women of state, and in a few instances they had taken the initiative for it according to the Roman usage. "She was always the passive party," says Woolsey.† And being kept in subjection and mostly in seclusion, there was ordinarily but one crime destroying the very nature of the marriage bond, of which she would be likely to be guilty—a breach of marital fidelity. She had not the opportunities and temptations in the usages of the time calculated to involve her in other crimes alike fatal to marriage.

The husbands had no such domestic restrictions against vice or crime, no such safeguard against the full exercise of their depravity. No family restraint was laid upon them practically to keep them from violating the marriage union from

* *Antiquities*, vol. 1, p. 133.

† *Divorce*, p. 19.

within. They doubtless were guilty, in many instances, of crimes or sins that as really destroyed the essence of marriage as fornication or adultery—as, for example, the crime against nature, or extreme cruelty, or beastly self-degradation, or a life of outlawry. Yet Christ did not mention these as a reason for a separation; he had no occasion to, for he was speaking to men against divorce, the only party among his hearers who practiced it.

Under these circumstances—addressing men who had forgotten the original idea and sanctity of marriage, and were tossing aside their wives from whim, or passion, or lust for others, with only a scrap of writing in return—when, perhaps, not one in scores of them had committed any moral offense weakening the obligation of marriage, or if any, most likely an act of infidelity; remonstrating with the men for this wrong to their wives, and having no occasion to speak of any of the far more numerous reasons for divorce from them the wives might have, who never resorted to it, is it strange, under these circumstances, that Christ should at times condemn divorce without qualification? He condemned the whole Jewish custom as it was carried on. How could he do otherwise? He was speaking to that condition of things; it was bad and demoralizing from beginning to end. Is it strange that at times he had no qualifications to make? Is it strange, again, that at other times he should provide in his remarks for the exceedingly small number of justifiable separations that were taking place, and should mention the only sufficient cause which was likely to exist? Adultery or “fornication” was the most probable sufficient cause of which the Jewish wife would be guilty; and therefore, when he thinks it important to do so, he mentions that exception to the general condemnation of the practice. So far as his object was to rebuke the license and corruption of the times on this subject and recall attention to the sacred and binding nature of marriage, it made little difference in the great multitude of cases whether he made provision for any divorce or not; just as, in the present drinking customs of society, considering the extent and fearful nature of the evil, it makes little difference whether a reformer in his popular appeals makes any provision for

drinking intoxicating liquors or not; and it is perfectly proper for him at one time to urge his hearers never to drink them, and at another time never to do it unless honestly as a medicine. The exceptions to the general prohibition are too few to need to be always mentioned.

Thus it seems very much as if Christ shaped the form of his teachings on this subject, in a measure, to the times and the state of things among the Jews. This is still more evident from the fact that all his references to it relate to divorce by men, except in one place, and in that he makes no provision for divorce for the woman on any ground whatever. In that passage, Mark x. 12, he says: "If a woman put away her husband and be married to another, she committeth adultery." This certainly does not look as if he regarded himself as speaking full and final words on the subject for all future ages and all men, but as rebuking an enormous evil of the times, and not needing to say much about divorce by women, which was rarely ever heard of among the Jews, and therefore it was not necessary that he should assign any reasons justifying it. Down to the age of Constantine the orthodox early Christians, who thought our Lord's meaning hung in the letter of his words, and supposed he was giving full and final instructions, "allowed no other ground for divorce than fornication or adultery on the part of women."* No offense or crime on the part of the husband justified it.

Gregory Nazianzen says that the reason why Christ allowed separation only from the adulteress was that she *adullerates the stock*—*ποθεύει τὸ γένος*.† But this assumes that Christ puts genealogical considerations above moral ones. The more natural explanation is the one that has been given, that Christ addressed Jews, and the Jews did not practice divorce for the sin of the husbands at all, and the only probable sin of the wife justifying it was infidelity. Christians in modern times have extended Christ's words enough at least to make adultery on the part of the husband a sufficient reason for the wife to seek a release.

The early Allegorists, indeed, according to their usual

* Christian Antiquities, vol. ii., p. 1110.

† "Divorce," p. 62.

method of interpretation, extended the meaning of the one term used by Christ as cause for divorce by giving it a spiritual sense, and made it to bear the meaning of idolatry, infidelity in religious matters, and covetousness, as well as fornication.*

Thus when we regard Christ as speaking to those around him about a great social sin of the times, using terms which reflect the color of the times, yet using words which are "spirit" and "life," and when we separate the substance from the shadow, and rise to the principle, the whole difficulty disappears. We then see that marriage in its true divine idea is indissoluble. It is a peculiar social oneness created by God, and only to be terminated or resolved into its parts rightly by God; and the formal union is only to cease for a cause that has already destroyed its essence. The spirit of his teachings is that no civil process can make a dissolution; it can only declare it. He leaves no room for such pretexts as want of congeniality, difference of taste and culture, disagreeable habits or manners, constructive desertion or failure of support, or disputes about property. The cause must be some great moral delinquency which destroys from within the very possibility of marriage life; then civil divorce may recognize the fact and publish it. Whenever there is absolute disloyalty to the marriage bond, severing through and through and totally the reality and possibility of marital oneness, and destroying the peace and happiness, as well as the integrity, of the home, then the spirit of Christ's instruction seems to be, wedlock may be formally dissolved.

Accordingly, while there may be a local and temporary tinge to his words arising from the peculiarity of the times and persons, permanent Truth rises like a rainbow above them, arching them, and giving a light to all coming ages. We commit an equal mistake when, on the one hand, we interpret every shade and tinge of his teachings as a part of the absolute and eternal verity of the Gospel, and when, on the other, we regard the whole message as local and ephemeral, designed only for those about him, dragging the sublime and unfading Truth or Principle down to the narrowness and thinness of a

* Smith's Dic. of Christian Antiquities, under Marriage, p. 1110.

personal and local deliverance. We need, for the honor of the Teacher, for our own safe guidance, and in the interest of Truth, to discriminate between the two methods of interpretation.

It may be objected that the disengagement of a principle from the Divine words which extends their meaning, is a perilous procedure and weakens the authority and exactness of the teaching. President Woolsey in his work on Divorce says : * "To say that Christ, when he said, 'except on account of fornication,' only gave a sample of several exceptions which he regarded as valid, is to trifle with his words, and to leave open the door for any degree of laxness." I do not think that Christ is giving a sample but a principle, and that the principle may cover more than the specified exception. Even President Woolsey, who is a strong advocate of the "one sole cause" theory, makes this remarkable admission in the same treatise : † "But there are frightful crimes against nature, odious even to the heathen : supposing these not to be included in the term *πορνεία* ('fornication')—will they furnish no ground for divorce? All that needs to be said here seems to be that death is the penalty for such crimes by the Jewish and many other laws, so that the separation would be inevitable ; that our Lord had no occasion to speak of great crimes of very rare occurrence about which there could be no difference of opinion ; and that if both he and the Pharisees admitted these crimes to be more than adultery, his *exception by right reason would include them.*" That is, President Woolsey, by fair interpretation of his words, does not regard Christ's meaning as inhering rigidly and wholly in the letter but as transcending it. He really regards him as uttering a principle, —not giving a "sample," but lifting up a permanent light by means of an illustration.

Such seems to be the meaning of the fundamental passages on this subject in the New Testament—the teachings of Christ. Now how is this view affected by other passages?

There are two others that are sometimes supposed to bear on divorce, both in the writings of the Apostle Paul. One is in the Epistle to the Romans, vii. 2-3 : "The woman which hath

* p. 83.

† Ibid., p. 64.

a husband is bound by the law to the husband so long as he liveth; but if the husband be dead, she is loosed from the law of the husband. So then if, while her husband liveth, she be married to another man, she shall be called an adulteress; but if her husband be dead, she is free from that law; so that she is no adulteress, though she be married to another man."

Now it is to be observed that this is brought in by the Apostle as an illustration. His main thought is not the binding nature of marriage at all; but the fact that the moral "law hath dominion over a man as long as he liveth;" and he wishes to illustrate the fact that we, being spiritually dead to that law through the death of Christ for us, may now, without feeling the obligation to keep the law as a method of salvation, be married to Christ. He only introduces the relation of husband and wife to show that when the husband dies the wife is free to marry another man. It would be foreign and fatal to his purpose to assign any ground for divorce at all. The only process he has in mind as a means of releasing us from the law is death; and so the death of the husband as the way of releasing the wife from the law of marriage fitly illustrates how our death to the moral law through the body of Christ dying for us, received by faith, releases us from the obligations of that law, and leaves us at liberty to look solely to Christ for salvation and to be spiritually united to him. It is straining the passage to take it out of its place and use as an illustration, and make it to do service as an independent treatise on the marriage relation.

If we do this, as the Apostle here makes no reference to divorce for any cause, we bring him into conflict with our Lord. Besides, if we press the words in this way—"The woman which hath a husband is bound by law to the husband so long as he liveth"—we bring him in conflict with himself in the Epistle to the Corinthians. In I. Cor. vii. 15, he says: "If the unbelieving"—husband or wife—"depart, let him depart. A brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases." Whether this means divorce or only separation, it does not matter here; but it certainly shows that there may be cases when in any strict sense "the wife is *not bound by the law to her husband so long as he liveth;*" and this is not brought in as an

illustration, but is the main subject under consideration. The passage in Romans can, therefore, really throw no light on the question before us.

We come now to the other passage which does have a very important bearing on it. It is this passage in I. Corinthians vii. 10-16. In the common version it reads:

10 And unto the married I command, *yet* not I, but the Lord, Let not the wife depart from *her* husband :

11 But and if she depart, let her remain unmarried, or be reconciled to *her* husband : and let not the husband put away *his* wife.

12 But to the rest speak I, not the Lord : If any brother hath a wife that believeth not, and she be pleased to dwell with him, let him not put her away.

13 And the woman which hath a husband that believeth not, and if he be pleased to dwell with her, let her not leave him.

14 For the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the husband : else were your children unclean, but now are they holy.

15 But if the unbelieving depart, let him depart. A brother or a sister is not under bondage in such *cases* : but God hath called us to peace.

16 For what knowest thou, O wife, whether thou shalt save *thy* husband? or how knowest thou, O man, whether thou shalt save *thy* wife?

This was written, it must be remembered, to Corinthian Christians living in the most corrupt city of corrupt Greece. The low state of morals there even for that age and land of social corruption was proverbial, so that in the Greek vocabulary "to Corinthianize" was "to play the wanton."* Divorces were common and for trifling causes. The apostle finds it necessary to resist the tendency in the infant church. There were two classes of Christians who were in peril—those who were married to Christians, and those married to pagans.

He writes to the former first and uses strong terms. He "commands" them, not in his own name, but taking up and handing over the general prohibition contained in the teachings of Christ, that neither party should seek a separation from the other. They are both Christians; they are to show an example of the moral obligation of marriage and the abiding oneness of the married state, in the presence of the pagan indifference to it. The evil is so general, for reasons that cannot justify divorce, that he makes no exception to the prohibi-

* Conybeare and Howson's *Life of Paul*, vol. ii., p. 27.

tion, imitating in this what we have seen was sometimes the practice of his Master. But the terms he uses, though the fact does not appear in either of our versions, shows that he has divorce in mind, and not separation, as the thing prohibited. In the tenth verse the word *χωρισθῆναι* would naturally mean to the Corinthians *being put away* in the familiar manner of divorce, and the passage, instead of reading "Let not the wife depart from the husband," would naturally read, Let not the wife be put away from the husband, though the connection shows that the separation is one that was agreeable to her and one that she also willed. It is probable, therefore, that this was one of those cases where both parties seek a separation—where there is a mutual antagonism and repulsion; and while the wife withdraws the husband helps her off; and that the passive voice of the verb is here used for the middle, in the "permissive sense" spoken of by Winer, to indicate this mutual action. But in either case the Corinthians would naturally look upon such a separation as a final breaking up of the marriage relation. Yet the apostle does not seem to regard the begun divorce as in all cases an instantly completed and final one, for he directs the wife, if the inchoate transaction has just begun, to "remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband."

So, also, *ἀφίεναι* in the eleventh verse could only suggest to them the act of the husband in sending off his wife in that way, and should be translated, "Let not the husband put away his wife," as it is in the old version, and not as it is in the new, "That the wife leave not the husband."

It must be borne in mind that both *ἀφίεναι* and *χωρίζεσθαι* were common legal terms used in divorce cases among the Greeks, and would be so understood unless the contrary were expressly indicated. Bloomfield, on this passage, says: "As to the use of *ἀφίεναι* and *χωρίζεσθαι*, it may be observed that a husband when divorcing his wife was said, *ἐκβάλλειν*, or, by a milder term, *ἀποπέμπειν*, or by the mildest, *ἀφίεναι*. On the contrary, a wife who, from whatever cause, left her husband, was said, *ἀπολείπειν* or *χωρίζεσθαι* (passive for reciprocal), for the wife could not send away the husband, but only leave the house." And President Woolsey says (p. 29), "Divorce at

Athens was easy and frequent. It took two shapes, distinguished often by different words, being called *sending away*, or *out of the house* (*ἀποπέμψεν* or *ἐπέμψεν*), when the husband repudiated the wife, but *quitting* or *going away* (*ἀπολέσκειν*), when the wife separated herself from the husband." But in a note he adds, "Other terms also occur, as *ἐκβάλλειν*, *ἀπολύειν*, *ἀφίεναι*." Liddell and Scott also state one definition of *ἀφίεναι* to be, "to put away, divorce," and refer to Herodotus as authority.

To Christians, therefore, who were married to Christians, the apostle urges that they bear their grievances and not resort to divorce at all; but concedes that this may not be possible in all cases, though he mentions no reasons justifying divorce, but simply directs in reference to the wife, if she depart—literally, if she be put away—the passive voice implying mutual repulsion, mutual separation—that she "remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband."

We come now to the case of Christians married to pagans. Here the apostle says he cannot appeal to any instructions from Christ, who had not spoken in reference to such cases, showing, it may be remarked, that he did not regard him as having uttered full and final instructions on the subject for all men in his remarks to the Jews. The apostle instructs the believing party, husband or wife, who has a companion who is pleased to continue in relations of wedlock, not "to put away" the unbelieving party—that is, not to take the initiative for divorce, as in Greece the wife might do, as well as the husband. The word here used to denote the prohibited act is the same in both cases, whether by the husband or by the wife. The word is *ἀφίέρω*, and this word in the popular Greek phrase of the time was a common legal term used to denote divorce, and would be so understood in such a connection, unless some other meaning were clearly stated. Lange, endorsing Hodge, says:* "There is ground for affirming that it is not simple abandonment, but formal divorce that the apostle here prohibits." Meyer takes the same view,† and says of the wife putting away the husband, "The Vulgate renders correctly, *Non dimittat virum*." The apostle's instruction, in effect, is

* Commentary in loc.

† Commentary in loc.

this: If the unbelieving party is willing to live with the believing, the believer should not seek a divorce. He does not stop to make any exception to the rule as he is only telling Christians how they should act in view of their religious relations and strifes. He views the subject only as a religious question—as one phase of the surging contest between Christianity and paganism. He is not dealing with marriage as between man and woman, but only as between a Christian and a pagan. Hence he has nothing to say about moral delinquencies that might be eating out the very life of marriage.

But the case is different when the unbelieving party repudiates the marriage. The Common version of the 15th verse reads: "But if the unbelieving depart, let him depart. A brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases: but God hath called us to peace." The words translated "depart,"—*χωρίζεται* and *χωρίζεσθω*,—are both doubtless in the middle voice, indicating that the departure is a personal and voluntary act, though prompted here also by mutual repulsion. Here the gravity of the case, the absence of any limitation or direction to remain unmarried, as in the former instance, and the connection, suggest that more than a separation was contemplated. It was a separation for good. No hold was to be maintained on the departing party, none on the one that remained. "Let him depart"—a finality. It could only be so understood by those to whom the Epistle was written. President Woolsey says:* "The word *χωρίζεται* denotes any separation, whether attended with formal statement of a purpose of divorce or not, in other words, it includes divorce and desertion." And that it means a desertion involving divorce here is evident by what the Apostle adds. After saying, "Let him depart," he makes this decisive remark: "A brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases." This definite statement seems conclusive that the Apostle has full divorce in mind. The words would have no meaning if mere separation were referred to, and not a dissolution of the marriage tie, for the unbelieving party had already gone away. He had abandoned the activities, duties, and privileges or authorities, of married life. He could inflict no longer any domestic torture or

* "Divorce," p. 82.

bondage. The only thing that could bind or oppress the believing party, who had been ready to abide by the marriage, was the continuance of the relation after the other had repudiated and abandoned it.

It is claimed by the advocates of the "one cause" theory that the Apostle here admits of separation *a mensa et toro*, but not *a vinculo*. But the unbelieving party had already taken himself away *a mensa et toro*; and yet the Apostle adds, not this: "A brother or a sister is not under bondage to the bed and board of the deserter in such cases—which would be tautological and absurd; but, "A brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases," to the marriage bond, doubtless, the only bondage remaining. Certainly the Corinthians must so have understood it; for they knew nothing about a legal status of a continued marriage bond when the marriage relation was repudiated and disowned by both parties. They were acquainted with divorce and with the legal terms used in divorce cases; and when such language was used, they could not understand a subtle method of separating the parties formally and forever, and yet keeping them tied together by an invisible ligature.

Bengel holds that divorce is here referred to, though he adds—what the Apostle has not added—that the wife should "remain unmarried," from the 11th verse. Meyer gives this exegesis of *δεδουλωται*, "is not enslaved, so namely as still to remain bound in marriage." Lange says the Apostle "here assigns the reasons why a divorce should be allowed on the part of a Christian; and the words cannot simply mean, 'he is not bound to crowd himself upon the other,—to insist upon the connection, as in the case where both are Christians;' but they carry the further implication,—'is not unconditionally bound to the marriage relationship like a slave, 'is free.'" And Lange adds, reaffirming Meyer: "Because Paul does not apply our Lord's prohibition of divorce to mixed marriages, he does not intend also to apply his prohibition of a second marriage in Matthew v. 22 to such cases."*

That divorce is meant is confirmed by what the Apostle

* The above quotations from Lange and Meyer are from their commentaries in *locis*.

adds in the last part of the verse and in the sixteenth verse. He says: "God hath called us in peace." The expression is *in* peace, as in the New Version, not *to* peace as in the Old. The idea is that the original condition in which the Divine calling to be a Christian comes is one of peace and good will towards all, not of hatred and strife; and the implication is that the condition of true Christian living is the same afterwards. If the Divine calling begins in peace, it can hardly be the Divine will that the Christian should continue in a condition involving wrangling subsequently, the Christian graces only thriving in an atmosphere of peace. This might harmonize with either of the two interpretations, separation or divorce. But he goes on to state that in such cases the great motive which might be assigned why the Christian should hold on to the pagan who has already separated himself—the hope of being the means of his conversion—may not after all exist, —intimating, indeed, that the probability of conversion may be less, by continuing the relation: "for how knowest thou, O wife, whether thou shalt save thy husband? or how knowest thou, O husband, whether thou shalt save thy wife?" (New Version.) That he does not here hold out the hope of conversion as a reason for continuing the relation, but states the improbability of thus aiding it, is the interpretation now generally adopted by the best commentators. It was introduced by Lyra, and adopted decidedly by Meyer, DeWette, Alford, Lange, and is conceded by President Woolsey to be the true one.* Lange says:† "Verse 16th is not a ground for remaining united in hope, etc., but the ground for consummating a separation, and not marring the Christian's peace for so uncertain a prospect as that of converting the unbelieving party."

To understand the condition of things which the Apostle thus made a ground of divorce, we need to reflect that the difference of religion, in that age when Christianity first came in conflict with paganism, when one in the same household worshiped the holy God and the other an impure god, one kept the idolatrous feasts and the other those of the Church, one did out of piety what the other deemed blasphemy or sacrilege, was a difference that reached from heaven down to the lowest

* "Divorce," Note, p. 76.

† Commentary in loc.

depths, all through life. When the parties were each earnest and resolute and unyielding in their religion, the conflicts in the home must sometimes have been fearful, overcoming the original mutual love, destroying the oneness of wedlock and throwing the family into domestic chaos. A chronic quarrel about the family God, disturbing the domestic love, preventing the unity of moral training, and embroiling the children—such as was likely to exist between the devotees of the corrupt gods of Greece and the devout worshipers of Christ—must have been terrific beyond anything we have knowledge of in Christian lands. Yet the Apostle counsels the believer not to take the initiative, but to wait patiently. If, however, the other party seeks a separation and effects it, he says, let him have it. His idea seems to be, if endless bickerings and quarrels about the deep things of religion, the most fundamental and vital interest of the home, are to be kept up, so totally at variance with the spirit of the Christian calling, which is a calling in the interest of peace,—and if the pagan desires it and will have it, it is better that the relation be formally terminated. “A brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases,” especially as there is very little hope, in instances of extreme religious violence, of the ultimate conversion of the unbelieving party by keeping up a relation with him associated with such bickerings and bad feeling. Conversion would be better secured by divorce. It would be in the interest of conversion to have it. “For how knowest thou, O wife, whether thou shalt save thy husband? or how knowest thou, O husband, whether thou shalt save thy wife?”

One other verse needs to be noticed, the 39th. The New Version is from the corrected text, and reads as follows: “A wife is bound for so long a time as the husband liveth; but if the husband be dead, she is free to be married to whom she will, only in the Lord.” The Apostle has already treated of the subject of divorce, and dismissed it. He has nothing more to say about it. He now comes to the question of second marriages. This is the view of Meyer, Alford, Lange, and others. Not having cases of divorce or divorced persons here in his mind at all, nor thinking of divorce only in the light of the general corrupt usage of the times as something in all ordinary

cases to be condemned, and confining his attention to the question of the propriety of second marriages of the wife, in the case of the death of the husband, which it seems had been called in question in Corinth, he says such marriages are proper, if to a Christian man. The marriage law reaches its natural limit when the husband dies; and when it has reached its limit, there is nothing in that to prevent re-marriage. It is probable that the re-marriage of the husband on the death of the wife had not been called in question in Corinth, inasmuch as it was felt that the necessities of the children might require the presence of a new mother in the bereaved home; and consequently nothing is said about it. The conjugal bond in itself is binding till death. It is indissoluble, of right, by man. But death releases from it and the obligations involved in it; and therefore the wife may remarry. It seems to be straining the words of the Apostle to press them into use against declaring void a marriage that had already been made void internally by the sin of one at least of the parties, as that is not the subject under consideration, and especially as such an interpretation sets the Apostle against himself in what he has deliberately laid down only a short time before.

Thus, rising to the principle which comes forth from the words of both Christ and Paul, we see that their teachings are in beautiful harmony, and reflect light and confirmation on each other; while, if the words of each are rigidly pressed, they are in disastrous conflict. For Christ certainly allowed divorce for one cause, while, according to the "one cause" theory, Paul, who certainly used language which could only have been understood as relating to divorce, did not allow it for any reason. The strain thus put on the teachings of the Apostle arises from the belief that Christ, contrary to his uniform custom elsewhere of holding men to a system of principles rather than of formal acts, yet on this subject purposely legislated in the form of his words for all ages and all peoples, and restricted divorce in all cases to one outward act. So they take Christ's words absolutely, and try to bring Paul's teachings into conformity. They do not first interpret Christ as speaking to his times and those present on this subject in terms colored by the circumstances about him, yet conveying instruction for all ages and

all men; and these regard Paul's teachings when naturally interpreted as throwing a side light on this deeper and broader meaning in the Master's words, which is the natural way of bringing the two in accord; but they first interpret Christ by the letter, and then compel the words of Paul to come into harmony. The principle in both is, however, the same. If the marriage bond has been internally destroyed by the sin of either party, throwing the marriage pair into absolute marital disagreement and mutual repulsion—as may happen in the case of adultery, or by a religious war in the home such as might exist between violent pagans and determined Christians, accompanied by abandonment—then divorce may take place; otherwise not.

It by no means follows, however, that divorce should always be sought or granted in case of adultery. There may be lapses in this way which do not carry down all family love and possibility of future fidelity, and which, on proofs of repentance, may not render family life impossible. Christ's instruction in cases of adultery is permissive rather than directive. Aggravated cases, admitting of no healing of the bleeding wound, and other sins equally destructive to married life, may be the occasion of a dissolution of the tie. This seems to be the principle as given by both our Lord and the Apostle.

This interpretation restores harmony to the sacred page, agrees with the original constitution of marriage and with right reason, and gives an interpretation that is adapted to all ages and all conditions of society. It has the further advantage of furnishing an intelligible and reasonable ground for practical legislation and bringing the law of the land into harmony with the law of God. Law-makers can understand it, the public can see it, husbands and wives can feel the force of it—this, namely: marriage by its divine constitution is absolutely, of right, indissoluble by man. Only some great sin can destroy the bond. No law of man can do it, no act of a court, no wish of the parties, no human pretext; nothing short of that which eats out the possibility of conjugal love and union. And when this is the case, and marriage is destroyed within, then the law, the courts, the civil process may declare the fact." "The sister or the brother is not under bondage in such cases; but God hath called us in peace."

It is true it would be easier in legislation and in public sentiment to have one external act as the sole ground for divorce. But it is not Christ's method to lay down a system of doings or non-doings of particular outward acts. He inculcated a system of principles, motives, spiritual doings; and we are to work towards them the best we can in public ethics and law. It is not a question of ease and facility, but of fidelity to the spirit of Christ. And it would be very strange if he who said, "Whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart," has, in reference to sin against marriage, departed from his uniform custom elsewhere and made everything turn on one outward act, to facilitate the work of the makers and administrators of law.

Many other authorities might be given for the general interpretation of the 7th chapter of I. Corinthians here presented; but authorities may be quoted on the other side. I have preferred to go directly to the Apostle himself, and see what he says and what he means as the more satisfactory way of understanding him. I have had no other motive in expressing these doubts about the only supposed Scriptural ground for divorce than a love of truth. I am in full sympathy with the efforts to restrict and purify the divorce legislation of the country; and share profoundly in the alarm arising from the low popular views on this subject and that of marriage. The public sentiment is corrupting the legislation, and the legislation, in turn, the public sentiment, and so society is drifting down in this particular towards the condition of things in Rome before the end of the Republic. All Christian people, all good citizens should unite to bring the State back towards the Christian and original divine idea of marriage, as in itself an indissoluble union, moral and sacred, and never of right to be terminated by the will or desire or caprice of man, and only formally to be acknowledged dissolved when some great sin or life of sin has incurably and forever already destroyed the bond of union from within. And for the proof of this the State should require the most conclusive evidence, assuming in all cases that the obligations of wedlock continue till the evidence is unquestioned that they no longer exist.

ARTICLE III. — THE HISTORIC RELIGIONS OF INDIA.

II.—BUDDHISM.

*J. F. Clarke's Ten Great Religions.**Max Müller's Dhammapada.**Buddhist Suttas.* Translated by T. W. Rhys Davids; and edited by Max Müller. Oxford, 1881.

BUDDHISM bears a relation to Brahmanism similar to that of Protestant to Roman Christianity. Those who have studied Brahmanism, or even read my article in the *New Englander* for July, 1880, will recall the general features of that stupendous system of human thought. In its philosophy the infinite overshadowed the finite, the spiritual world the material, existence its conditions, and substance its attributes and acts. Carried out on the side of religion, this gave the divine casting into shade the human, the soul the body, thought tending toward quiescence, free agency weakened, religion separated from and superior to character, benevolence forgotten, change as inherent in all constituted things the great source of evil, escape from it by the cessation of desire, and for a final heaven absorption in the infinite. In the language of Cousin, "It is the religion of death rather than of life; its object less to govern life than to teach us to despise it." At the same time it gave no full and clear personality to the divine, leaving thus perhaps the profoundest want of the human soul unsatisfied, and the heart and even the self-respecting intellect to pine desolate and starving.

The natural development of such a system was into a cold and crushing ecclesiasticism, sacerdotal sacramental worship, the Brahmanic priesthood, all congealed in the inexorable molds of caste, the consciousness of its relation to the eternal father taken from the individual soul and given to a church.

It is difficult for the Western mind to understand, or conceive as real the Hindu type of thought. The swallowing up of the finite in the infinite, of matter by spirit, how can it be

an actual reality, or seem such to a healthy mind! The absorption of the human by the divine, how can it be possible, or seem an object of desire? But to the Hindu sage, who, in the "forest life" gave up the world in advance of the release of death, to repose on the bosom of the Infinite, these were no empty dreams. Materialism was not in the ascendant in the ancient Hindu mind; and among the values of the study of Brahmanism is its reminding us, in the face of this age of time and sense, that the historic belief of the race has fastened upon something within, and above, greater and more real than matter.

But against such a system there must sooner or later be a reaction. The pendulum must vibrate; opposites follow each other. The time came some five hundred years, more or less, before the Christian era.

The legendary history of Siddartha, afterwards known as Sakya Muni (Hermit of the Sakyan race), Gautama, or Gotama (Priest of the Sakyans), and Buddha (the Enlightened One), I shall not repeat. The beautiful poem of Edwin Arnold, and its reviewers, have made it sufficiently familiar. Born to a kingdom in Northern India, he grew up a serious, thoughtful youth, with more than even Hindu tendency to vast and abstruse speculations, especially on remote and somber themes, and with feelings pained and oppressed at the changes, the disappointments, the wrongs and woes of life. Long his spirit wrought in agony to solve the dark problem, and wrought in vain. In the bloom of youth, at twenty-nine years of age, "moved by godlike pity," he gave up his kingly prospects, royalty, pleasure, love, and home, and wandered forth a mendicant devotee. "I will never return," he said, "till I have attained to the sight of the divine law, and so become Buddha, the Knowing One." He listened to the Brahmins and practiced their austerities for six years; but found not the light and life which he sought. He returned to a more natural mode of life, but did not relax the agony of desire, and purpose, and thought. Alone in his hermitage, after a week of ceaseless meditation, and unparalleled assaults of tempting fiends, seated with his face to the East, without motion for a day and a night, he at length attained to the "beatific vision,"

the "triple science," the "knowledge never to be shaken of the laws of things," which was to rescue mankind from its woes and sins. From that hour to his death at the age of eighty years, he gave his strength and life to the proclamation of his new gospel, destined to endure for unknown ages, and to comfort, and in some measure to purify the hearts of unnumbered millions of men.

The religion thus born soon spread throughout India, and three hundred years before the Christian era became the religion of the State. Expelled subsequently by the reviving power of Brahmanism, it seized permanently in return upon almost the whole of Southeastern Asia, and holding to-day the State in Birma and Thibet, the people in Japan, and the majority of them in China, it is the religion of more than one-quarter of the human race. Probably no single name has held so many hearts and minds in trusting faith, and something at least of adoring worship, in all human history as that of Siddartha Gautama Buddha.

What then is this mighty system; and what the elements of its growth and strength?

Buddhism will be best understood by regarding it as a natural reaction from the intense infinitism and spirituality of Brahmanism, toward the finite, the sensible, and man. Humanity could not be defrauded of its rights forever. Hence the great protest. Buddhism has been well called the Protestantism of the East. It was the old struggle between the really complementary, though often mistakenly made antagonistic powers of the human and the divine in religion, that is, in the great field of their relation to each other; the ever-living question between superstition and rationalism.

Yet the nature of the Hindu mind could not be fundamentally changed, nor the influence of the old philosophy wholly shaken off. All constituted things were still regarded as from that fact changeable, imperfect, unsubstantial. So far was the latter idea carried as to involve a kind of unreality,—an apparent existence only; substance alone was real and immutable. The Hindu mind here, as at other points, approached the most abstruse metaphysical speculations of the Western world in ages long after. Noumena and phenomena

antagonized each other on the plains of India, long before Kant, or the schoolmen were born.

Constituted means organized,—having a nature, attributes, something phenomenal outside of absolute substance. A constituted nature was essential to individuality, to personality, to consciousness, thought, and even identity as the Hindu mind conceived of it. The unconstituted—the absolute, was nearly the same as the Absolute—the All of modern Pantheism.

Deity could not of course be predicated of the constituted, the changeable, the unreal. A Deity then must be unconstituted, and the unconstituted is all the Deity there is, absolute, unchangeable, scarcely conscious, active, or individual. The Hindu mind seemed unable to grasp the ideas of infinity, and personality, and harmonize them in a working whole, as Christianity has done. Hence a ceaseless struggle between the two, and a vibration of individual philosophic thought, as moved by idiosyncrasies or surroundings. Whether on the whole personality can be predicated of the Buddhist divinity, or whether Divinity in the sense of Being, can be predicated of the absolute, is questioned among scholars. The system has been pronounced atheistic by some, and the judgment denied by others. It is safe to say that the Absolute as such cannot be personal. But personality might as easily be supposed to be mysteriously joined with the absolute, as the human with the divine in Christ, though the Buddhist theology was much less thoroughly digested in this respect than the Christian. Similarly the soul of man, as an organized nature, consisting of certain elements, is perishable, while back of all these, the absolute, unorganized self, without attributes, lives on forever. Nay, rather, said the Buddhist, there is no individual, continuous identity, called the soul, but a certain force, emanating from the absolute, wrapping the drapery of personality about itself to-day, to drop the eidolon to-morrow.

The element of confused doubtful personality,—a kind of nondescript, *tertium quid*, between personality and impersonality, thus found in the Deity, proves one of the most significant features of the Hindu philosophic theology, really underlying the nature of man as well as that of the Deity, and modifying the relations of the two at almost every point.

Since all constituted things were changeable and little more than apparent, they might easily be supposed to lapse again into the absolute from which they sprang, dynamically if not historically. The finite could become lost in the infinite. And such an absorption—Nirvana—is the true heaven which awaits the righteous, and the highest destiny to which man can aspire. Nirvana was a mystic, inconceivable state, something between existence and non-existence, the continuance of the absolute ground of being absorbed in the divine, as a drop of water gliding into the ocean, while all organized nature and attributes quiesce in dreamless sleep. Whether Nirvana on the whole should be considered existence or non-existence, like the similar question as to the existence of a Deity, is disputed among scholars. Probably each of the alternate ideas is understood too exclusively. Thus the soul in Nirvana, as any other absolute existence, is called no thing, which words have been combined by the reader into nothing, whereas the real meaning is no thing of nature or organization; while on the other hand, being has been taken in a sense too strictly that of a limited individuality, such as can only be finite. Thus it has been difficult for the conception of Nirvana to rest content on either side, and the question has remained open. Moreover, what is the absolute substance remaining when all constituted nature has been sloughed off? How inconceivable, and itself unreal, though in a different sense from that indicated by the word when applied to finite things! In what sense can there be being at all without individuality? If the question be unsusceptible of a definite answer, it is not more so than questions which might be asked respecting the doctrine of universals in medieval, and those of time, space, and substance in modern philosophy.

Thus far the tone of Buddhistic thought has sounded in harmony with the old philosophy of the Hindus.

Here come in the reactive, or complementary ideas in behalf of the finite and of man.

As already said, Buddhism was the uprising of humanity in the assertion of its rights, its powers, and its values. Human nature was exalted. Both the intellectual and the moral faculties were recognized in their autonomy, and their responsibility.

Reason in the soul was like the sun in the heavens. Free will sat on her throne honored and appropriated. The moral sense as the subject of all true character, was seen and appreciated. Conscience was trusted and cultivated. Character was the end for which religion and worship were valued. Life must be one long struggle for self conquest, and self exaltation; to repress every weakness, every vice, to acquire every virtue. No low or selfish motives were appealed to. Personal character, such as answered to the conception then formed of the "true, the beautiful, and the good," was the object and reward of every effort, save that absorption in the absolute in Nirvana was expected as the final happy end. How there could be happiness without consciousness, and how consciousness without personality, are questions for the Hindu mind to answer.

As to the direction in which the lifelong effort was to be pushed, enlightenment was the inspiring word. Buddha was the Enlightened One, and his followers were gnostics in the tone and spirit of all their thought. What connection, if any, there may have been between this and the Gnosticism of Western Asia, about the same time prevalent, we do not now pause to inquire. And of all knowledge that of self was the center and soul. "Know thyself" might have been inscribed on the walls of every Buddhist temple.

Doubtless the intellectual element was in strength somewhat out of proportion with the moral, yet "self knowledge," in many connections at least, probably meant something akin to the Christian idea of "experience." Not cold, barren, intellectual knowledge merely, but wisdom in a richer more comprehensive sense, was unquestionably what the Buddhist cultus aimed to secure. The spirit of the wise Hebrew king was echoed on the banks of the Ganges: "Discretion shall preserve thee; understanding shall keep thee." Self knowledge in this sense of clear, healthy, and discriminating thought instead of dreamy, quiescent contemplation; victory over the world, and passion, and sense, instead of contempt for and cowardly escape from them, were a vast improvement upon the previous direction of religious effort in India.

The ineffable purity and loftiness of the Christian concep-

tion of holiness the Buddhist mind never reached. The control of the lower by the higher faculties, virtue, manliness, truth, and a benevolence as wide as the world it attained. But the indescribable something in the highest Christian character—the idea of holiness which charms and lifts the ravished heart, as the ideal of beauty the rapt soul of the artist, it could not impart. It is probable that here as elsewhere the lack of clear personality in the divine nature makes itself felt. Holiness in the highest sense is the attribute of a conscious, knowing, willing being, and of nothing else. Without such a being to embody it the conception could never be fully formed in the mind of man. Pantheism will not attain it.

With the idea of holiness would naturally correspond that of sin. The same ground underlies the two; they bear the same relation to personality. The Buddhist conception of sin, therefore, though deep, solemn, and inexorable, lacked the awful sense of guilt, the sense of the wrath of an infinitely holy and all-seeing God—the “fearful looking-for of judgment which shall devour the adversaries.” The distinction between the sins and the miseries of men was not clearly drawn. Condemnation of guilt was little more than pity for woe. Guilt before a law of nature, an impersonal principle or force, does not pierce and scorch the soul of its conscious subject as when the sleepless eye of a thinking, acting being blazes down upon it. Yet with such grasp of thought as a pantheistic system could nourish,—comprehensive, deep and immutable, if not strenuous and convicting, it saw and affirmed the cold poison of sin rankling in all human veins. And there is, we know, a fathomless relation between sin and woe, which it was some merit in Buddhism to have seen and brought to light.

The Buddhistic idea of the punishment of sin was expressed in the important doctrine of Karma, or consequences. The fortunes of men, material, intellectual, social and moral, their powers, character, surroundings and destiny were determined by their previous conduct,—the consequences under the law of cause and effect, of that which had gone before. So strenuously was the principle pushed through as to trench perceptibly upon free agency, and personal responsibility, and almost upon personal identity itself, which here felt the beclouding

influence of the intensely metaphysical Hindu mind, and became lost, in a sense, in an inexorable course of natural effects of natural causes; yet this not without a certain reservation by which it was felt that somehow the law of causation acted in and not upon the personal will, and free agency, though obscured, was conserved. "He departed," say the Sutras of one dead, "according to his deeds." "He builds for himself a new home of the timbers fashioned in the present life." It was a most strenuous assertion of the law, "Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap." Man's destinies are committed to his own hand. The Buddhist salvation was of works and not of any form of divine grace.

The inexorable energy with which the law of causation is conceived to apply to character, fortune, and destiny, constitutes a judgment bar before which "every work shall be brought into judgment," if less concrete and personal, more vast, relentless and eternal than even that of the Christian system itself.

The method by which the law of Karma is wrought out is that of transmigration, substantially the same as in the Brahmanic system. The life re-appears, (re-appears expressing better than continues the Hindu conception of identity), in a new grade, condition, or being, the character of which is determined by the conduct in the antecedent state. All fortunes of all men in this life are the awards of desert in the past. The Buddha himself reached his half divine honors in this way. In this way only Nirvana must at last be attained; the individual is absorbed in the all because worthy to return to the absolute whence he came. It was the natural basis on which that pillar in the Christian temple of the supernatural expressed in the words "As thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us," stands.

The ideas entertained as to the nature of holiness and sin would determine the conception of regeneration, or of whatever moral renovation stood in place of it in the system. Regeneration then in Buddhism was a reformation such as is wrought elsewhere by the upward aspiration of the human faculties. While language is scarcely able to overstate the strength and beauty, the sublimity and value of this new

birth, in forms which it sometimes assumes, the Christian will readily understand its inevitable lack of that wonderful something which stamps the character of miracle upon gospel regeneration. Less radical and soul-thrilling, less absolute in the surrender of the will, less inclusive, therefore, of all character, less permanent and living, less tender and childlike in the glow of the new-born spirit, it was the loftiest of all non-Christian reformations. But the Christian's great change is a regeneration not of man but of God. No such effect could be wrought by forces emanating from an impersonal God, nor any such doctrine find a place in minds so pantheistic in tone and thought. In regeneration, and in all experience and character rising out of it, that is, in the whole conception of religion, the intellect and the will play far too large a part compared with that of the heart, and especially with a divine influence acting upon the heart. The latter would naturally be excluded with the former, since any outward influence most naturally approaches the soul through the heart, as in the common idea of the conquest of the soul by love, as by an external power. The result in the Buddhistic regeneration was cold, tasteless, prosaic, unfruitful, unblest.

The character of the Buddha, as sometimes conceived of, as deified man and savior in some degree like Christ, as well as the exalted nature and value of man, naturally suggest the boundless benevolence of the system in its development. The Buddha consecrated his life for fifty years to the proclamation of his gospel of blessing to mankind. His followers caught his spirit, and lived and toiled to save their fellow-men.

Buddhism is the only non-Christian great missionary religion that the world has seen. Its annals share in this respect the sublimity of apostolic or of modern Christian history. Within a few years past caskets of sacred stone have been found in ancient topes or massive sepulchral hemispheres forty or fifty feet in diameter, containing human ashes, with inscriptions giving the names and missionary character of the persons commemorated, and dating at least two hundred years before Christ.

Benevolence, when a reigning principle, implies self sacrifice. The great renunciation of the Buddha reminds us of the

sacrifice of Christ. The legend of the famished tigress, to whom in a previous life he gave his body that she might eat and nurse her young, shows, both the sense of his early followers of the spirit of their lord, and the crude and ill-directed expression which the noble principle was left by nature to assume. And the love of the Buddha seems somehow a different thing from that of Christ. It is the love of a man, not of a God. The infinite is not in it.

The want of personality is felt through the whole circle of thought of which the Deity is the center. Dependence, obligation, accountability, trust, love, fellowship all are dulled, benumbed, inefficient, when sought to be exercised toward a principle, force, or absolute whole, instead of a conscious, thinking, feeling being. The value of infinity and personality seem each in a measure lost by the want of that perfect combination in which Christianity holds them; as the force of gunpowder or dynamite depends upon the exact proportion of the elements which compose it. And the principle applies to the love of man to God, and to the Buddha as Savior, as well as his to us. There was no Savior at once personal and divine; no divine expiation, no cross, nor Lamb of God bearing the sins of the world thereon. Of course the unutterable and exquisite gratitude of the Christian heart was unknown in Buddhist experience; and not less so the higher and more ethereal forms of every Christian affection. What heart can thrill with tenderest emotion toward the unconscious, the unthinking, the unfeeling? Yet the pantheistic tone of thought, and circle of ideas and forces is vast, grand, fundamental, and immutable, even more so than the Christian cosmogony, though less stringent, vivid, concrete, and awful. Each hemisphere of the great universe of thought has its advantages; Christianity combines them as they are not combined elsewhere.

What has been shown is sufficient to account for the fact that Buddhism, so far as can be discovered, never exerted that magic purifying power in the hearts and minds of men which forms the chief claim of Christianity upon human faith. If such a power ever inhered in the system it has long since disappeared. Nor has it been able to establish social and political society endued with the vital elements of purity, elevation,

and progress as Christian society is. Indeed the system has not been able to hold its own during the lapse of time. Like Brahmanism, its best days were its earliest; and to-day it may be likened to a dead body,—something of form remains but life is not there. It was a noble, even a sublime attempt, but the quickening spark of divine life was wanting.

Is there any cause for this further than has been shown? The Christian will reply, the absence of the Spirit of God, with its lifting and inspiring influence. But why absent? By God's sovereign will? Or did the proud, rationalistic spirit of Buddhism ignore and put itself out of the magnetic circle of such help? Or were the Hebrews gifted naturally with higher religious genius, which brought them near to God, and within the region of the dews of his grace, more than other nations; as the intellectual genius of the Greeks made them the prophets of literature, philosophy, and art for all other lands and tongues? Or is it but a part of the fortuitous course of history, swaying now this way now that, in obedience often to causes too inscrutable for human investigation? We cannot discuss these problems here. But we are safe in saying that the combination in Christianity of the complementary elements of the human and the divine, the personal and the infinite, with a just balance and clearness of conception never elsewhere attained, has been the source of an incalculable advantage.

Thus far I have sought by an analysis of the Buddhistic system to show its philosophic basis, and trace its logical development therefrom. It is time to consider the actual matter of its teachings,—with what hands, and by what instruments it sought to take hold upon character and life, and control and mold them to its will. The study of its sacred books will best give the answer to these questions.

The sacred literature of Buddhism is exceedingly voluminous, and has been preserved in various languages in Ceylon, Nepaul, Thibet, and China. Many inscriptions on rocks and monuments are also to be included. Many of the writings date back to near the time of the Christian era; and many were compiled from still earlier records, or from attested tradition. We have seen in the study of Brahmanism the stringency

and system with which the Hindu mind was applied to the acquisition and preservation in the memory, and by recitation, of their oral treasures of sacred lore. Within the few decades past translation has placed many of these works in the hands of the English-reading world. Those from which I have been able at this time to draw, are the "Dhammapada, or Path of Life," a collection of four hundred and twenty verses, or sentences, ascribed to the Buddha himself, and translated by Max Müller; and seven "Buddhist-Suttas," or gospels, translated by T. W. Rhys Davids, an eminent English scholar, and published by Max Müller as the eleventh volume of his "Sacred Books of the East," at Oxford.

The title "Path of Life," suggests the character of the "Dhammapada." It aims to teach the way of spiritual life. The difficulty of making clear to a Western mind the real meaning of writings so ancient and so different from our tone of thought is great; and either from this, or other reasons, the "Dhammapada" seems to me somewhat dry. In its method of approach to the mind it resembles the Proverbs of Solomon. Through the whole there runs a thread of purpose in favor of strenuous self-study and self-control, and against all sensuous passions, and low, weak tendencies, but too general, feeble, and commonplace, we should suppose, to be of the highest value. When we think of them however as the product of the unaided heathen mind, they rise in dignity and value in our estimation. Of the most vigorous and significant sentences the following are fair examples.

All created things perish; he who knows and sees this becomes passive in pain; this is the way to purity. There is no fire like passion; there is no spark like hatred; there is no snare like folly; there is no torrent like greed. Him I call indeed a Brahmana who does not offend by body, word, or thought, and is controlled on these three points. He who never identifies himself with his body and soul, and does not grieve over what is no more, he indeed is called a true wise one. The disciples of Gotama are always well awake, and their mind day and night always delights in meditation. He in whom there is truth, virtue, love, restraint, moderation, he who is free from impurity, and is wise, he is called an "Elder." From lust (or greed, or love) comes grief, comes fear; he who is free from lust (or greed, or love) knows neither grief nor fear. Let us live happily, then, not hating those who hate us! let us dwell free from hatred among men who hate! Not to commit

any sin, to do good, and to purify one's mind, that is the teaching of the Awakened. Four things does a reckless man gain who covets his neighbor's wife,—a bad reputation, an uncomfortable bed, thirdly punishment, and lastly hell. As a grass-blade, if badly grasped, cuts the arm, badly practiced asceticism leads to hell.

The Suttas translated by Mr. Davids are more various in literary character, and more interesting and significant. The first is entitled "The Book of the Great Decease;" and gives some of the latest teachings of the Buddha, with an account of his death, and cremation, and the honors paid to his memory by saints, sages, and kings.

The Buddha wandered from place to place with his disciples teaching, as Jesus through the villages of Galilee. His instruction, though cold and formal, and even spiritually low and feeble in comparison, are as pure and free from the least sensuous or corrupt taint as those of Jesus in the Gospel of John, the latter portion of which this Sutta is not altogether unlike. Like Jesus he accepted offered hospitality whether from saint or sinner, and hallowed every place and occasion by his heavenly discourse. Like Jesus, the heart of a sinful woman melted in penitence at his presence. Like Jesus he forebore to cling to life when he might have done so; and foretold to his reluctant disciples his approaching departure.

The literary form of this, as of other Suttas, exhibits some peculiarities. Repetitions to an unexampled extent, and shaped in certain recurring and symmetrical forms, abound; induced apparently, by the desire to aid the memory in acquiring and repeating, and to gain the power of impression which accompanies sentiment reiterated with endless persistency.

The element of number, so prominent in the Hebrew Scriptures, is far more so here, as a rhetorical and sometimes poetic form, and often when by no means suggested by the thought. Seven conditions of welfare of a State or community are given:—"frequent religious assemblies; concord in action; conservatism of established institutions; honor to fathers and teachers; control of the desire for life and its pleasures; delight in solitude; and kindness to visiting brethren." And to these other seven, and yet others, and others, and others, and six conditions of prosperity are added. "Fivefold, O householders, is

the loss of the wrong-doer through his want of rectitude. Fivefold is the gain of the well-doer through his practice of rectitude." The last loss is to be re-born after death into some state of misery; the last gain to be re-born into heaven. "When the Blessed One had thus taught his disciples, and incited them, and roused them, and gladdened them far into the night with religious discourse, he dismissed them.

One resounding paragraph of half poetic tone is repeated, again and again, as if in the hope to mold the character, as ceaseless dropping of water wears the stone away.

Great is the fruit, great is the advantage of earnest contemplation. The mind set round with upright conduct : Great is the fruit, great the advantage of intellect when set round with earnest contemplation. The mind set round with intelligence is freed from the great evils, that is to say from sensuality, from individuality, from delusion, and from ignorance.

As the hour of his departure drew near, clearly foreseen by the Buddha, his conversation with his disciples grew more loving and tender, more thoughtful for the interests of the society when he should be gone, more regardful of every beautiful propriety as to their conduct toward each other, and altogether such as to suggest the inquiry, whence comes the likeness of all this to the last hours on earth of our Lord? And yet the difference is wide between the two.

Then the Blessed One addressed the brethren and said, "Behold now brethren I exhort you, saying, "Decay is inherent in all component things. Work out your salvation with diligence." These were his last words.

Then the Blessed One entered into the first stage of deep meditation. And rising out of the first stage he passed into the second. And rising out of the second, he passed into the third. And rising out of the third stage he passed into the fourth. And rising out of the fourth stage of deep meditation he entered into the state of mind to which the infinity of space is alone present. And passing out of the mere consciousness of the infinity of space he entered into the state of mind to which the infinity of thought is alone present. And passing out of the mere consciousness of the infinity of thought, he entered into a state of mind to which nothing at all was specially present. And passing out of the consciousness of no special object he fell into a state between consciousness and unconsciousness. And passing out of the state between consciousness and unconsciousness he fell into a state in which the con-

sciousness, both of sensations and of ideas had wholly passed away. And his disciples said one to another, he is dead. But the Blessed One, turning backward upon his path again, passed through the stages in order to the first, and then turning onward again from the first to the last stage of deep meditation he immediately expired.

Nothing can be more curious than the glimpse into seldom trodden regions of human thought given by this picture of the Hindu mind struggling to conceive of the process of the absorption of the finite individual into the infinite whole. A lower form of something essentially the same in principle,—the entrance in this life into Nirvana,—is thus in another place described.

And ere long he attained to that supreme goal of the higher life for the sake of which men go out from all and every household gain and comfort to become houseless wanderers—yea, that supreme goal did he, by himself, and while yet in this visible world, bring himself to the knowledge of, and continue to realize, and to see face to face! And he became conscious that birth was at an end, that the higher life had been fulfilled, that all that should be done had been accomplished, and that after this present life there would be no beyond!

Nirvana seems to be a character, and an inward experience, the commencement of which can be reached in the present life, after which there is no further transmigration, but at death absorption in the infinite will be consummated.

And when the Blessed One died (again like Jesus) there arose a mighty earthquake, terrible and awe-inspiring, and the thunders of heaven burst forth. And the One great Brahma, the first cause, uttered at the moment a stanza in honor of the Buddha, and in allusion to the central doctrines of his faith. And Sakka, the king of the gods (in the popular mind) in like manner responded to the greatness of the event; while of his disciples, those who were already raised above the world adored with solemn calmness, saying, "Impermanent are all component things. How is it possible that they should not be dissolved; while those in whom individual passions yet lived, fell headlong on the ground, convulsed with anguish at the thought, "Too soon has the Blessed One died! Too soon has the happy one passed out of existence! Too soon has the light gone out in the world."

For something like a systematic view of the religion of the Buddha, practically considered, we look to the second of Mr. Davids' Suttas,—*"The Foundation of the Kingdom of Righteousness."*

But a scheme of redemption for fallen man must involve of course a recognition of the fundamental nature of his error, or fallen state. The system of the Buddha founded on this level, is not surpassed in vastness and grandeur by anything in the history of human thought; and justifies the rank which has been assigned to him, as one of the greatest and most original religious thinkers whom the world has seen.

It has already been suggested that the Buddha failed to distinguish with sufficient clearness between natural and moral evil. The sum of the evils oppressing humanity are spoken of often as sorrow. And the one fundamental condition which renders sorrow possible is individuality. Birth, decay, and death, infinitely varied surroundings, all things unpleasant, all unsatisfied desires are occasions of pain and sorrow, that is all individual experience, with its vicissitudes, is open to sorrow and to sin. Sin, so far as distinct from sorrow, seems to have been viewed as a kind of inevitable accompaniment, or consequence of it. Absorbed in the infinite there can be no individual experience, therefore no sorrow, and, an objector might add, no joy. Individuality is the occasion of all evil. And the cause is the thirst, or craving which causes individual existence, that is, either the craving for sensual gratification, or for continued existence itself, the two forms of desire being singularly associated. The meaning of these last sentences seems to be, that the desire for existence, and for its pleasures, especially the pleasure which results in the renewal of life, renders man "through fear of death all his life-time subject to bondage," and in like manner to other sources of pain or to death. All individual existence is a painful struggle against the inevitable. The cessation therefore of this craving desire for life or its pleasures, or anything belonging to the individual state, will be deliverance from sorrow; and failing to see the true nature of sin, the Buddha thought also in consequence, deliverance from sin.

Upon this conception of the nature of sin and evil, the Buddha proceeded to construct a vast system of intellectual and moral culture designed to lift the soul above these fears and desires, to break its fetters, to unseal its eyes, to plume its wings, and start it on its upward flight. It was a magnificent

conception, but the Christian can easily see where the miry clay mingled with iron strength, and the golden glory.

"The Four Noble Truths," are these : The Noble Truth about Sorrow ; The Noble Truth about the Cause of Sorrow ; The Noble Truth about the Cessation of Sorrow ; The Noble Truth about the Path that leads to that Cessation.

In systematizing his teachings concerning this path, we find the tendency toward a numerical, to the degree often of an illogical, and merely mechanical division and classification, possessing his mind at every step. Thus, the whole cultus he lays off as follows :

The Four earnest Meditations.
The Fourfold great Struggle.
The Four Roads to Saintship.
The Five Moral Powers.
The Five Organs of Spiritual Sense.
The Seven kinds of Wisdom.
The Noble Eightfold Path.

The four earnest meditations are these.

Meditation on the Body.
Meditation on the Sensations.
Meditation on the Ideas.
Meditation on Reason, and Character.

The fourfold great struggle against sin is,

The Struggle to prevent Sinfulness Arising.
The Struggle to put down Sinful states which Have arisen.
The Struggle to produce Goodness not Previously Existing.
The Struggle to increase Goodness Already Existing.

The four roads to saintship are,

The Will to acquire it, united to earnest Meditation, and the Struggle against Sin.

The necessary Exertion, united to earnest Meditation, and the Struggle against Sin.

The necessary Preparation of the Heart, united to earnest Meditation, and the Struggle against Sin.

Investigation, united to earnest Meditation, and the Struggle against Sin.

The five moral powers are,

Faith, Energy, Thought, Contemplation, Wisdom.

The five organs of Spiritual Sense are the same as the five moral powers. Why they were distinguished in the schedule is a question; possibly to fill out the number of Paths, or Methods of Culture, to the sacred number seven.

The seven kinds of wisdom are,

Energy, Thought, Contemplation, Investigation, Joy, Repose, Serenity.

Here again we notice some reduplication of the Powers, or Organs.

The Noble Eightfold Path is,

Right Views, (of truth, or doctrine).

Right Aims, (high, worthy, earnest).

Right Speech, (kind, open, truthful).

Right Conduct, (peaceful, honest, pure).

Right Livelihood, (injuring no living thing).

Right Effort, (self-trained, self-controlled).

Right Mindfulness, (active, watchful mind).

Right Contemplation, (earnest thought on deep things).

The Eightfold Path is a summary of the Buddha's idea of all virtue, and holds of course, a large place in his system of culture. In content, that is the principal virtues which ought to adorn the human character, it does not differ greatly from the New Testament. The superiority of the latter is in the unspeakably lofty spiritual and supernatural element, which might accept for the most part the Buddhistic system as a rational foundation, but on which it builds the domes and spires of celestial glory. But by whatever the theurgy here provided falls short of the marvelous transforming powers of Christian regeneration through faith in Christ, and the breath of the Holy Spirit, it certainly drives hard toward its mark, and that a high one. How unspeakably different from, and superior to all that we are accustomed to associate with the idea of Heathenism!

We observe too the great place occupied by meditation, and similar exercises,—contemplation, thought, wisdom, investigation, and the like, and the preëminently intellectual, rationalistic character of the whole system.

In the same spirit of artificial classification already noticed, we have the Eight Positions of Mastery over the delusion arising from the apparent permanence of external things. Eight

stages by which that mastery is begun and made perfect. Five hindrances in the Discipline of the Noble One are named, viz :

The hindrance of lustful desire ;
 The hindrance of malice ;
 The hindrance of sloth and idleness ;
 The hindrance of pride and self-righteousness ;
 The hindrance of doubt.

The Ten Precepts are directed against

Theft, unchastity, falsehood, slander, bitterness of spirit, foolish talk, injuring life, acquisitiveness, servility, violence.

The good man lets his mind pervade one-quarter of the world with thoughts of love, even as the sun shines on all the earth, as a mighty trumpeter makes himself heard throughout the four quarters of the heavens. And so (the rhetorical form repeated), with thoughts of pity, and sympathy, and equanimity.

The Suttas on "The Desire of Good ;" and on "Barrenness, or Bondage" are repeated and varied enforcements of the one never-forgotten principle of strenuous, unflagging agony of effort at self-control and self-culture, reminding the translator of the inspiring battle-call of the New Testament,—*"Giving all diligence, add to your faith virtue, and to virtue knowledge, etc."* The Ten Fetters of the upward striving mind are said to be the

Delusion of Self, Doubt, Trust in rites and ceremonies, Bodily lust and passions, Hatred, Desire for a future material life, Desire for a future spiritual life, Pride, Self-righteousness, Ignorance.

The variations and windings of phraseology by which with the change of a word to vary the application all these lessons are repeated, and made to bear with redoubled force, like the steel-pointed drill upon the rock, are something unknown elsewhere, perhaps in all literature. For example :

When a brother has not got rid of the passion for lusts, has not got rid of the desire after lusts, has not got rid of the thirst for lusts (and so on with several further particulars, all meaning the same thing). Whatsoever brother has not got rid of (here all the particulars over again), his mind does not incline toward zeal (predicate repeated for each name), exertion, perseverance, and struggle ; he has not broken through this first spiritual bondage.

Then the whole is reversed, and the effects of the opposite good efforts in breaking the five kinds of bondage are shown with the same reduplication.

If there be power in repetition to impress the human soul with thought or feeling it must be realized here.

The Sutta of "All the Asavas" that is, the infirmities, errors, and sins, treats of the subjugation and escape from the chief downward tendencies of humanity, and the means by which it must be accomplished.

The means are in substance those previously enjoined—knowledge, study, insight, contemplation, and the like, enforced by the same involved repetitions that we have just seen, but, here as elsewhere, revealing no idea of a mysterious change of the moral taste of the subject from the love of sin to that of holiness, such as Christian regeneration effects. The sole reliance is on a wakeful and earnest spirit of intellectual effort, study, contemplation, self-knowledge and self-control—a spirit of self-urged discipline the most strenuous, vigilant and untiring that the world has ever seen.

Herein, brethren, a seeker, wisely reflecting, cultivates that part of the higher wisdom called mindfulness, dependent on seclusion, on passionlessness, on the utter ecstasy of contemplation, resulting in the passing off of thoughtlessness.

A lesson of a different and more significant kind is taught in the following:

Unwisely doth he consider thus: "Have I existed during the ages that are past, or have I not? What was I during the ages that are past? How was I during the ages that are past? Shall I exist during the ages of the future, or shall I not? What shall I be during the ages of the future? How shall I be during the ages of the future?" Or he debates within himself as to the present: "Do I, after all, exist, or am I not? How am I? This is a being. Whence now did it come, and whither will it go?"

The notions he gets in answer to these questions are denounced as—

The walking in delusion; the puppet show of delusion; the writhing of delusion; the fetter of delusion.

In general, in the Suttas, the poetic element is at a minimum. The rationalistic spirit is naturally much less closely allied to the poetic, than that of faith and the emotions.

But the Sutta entitled "Maha Sudassana, the Great King of Glory," is an exception. It resembles the Christian apocalypse and is a sublime prose poem.

Under the doctrines of Transmigration, and of Karma, the argument supposes that countless ages past, the Buddha lived in the person of a magnificent monarch in Northern India—an oriental Solomon, whose wisdom, power and glory were at once the consequence of merit in previous lives, and the cause of yet higher advancement in the new incarnation of the Tathāgata, or new Buddha—Siddhartha. The poem is a half epic, half dramatic picture of the magnificence and glory, and final apotheosis of this king. How far the early Buddhists accepted it as based upon historic truth, or as merely a symbolical poem, it is difficult now to determine. The Buddha himself tells the story to his disciples from his recollections of that far-off life. I condense the text.

Long ago there was a king, by name Maha Sudassana, a king of kings, a righteous man, who ruled in righteousness, an anointed One, Lord of the four quarters of the earth, conqueror, the protector of his people, possessor of the seven royal treasures. The royal city was on the East and on the West twelve leagues, and on the North and on the South seven leagues, mighty and prosperous, full of people and of all riches. By day and by night it resounded with the ten cries—that is, the noise of horses, of elephants, of chariots, of the drum, of the tabor, of the lute, the sound of singing, of the cymbal, of the gong, and the cry, "Eat, drink, and be merry."

The city was surrounded with seven ramparts, of gold, of silver, of beryl, of crystal, of agate, of coral, and one of all kinds of gems. Four gates were of gold, silver, jade and crystal, and at each gate seven pillars, of like material, each as high as three or four men. The city was surrounded with seven rows of palm trees, of gold, of silver, of beryl, of crystal, of agate, of coral, and of all gems.

The golden palms had trunks of gold, and leaves and fruit of silver, and the others were similarly alternated. And when these rows of palms were agitated with the wind there arose a sound sweet and pleasant, and charming and intoxicating. And such as were merry danced around those palm trees when shaken by the wind.

The Great King of Glory possessed seven treasures. When, on the day of the full moon he had purified himself, and gone up upon the top of his palace, there appeared unto him the First, the heavenly treasure of the Wheel,—symbol of his own invincible power and glory, and of the onward rolling of the Kingdom of Righteousness on earth. And he arose and sprinkled water upon the Wheel, and said, "Roll on, O my Lord, the Wheel! Go forth, and overcome." And the Wheel rolled on toward the East, and the King followed with his armies, and wherever the Wheel stopped there came all the kings of that quarter of the earth, and made submission to him, and besought him to be their Lord and teacher.

And he gave rules to them. "Ye shall slay no living thing, shall not rob; yield not wrongly to bodily desire; speak no lie, drink no maddening drink, eat according to the established custom." And then the Wheel rolled to the South, with like results, and to the West, and to the North. And then it returned, and remained in the royal city in a blaze of glory.*

The Second Treasure of the Great King of Glory was the "Elephant King," wonderful in power, flying through the sky. And when the King mounted him in the morning, he flew to the ocean boundary of the earth, and returned again in time for the morning meal. The third was the Horse treasure, white, with black head, and dark mane—the Charger king, flying through the sky to the ocean boundary of the earth, and back before the morning meal. The fourth was the Gem treasure, so resplendent as to give light by night for a league around, so that the birds awoke and thought it was the dawn. The fifth was the Woman treasure, surpassing human beauty, the pearl among women, devoted to the King even in secret thought. The sixth was a Treasurer, of miraculous power to furnish gold. The seventh an Adviser of super-human wisdom and faith.

Four marvelous Gifts, too, the King of Glory possessed. The first was marvelous Grace and Dignity of person; the second, Long Life beyond mortal range; the third miraculously perfect Health; the fourth, the Love of all men. Riding through the land the people prayed him, saying, "O King, pass slowly by that we may look upon thee a little longer time."

And so the tide of description rolls on. The landscape gardens of the king; the incomparable palace called the Palace

* One of the few passages in which the Buddhist mind breaks the fetters of didactic prose is a description of the occasion when the Great Teacher first proclaimed his Gospel in the ears of men, and thus set the Wheel of the Kingdom rolling through the earth: "The evening was like a lovely maiden; the stars were the pearls upon her neck; the dark clouds her braided hair, the deepening space her flowing robe. As a crown she had the heavens where the angels dwell; these three worlds were as her body; her eyes were the white lotus flowers, which open to the rising moon, and her voice was, as it were, the humming of the bees. To do homage to the Buddha, and to hear the first preaching of his word, this lovely maiden came. The devas (angels) throng to hear the discourse until the heavens are empty; and the sound of their approach is like the rain of a storm; all the worlds in which there are sentient beings are made void of life, so that the congregation assembled was in number infinite, but at the sound of the blast of the glorious trumpet of Sakka, the king of the Gods, they became still as a waveless sea. And then each of the countless listeners thought that the sage was looking towards himself, and was speaking to him in his own tongue, though the language used was the Māgadhi." Whatever reminder the reader may find in this passage of the day of Pentecost, I shall leave without remark.

of Righteousness, built as an expression of love by his nobles and men of wealth, of bricks of gold, and silver, and precious stones; with eighty-four thousand pillars of similar material, and twenty-four stair-cases; and eighty-four thousand chambers, furnished to match; and groves and lakes surrounding it; all with every indescribable feature of splendor and glory, which Eastern imagination can conceive!

And of what previous character, thought the King, is all this glory the fruit? And the answer came; of Giving; of Self Conquest; and of Self Control.

And the King ascended up into the royal chamber, and stood at the door, and broke forth in a cry of intense emotion:

Stay here O thoughts of lust! Stay here O thoughts of ill-will! Stay here O thoughts of hatred! Thus far only O thoughts of lust! Thus far only O thoughts of ill-will! Thus far only O thoughts of hatred!

And then by stages something like those through which the Buddha passed to his death, the Great King of Glory passed into the state of purified self-possession and equanimity, without ease, and without pain.

And he went out from his chamber and let his thoughts of love, and of pity, and of sympathy, and of equanimity pervade the four quarters of the world in succession.

Then the Queen of Glory, chief of the four and eighty thousand wives of the King, came before the King, and rehearsing the tale of his eighty-four thousand cities, and treasures, and honors, and powers, and pleasures, and armies, and glories, beyond all computation and beyond comparison, besought him to think of all these, and to set his heart upon them, and to quicken his desire for life. But he replied:

Nay, rather, exhort me to cast away the desire of these from my heart. For the nature of all things is such that we must leave them. "Pass not away," thou shouldst say, "O King, with desire for these in thy heart."

Then the Queen of Glory wept much; but at length dried her tears, and spake as the King exhorted; and said, "Cast away desire for these, O King, long not after life."

Then the Great King of Glory died even as a healthy man sinks into sleep after a hearty meal.

Forty-eight thousand years he had lived the life of a prince. Forty-

eight thousand years he had lived as heir apparent. Forty-eight thousand years he had reigned, the Great King of Glory. Forty-eight thousand years he had passed as a layman in the palace of righteousness. And now, full of noble thought he died, and entered the noble world of Brahma. All this has passed away !

How transient are all component things !
Growth is their nature and decay :
They are produced, they are dissolved again :
And then is best when they have sunk to rest.

With this, the perpetual refrain of the whole great drama, we close the volume, under something like the spell of a mighty epic. The mingled admiration and sympathy which the career of a great hero excites play joyfully around the feet of this mightiest "hero as prophet" that has opened his burning lips to men. For who shall claim this rank if not the Indian Buddha ! The simple personal force by which alone he wrought his work, appealing to nothing in heaven or earth save the pure intellectual and moral reason of man ; the unequaled numbers whom he has swept into the vortex of his faith ; the twenty-three centuries in the lapse of which his name has not lost its spell ; with the immaculate purity and sweetness of spirit and character, which breathes like a blessing through his teachings and his life ; all these have never elsewhere been combined, in equal degree, under a single human name !

True, he did not find his way to Calvary, nor see the God-man who died there. The words cannot be pronounced of him,—“God was in the anointed One reconciling the world unto himself.” He did not see clearly, in human free-will, the germinal root of holiness and sin. He was not able adequately to combine the personal and the infinite. But what an attempt ! And with what results inscribed forever on the page of history !

And what may not human reason accomplish, when working under skies ablaze with Gospel light ; if she reared so grand a temple, groping in nature's darkness ! And they who fear that ultimately the arm of God will be shortened, by the exaltation of human reason in the thought and faith of the Church, may well be asked : “How comes it, that the only great purely rationalistic religion that the world has seen, most powerfully and permanently won the heart and mind of men !”

In the study of this subject, once more too, I am impressed with the depth and strength, and inexpugnable position in the human soul, of the religious sensibilities and intuitions! It has been said, "Conduct is three-fourths of life." Certainly the moral nature of man is at least one-half of humanity; and the moral nature cannot culminate or be content without religion. Never to me, has modern indifference, whether scientific, philosophic, materialistic or what not, looked so ineffably weak, narrow, and presumptuous as when I have traced with rapt interest and awe the SOLEMN AND MAJESTIC MARCH OF THE RELIGIOUS NATURE OF MAN THROUGH THE AGES.

ARTICLE IV.—THE REAL SCHOOL CONTEST IN GERMANY.

THE Real School Contest in Germany is part of that general conflict which has arisen in England and in this country through the attempt to curtail classical instruction in the higher educational institutions and substitute for it a larger measure of instruction in mathematics, modern languages and natural sciences. The movement is a popular one, grounded in the practical sense of the average man, who regards that as useful which he can use immediately.

In England this practical educational drift has obtained expression in the writings of Professor Bain and Professor Huxley. In this country you meet the movement in all directions, among those in whose way it comes to discuss educational matters. It has found practical expression here in numerous modifications of the college curricula as well as in the various technical, polytechnic, and scientific schools which, far as they are from doing the essential work of colleges, substantially replace them in the minds of their numerous patrons and frequenters.

In France, where the revolution and the consulate overturned the old classical system and set up the polytechnic in its place, efforts have been made, during the last twenty years, to bring back the classical element into the higher education.*

The importance of the subject cannot be overestimated, and after a few years of experimenting in the direction of various substitutions for classical culture, it will probably have to be subjected to a thorough rediscussion such as is now going on in Germany. The interest of this Article in the subject arises largely out of the bearing of the German experience on the Education of Men of Science, which I briefly discussed in the last number of this journal. After that Article was written a number of pamphlets came into my hands, which cover, with a good degree of completeness, the history of the struggle of

* *Gutachten der Philosophischen Facultät der Königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität. Berlin. 1880.*

the German Real Schools to obtain for their graduates equal university and other privileges with the graduates of the old classical gymnasia. These pamphlets consist of addresses, and other forms of approach to the public by noted German educators in the Gymnasia, the Real Schools, and the Universities. They are occupied with arguments against the Real School System as a system of culture, or at least of culture fit to replace that of the classical schools; with replies to such arguments; with historical reviews of the development of the two styles of education; with comparisons of the two courses of study, and statistical results of the two systems; the whole making up an exceedingly interesting series of educational papers. The marginal list will convey to the reader a pretty good impression of the interest which has been awakened among German students by the agitation which has now been going on for fifteen or twenty years, and will show what sort of men are entering actively into the conflict.* Specially noteworthy among the documents are Dr. Schacht's discussion of the question of equal privileges (*Gleichberechtigung*) on account of its historical review and its comparative exhibit of the two methods of instruction; Professor Hofmann's inaugural address as Rector of the University at Berlin, which has done more than any other utterance to stir up the strife afresh

* *Bemerkung zur Realschulfrage.* Von einem Mitglied des Abgeordnetenhauses. Berlin. 1877.

Ueber die Gleichberechtigung der Realschule I. O. mit dem Gymnasium. Dr. Ludwig Schacht, Director der Realschule I. O. zu Elberfeld. Berlin. 1878.

Die Gutachten der deutschen Aertze-Vereine über die Zulassung der Realschulabiturienten zum Studium der Medicin. Dr. Paul Wossidlo, Director der Realschule I. Ordn. zu Tarnowitz. Stettin. 1880.

Die Frage der Theilung der philosophischen Facultät. Rede zum Antritte des Rectorats in der Aula der Friedrich Wilhelm's Universität zu Berlin am 15ten October, 1880. Dr. August Wilhelm Hofmann.

Die Abiturienten der Realgymnasien und Realschulen 1 Ordnung als Studierende an den Universitäten. Dr. Johannes Wislicenus o ò Professor der Chemie, zum Zeit Rector. Berlin.

Unsere Abiturienten. Dr. O. Steinbart, Director der Realschule I. O. zu Duisburg. Berlin. 1881.

Human- und Realgymnasium von Dr. Phil. Fr. W. Pfüger, Director der Realschule I. O. in Chemnitz. Chemnitz. 1882.

Gymnasium und Realschule. Dr. A. J. Reisacker, Gymnasialdirector. Berlin. 1883.

since 1880; Dr. Wislicenus' address on occasion of the two hundred and ninety-ninth anniversary of the founding of the Julius Maximilian University, which occasion he improves to reply to Dr. Hofmann; Dr. Steinbart's statistical discussion, mainly in reply to Hofmann; and, again, on the side of the Gymnasium, Dr. Reisacker's very moderate and careful contribution to the subject with a view to changes in gymnasial instruction, of a not radical character, but sufficient to meet the difficulties and objections of the present system.

To understand the discussion we must call to mind the main features of German education. The regular, the normal course of instruction in Germany for those who aim at a liberal education leads through the elementary schools, which the pupil is supposed to leave at about the age of nine years, into the Gymnasium, and thence into the University. Passage through the University is prescribed by law for all who will practice in the learned professions of Law, Medicine, and Theology; for all who aim to be teachers in the higher institutions; and for a large share of the leading offices under the Prussian government. This legal exclusion of all except university graduates from the learned professions and public offices, is a part of that broad policy which avoids confiding great trusts to those who have not been carefully educated into that breadth of knowledge and those mental habits which may be supposed best to qualify men for them. Great emphasis is laid upon the disciplinary value of the regularly prescribed course of instruction. To pass an examination is not sufficient, though necessary; there must be a guarantee in the long course of study actually gone through, that the successful examination is not the result of mere cram.

As honorable exit from the University is the condition of admission to these higher callings, so, until within a few years, the Gymnasium has been the only door through which a young man could come into the University as a regularly matriculated student. Practically so at least. For if a pupil from any school, public or private, would enter the University, he must present himself before the proper authorities with testimonials and a *curriculum vitae*, showing the course of study pursued, and may thereupon receive a permit for examination before

the examining board of the Gymnasium. The certificate of this board admits the bearer to the University as it does the regular gymnasium graduate. The Gymnasium is therefore the classical school preparatory to the University. Its course of instruction is prescribed by law, or is under governmental control. It does for the German student what is done for the American student by the grammar or high school and the college. It prepares him for his special and professional studies in the University. Its object is not to anticipate those studies by giving the mind an early professional drift, but by general discipline and a broad culture to prepare the student to pursue in the University such studies as he may choose with reference to his future calling. All the students of the Gymnasium pursue the same course with only an exception in favor of Hebrew for those who have already decided to study theology, and this work is done out of school hours. Instructors are expressly directed to keep the question of a future profession, so far as possible, out of the mind, leaving it prepared for any choice at the threshold of the University.

The gymnastic course extends over nine years including the period from the age of nine to eighteen. There are six classes, named numerically from *sexta* the lowest up to *prima* the highest. A year is given to each of the three lower classes, two years to each of the three higher. The course of study includes Latin, Greek, Mathematics, German, French, Geography, History, Natural Science, Religion, Drawing, Singing, Gymnastics. The strong classical and disciplinary drift of the institution appears in the apportionment of time to the several studies. Ten hours a week are given to Latin during the first eight years of the course, and eight hours per week in the ninth year. Greek begins in the third year or in class *quarta*, and from that time on it has six hours per week. The native tongue has two hours per week in all classes except *prima*, when it has three. Mathematics gets four hours per week at the start, then three, and afterwards again four. French begins in *quinta* or the second year, and is kept up through the entire course. The Natural Sciences hold an uncertain position until the last four years, when they receive at first one and then two hours per week.

The purpose of the gymnasium is in the broader, German sense of the word scientific (*wissenschaftlich*); that is, it aims at intellectual culture for the sake of knowledge as knowledge. It does not aim to be practical in any other sense than this: it does not look immediately towards the material service of life; it aims to develop mental power, to put the mind in possession of itself and of the means of future acquisition.

From the gymnasium after passing his graduating examination (*Abiturienten-examen*), which is by law held at the school and by a regularly constituted commission, the young man passes, if he obtains a certificate of ripeness, into matriculated membership in the University. Here he enters upon a life of great freedom. He chooses now the faculty under which he will study, he selects the lectures he will attend;—he has command of his own time, he can change from one university to another; he is not interfered with unless he is exceptionally negligent, or is guilty of some breach of university order. While he is enrolled under a particular faculty and will necessarily study mainly in that faculty in order to obtain its degree, I know of no restriction on his choice of lectures from any other faculty. The German faculties are almost without exception four in number, including Law, Medicine, Theology and Philosophy. These faculties cultivate the studies and confer the degrees appropriate to their several names. The philosophical faculty is the one over whose proposed division a good deal of discussion has arisen, a subject which furnishes to Prof. Hofmann the theme of his inaugural discourse, and which he treats in its close relation to the Real School Contest. It is usually the largest faculty of the university. Under it are grouped the studies which do not fall within the provinces of Law, Medicine, or Theology. Here belongs, therefore, a very large range of studies, beginning with Philosophy proper, extending through Mathematics, the Natural Sciences, Philology, Archæology, History, Ethnology, Political Economy, and the like. This bringing together of so many subjects in one group involves a large faculty, and the number of instructors increases rapidly, together with the rapid development of studies of this nature, and their subdivision into specialties. So it happens that since the founding of the Frederick-Wilhelms-

University in Berlin the number of members in its Philosophical faculty has well nigh quadrupled, while those of all the other faculties taken together have hardly more than doubled. A like relative growth is seen in other universities. The absolute number of members is also usually equal to that of all the other faculties taken together and sometimes larger. It will be noticed that the studies they cultivate, while they cover a wide range, stand in close relation to each other, and are animated by one spirit. They are preëminently scientific as distinguished from practical. The faculties of Law, Medicine, Theology, busy themselves with studies of immediate practical bearing on the concrete necessities of life. While any one of those subjects may be treated as a science, they concern themselves mainly for the every-day life of the masses of men. Not so with the studies of the Philosophical faculty. As its name indicates, its purpose is speculative, intellectual, scientific. It aims at knowledge for the sake of knowledge. The practical bearings of its studies are of secondary consideration. It stands therefore in the University as the representative of the higher culture, of ideality, and the scientific sense. The degree which it confers has always been regarded as specially a literary degree or a mark of scientific attainment. Circumstances which will appear hereafter have caused this faculty to bear a somewhat conspicuous part in the Real School Contest.

The glance we have taken at the normal course of study established and brought to a high degree of perfection in Germany, especially since the influence of Wilhelm von Humboldt made itself felt in the first decade of this century, prepares us to enter into the merits of the Real School Contest.

The name Real School (*Realschule*) dates from the first half of the last century. It was applied to schools which aimed more directly at preparation for business life. Various attempts have been made in Germany to establish schools of this general nature, but it is said that the first successful Real School was one which had been established in Berlin as far back as 1747, but did not prosper until about the year 1822. After that time institutions of this character began to be demanded by the increasing necessities of the times and, following the success of the Berlin institution, they drew the attention of a

government ever watchful of educational interests. They were finally taken in hand as government schools, and it is common to date their special importance from the year 1859, when they were divided into three grades or orders, and regular courses of instruction were laid out for each order as for the other government schools. It is the Real School of First Order, the highest of these institutions, which alone concerns us, as the one over which the sharp contest has arisen, through the demand made for its graduates, that a certificate of fitness (*Zeugniß der Reife*) held by them, as a result of the graduating examination, should admit them to regular matriculation as students under the University faculties.

Relatively to the lower Real Schools the Real School of First Order stands in the same position as does the Gymnasium to the lower schools of its kind. It differs from the Gymnasium in its history, in its traditional purpose and aim, and in its course of study. The number of classes is the same as in the Gymnasium, the number of years covered by the course of study is the same, but the two courses of instruction differ, in the lower degree of importance assigned to classical studies in the Real School; in the entire absence of Greek from its course; and the substitution therefor of a modern language, the English; in the larger part played in its system by mathematics and the natural sciences; and therewith in the amount and kind of work done in Latin, as well as in that general animus which will unavoidably have been given to the school by its past history and its origin in a demand for a more practical style of instruction adapted to the necessities of business life. In accordance with these differences the graduating examinations differ not only in the subjects with which familiarity is required, but even when they touch the same subject, differences are noticeable corresponding to the general animus of the rival institutions.

The strife therefore which divides Germany to-day on the school question is precisely the one which has been going on in England and in this country over the relative value of classical discipline to liberally educated men. There, however, the strife has been sharpened and somewhat embittered by the fact that there are numerous graduates of the two kinds of

preparatory institutions, some of them occupying important positions, whose zeal for and pride in gymnasium or school naturally lead to a partizan advocacy of their several systems. Great additional interest is given to the admission of Real School graduates to the University by the consideration that without a university education a man is cut off from so large a number of public offices. No man can become a lawyer, a pastor, a doctor, a teacher in a higher institution, unless he has passed through the university course and the regular examinations. The same is true of many of the political offices in the gift of government. Exclusion from the University means for the Real School graduate exclusion from the most coveted and influential callings in the land. The push now being made for the University means a push for these offices; so far, indeed, especially for the higher teaching offices; but it is not disguised that it means, in the end, full equality of privilege with any graduate of the Gymnasium. The push as we shall see has been in part successful. The Real School men had for a long time been gradually, but perseveringly pressing upon government their claims for recognition, as persons qualified by their education to be admitted to one after another of those government positions to which a university education was not esteemed necessary. As far back as 1832 instructions were issued on the part of government for graduating examinations with a view to making a Real School certificate of value to the bearer, as admitting him to the "one year volunteer military service" instead of the full term to which they who have no educational certificate were obligated, also to the post and bureaux service (*Post- und Bureaux-Dienst*), as well as to the study of forestry and architecture in the government institutions. Besides these, they were early admitted to the royal artisans' school and the polytechnic schools and to some higher offices in the mining interests. The way was thus gradually prepared for the celebrated "*Unterrichts und Prüfung's Ordnung der Real- und der höheren Bürger-schulen*" of 1859 to which allusion has before been made. This "Order of Instruction and Examination for the Real and higher Bürger Schools" brings these schools completely under government regulation, prescribes the order of studies and examina-

tions, and defines the privileges won by the possessor of the graduation certificate. It is much insisted on by the advocates of the Real School, that the ordinance of 1859 expressly assigns to the Real School a coördinate position relatively to the Gymnasium; that it carefully denies any contrast in fundamental principle between them; one is rather the complement of the other. The Real Schools are no longer to be regarded as trade schools (*Fachschulen*), but along with the Gymnasias occupy themselves with the work of *general culture*. Yet it was expressly understood that these institutions aimed at general culture as a preparation, nor for the learned professions or the highest official stations, but for "such higher practical callings as do not demand a university education."* The certificate did not admit to the University; and the Real School student was by that fact excluded from those positions for which a university education was an indispensable preparation.

No doubt a great advance was made by the Real Schools in consequence of this action of the Prussian government in 1859. On the one hand the charge that they were mere practical schools was taken away. For while they aimed to prepare men for the various callings of life, not specially literary or scientific, they aimed, as all preparatory schools should, to secure that preparation by the way of a scientific culture; by the way of mental development rather than by what may be called trade studies. Moreover, unity was given to this whole system of education by placing all schools upon a graduated scheme and uniform courses of study, as had been done with the gymnasia and their affiliated schools. The fixed requirement of Latin, including the reading of authors as far as Livy, supplied for the schools of first order what many would regard as a sufficient classical culture.

As in its disciplinary aim and to some extent in its required studies the Real School approached the Gymnasium it won the confidence of the public; the number of schools and their attendance increased; and though the government did not intend it to fulfill the same educational office as the Gymnasium, whose special work is preparation for the University, it

* Reisacker.

was only natural that the increased efficiency of the schools should be pointed out, and that, as the quality of work done in the schools rose, the demand should be heard, more and more distinct and peremptory, that a share of university privileges should be conceded to those students who came armed with the graduating certificate of the Real School of First Order. The school, it was claimed, pursues the same aim as the Gymnasium, only by a different route; and as its object is no longer simply practical, but properly speaking scientific culture, disciplinary, it is to be regarded as fully equal (I have nowhere seen the claim that it is superior) to the Gymnasium for purposes of intellectual discipline; the way therefore should be opened for its pupils through the University into the highest professional positions and offices of State. If the demand was first made, and I am not sure that it was so, in reference to any particular part of the University and the callings to which that department opens the way, it is no longer a secret that the advocates of the new system intend to push their demand so as to cover all the four faculties of Law, Medicine, Theology, and Philosophy, and consequently all the government patronages. The Real School sets before itself the same aim as the Gymnasium, a high intellectual culture; it should have the same privileges. It differs only in its method, and the method is as good, at least, as the old classical method. It furnishes as good a preparatory culture as that does, its men should be free to apply that culture in any station which is open to the men of humanistic training.

It is important to note the ground of the demand. It is not based, as it would be with us, on the very questionable right of any man to pursue what avocation he pleases and make his way wherever he can on such capital as he may happen to possess. All concede that the government is right in requiring of those who are to hold high positions of trust definite courses of study leading to high mental discipline; but the claim is, that this requirement is fulfilled, and on that claim is based the demand for equal privileges.

The perseverance of the new educationists was again rewarded. The government proceeded cautiously to test the question of adequate culture. In 1869 it submitted to the

universities for their consideration and advice the question "Whether and to what extent Real School graduates should be admitted to the studies of the several faculties in the Universities."

The question thus definitely brought before the large body of professors distributed through the Prussian Universities was widely discussed with the result that, while some faculties received the proposition with more favor than others, so large a majority were opposed as to constitute a positive decision against the ability of the Real Schools of the First Order to give a preparation for the University equivalent to that offered by the Gymnasium. The data furnished by Prof. Hofmann show that out of nine universities, among which are those of Berlin, Bonn, Göttingen, Halle, Marburg, and some of which represent both the protestant and catholic theologies; and out of the thirty-two faculties in these nine universities, twenty-seven faculties voted for the rejection of the proposed graduates—three for conditional admission and only eight for admission. Reckoned by faculties, the vote stood as follows: In theology the nine protestant and two catholic faculties, eleven in all, voted for rejection; in Law seven faculties voted for rejection, and two for admission; in Medicine five faculties for rejection and four for admission; in Philosophy the vote stood four faculties for rejection, three for conditional admission, and two for admission.

In consequence of this overwhelming vote the Real School graduates remained excluded from all the faculties of the universities, excepting the Philosophical. With limitation to certain studies; Mathematics, Natural Sciences and Modern Languages; the applicants were admitted to matriculation in this faculty, and to the corresponding examinations, by government order in December, 1870. The eligibility of such students to the higher teaching offices, after passing through the University was, however, limited to positions in the Real Schools and higher Bürger Schools; and for teachers of modern languages in these schools a decided preference was to be given to those who had gone to the University from the Gymnasium.

The Philosophical Faculty of Berlin, in common with the other faculties of that institution, voted for rejection, and that

with emphasis. (*Entschiedene Abweisung*).* The position of this influential faculty has all along been a thorn in the side of the new movement. At the time of its adverse answer in 1869, it numbered among its members such names as Trendelenberg, Dove, Gustav Rose, Magnus, von Raumer, and Mommsen. In its address to Herrn von Mühler, Minister of State, etc., dated at Berlin, December 18, 1869, it gives reasons for its rejection of students who come unprovided with that culture whose "center is found in the classical languages, the methodical study of which is impossible without logical training and manifold historical learning." They concede that "it is the most difficult, but even on that account the most formative object of study." They assert that, notwithstanding their apparently superior opportunity for mathematical study, the Real School graduates do not even in that branch show any special gain over the graduates of the Gymnasium; and as for the natural sciences the early attention given to them seems to dull the enthusiasm for such studies, and experience teaches that in this department of instruction the gymnasium graduate gives on an average a better result, when, after leaving their several preparatory schools, the two classes of students are brought into competition. Even in modern languages the aim of the Real School is said to be rather at a certain practical readiness than at such substantial culture as is sought and gained in classical studies. They also urge that if the Real School students are admitted to the University and through it to places as Real School teachers, the want of classical zeal in such teachers must tend still further to depress the standard in such schools; and if they are admitted to those State offices which require breadth of view and historical learning, the State must suffer from the absence of that converse with antiquity which forms the basis of our modern statesmanship. The report claims the advantage for the Gymnasium even as a preparation for the more practical callings, in that it asserts, as a result of experience, that for business positions in great commercial houses and in industrial establishments the young men who come from Prima of the Gymnasium are preferred over those who come from the Real School.

*The medical faculty of Berlin voted for *Abweisung* without the emphasis; the other faculties with the emphasis.

Such was the position of the universities towards the question of classical education in 1869. Nevertheless the Real School made a great gain. Against the decisive votes of the faculties of Law, Medicine and Theology, and under the doubtful consent of the Philosophical Faculty, its graduates were admitted to a portion of the studies under the last-named faculty. The door was opened, not wide, but a little, enough to encourage the schools to new effort, and their advocates to further agitation.

The next objective point of the agitation has been the admission of students to the Medical Faculty which, on the former trial, rejected the application less decisively than the faculties of Law and Theology, by a vote of only five against four. The ultimate goal however is, as has been said, that of equal privileges with the gymnasium graduates. The discussion has been particularly lively of late taking the form of a canvass of the results of the last ten years' experience, under the plan of admission to a limited number of studies in the faculty of Philosophy. No doubt the matter has been closely watched by both parties. They are by no means agreed in their verdicts. The two classes of students have been at work side by side, on a level of perfect equality, and nothing could be more important to the future of the Real Schools than the manner in which their graduates may seem to have borne themselves along-side their competitors from the Gymnasium.

Opinions differ. On the one hand it is asserted that the trial has fully justified the opposition made to the admission of students who had not been qualified for the higher university studies by a thorough classical training. The Real School graduates manifest at first a kind of readiness and maturity, but are soon outstripped by the students of classical training. They show a want of mental discipline, a lack of culture. In many of the departments they are found lacking in that instrumental outfit which is necessary to the successful prosecution of their studies, and which is supplied only by a practical knowledge of the classical languages and literature. On the other hand, the advocates of the new style of education, stung by the charges brought against it by Prof. Hofmann, in his inaugural address, and by the Philosophical Faculty at Berlin,

in a new treatment of the subject, as well as by the discouraging rejection of their graduates by vote of the great majority of the German Medical Associations, before whom the question of their admission to the study of medicine has been brought, retort, not without bitterness, that the examination and other statistics prove the Real School graduates to have been misrepresented: that fairly viewed, the record is decidedly in their favor; that, moreover, the conditions of a fair trial are still wanting and will be wanting until the students are admitted to full privileges in all directions, when alone the total result of the new training can be appreciated. So the cry is still for equal privileges, for a fair chance, "*gleiche Verteilung von Raum, Luft and Licht.*"

Dr. Hofmann is Professor of Chemistry in the University of Berlin, and was made Rector of the University. He seems to have been one of the first to bring the results of the experience of the last ten years to the notice of the public. At any rate he has by his inaugural made himself a conspicuous mark for the return fire of the defenders of the new education. He expresses himself positively, though courteously, with regard to the present state of experience. His conclusions are based not on the observation of cases of exceptional ability or disability, but on that of a considerable number of students of average intellectual capacity taken both from the Gymnasium and the Real School. Out of these observations, conducted through more than a decade of years, he concludes that, in the first place, "the preparation for academical study in the German High Schools (by which term is meant the universities), is undergoing a significant change," as a result of the admission of Real School students even in a limited degree to the University. The number of such students is yearly increasing. In the last five years the number of Real School graduates matriculated in the Philosophical Faculty of Berlin has nearly quadrupled. Other universities are having a like experience.

In the second place, if formerly it was charged that the opponents of admission, in their earlier utterances, were influenced by fears which arose only from theoretical views, we now have the experience; and experience confirms the prophecies of years ago. "The Ideality of academical study, the unselfish devo-

tion to knowledge as such, the free exercise of thought, at once condition and result of such devotion, fall on the whole more and more to the rear in proportion as the classical foundation of our mental life is withdrawn from a preparation for the university." While this conclusion claims for itself only a personal character, it is not based alone on Prof. Hofmann's own observations but also on those of friends in the departments of physics and mathematics, whom he finds almost without exception of the same mind. With this general conclusion drawn from experience before us, we are warned by the author of the address, that the style and content of university instruction must ever depend on the quality of preparation which the students bring with them; and that any letting down of the standard of preparation must result in the decline of the University itself; and the remark dropped by the way is instructive in more than one direction, that it would be a great error to suppose, because of our rapid progress in physical science and our new power of lightning transmission of thought, that thinking itself is swifter and easier than heretofore: "good thoughts are no cheaper now than at any former period."

The testimony of the Rector of the University at Berlin is confirmed by the recent official action of its Philosophical faculty. Two years ago the members sent a memorial to the Minister of Spiritual, Educational and Medicinal affairs, Herrn von Puttkamer, in which they embody the results of their experience as the only kind of faculty to whose instruction Real School graduates have been admitted. The memorial sets forth that the great majority of the members of the faculty, who have had opportunity to observe the working of the new system, are agreed that the fears expressed when the matter was before them ten years ago are not by any means quieted by their later experiences. The memorialists do not however deal in generalities; they enter the several departments where experience has been accumulating, and give the results of observation in the separate studies. They notice with regret the rapid increase in the University of the percentage of Real School students during the last half of the decade. In the winter semester of 1875-76, out of 705 matriculated Prussians in this philosophical faculty there were only fifty-six Real School graduates, or

less than eight per cent. In the winter semester of 1879-80 out of 1299 Prussians there were one hundred and forty-four such graduates, or more than eleven per cent.; and if we take into the account only those departments of study to which the Real School students were admitted, the per cent. increase is still greater, rising in Mathematics, Natural Sciences, and the Modern Languages from less than eight per cent. to fifteen per cent.

The testimony of instructors in the several departments is very uniformly adverse to the style of preparation manifested by those students who present themselves without thorough classical discipline. In Mathematics, those whose lectures are attended by students who are spending their first semesters at the University do not notice any special difference between the two sets of graduates; but those professors who teach the higher Mathematics hold fast to the opinion, that, although more attention is given to Mathematics in the Real School than in the Gymnasium, the graduates of the latter, in the end, surpass their friends from the Real School in scientific bent and sense as well as in capacity for deeper understanding. The occupant of the chair of Astronomy is more positive and more discouraging. The young men from the Real Schools start off with more knowledge and skill, but in the long run bear no comparison with those who come from the Gymnasium. They are slower to develop, more superficial, less independent, and more conceited.

In Chemistry, Prof. Hofmann finds the Real School graduates possessed of an advantage in the start, which is soon lost on account of the better discipline of those trained in the Gymnasium. Prof. Rammelsberg observes that in the technical school he finds the young men from the Gymnasium listening to his lectures with a lively interest, not manifested by students from the Real School, and the Artisan Schools, who for the very reason that they were early introduced to these studies, listen with an air of surfeit (*Blasirtheit*). The Gymnasium students also come off relatively better in the examinations.

Among the instructors in Natural History, Professor Peters complains not only of their imperfect knowledge of Latin, but

also of English and French, in which they might be expected to be strong; while he finds it impossible to make clear to them names and terminology taken from the Greek. On the other hand when it comes to observation, direct eye and hand work, Prof. Martins, whose contact is mainly with a smaller class of zealous specialists, does not find his Real School students deficient in power of observation, or of discrimination, or in scientific aspiration, diligence and endurance. But he finds them less receptive of that which is imparted by others, and they have less power to reproduce that which is communicated, and possess less versatility.

In modern languages, the Professor of French finds no material difference between the two classes of students; while the Professor of English finds the Real School students at a disadvantage, when it comes to a scientific study of English, because of their uncertain knowledge of Latin, while no such lack is observable among the Gymnasium students; the want of Greek also makes grammatical instruction more difficult; and they seem to him deficient in sharpness of apprehension and in independence of judgment. As a member of the examining commission he finds the results of the examinations in English on an average more satisfactory among the Gymnasium students.

In like manner runs the testimony from the instructors in the German language and in a marked way from the department of Philosophy, where Professor Zeller finds the Real School students a constant source of embarrassment, on account of the relations of the modern philosophical terminology to the ancient, and the want on the part of these young men of the necessary knowledge of Greek and Grecian antiquity.

Yet the faculty indicate their conviction that it is not simply the want of acquaintance with Greek or imperfect acquaintance with Latin which places the Real School student at a disadvantage in pursuit of the studies which have so far been opened to him by law. Above all they think that the Ideality of the Scientific Sense, the interest in knowledge as such without reference to practical aims, discipline of thought and acquaintance with the classical foundations of our modern culture cannot be secured outside of humanistic institutions; and so after

an earnest plea for the preservation of the high standard of German culture, they request a reconsideration of the question of the further admission of Real School students to University privileges. The names of the present faculty are appended to the memorial, among whom American readers will recognize such men as Zeller, Helmholtz, Lepsius, Mommsen, Peters, Hofmann, and others.

So far we listen to the representatives of the old and still prevailing order of liberal and professional education in Germany. The answers made by the advocates of the new system may be given more briefly, because, except when statistics are introduced, they are compassed by general statements and are very much the same with different writers.

A large share of what has been written in defence of the Real Schools consists of historical reviews of the development of the two systems of education and comparisons of the two courses of study, with a view to showing how the deficiencies of the newer schools are counterbalanced by the advantages they offer. These discussions, which are mainly theoretical, not concerning themselves with practical results, we do not need to reproduce. They may be passed over with the general remark that there seems to be no disposition to deny, as is done, or at least all but done, in some quarters of England and of this country, the special value of classical training and the manifest advantages of the classical schools over the Real Schools in this respect. It is only contended that the deficient Latin training and the entire absence of Greek in the Real Schools is in part made up for by the grammatical training in French, and the philological and literary training which is obtained from the composite English speech and its rich literature.* To this add the mathematical discipline, the superiority of which in the Real Schools is insisted on; and the culture obtainable through the inductive sciences, and we have a total result, it is claimed, equal in value to that of the classical Gymnasium as a preparation for University study.

The replies made to the objections drawn from the actual experience of the last ten or twelve years consist, in part, of rebutting testimony either of instructors, who give the results

*Schacht.

of their observations on the two classes of students which stand side by side in the University; or of statistics, showing how the Real School graduates have borne themselves in examinations or in the competitions of actual life; and, in part, of reasons why the record is not more satisfactory.

Conspicuous among the University defenders of the claims of the Real Schools stands Dr. Johannes Wislicenus, Chemical Professor and Rector of the Bavarian Julius Maximilian University at Wurtzburg, whose testimony is of the more value to the new system, because though himself trained in a Real School, he has formerly ranked himself among the opponents of the movement for University privileges. By contact with graduates of both classes in his own laboratory, he has become convinced "that the preparation for the University given by the Real Gymnasium cannot be regarded as poorer than that intellectual development which comes mainly by way of the humanistic schools." He does not find the real students wanting in scientific interest or in appreciation of knowledge for its own sake. They are on a par with other students in their laboratory work, though he grants that any special advantage they may at first appear to have in consequence of their earlier training, is soon lost. They are on an average in course of time overtaken by the Gymnasium students but not surpassed by them. It is to be noted here that the Real Gymnasium of Bavaria differs somewhat, especially, if I understand aright, in its stronger Latin discipline, from the Real School of First Order in Prussia; yet this can hardly account for all the difference of opinion between the Chemical professors at Würtzburg and the Chemical professor at Berlin. Of other professors who have declared themselves in favor of Real Schools, the list collected by Dr. Pflüger, director of the Real School I. O. in Chemnitz and given in his "Human- und Realgymnasium"—1882—does not seem to be long; it includes but six names, among which is that of Dr. Wislicenus. Another Dr. Körting, Prof. der romanischen und englischen Philologie in Münster, speaks decidedly in favor of the attainments and scientific spirit of the real students, though he contends for a single preparatory institution, which shall do away with the faults both of Gymnasium and Real School, and in which Greek shall be a

part of the course; the higher culture being inaccessible to those who are not versed in Grecian antiquity. So far, therefore, his testimony is against the principle of the Real School.

It is not possible in this already too long review of the subject to go into the array of statistics on either side, which according as they are handled, seem to tell in favor of or against the Real School graduates as compared with the graduates of the Gymnasium. Among such appeals to statistics, that of Dr. Steinbart, also a Real School director, is especially celebrated and much quoted. It was natural enough that the unfavorable judgment of Professor Hofmann should be met with some feeling by those who were committed to the defence of the real students; and Dr. Steinbart does not disguise his disgust over the attitude of the Berlin professor. His statistics however are of value and certainly make a handsome showing for his favorite class of students, whatever may be said of his attempt to prophesy an unfavorable comparison for the Gymnasium graduates when they may be brought to a like statistical test. The lists of Dr. Steinbart show that out of a hundred and eighty persons, who in the ten years between 1866 and 1876, left the North German Real Schools to study Chemistry and Natural History, and of whose subsequent career it was possible to get information, one hundred and seventeen had taken the Doctors degree, of whom seventy-six were promoted to that degree in Prussian Universities, forty-one in other German Universities, and four in foreign lands. Of the remaining sixty-three out of the one hundred and eighty, twenty-two were still studying, twelve were practical Chemists, ten were assistants. An official comparison of the grade attained under the examination for doctor's degrees as between the two classes of students could not be obtained, but Steinbart is confident in the assumption that the average result would prove itself superior to that reached by the students from the Gymnasium. Out of the hundred and eighty-three there were also eleven in the teaching office or preparing for it. Of these some are assistants, others professors in Universities. These are statistics of which the Real School advocates do not need to be ashamed. How far they go towards deciding the relative merits of the two systems on the ab-

solute questions at issue we may see hereafter. A few words may here be in place in regard to excuses made for the Real School.

Prof. Wislicenus calls attention to the fact that the material of the Real School, the class of youth who enter it, is not as a whole so good as that of the Gymnasium. The fact that all public positions stand open to the graduate of the Gymnasium, by way of the door into and through the University, draws the best material into the classical schools. Only when the door to all departments of the University stands wide open can this be remedied. At present the children of the cultivated classes turn to the Gymnasium unless they show a very special aptitude for some calling, preparation for which may be had in the Real School, or unless they show a special dislike to classical study. This state of things is urged in answer to the unfavorable judgment passed upon the Real students. The system can only show what it is practically worth when it has a free course open to it. There is certainly force in the argument, but the answer comes back from the University, that it is dangerous to try the experiment of giving full privileges to a system about which there is so much doubt, and that it is much easier to keep a door shut against an evil than to close it when for the sake of trial this evil has been permitted to get a foothold.

The further attempt to excuse or justify the real students by charges of unfairness in University examinations, on account of the prejudices of the professors, seems hardly worthy to have been brought forward in such a discussion.

I trust the importance of the Real School contest in Germany in its bearing upon the subject of the higher education will justify me in thus going into some of the details of its history. In closing this review, we must bring together the main results so far as they are now developed, and put them into their proper relation to the subject heretofore discussed, that of the Education of Men of Science.

We find in these recent movements of the German, and especially the Prussian government and universities a more than usually systematic testing of the great question of the mathematico-natural history culture, as against humanistic culture as a preparation for higher studies, whether professional or oth-

erwise. The circumstances are unusually favorable for such a trial. The existence of two distinct sets of schools, each having a sufficient past to secure to it a definite traditional spirit; the fact that these schools are not left to go their own ways but are under strict government control; the circumstance that government, in exercising this control, does not seek to revolutionize either the one or the other, but to guide each along an already marked out path, while it sets before each the same fundamental aim of general culture, as a preparation for the future work of an educated manhood in whatever sphere; the stimulus given to the two classes of institutions by rivalry, and by the necessity put upon the newer schools, by their own ambitious demands for equal privileges with the older Gymnasias, to do the very best work and show the best results of the new training; all these constitute a combination of conditions peculiarly favorable to a fair and instructive trial of the relative value of the two methods. The time only is short. Ten years is sufficient, for observing the bearing of the two classes of students in the University, and comparing their relative fitness for the branches of study they pursue together, and so coming at a reasonably probable conclusion as to the general result in culture. It may be fairly presumed—experience teaches us this—that as a rule the advantages and disadvantages exhibited at this early period of life continue to assert themselves in all the future career. The foundation laid, the habits of thought, the mental drift acquired at this period are a serious element in a man's future. And yet, it is but just to say, that the full fruits, whether evil or good, of the new culture can only be gathered as the fruits of humanistic culture are being gathered through the long harvest of years, and in strictness one must say of generations and centuries. That which can be gathered from the present experience is, necessarily, only one indication as to the wisdom of a wide encouragement of a distinctively non-classical culture.

On this point the great weight of opinion apparently among men of culture and learning in Germany is unfavorable to the mathematico-scientific method as against the humanistic. And whatever view we may take of the peculiarities of the German mind, its indisposition to change, its tenacity of opinion, no

one acquainted with the German scholar as we find him at his work table, with his great fondness for and appreciation of scholarly work; or in the lecture room with his large sympathy for youth, especially for youth of promise, can believe, that in the judgment of a question of such moment and with such men, littleness is asserting itself above breadth of manhood.

If we sum up in a few words the content of this unfavorable opinion, we find the leading instructors complaining of the non-classical school, that it sends the student forth, wanting in certain spiritual and intellectual qualifications for the highest scholarship, such as the scientific sense, or fondness for and aspiration after knowledge for its own sake, and without reference to the questions of meat and drink; independence of thought, capacity to strike out for himself in intellectual work; depth and comprehensiveness of mental grasp, and that ideality or imaginative power and sense of the beautiful and grand which lie at the root of the creations of genius, whether in the fields of literature or of science. On the other hand, the advantage which the young men possess over those of classical training, on account of greater progress in mathematics, a certain familiarity with physical science and practical knowledge of French and English is soon lost relatively to the trained student of the *Gymnasium*, who by virtue of a better mental discipline after a while overtakes his competitor,—this even Prof. Weslicenus admits—so that what the student had gained in these respects by no means makes up for the want of logical classical discipline and that classical knowledge which forms the historic bond between ancient and modern learning. These deficiencies of the non-classical training were anticipated by the leading German educators and their experience justifies the prophecy.

It is hardly venturing too much to say that the defects pointed out by the German professors are for the most part such as would naturally be anticipated by one even imperfectly trained in classical learning; such as naturally flow from the necessary and intimate relation, the fundamental connection between the modern and the ancient, the present and the past, and from the fundamental quality of that discipline which comes from grammatical and kindred studies as compared

with the study of the sciences of observation taken up at an age which does not admit of previous logical training. Nor does the fact, shown by statistics, that a good proportion of the Real School graduates have been promoted to the doctors' degree, constitute an answer to these objections. In the first place these statistics are absolute not relative. They do not show the comparative number of students from the two classes of institutions which have come to this degree, nor the grade with which they have come out of the examination test. And though Steinbart bases on the limited experience of Weslicenus, a favorable prophecy for the Real School men when the comparison shall be made, I find by a note of Reisacker, in his most excellent and every way fair discussion of the subject, that Dr. E. A. Richter has recently issued comparative statistics, showing a directly contrary result, based, I believe, on the State examinations for teachers in the higher schools. Richter points out important omissions and weaknesses in the figures heretofore given, and makes the exhibit unfavorable for the Real School, while Reisacker justly observes, that in view of the numerous incalculable factors which enter into such a question as this, every conclusion based on statistics must be regarded as exceedingly unsafe. Daily contact with students, such as is granted to the instructor and guide must furnish a much more reliable means of forming a judgment than any statistics based on examination tests. Nor can the main question be decided by pointing to individual cases of eminent success from either school. Such cases there will surely be. But here we have to do with average results, in professional callings, in science, in literature, in the culture and thought of the age.

If we come now to the special motive which has led us into this study; to the question, what preparation is best suited to the wants of men whose lives are to be devoted to natural science, we find ourselves led to the conclusion reached by a different method in a previous Article. The best qualification for a life of scientific study is that which is best for a life of study in any department; a thorough mental discipline gained by a careful classical and mathematical training, and by a fundamental acquaintance with the earlier thought of the world, its learning, its history; the foundation on which has

been raised the superstructure of modern thought. A culture without this must be deficient, and to no one is this early indoctrination more necessary than to one whose life is to be spent in search among the phenomena of nature, after the laws of nature and after its higher lessons. If we are to avoid that "mental twist" which Mr. Huxley freely grants is the normal result of a too exclusive study of natural science, we need precisely what many, and among them Mr. Huxley, are now saying, men of science cannot afford to spend their time in acquiring.

As bearing on this question of time, the uniform testimony of the German professors is instructive. The gain made by the students of the Real School, in consequence of their fuller introduction to scientific studies in the preparatory course proves to be of little account. The Gymnasium student soon overtakes him in these very branches. Would it not then have been better for the Real School graduate to have given the time he vainly spent in securing an advanced position in these studies, to the classical branches which he neglected, and the loss of which he may never be able to repair? The experience of the German instructors is in the main confirmed by the instructors in our own schools of science. It is notorious that, as a general rule, the graduates of colleges who enter such schools prove themselves, with only now and then an exception, vastly better fitted to take up general and special science, and make much more rapid acquisitions therein than those students who cut the college course and try to save time and money by plunging at once into a scientific course. And how much the best teaching talent of the land gathered in science schools, is forced by this haste and waste to weary itself with the merest drudgery of elementary teaching, in order to put young men in condition to profit by their higher studies, they know best who have spent most time in that way. This again comes of the standard of preparation required for entering such schools. I speak not of those who enter them as technical students; I have previously carefully distinguished between the technical student and the student of science. I speak of those who pursue science as a branch of knowledge for the sake of knowledge. It is the German experience, that

if the door is opened to the faculty of philosophy and to its degrees for students of non-classical training, immediately the proportion of students who have gone through the hard classical discipline falls off and the proportion of those who have chosen the easier way increases. The lovers of the higher learning point with fear to the danger which threatens the national standard of culture from this source. So it will ever be. Requirement secures attainment. Privileges, honors, degrees which can be had by the easier route, will be sought through the easier route. It distinctly concerns the future of our rapidly developing American science that it does not hold its privileges and honors cheap. The strict requirement of a careful humanistic training, as a condition of entering on a candidacy for the higher scientific degrees of our universities, would not so much exclude some worthy aspirants as stimulate all worthy aspirants to subject themselves patiently to the cost of the required training.

It would have been foreign to the purpose of this Article to go into a discussion of the probable effects of the Real School Contest on the educational system of Germany. It is proper, however, to note here the indications of important changes preparing, probably in the Gymnasial course, more perfectly adapting it to the changed intellectual conditions of the last twenty-five years. No doubt the true conception of mental culture lies somewhere between the older humanistic and the newer science method. Thus true conception will be more nearly approached through the present discussion. In the mean time, it will be the duty of those who aim at a healthy development of scientific thought in this country, to insist upon the danger of delivering over one of the widest and most rapidly expanding departments of modern learning to men, who, through early neglect of classical studies have failed to bring their minds into that relation with the past which powerfully aids the student in measuring, understanding and taking part in the unfolding present.

ARTICLE V.—LIBERTY OF MAN, WOMAN, AND CHILD IN UNCHRISTIAN LANDS.

THE most eloquent, though not the most scholarly, of infidel orators, in one of his most popular lectures, attempts to show, by quotations from the Old Testament, that Christianity is unfavorable to the "liberty of man, woman, and child;" even more so than the great religions of Asia, from whose ancient books he quotes some exceptional sentences; while infidelity, he claims, is the very champion of these liberties.

Instead of judging either Christianity or Asiatic religions by exceptional and debatable passages from their most ancient books, it would be a shorter, as well as a surer way to get at the real influence of the various religions and infidelities upon the "liberty of man, woman and child," to compare quotations from the newest testament of living Christianity, with others from the newest expositions of heathen religions and of infidelity, as seen in the lives and practices of their disciples.

Let us then take the United States as the freshest gospel in this newest testament of living Christianity, and compare it with equal territory in Asia, including Japan, which is about the size of California (160,000 square miles), "China Proper," about as large as the portion of the United States west of the Rocky Mountains, exclusive of California (1, 500,000 square miles), and India, about the size of our country east of the Rocky Mountains (1,860,000 square miles),—total, 3,020,000, the United States having 3,026,494—these being the lauds where the best heathen religions and the most popular infidelities of to-day have had longest and fullest trial.

The population of the Asiatic countries I have named is about thirteen times as dense as in our equal area; for we have but fifteen millions, while they have nearly half the people on the earth—about six hundred and thirty-three millions. Japan has 31,000,000, China, 350,000,000 (by Williams' estimate), India, by recent census, has 250,000,000. While the average of

population in our country is only fifteen to the square mile, in the Asiatic countries it is two hundred. This fact has indirect significance in the comparison as to "liberty," and is of interest in connection with the question of Asiatic immigration and human brotherhood. Men who cry out for fair play in regard to Irish land cannot consistently object to a country which has but fifteen people to the square mile receiving peaceable refugees from a region where each mile is crowded with two hundred of our human brothers. This whole Chinese scare is very much like a large woman being frightened into a faint by a small mouse, that is still more frightened. Taking the back of the hand as a map of our fifty millions of population, the body of the hand and the middle finger represents the proportion of native white population, about seventy per cent. of the whole; my first finger and thumb show the proportion of foreign born white population, about one-seventh; the third finger and lower half of the little finger, stand for the six and a half millions of Negroes, about one-eighth of the population; the three hundred thousand Indians are represented by the upper half of my little finger, excepting the finger nail, which is the right size to picture the one hundred and fifty thousand Chinese in this country, at which the other portions of the population, three hundred and thirty-three times as many, have been so alarmed. The Bible tells of "one putting a thousand to flight." In this case each Chinaman seems to have put three hundred and thirty-three Americans into fear of losing their liberty and religion and virtue. The mountain indeed brings forth a terrible mouse. More than six times as many emigrants are now coming to us from other quarters every year as from China in the thirty years since her people began to visit our shores, and, to say the least, one hundred and fifty thousand of this annual immigration of whites will be found as dangerous and as degraded as the Chinese. Thirty-four millions of Americans ought to be able to leaven these small lumps of European and Asiatic heathenism.

In place of our needless fears of a Chinese invasion, let us show to the twelve thousand Chinese servants in our homes, and to other thousands in our employ, the true "liberty of man, woman, and child," which Christianity alone affords, and

thus send back, by their home letters, into oppressed Asia, the heaven of freedom.

The three unchristian countries which I propose to examine together as to their relations to liberty have much in common. Japan was doubtless peopled from China, and with her reverences the teachings of Confucius and Buddha, being allied by the latter tie to India also. These countries are alike in the antiquity of their civilization and culture; in literary evidences of native mental power; in their common slavery to idolatry and priestcraft; in the worship of creatures in place of the Creator; and especially in denying to men, women, and children what are considered in our country their inalienable political and social rights.

No field offers so full and fair an opportunity for testing what degree of "liberty for man, woman, and child" can be attained apart from Christianity as these countries, for the following among many reasons: The test is on a broad scale, including half the population of the world, living in all kinds of climate, and under several of the best unchristian forms of government. These nations include also all degrees of education, from the lowest to the very highest.

The *Hartford Courant* recently said of the Chinese students in this country, "when they have entered a school or college, or taken up a study, they have forthwith proceeded to step to the head of the school, and to master the whole of the study. It has been amazing to see how, in a strange country, speaking a foreign and peculiarly difficult language, they have managed in so many different ways, on so many occasions, to beat their American boy associates."

China had a lexicon seventeen hundred years ago; an astronomy in the times of Abraham; laws and literature in the days of Moses, superior to those of Egypt; classics a hundred years before David; and poems in the days of Homer; while the teachings of Confucius surpass those of Socrates. When Europe was in barbarism, China was the home of culture. Her people invented gunpowder, fire-arms, paper, and printing, centuries before they were invented in Europe. China has shown her superiority to Egypt, Greece, Rome and other lands of culture by the "survival" of her civilization after their

destruction. Only a people of strong mental capacity could have thus continued their national life for four thousand years through the wreck of empires all about them. All I have said of the mental capacity of the Chinese, "The Yankees of Asia," is true of the Japanese—the quick, versatile, polite Frenchmen of the East, whose Mikado traces back his imperial ancestry to the sixth century before Christ, making the longest reign of any royal family now represented on the thrones of the world. Japanese students and merchants in our land have disabused us of any theory we might have had of their mental inferiority.

India's culture ranks with that of China in antiquity and shows similar native strength of intellect, although education has never been so generally diffused, and mental power has been given chiefly to building up its masterly system of Brahminic monopolies rather than to inventions and moral precepts. Japan, China, and India offer a fair field for the test proposed, also, because they include all the great religions, Brahminism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Parseeism, Mohammedanism; besides many lesser religions; and also all the forms of Atheism, Deism and Infidelity that have been varnished up as "new philosophies" in England and America.

Both of the overpraised systems of Confucianism and Buddhism seek, with very little success, to persuade men to obey moral laws, for whose enforcement there is neither police, prison, nor penalty. Each of them has fine precepts, but with no grip, because no God. Both are practically atheistic materialism. It is a matter of dispute whether there is in the writings of Confucius any word for a Supreme Being. If the word in debate ever had that meaning, it was little used and held a very insignificant place in the religious system. No clear distinction was made between soul and body, and the worship of deceased relatives is the only hint at immortality, while future rewards and punishments are ignored. Hence the Confucian teachings as to conduct—the best outside of Christianity—have produced no better morality than the other inferior religions of Asia, through the lack of penalties such as every lawgiver recognizes as necessary to the success of his laws. Buddhism and Confucianism are, religiously, hero-worship, combined with

other idolatries ; and practically they are Spencerism, that is, an effort to make men virtuous, without recognizing God above, or a soul within, or immortality beyond. No one can fairly test the fruits of infidelity in an American infidel—a graft on a Christian tree in a Christian soil. Infidels in our land, who have come from Christian homes and grown up in Christian surroundings, may prize the “liberty of man, woman, and child,” but to know the real fruit of infidelity, we need to try it in its own orchard and in its own soil, as we can in Asia, in the nations where atheistic and materialistic theories have been long and fully tried amid the most cultured and enduring nations of the world.

In these Asiatic countries we have the best possible evidence of what materialistic culture, atheistic philosophy, the best systems of heathen religion, and the purest codes of human morality, all working under strong governments, can do for the “liberty of man, woman, and child.”

What then, first, is the *liberty of men* in the most favored of unchristian lands? Japan was, until 1868, when Christian influences led to a revolution, under a feudal government, such as our European ancestors overthrew long centuries ago. The throne was double-headed, consisting of a pope, called a *Mikado*, and a military dictator, called the *Tycoon*, until by the recent revolution, the *Tycoon* was abolished, and both civil and religious supremacy was vested in the *Mikado*. Each district was ruled by one of the nobility called a *Daimio*, corresponding to the barons of Europe, to whose will the common people were as fully subject as his dogs. This dog-degree of “liberty” is the best that a very polite and intelligent people, trained for centuries in the precepts of Confucius and Buddha, were able to work out for even “the lordly sex,” while women and children suffered the added despotism of their husbands and fathers, who were barons to them, with unlimited power.

The most influential paper in Japan, edited by a native Buddhist, nevertheless had the frankness to say, in a recent editorial on “the Jesus way,” as Christianity is called in that land : “See what blessings this religion confers ! Open the map of the world and look at the nations of the earth ; there is not a Buddhist nation among them that knows what liberty is. The

weakest and most insignificant Christian countries have more liberty than the most powerful Buddhist countries. Is it not time for Japan to advance?"

Confining ourselves still to the most favored sex in these lands, we ask what is the "liberty of *men* in China?" No large nation outside of Christianity has for any long period given so much of political power to the people, as China. The lowliest boys can by study and civil service examinations win many of the highest offices—the very highest being hereditary. There is also a court of tribunes, to borrow a Roman term, to which the people can appeal, even from the Emperor; and a constitution by which the power of the latter is limited. But how far short of the privileges of an American or English voter is this best government of heathenism! The difference between China and America in regard to the rights of men is still more apparent in the courts. Let me quote from Dr. H. M. Field's "Egypt to Japan," some facts in regard to the courts of Canton, which fairly represent Chinese courts in general: "The court-room was very plain. A couple of judges sat behind tables, before whom a number of prisoners were brought in. There was neither jury nor witnesses. There is no trial by jury in China. What is more, there are no lawyers, but the judge has it all his own way. He is simply confronted with the accused and the accuser and they have it all between them. A number of prisoners were brought in; some were carried in baskets as they are borne to execution, and dumped on the stone pavement like so many bushels of potatoes; others were led in with chains around their necks. As each one's name was called he came forward and fell on his knees before the judge, and lifted up his hands to beg for mercy. He was then told of the crime of which he was accused, and given opportunity if he had anything to say in his own defence. There was no apparent harshness or cruelty towards him, except that he was presumed to be guilty unless he could prove his innocence. Two men were accused of robbery with violence—a capital offence, but by the Chinese law no man can be punished with death unless he confesses his crime; hence every means is employed to lead a criminal to acknowledge his guilt. Of course in a case of life and death he will deny it as long as he can.

But if he will not confess, the court proceeds to take stringent measures to *make* him confess. For this purpose these two men were now put to the torture. The mode of torture was this: there were two round pillars in the hall. Each man was on his knees, with his feet chained behind him, so that he could not stir. He was then placed with his back to one of these columns, and small cords were fastened around his thumbs and great toes, and drawn back tightly to the pillar behind. This soon produced intense suffering. Their breasts heaved, the veins on their foreheads stood out like whipcords, and every feature betrayed the most excruciating agony. Every few minutes an officer of the court asked if they were ready to confess, and as often they answered, 'No; never would they confess they had committed such a crime.' They were told if they did not confess they would be subjected to still greater torture. But they still held out, though every moment seemed an hour of pain. While these poor wretches were writhing in agony, I turned to the judge to see how he bore the spectacle of such suffering. He sat fanning himself and smoking his pipe, as if he said he could stand it as long as they could. Of course he knew that as their heads were at stake, they would deny their guilt till compelled to yield; but he seemed to look upon it as simply a question of endurance, in which if he kept on long enough, there could be but one issue."

Many good men defend this trial by torture as a necessity in China, because testimony is absolutely worthless, since you could hire witnesses at ten cents apiece to testify to anything as long as your money held out. This national trait of unparalleled untruthfulness is incidental evidence (?) of the superiority of Confucianism and Buddhism, so much lauded in some pulpits, to Christianity.

The tortures of Chinese courts are nothing beside their modes of punishment, which are more fiendish than any ever invented by the savages of our forests.

The condition of men in India under the native princes, and even now in spite of British rule and its efforts to establish equal rights, is worse than in Japan and China. The Brahmins—than whom a more infamous set of priestly robbers never cursed the earth—have made the people of India believe

them a superior and ruling race, created from the head of Deity, while others are created from his shoulders, side, and feet for lower castes; and hence this oligarchy of a few thousand Brahmins, by the mystic power of superstition, holds the millions of India as slaves to the terrible despotism of their Jesuistry. They have so leavened the people with their errors that the great truth that all men are created of one blood and have equal rights will not soon be received. There is not on the earth a slavery so complete as that of India's *sudras*, who are made to believe themselves created to be for all generations the slaves of the Brahmins, and shut off from even the privileges of religion for time and eternity.

Such is the "liberty" (?) wrought out for *men* in Japan, China, and India by the best religions and philosophies found outside of Christianity. In neither of these countries does a man have any power in selecting his rulers, or in making the laws, or any adequate protection of his rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," except such as have been secured by the recent influence of Christianity.

The "*liberty of women and children*" to which some represent Christianity as less friendly than Infidelity, or even Asiatic religions, is still more of an unknown quantity in the real life of these unchristian and infidel lands. Even in the sacred books there are only a few exceptional passages that make any favorable reference to woman. We lavish our pity on the sufferings of a Chinese lady's compressed feet, but the souls of the women of Asia are more terribly crushed and dwarfed.

In all three of these Asiatic countries the birth of a girl is regarded as a misfortune. It is actually made the occasion for condolence, rather than congratulation. In all of these countries the infanticide of girls, as not worth raising, has been carried on by the wholesale for centuries. This practice is now forbidden by English law in India, but formerly the slaughter of female babes was regarded as a religious act, pleasing to *Kalee* the goddess of blood. The stories of babes thrown to the alligators in the Ganges is no fiction. In all these references to women and children I speak not of the degraded but especially of the rich and cultured classes.

A Hindu, who had three boys and three girls, being asked

how many children he had, answered "three." He did not count the girls, they were as nothing. The historian, Wilkinson, from statistics of infanticide carefully gathered—and the people make no more secret of killing a female babe than a kitten, one village declaring that they killed all their girls—estimated that in parts of India two-thirds of the girls were killed at birth. The killing is usually done by the parents,—oftenest by the mother, who in many cases has a tub of water at hand to drown her babe, if a girl, as soon as it is born. This killing of female babes in each of these countries is due partly to the desire to save expense in raising the child and marrying her with a dowry, but still more to the fact that sons only can perform the religious sacrifices which will benefit the deceased parents. A Chinese mother defended herself for consenting to have five of her baby girls drowned by her husband, year after year, by saying sadly, "Girls are better dead than alive; I wish I had been drowned."

In place of killing the girls, it was the common custom in Japan, until the influence of Christian nations led to the recent law forbidding it, for parents to sell their girls for a term of years, or for life, for the vilest purposes. This custom still continues in China on a very large scale, and before British influence interfered, was also common in India. In all three of these countries prostitution is practiced without public disapproval, and to a degree never seen in the worst parts of our cities. Indeed, in all of these countries licentious rites are connected with religious services, although Japan, by an edict inspired by Christian influences, is now seeking to suppress the vice as far as it connects with temple worship. Not only babes, but older daughters and wives are sold in China for debt.

The facts that I have stated that in neither of these countries, before Christian nations interfered, was it any crime to kill or sell a female child, shows at once the status of woman as the *property* of her father, as she is afterward of her husband, holding a relation to them little better than their dogs. Nowhere have women and children in their weakness been treated otherwise by the stronger sex, except where Christianity has made men feel that every human being has an immortal *soul* within, and a protecting and avenging God above.

Indeed if men are soulless, highly developed apes, as infidelity teaches, why should they not follow the law of animals that "might makes right?" When a Hindu father was asked to educate his daughters he replied, "Educate our girls? why, they will be talking about educating our cows next!" The only educated women in India are the prostitutes, or nautch girls. When the education of a Hindu girl was proposed, her father exclaimed, "Would you make my daughter a nautch girl?" Girls, other than prostitutes, are not allowed to attend school, or mingle in society, but are kept secluded and ignorant.

If a girl escapes both slaughter and sale, she falls on a third evil, which in that land is only another form of slavery—betrothal and marriage in childhood to some man selected for her by her parents with the aid of a professional match-maker. Betrothal in Asia usually occurs when the girl is not more than twelve, often younger. For a girl to be unmarried beyond twelve is a burning disgrace, which seldom occurs. She must marry the veriest knave rather than be single. Betrothal is the legal marriage, and after it the baby-bride is no longer allowed to roam the fields, but is shut up, as in a prison, in her father's house and taught to cook, to serve, to worship, but not to read or write. After she has learned these lessons, she is transferred to the prison of her father-in-law's home to be a slave to three masters—the mother-in-law, the father-in-law, and the husband. Confucius taught in "*The Great Learning of Women*," and Buddha afterward adopted the maxim,—“A bride must serve her father-in-law and her mother-in-law.” When a bridegroom goes forth from his father's home to bring back his bride, the mother as a regular part of the wedding ceremony, asks, "Where are you going, my son?" He answers, "I am going to bring you a female servant." It was doubtless because of this oriental slavery of the wife to the mother-in-law that Christ commanded the bridegroom to "*leave his father and mother.*" The bride having been brought to her father-in-law's house becomes a prisoner for life, with jealousy and suspicion as her jailors. She is to live henceforth, until death frees her, in the woman's quarters of that house, with no opportunity to go forth in loving ministries to the sick or needy,

while in her own home she cannot eat with her own husband, but only serve him as his cook and waiter. Nor can she receive guests at her own table, or meet any man except her father, brothers and husband, not even a physician to save her life. Her husband has sumptuous quarters, but hers are more like a prison cell with its lattice bars and scanty furniture.

A correspondent in *The London Christian Leader*, in a recent letter to that paper, gives the following picture of a Hindu wife whom she was allowed to meet. "At the appointed time I went and paid my first visit to the interior of a Hindu house, the *zenana* or apartments used for the females. I was shown into a small room with two small barred windows near the roof. The door opened into a verandah, which ran around a square, green with damp, as if the sun's rays never penetrated to the floor. The lower story was occupied by cook-rooms, cow-houses, and store-rooms. I had not been long in the room when a lady covered with jewels came in, but drew back when I approached her. When she found that I could talk to her in Bengali she became very talkative, and told me that she was the second wife and had two sons. The first wife was considered accursed of the gods, because she was childless. The first wife came and looked into the room, but refused to enter as she had a vow on herself and could not mix with other people until she had bathed. However, she sat and listened to what was said. The lady I was visiting said she had heard that the European ladies excelled in needle work. I said I would bring her some and some books. Oh no! she did not want books—learning among women brought down the anger of the gods. On my next visit I took canvas, needles, and wool, also 'The Peep of Day' in Bengali, and read several pages to her, with which she was much pleased. But to the question, 'Would you not like to learn to read?' she looked very much frightened, and said, 'I am only a woman. How could I learn to read? The gods would be angry and make me a widow.' However, she did learn to read, and used to read portions of the 'Pilgrim's Progress' to the other women of the house. The husband purchased a Bible, and I found they often sat till late at night reading it. Finally the Baboo took his family to Calcutta, and there he died of cholera. I tried when in Calcutta

to get a sight of the poor widow, but was never allowed. No doubt the poor creature was made to feel that all this misery was brought upon her as a punishment for learning to read."

In Asia it would hardly have been necessary to correct the mistake of the child, who, being examined by the priest in the catechism, gave the definition of *purgatory* when asked to explain the sacrament of *matrimony*. In Asia a woman is made to feel that marriage is a state of torment into which souls enter to prepare them for another and a better world. "They submissively endure a hell on earth as the price of heaven."

The Hindu law-giver, Menu, in his *Institutes* (sec. 154), says to woman in regard to her husband, "Though inobservant of approved usages, or enamored of another woman, or destitute of good qualities, yet a husband must constantly be revered as a god by a virtuous wife."

That is Hell's masterpiece of oppression.

Polygamy, that climax of woman's wrongs, is legally sanctioned and practiced in China, Japan, and India, and by persons holding each of the religions. The Emperor of China is a Brigham Young in his family relations, although most Chinamen have but one or two wives. In India polygamy is more common. Polyandry, that is many husbands to one wife, existed in India until suppressed by England. The heroine of India's greatest poem, the *Mahabharata*, is represented as marrying five brothers at once, and at last taking them all and her children by them to the home of the gods. In India men are not only allowed to add new wives on many pretexts, but also to cast off even from support old ones for trivial reasons given in the sacred books, the husbands being the sole judges and executors of the divorce. In Japan and China three of the seven grounds for divorce are disobedience, impoliteness to a mother-in-law, and a "persistent habit of loquacity."

Bad as is the lot of an Asiatic wife, more deplorable is that of a *widow*. Until British law interfered, millions of widows in India were burned, with their own fanatical consent, on the funeral piles of their husbands. In one case eighteen living wives were burned with the dead body of their lordly husband, leaving forty children doubly orphaned in a day. From 1815 to 1825, these widow-burnings occurred at the rate

of 1100 a year, besides those done too secretly for British officers to count. It is not strange that Hindu widows were willing to burn with their husbands rather than suffer a Hindu widow's life-long torture and degradation. A widow, even though she is only a child of ten, betrothed to some boy who has died, must never marry again, but putting off her wedding ring and jewels, and having her locks cut every ten days, wear henceforth a coarse dun-colored robe, without seam or fringe or figure, sleep on the ground instead of on a bed; and eat but once a day and then scantily and of the coarsest food, and never participate in the wedding joys of even a friend or sister. To all this is added the terrible thought that she may have caused her husband's death by some unintentional violation of petty caste rules about his dishes or eating, for which the gods were angry. Widowhood in India is practically being *buried alive*.

In contrast to this oppression and enslavement of man, woman, and child by false religions and infidelity in the lands where they have had the fullest power, look at the lands where Christianity is the prevailing religion. There is not one of them, save the half-barbarous Russia, in which there is not constitutional government, giving to men a right to vote, and to women and children protection in life and property, even against their own fathers and husbands. If Christianity favors polygamy and slavery and the oppression of women and children, as some infidels attempt to show by misinterpreted quotations from the Old Testament, how is it that in every Christian land slavery and polygamy have been made illegal, and the rights of women and children have been protected by law? How is it that feudal Japan, at the touch of Christian nations and missions, promises its *men* a constitutional government and national assembly in 1890;* and already begins to protect

* Rev. Otis Cary, Jr., writing from Okayuma, Japan, to the *Independent*, thus describes the recent changes :

"When in 1868, the revolution in the Japanese Government had been effected, Mutsu-bito, the youthful occupant of the throne, took an oath in which he promised that 'a deliberative assembly should be formed and all measures be decided by public opinion; that the uncivilized customs of former times should be broken through, and the impartiality and justice displayed in the workings of Nature adopted as a basis of action; and that intellect and learning should be sought for throughout the world, in order to establish the foundations of the empire.' Then

women and children by forbidding the sale of baby-girls, and releasing those already sold for prostitution, and prohibiting also the licentiousness of the temples, the sale of obscene books and pictures, and the promiscuous use of public baths by both sexes?

How is it that in India, this Christianity, which is declared to be hostile to the liberty and rights of women and children, has abolished infanticide, polyandry, and widow-burning, and is seeking both in India and China by establishing girls' schools, and by other means to educate the women out of their slavish condition? A remarkable sign of the times is the number of ladies engaging in *zenana* work. The prophecy of Ps. lxxviii: 11—"The Lord gave the word, and great was the company of the *women* that published it," is being fulfilled.

The facts I have mentioned are such as should confirm our faith in Christianity as the only religion which could have come from the Father of all, as it is the only one that secures the "Liberty of man, woman, and child." They are such as should awaken in us deep gratitude for the constant, as well as special blessings of Christianity, in our political and social lives; such as should bring every woman and child especially, in thankful consecration, to Christ, their Liberator. And they are such as should stir us with missionary interest, world-wide and pocket-deep.

followed a series of events compressing into a brief space of time many of those changes which in other lands have required decades and even centuries. The feudal system was abolished, the military class lost its old privileges and an army recruited from all classes took its place; the taxes were revised, the farmers became permanent proprietors of the soil, and a system of universal education was inaugurated. Though in 1869 a so-called parliament was established, it was not worthy of the name, since the people at large had no voice in the election of its members and it had no power to enact laws. Far more important, as educators of the people in the principles of self-government, were various city, provincial, and other assemblies authorized in 1878, though the powers of these also were mostly confined to deliberation and advice upon questions submitted to them by the officials. On October 12th, 1881, the Mikado issued a proclamation promising a Parliament in 1890."

ARTICLE VI.—LES BASQUES: BY J. WENTWORTH
WEBSTER. SAAR. BASSES PYRÉNÉES.

[Translated by JNO. DAVENPORT WHEELER, New Haven.]

I.

THE BASQUES AND THE IBERIANS.

EACH day science is opening to us new paths, and penetrating with its light the most obscure recesses; while little by little the history of the earth is developed from the unknown. But yesterday we counted the age of the habitable globe by thousands of centuries; to-day our horizon extends far beyond the epoch assigned to the appearance of man upon our planet. But setting aside the vast astronomic cycles, and those great discoveries of geology which have changed completely our ideas regarding the duration of the primeval ages, we will occupy ourselves here solely with the age of man, and attempt to extend our vision along the far off perspective which is progressively unveiled to us by the study of paleontology, and prehistoric archæology.

To the men of science of the last century, the age of Moses, the beginnings of the kingdom of Egypt, the civilizations of Assyria, of India, of China, the epoch of the first Celtic migrations into Europe were the most remote periods open to their historical labors; their researches were perforce limited to what remains to us of the Greek and Latin authors. To-day, beyond the living languages of India, we have found the Sanskrit, and beyond the Hebrew, the Assyrian language, itself again preceded by the Sumerian. Of our own old Europe we begin to catch some faint outlines amid the mists of early dawn, but the forms are less clearly defined than those of Eastern antiquity. We possess some imperfect knowledge of the inhabitants of the lake dwellings, and, as they retire more and more from our own age, those successively of Iron, of Bronze, of polished Stone, of Flint, but as yet no exact chronology can be estab-

lished, our step is not firm, and the ground slips and disappears from beneath our feet.

One single fact is clearly ascertained: before the migration of the Celts in the East, before the arrival of the Greeks and Latins, before the first Egyptian or Phœnician colony, there existed a civilized Europe; a civilization it is true distinct, and different from that of the Aryan nations who were about to overflow it, a civilization of a low order, but already far above the savage state. This early world has disappeared and left us scarce a trace. But as the geologist divines, and reconstructs a submerged continent by means of a few islets and rocks still raised above the waves, the archæologist conjectures from the vestiges of these ancient peoples which emerge from the great Aryan ocean, what was the primitive civilization of prehistoric Europe. These vestiges, thinly scattered, have, up to the present time, been but little studied; and notwithstanding the recent efforts of science, we possess neither the facts nor the dates which would authorize any well-defined conclusion. For Egypt we have the hieroglyphics, for India the Sanskrit and the Vedas, while the cylinders and the cuneiform inscriptions upon their bricks open to us the history of the Assyrians. But in Europe we are unable as yet to decipher with any accuracy the inscriptions engraved by those who were perhaps the contemporaries of the ancient Egyptians. The Etruscan idiom is almost completely a mystery; the *letras desconocidas* of ancient Iberia await yet their Champollion. Written documents are rare and of small importance. As we know from the classic authors, these languages had a literature, written laws, annals, poems following the rules of metrical composition; but not a single direct citation has come down to us; even in the time of Strabo they had ceased to be understood. It is then necessary to have recourse to other means; and to form an idea of pre-aryan Iberia, and of the ancient civilization of southeastern Europe we have but one resource, the study of the language and anthropology of the last remaining waif, the Basque, or Escudunac people.

It would be lost time in these days to recall the strange speculations of our fathers upon the character and origin of the Basque or Escuara language. The problem is effectually

solved, thanks to the labors of numerous scholars, among whom we can cite W. von Humboldt, M. M. d'Abadie, member of the Institute; canon Inchauspé, Van Eys, Julian Vinson, Fr. Ribary, and above all the prince L. L. Bonaparte.*

The Escuara, as is now known, belongs to the second group of languages, the agglutinant. It is placed between the Finno-Uralian agglutinant languages of northern Europe, and the incorporant languages of North America. It is not yet determined whether or no there exists any relation between the Basque and any of the languages spoken to-day in Caucasian Iberia.

As it is needless to say to those who have any conception of the processes of modern philology; these conclusions have been reached by the study and comparison of the grammatical forms of the language, especially of those of the verb. The Escuarian vocabulary, like that of some other agglutinant tongues, is recruited largely from without; we find in it words from the Celtic, Greek, Latin, Limousin, Spanish, French, indeed from almost all the languages spoken by the races with which the Basques have been in contact.

This facility of adoption has deceived our predecessors, and has necessarily given place to most absurd theories based upon a language the origin and parentage of which is sought in the vocabulary, rather than in the grammatical forms.

* *Berichtigungen und Zusätze über die Cantabrische oder Baskische Sprache*, von Wilhelm von Humboldt, Berlin, 1817.

Études grammaticales sur la langue Euskarienne, par A. Th. d'Abbadie et S. Augustin Chaho, Paris, 1836.

Le verbe basque, par l'Abbé Inchauspé, Paris, 1858.

Essai de Grammaire de la langue basque, par W. J. Van Eys, Amsterdam, 1867.

Grammaire comparée des dialects basques, par W. J. Van Eys. Paris, 1879.

Essai sur la langue basque, par François Ribary, traduit du Hongrois par Julien Vinson. Paris, 1877.

Le Verbe basque en tableaux, accompagné de notes grammaticales, selon huit dialectes de l'Euskara, par le prince L. L. Bonaparte. London, 1869.

For those who would make merely a comparative study of the Escuara, the translation of the Essai of Ribary by Professor J. Vinson is perhaps the most useful work. But the *Verbe basque* of prince L. L. Bonaparte is, and probably will be for a long time, the principal work for those who would make a thorough analysis of the Basque language.

Not that it will be safe for us to neglect the first of these studies; since the vocabulary affords us most valuable revelations. Max Müller and many others have shown how, from the words only of a language may be deduced the state of civilization of those who made use of them. By an analysis of the Sanskrit and the Aryan languages they make known to us what was the condition of our ancestors before the great emigration from the plateaux of Central Asia; as a people familiar with agriculture, at least with the primitive agriculture of the nomad races; as possessing some kind of plough; and as having already subjugated the greater part of the domestic animals. The social state was fixed; the family established; the tribes, obedient to laws and chiefs, having among themselves political relations. By a similar analysis of the vocabulary of the Basques, we arrive at conjectures more or less well founded as to their primitive civilization prior to all contact with the Aryan races.*

This method tends to prove that the use of metals was unknown to the early Esculdunacs; nearly all the vocables strictly Basque, used to designate cutting implements, are compounds into which enters the word *aitz* (hard stone, flint); *aizkor*, axe; *aizur*, pick; *aizto*, knife.†

The Basque week had but three days, the first, the middle, and the last; *astelen*, *astearte*, *asteazken*. All collective and abstract terms seem in a great measure to have been borrowed; many species of trees bear names peculiar to themselves, but the ordinary generic term *arbola* comes evidently from the Latin *arbor*. So the term *errege*, King, *Iaun*, the Lord, appears in the name of God, but is used also in addressing an ordinary person. In Basque, the words father, mother, brother, sister have an incontestably original sound. The greater part of the domestic animals have also their names in Basque.

But while admitting that the Escuarian language is agglutinant, and of an antiquity more remote than that of any of the inflexional languages of Europe, we may yet demand the

* See Max Müller, *Lectures on the Science of Language*, first series, p. 245, London, 1864; and *Histoire des Basques ou Esculdunac primitifs*, par A. Baudrimont, Paris, 1867.

† Compare however *ἀξινί*, *ascia*, *hacha*, *hache*, *axt*, *axe*, *hatchet*.

proof that the Escualdunacs, or those who formerly spoke their language, inhabited our western world before the Aryan tribes. The agglutinant languages are probably anterior to the inflexional, as well in time as by the logical order of their development; but certain peoples belonging to the former of these categories, the Magyars, and the Turks among others, invaded Europe long after the immigrants of the Aryan race.

To determine the priority of occupation of the Escualdunacs it is therefore not sufficient to determine the character of their language; but here we can invoke the testimony of the Greek and Latin authors, and above all have recourse to the study of geographical names preserved by them. The traces of an ancient or lost language, as will not be contested, reassert themselves for a long time in the toponymy. To ascertain this it is necessary only to count the Celtic names on the map of France, or those of Mexican or Red Indian origin on that of North America. Now, the ancient writers are agreed in saying that in Spain the earliest known inhabitants were the Iberians, whence the name Iberia, applied to the country; later came the Celtic tribes who, in various regions, fused with their predecessors to form the Celtiberians. If the existing Basques are the modern representatives of this mixture, we should find to-day in what remains to us in Spain of ancient local names some traces of the Basque language. Do such traces exist? The answer, already difficult, has been rendered still more complex by the zeal with which the subject has been disputed.

On the perfect understanding of the conditions of a problem depends evidently its solution; as a living being, a language has its period of growth, of maturity, of decay. It never continues absolutely stationary. A language spoken centuries ago cannot be identical with that in use to-day; some change will have taken place either in the vocabulary or in the syntax. It is already difficult to recognize it in its individuality. The Basque of to-day, and the language of ancient Iberia cannot be completely similar, and we may consider ourselves fortunate if we find sufficient material in common to establish an essential analogy. Moreover, this Iberian toponymy has been transmitted to us by foreigners who knew not a word of the

language of the country. Strabo and Mela both complain bitterly of the impossibility of expressing by the Latin or Greek pronunciation, the names of Iberian geography.* This forms a double obstacle to our research for existing Basque names among the classic authors. If we take, for example, upon three maps, English, French, and German, the names of certain Oriental cities, how much difficulty we have to recognize them. Now this very difficulty renders the proof more conclusive if we are able to establish an unequivocal identity even among a very small number of names.† The existing Escuarian toponymy is in a great measure descriptive; we find, for instance, "Mendigorri," Rougemont, Redhill; "Iriberrri," Villeneuve, Newtown; "Iluro," Dax, Eaux Bonnes, Watertown, etc., etc. On the map of ancient Spain and Gaul we find two "Mendiculeia,"‡ one among the Ilergetes, the other in Lusitania; two "Iliberris," one in Betica, the other now Elne; three "Iluro," one Oloron, another in the Taragonnaise, the third in Betica. We have also "Iria Flavia," the city of the Empress Flavia, Flaviaville, like the numerous Georgetown, Charlestons, etc., of the United States. No one can doubt that the name "Iliberrri" is identical with the "Iriberris" of the Department of the Basses Pyrénées, and of Spanish Navarre. It is needless to accumulate examples; they can be found in the already mentioned works of W. von Humboldt, de Luchaire, etc. The objections of Mons. Van Eys seem to us to be without foundation.

In view of these data we may believe that at the time of the classic writers Spain was inhabited by a people who spoke a language analogous to the modern Escuara. A like reasoning would establish the fact that they were extended along the south of France, even to the line of the Adour, to Sardinia, and to some districts of Sicily.

* Strabo, III. 8, vii-x. Pomponius Mela, de Situ orbis, III. 1.

† Larremendi, Discurso historico sobre la cantabria, 1736. Humboldt (W. von), Prüfung der untersuchungen über die Urberwohner Hispaniens, etc., Berlin, 1821. A. Luchaire. Remarques sur les noms de lieux du pays basque, Pau, 1874, and Études sur les idiomes pyrénéens. Paris, 1879.

‡ There are two Basque terminations to which "culeia" may be referred: "gorri," red, and "gora," high.

Regarding the Turdetani of Betica, Strabo reports (III. c. 1, 25), that they possessed for six thousand years written works, annals, laws, poems composed according to metrical rules; that the art of writing was known as well by the other Iberians, who however used a different character, and who differed also in dialect and pronunciation. Of all this literature nothing remains to us; of the characters then employed we possess some inscriptions upon metal, and on stone; numerous coins gathered from various points in Spain, and in the south of France, of which the legends, the "letras desconocidas" of the Spaniards have not yet yielded to us their secret. Up to the present time it has been impossible to make use of these inscriptions for the purpose of comparisons analogous to those which have been made by means of the classic toponymy. Although some date from the time of the Roman occupation, although unknown figures are found engraved along with Latin words and letters, and certain of these characters remained in use in Spanish manuscript even to the beginning of the middle ages,* no one has as yet succeeded in reading them in a manner at all satisfactory, or in reconstructing their alphabet. Not a single bilingual inscription has been established. The most extended "text" known, that of Castellon de la Plana, found in 1851, is engraved upon a plate of lead seventeen inches long by one and a half wide. It consists of four lines, each thirteen inches long, containing twenty-one words composed of one hundred and fifty-three letters perfectly preserved. There exist other "texts" on stone, but shorter. Coins are not rare. In 1879 were found at one time at Barcus, near Oloron, nearly eighteen hundred. Many numismatists since Erro and Astarloa, have attempted the interpretation of these Celtiberian coins, for which we may consult the works of MM. de Sauley, Borichs, Barry, etc., and for the "treasure" of Barcus, a memoir of M. Taillebois, Bulletin of the Society of Borda (Dax, October, 1879). The inscription of Castellon has been discussed in the pamphlet of Hofrath George Philips (Vienna, 1871), and in an article of Professor A. H. Sayce, in the Journal of the *Academia* of Madrid, 15th April, 1877.

* *Ortographia de la lengua castellana, compuesta por la Real Academia Española.* Madrid, 1815. Vide the plates at the end.

Of all these authors not one has succeeded in impressing his opinion with authority. The best founded seems to us to be that which does not seek the key to these characters in the Escuara or any other analogous language. Nor do we consider that they can be rightly treated as belonging to a single tongue, of which, as is said by Strabo, there no doubt existed several widely different. We conclude by finding in these letters both ancient and comparatively modern forms. In regard to the origin of these characters we find it difficult to establish a theory; they are neither Iberian nor original, but resemble somewhat those of the Carian, Cypriote, and some other alphabets of ancient Asia Minor. Artistically considered, the engraving of the coins recalls the Greek Asiatic forms; the horsemen are spirited, the horses are in good relief; indeed, they who struck such pieces were far from being barbarians.

The result of all these researches is but to complicate the problem, of which the solution still escapes us; but some inspiration of genius, the fortunate discovery of some bilingual document may resolve it at any day. The century which has deciphered the Egyptian hieroglyphics, and the Assyrian and Sumerian inscriptions, will not acknowledge itself vanquished before the "letras desconocidas" of ancient Iberia.

Of the religion of these people we know extremely little. The preconceived ideas of those who have given attention to the subject have naturally influenced their interpretation of facts. The Latin inscriptions found in the Basque countries speak of unknown gods; of gods admitted to the number of the Roman pantheon under Latinized names, whose attributes it is very difficult to determine. The Père Fidel Fita has demonstrated that in Spain several of these divinities have names with terminations conformed to the Celtic grammar, and that they were common to the Celts and Iberians.*

The Basques certainly professed some religion before the Christian era, but Chaho and the others are quite without authority when they maintain that such religion was pure monotheism. Whatever it was, the Escualduns were attached to it with a desperate tenacity. Though all along the Roman

* *Restos de la declinacion céltica y- celtibérica en algunas lapidas Españolas* por el P. Fidel Fita, S. J. Madrid, 1878.

road which traversed the Basque country by St. Jean-Pied-de-Port, Roncevaux, Pampeluna, Vittoria, Christian churches were founded at a comparatively early date, and though in the fourth century Prudentius sang the Martyrs of Calahorra, tortured in the third, the missionaries arriving from the north of France in the ninth and tenth centuries still found idolatry existing among the Basques of Labourd.*

Unfortunately in their legitimate aversion to the Pagan religion, they disdained to inform themselves regarding these false gods, and we are reduced to conjecturing from other data what may have been the belief of the ancient Escualdunacs. The name of God in Basque is "Jaungoikoa," or by a common abbreviation "Jainkoa." "Jinkoa" signifying "the Lord from on high." But prince L. L. Bonaparte has shown that in the dialect of Roncal the moon is called "Goiko," a fact which suggests an entirely different meaning for the word. "Jaungoikoa," then, may be no more than an abbreviation of "Jaungoikokoa," "the Lord of the moon," or perhaps simply "the Lord moon."†

Apropos of the Celtiberians and their neighbors of the north, Strabo informs us that on the nights of the full moon, they danced in honor of some nameless divinity. According to the same geographer, the "Turdetani," appellation under which he comprehends all the Iberians of Betica, had τὸ τῆς Φωσφόρου ἱερὸν ἢν καλοῦσι Δοῦκεμ δουβίαν, a temple to the morning star, which they called "the doubtful light." It is a singular fact that the Basque shepherds still designate it at a particular season of the year as "l'Etoile au milieu" arte izarra, the star between the night and day. Silius Italicus tells us of the Celtiberians, that they exposed the bodies of their relatives to vultures, in order that they might thus reach heaven.‡ These

* See lives of S. S. Amandus, Adalbaldus, Rictrudis, and of Leo of Bayonne in the *Acta Sanctorum* of the Bollandists.

† See a correspondence between the prince L. L. Bonaparte and Prof. J. Vinson in *The Academy*, vol. xi, pp. 186 *et seq.* reproduced in *Mélange de Linguistique et d'Anthropologie*, par A. Hovelacque, E. Picot, J. Vinson, pp. 209. Paris, 1880.

‡ Venere et celtae sociati nomen Iberis.

His pugna cecidisse decus, corpusque cremari

Tale refas: Coelo credunt superisque referri,

Impastus carpat si membra jactentia vultur.

Punicorum III, 340.

considerations would seem to show that the primitive religion of the Basques was the worship of the elements and of nature. The custom of "la couvade," attributed to the Basques, is not yet sufficiently well established.*

Here we have, as briefly as possible, all the information as to the origin of the Basques afforded us by the language, classic toponymy, numismatics, inscriptions, and the ancient authors. To carry still further these researches, we must have recourse to other means and address ourselves to the new sciences of anthropology and prehistoric archæology; but before questioning the former we must needs have some fixed idea as to the physical characteristics of the Basques of our own day. We should not forget how many centuries have elapsed since the appearance of the Celtiberian race upon the soil of Spain; and admitting all the while that the Esculdunacs of to-day are their direct descendants, it is impossible to deny that our contemporaries have not been more or less mixed with the other races, with whom for so many centuries the Basques have been in daily contact. The lamented Dr. Broca has compared skulls taken from three different districts of the littoral of the Basque country: Saint-Jean-de-Luz, Zaraus, and Bilbao; some tolerably well defined, are dolicho-cephalic, but an occipital, not frontal dolicho-cephalic, as in the skulls of the dolicho-cephalic race of the north of France: the facial angle is good; some examples being opisthognathous rather than prognathous; the features of the face are fine and delicate, but the capacity of the skull is not altogether in harmony with the beauty of form of the anterior part. One may still observe, it seems to me, these same characteristics in many of the Esculdunacs, notably in retired districts.†

M. Broca has made a map upon which, in white, gray, and black, he has classed the departments of France according to the color of the hair, the complexion, the stature of the inhabitants, and the number of exemptions from military service. His aim being to establish that dolicho-cephalic ancestors of

* See, however, the Bulletin of the Society of Science, Letters, and Arts of Pau.

† *Sur les Caractères des crânes basques*, par M. le docteur P. Broca. Masson, 1863. *Sur l'origine et la répartition de la langue Basque*, of the same author. Leroux, 1875.

dark complexion and short stature belonged to the Basque race. The views of the eminent professor, adopted by numerous men of science, Professors Huxley and Boyd Dawkins among others, are generally accepted at the present time; but we must inquire whether the map of M. Broca proves what they would deduce from it? The departments which are most deeply shaded, are not in the regions occupied by the Basques, but rather in the center, and the southeast. Ancient Gascony, excepting the Landes, where the conditions of the soil are entirely exceptional, is not black, but gray, as is also Basses-Pyrénées, of which three Arrondissements are occupied in whole or in part by the Escualduns. A residence of many years in their country enables us to affirm that far from being smaller or more dark than the Béarnais, their neighbors, we find among the Basques a greater number of individuals who are tall and blond; with gray eyes predominating. I would ask, moreover, how, from an ancient skull can be determined the color of the skin, the hair, the eyes?

The opinion of the learned Spanish anthropologist, M. Turbino, seems to me to be better founded.* He sees in the Basques and the Iberians the remains of a blond race, tall and slender, such as figure upon the Egyptian monuments, among the people of Western Lybia; the modern representatives of whom are to be recognized to-day in certain Berber tribes, and among the mountaineers of the Sierra Ronda, in Andalousia. Père F. Fita has lately discovered at Santiago de Compostella a manuscript of the twelfth century, in which is found the earliest known Basque vocabulary. Regarding the people who made use of it, the author says: "Bascli facie candidiores Navarris approbantur.†

That there may have existed throughout the west of Europe a preceltic and prearyan race I am willing to admit, and I grant that the Basques or Iberians may have made a part of such

* *Los Aborígenes Ibéricos ó los Beréberes en la península*, par Francisco M. Turbino. Madrid, 1876.

† *La Ilustracion Catolica*, Madrid, Mayo 14, 1880. Mr. V. de Rochas (*les Parias de France et d'Espagne*, Paris, 1876), gives as the characteristic trait of the Basque: the eyes and skin of a light color, the hair blonde or black. p. 188. See in the same connection, *The Cagots*, by D. Hack Tuke. *Journal of Anthropological Institute of Great Britain*, May, 1880.

race; but it is another matter to conclude that from them have come the small and dark populations of the center and the north of France, and of Great Britain. At the present moment almost the whole of Europe is inhabited by the descendants of the Aryans; but if at some future day they should be replaced by others, might it not be quite as well said that the Spaniards or the Italians, were as to stature, or by the color of their eyes and hair identical with the English or Germans? I see no proof that the Iberians have passed to any distance north of the Adour; most assuredly other races occupied Europe at the same period; and some may have been of short stature, with dark complexion and dark eyes, characteristics, as I said above, far from being applicable to our Basques of France or Spain.

I held the opinion until within a few years, that megalithic monuments, dolmens, and menhirs, were entirely lacking in the Basque country, but quite recently a number have been discovered. Mr. Turbino, considering the great number of such monuments found in Algeria, has tried to see in the Iberians the builders of these mysterious "*pierres des fées*." It is an hypothesis worthy of examination, as the origin of these monuments is strongly disputed. Mr. Ferguson insists that they are of the times of the Romans, nay, even of the Christian era, while others attribute them to the Celts. What is needed at the present day, is a careful and continuous study from the point of view of prehistoric archæology, of the two slopes of the Pyrénées in the Basque country, their vast and numerous caves, their peat bogs, their abandoned mines, the remains scattered here and there on their mountains and in their forests. Their pottery, their polished axes, the flints already discovered, differ in no degree from those found elsewhere. The dolmens which bear sometimes Basque names, have not been thoroughly examined; even the skulls which we have been able to study have all come from the borders of this territory. We must admit that all is yet to be done.

ARTICLE VII.—PROGRESS IN PSYCHOLOGY.

THE statement is frequently made, that the science of mind makes no progress. Psychology, it is often said, is no nearer a solution of its problems than it was in Plato's time; its professors still dispute among themselves, with no approach to an agreement and no hope of any; the progress of physical science has left mental science far back in the dark ages, whence it will never emerge.

This opinion is erroneous and superficial. The science of mind has made as great progress in modern times, considering its peculiar difficulties, as the sciences of matter have done. Mind cannot be measured, weighed, or analyzed, and hence its study is more difficult, to most people, than the study of matter. Mind is self, and hence its study is more exposed to prejudice and mistake than the study of the not-self. To study the laws of matter, again, is fashionable. Thousands of able men, throughout the civilized world, constantly stimulate one another in physical research, make known the smallest new results through their learned societies, gain fame and sometimes fortune from a happy guess. In psychology a few scores or hundreds of patient thinkers build with one hand and fight with the other, constructing their science and defending its very existence at the same time, having little of the enthusiasm which springs from combination, and less of the eagerness which is derived from profit. Again, these objectors forget that in the sciences of matter vast regions are still unexplored, new theories are to be tested, and ultimate facts are still matter of speculative inference. Mechanical ingenuity is not science, and it is a great though common fallacy to cite progress in machinery as a proof of the vast progress of the science of matter, no less unfair than to charge upon psychology all the absurdities and vagaries of abstract thought, all the wild or weak speculations concerning the great problems of existence which the ages have produced.

We shall undertake to make it clear that the progress of psychology in modern times has been great, and in the following particulars. I. In positive additions to our knowledge of

the operations of the human mind, and this in two ways: 1, the true theory of vision, with its consequences, and 2, the increased knowledge of the brain and nervous system. II. In the remarkable approach to one another, whether explicit or implicit, conscious or unconscious, of contending parties on some important points of psychology.

I. 1. The true theory of vision, a doctrine most fruitful of consequences in many departments of thought, was first proved by Berkeley in 1709, though others had dimly seen or hinted at it before. We quote a part of Prof. Bowen's statement of the theory. "Berkeley proved that there is no resemblance whatever between the *visible* and the tangible qualities of material things; that colors are the only objects of sight, while the distances, figures, and magnitudes of external objects are not seen, but only inferred or estimated from qualities which are really visible, that is, from variations of color, and from the gradation of tints, and of light and shade." The sensations of sight alone give us, directly, a very limited amount of information, but a vast structure of knowledge is built upon them by association, by inference, and by the aid of the other senses.

No doctrine of science has ever been more revolutionary in its effects, nor has any ever compelled more completely the reluctant assent of the thinking world. Like the theory of gravitation, or the undulatory theory of light, or the theory of the exact combinations of atoms, or that of the correlation of forces, it is accepted as embodying the most certain truth, even though it makes the subject in some respects still more mysterious and difficult than before.

In the first place, this doctrine establishes beyond dispute the truth that the mind is active in perception. It was believed in former times that the outer world had a power of its own to make itself known to the mind. But in modern times the new theory of vision has led to a similar analysis of the operations of the other senses, and they have been shown to be, in varying degrees, subject to similar laws. It is now generally held that the whole mind is active in perception, sensation receiving impressions from the outside world, association supplying the information which would be afforded by the other senses, judgment distinguishing the object or its properties from others, memory giving the aid of former similar perceptions, imagination constructing the landscape, the complete object in its rela-

tions, feeling experiencing pleasure or pain, the will selecting one or another part of the object for special attention.

In the second place, the modern theory of vision has been the starting point of school after school of metaphysica. Berkeley was led by it, quite unnecessarily as we believe, to deny the existence of the material world, "idealizing matter and realizing ideas." Hume pushed this idealism a step further, denying the existence both of matter and of mind; and from Hume has sprung nearly all modern metaphysica. The idealistic pantheism of Germany, with its two-faced subject-object, which is both matter and mind at once, is but a hot-house growth of the seeds sown by Hume, while opposition to him was the spring of all the best, most original, and most permanent parts of the philosophy of Kant. And it is a singular fact, that the latest materialism, while it denies the existence of spirit, and makes that denial one of its postulates, is yet led by this stream of tendency which is derived from the theory of vision, to deny matter also, although it thus wheels into line as one of the systems of idealistic pantheism. Prof. Huxley, for example, in his life of Hume, follows each of these tendencies to its last results. He denies the existence of the material world, except as an experience of mind; but the mind, according to him, is only the series of our sensations and feelings, a mere function of the brain, which is itself matter; and thus, if we understand the word matter in its usual sense, it is nothing but a product of nothing, which nothing itself begets. But it is obvious that Huxley's idea of matter must be, whether he so declares it or not, the pantheist's idea of Substance, the double-faced Being, whose two sets of attributes make up the universe. Prof. Tyndall, indeed, shows this very clearly in his celebrated utterance describing matter as "containing the potency of life," for mind, with him, is only a function of life.

2. Another modern improvement in psychology is the better knowledge of the action of the brain and nervous system in thought, feeling, and perception. Not only has a vast mass of knowledge been accumulated through anatomy, vivisection, and the use of electricity, but the phenomena of somnambulism, sleep, nervous disease, idiocy, etc., have been studied with great assiduity and considerable success. And if it should be said that all this is not psychology, that we do not know any more about the mind because the body has been dissected more care-

fully, two replies are possible. First, it may be said that psychology has for its field the whole apparatus of thought, as a unit, and is just as much concerned with the physical as the immaterial part of the machinery. Secondly, it may be said that from these researches psychology has received its grandest justification. For when an impression on the nerves of sensation has been traced along its course to the brain, and the vibrations of the atoms of the brain have been all traced and described, we then stand more than ever face to face with mystery; the chasm in our knowledge is not only as great as ever but is more apparent than ever. And even those who assert that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile and that man is only an automaton, even Tyndall and Taine themselves, admit that if we could explain all the changes in the substance of the brain, we should be no nearer to explaining how such molecular changes give rise to an image, a consciousness, a thought.

We think it is clear then, that psychology has not been unprogressive in the modern era of progress, but has established some new theories of great importance and pursued new investigations of great interest. It remains to show that there is a certain convergence, on some important points, in the teachings of the leading thinkers.

II. The problem of knowledge has always been the battleground of philosophy. Is the human mind capable of certain knowledge; what are the limitations of its knowing; how does it acquire knowledge? Such are the questions which have been disputed by all thinking minds, and which have divided the philosophical world into schools and sects. The question of the origin of knowledge is the most important and living of psychological issues at the present time. Are all the thoughts of the human mind derived from experience, or does it have other sources of knowledge, innate ideas, *a priori* concepts? This is the question which makes the deepest line of division between opposing parties, and here we believe they have made great, if unconscious, concessions to one another, so great as to make a genuine step of progress in the science of mind.

The greatest argument ever constructed for innate ideas was made by Kant. This immortal work, in spite of its abstruseness and difficulty, and its strange terminology, has had and still has an immense influence. Kant did not, like most of his

predecessors and some writers of the present day, mass together a number of incongruous principles, and say that the ideas of identity, of space, of time, of cause and effect, of the beautiful, of the true, of right, etc., are all innate ideas. Beginning with sensations, he shows that the *a priori* concepts of space and time are the necessary forms of all our perceptions. We cannot perceive the external world at all except under the conditions of time and space. We cannot imagine events occurring or objects existing out of time, nor can we imagine bodies existing out of space. Now it is true that Kant went on to make space and time mere forms of thought, and nothing else, true empirically, but without objective existence; thus converting this plain, practical philosophy into the most thorough-going system of skepticism. But this does not destroy the value and suggestiveness of this treatment of space and time, because in the words of Professor Bowen, "we can admit the positive portion of Kant's theory, without accepting the skeptical doctrine which he has needlessly and unreasonably appended to it, the doctrine, that is that space and time in themselves are unreal and illusive." Sir W. Hamilton for example, teaches that space is a form or fundameptal law of thought, and yet, at the same time, an existing reality of which we have knowledge through experience.

And here, curiously enough, most of the experience-philosophers fall into the same pit with Kant, though reaching it by an opposite road. For they prove, most elaborately, that we have a knowledge of space through experience, and yet teach that space is only a relation of our sensations to one another, and has no real existence outside of our perceptions. Like Kant they deny in the sequel the validity of the very faculties which at the outset they declare to be the only source of knowledge.

We are not concerned at present, however, to refute the errors of either party, but we believe that we can show that the experience-philosophy is not so far from the position of Hamilton on this point as it usually declares and supposes itself to be, while the intuition-philosophy has made very important concessions in its turn.

The most elaborately constructed, perhaps the ablest, of all systems of experience-philosophy, is that of Professor Bain.

There are two distinct ways, if we mistake not, in which Professor Bain generates the idea of space, first, the direct feeling or perception of distance, and second, the muscular feeling of motion. When one places both points of a pair of compasses on his hand, not too near together, he has an immediate knowledge that the two sensations are not one and the same sensation, but different. Now, in what do they differ? Evidently in space, distance, extension. If they were closer together they would not be recognized as two, they would unite in one. They may be alike in all other respects, different only in place. Space is what separates them, space is what we instantly and irresistibly recognize as separating them. At this point the intuitionist affirms that we could not perceive the two points as occupying different parts of space, if we did not know beforehand what space is; that we could not tell that the two sensations differed unless we knew that in which they differ; just as we could not tell a tall man from a short one unless we knew something about what tallness and shortness are. We are not arguing on either side, but we think the intuitionist is entitled to say that, even though all our knowledge of space be derived from these double sensations, yet space is by this method of induction proved to be an actual existence, if anything is proved about it at all, and, if it be a real existence, then it must be a condition of the being of all material things, and hence a law of all thought concerning them.

Again, let one place his hands together, and then move them apart till separated widely; the successive muscular sensations consequent upon the constantly changing position of the arm give, says Professor Bain, the idea of distance or extension, which is the same as space. Closely allied with this experiment is that in which one rubs the hand or finger slowly over a rough surface, such as a file. In this case it is the succession of tactual sensations which gives occasion to the idea of space. Now, the intuitionist will reply that successive muscular or tactual sensations can have no tendency whatever to give rise to the idea of space, unless there be a consciousness of motion between the successive sensations; and he will add that such a consciousness of motion amounts to but little if anything less than an *a priori* concept of space, rising into consciousness on the occasion of the movements of the body.

We do not desire, at present, to decide between the two

views; but we affirm that if the mind has the power of constructing such a concept as that of space, so that this concept irresistibly arises, upon such a basis as the perception of two points near together, or the almost imperceptible muscular sensations which occur in moving the arm, or the quick succession of delicate abrasions from a rough surface,—then the mind has a power not very distant after all from that which the intuitionists claim for it, especially if we bear in mind the concessions which have been made by the more recent writers of that school. For intuition is no longer considered as a complete, perfect, philosophical knowledge of *a priori* concepts; it is admitted that these concepts do not exist in the mind consciously and completely, without reflection, and that they come into operation only on the occasion of sensations, while the training and study of a philosopher are necessary to segregate them and make them clear and recognizable in consciousness. For example, President Porter says, "Human Intellect," 501: "In calling them first truths or primitive judgments, it is not intended that these truths or judgments are acquired first in the order of time, or that the mind's assent to them is prior to its other acts of knowledge. The majority of men never think of them, much less do they accept them. To reach them, long courses of training are required, to bring the intellect into a capacity for analysis and generalization, which may enable it to understand and assent to them." And again, 504, "we are, in some sense, indebted to experience for their acquisition. It is equally clear that experience does not give them authority. Both these truths are expressed in the often repeated proposition that our knowledge of these truths is occasioned by, but it is not derived from experience."

We may approach this point from another direction. What are the smallest component parts, or elements, of our knowledge? Bain's analysis of the powers of the mind is simple and striking. He says: "The primary attributes of Intellect are, consciousness of difference, consciousness of agreement, and retentiveness." The original products of these primary powers, would be then, of course, the first elements of knowledge. For our present purpose we need consider only the first. It is evident that this feeling of difference is nothing but the correlative of the feeling of identity, that either one, taken by itself, is only the denial of the other. This is, then,

only a slightly different expression of the relativity of knowledge, and is so explained by Bain himself. The mind can know nothing except as different from something else; black is not white, up is not down, long is not short, all knowledge is relative. On this point all parties are agreed. But at this point the intuitionist asks: "How can the mind know two things as different, and not the same, unless it previously knows what identity-difference is? Does not Bain, then, really reduce knowledge to three intuitive principles or concepts, identity-difference, agreement, and continuance?" We do not stop to answer this question. Be that as it may, we affirm that a philosopher who builds up the concept of space, for instance, out of the consciousness of identity-difference, which he admits to be a part of the original furniture of the mind, does not differ by such a world-wide distance, after all, from those who hold that the concept of space itself is in itself *a priori*, but is awakened into action and brought forward into consciousness by, in, and through the experience derived from the senses. Here, we say, is an important concession on the part of the experience-philosophy. We shall come to one which seems to us still more fundamental.

The modern experience-philosophy asserts that there is no occasion for assuming an *a priori* origin for the primary concepts, such as space, and causation, because they can easily be derived from our experience, by induction. The question then at once arises, what is the basis of this induction, or can it hang in the air, without any basis? Is inductive reasoning a kind of reasoning without a major premise? Suppose the mind has a feeling of space, or extension, or distance, when two points are pressed upon the skin at a moderate distance apart; suppose the experience repeated a thousand times. How do we know that the same fact will cause the same feeling the next time? How can we generalize such experiences into any universal truths concerning space, distance, extension? Nearly all reasoners upon these subjects admit the necessity of some principle here, upon which to found our reasoning, when we generalize from nature or experience. Professor Bain, in particular, admits, in his "Logic," the principle of the uniformity of nature, the conviction that the future will resemble the past, as an irresistible persuasion of the mind, and the basis of all inductive reasoning. In his "Mental Science," he

states it in this way : "There is, in the active tendency of the mind, a strong disposition to extend to all places and times whatever is true in the present. So powerful, indeed, is this impulse, that it constantly leads us too far, and needs to be checked and reduced within limits." Again, among the emotions he classes Belief, and says that the mental foundations of belief are in our activity, in association, and in the feelings ; but he also says, under this head : "Our belief in the physical laws is our primitive spontaneity *contracted* to the bounds of experience." "We begin with unbounded credulity, and are gradually educated into a more limited reliance." The intuitionist will say that this "strong disposition," this "primitive spontaneity," looks immensely like an intuitive idea. And surely, even to an impartial observer, the extreme ingenuity with which Professor Bain introduces a new principle as a basis for induction, serves to prove the deep necessity for such a principle, felt by all logical minds. At any rate, it is evident that to derive primary truths from induction, and then rest induction on spontaneity, or irresistible belief, is to pursue a process somewhat more complicated than that of the more recent intuition-philosophy, but not otherwise at the opposite pole from it.

The primary notion, or intuition of causation, is one very much in dispute at the present day ; it also belongs to a totally different order from that of space, to which we have appended our previous remarks ; we therefore desire to present a few further remarks under this head. According to Kant, as we have seen, space and time are the forms under which alone we can know the material world. But when we begin to reflect upon our perceptions—to join them together, our reasoning must be under certain categories of the understanding—*a priori* forms of thinking, as necessary and as pure as the forms of sensation. Unfortunately, to quote Prof. Bowen again, "Kant with his usual fanaticism for system," insisted on twelve categories, because that number could be derived from the forms of logic. Some of them, consequently, are repetitions, and some are needless. Among them, however, we find those of reality or existence, limitation, substance and attribute, and cause and effect, which are accepted by almost all who believe in any intuitions at all. When we reflect upon any event, or any change, any phenomenon whatever beginning to exist, we are

compelled, according to Kant, by the very nature of the mind, to think of it as caused. It is impossible for the mind to conceive of any event occurring without a cause. It is obvious that this notion of cause implies actual efficiency or power in the cause to produce the effect, and it is so understood and accepted by intuitionist philosophers in general. They say that the idea of causation in this sense is native to the mind—is called into exercise when we first reflect upon an event, and is irresistible in its regulative office over our thoughts. The experience-philosophers, on the other hand, affirm that the idea of cause is a mere result of experience, an induction from the innumerable sequences which we observe occurring in the world. But it must be carefully noted that they nearly all, from Hume down, deny that causation implies efficiency or power to produce an event or effect. When a ball is shot from a gun, they say, there is some connection, no doubt, between the explosion of the powder and the expulsion of the ball, but we are unable to say that it is anything more than an invariable sequence; we have no right to infer an efficiency, a power on the part of the exploding powder to expel the ball. It is obvious that the parties to this controversy do not use the word cause in the same sense. The intuitionists charge the experience-philosophers with leaving out the essential element of causation, because it forms a difficulty insoluble by their methods; and admit that a causation which is nothing but mere sequence can be easily enough proved by induction from experience, and does not need to be a necessary category of the understanding. The experience-philosophers, on the other hand, accuse the intuitionists of assuming an entirely unnecessary and irrational principle, and then assuming a special faculty to account for it. On this last point the experience-philosophers have undoubtedly the general opinion and consciousness of mankind against them. That the explosion of powder has not actual efficiency to drive out a ball will always appear a philosophical subtlety, repugnant to practical common sense. It may be replied that it is no more contrary to common sense than the theory of vision, which is now universally accepted. Still we think it must be regarded as a very important unconscious concession on the part of most of the experience-philosophers that they discharge the idea of causation of all its original meaning before they proceed to construct

it out of the gatherings of experience. To win the day and expel causation from the list of *a priori* principles, they must show either that the idea of cause, in the full sense of efficiency, can be generalized from experience, or else that cause is not, in either sense, a category of the understanding, a regulative form of our thought concerning the phenomena of the material world. And this concession, unlike those previously mentioned, proceeds from the extreme wing of the modern experience-philosophy; those who erect a building in the air, with no foundation, denying the validity of consciousness or any of the powers of the mind, denying that induction needs any basis, denying that knowledge corresponds to reality—those who, like M. Taine, find in the mind nothing but a series of hallucinations, with no check and no test but their mutual interferences and rectifications; those who, like John Stuart Mill, are compelled to admit that, on their principles, two and two may possibly, in some circumstances be five. It lies at the very basis of their system to deny the reality of causation. This is felt to be a test-case between the two parties, one which the new philosophy must win at any cost.

The old philosophy has made no corresponding concessions with regard to this point. Sir W. Hamilton, it is curious to notice here, attempted such a concession, and made the attempt to explain the idea of causation by analyzing it, according to his favorite method of the antinomies of human reason, into nescience, or imbecility—the imbecility of the mind to conceive an absolute beginning. But we are not aware that he has been followed in this by any subsequent thinkers.

We think we have succeeded in showing that the most recent parties in psychology are approaching each other on some points more nearly than they are altogether willing to admit; that mutual concessions have removed a part of the *casus belli*; that even the party of philosophical skepticism or nihilism is no longer content simply to “deny everything and call for proof,” but takes pains to undermine the citadel before attacking it, to prove that cause is only sequence, before attempting to prove that it is not a category of the understanding. These things, we believe, constitute a genuine step of progress in psychology.

There are many in these days of materialism who deride all philosophy and ask, with a sneer, of what use any of these

inquiries or controversies can be. Various replies may be made. We may say, in the words of Sir W. Hamilton, "It is as the best gymnastic of the mind that I would vindicate to these speculations the necessity which has too frequently been denied them. By no other intellectual application is the mind thus reflected on itself, and its faculties aroused to such independent, vigorous, unwonted and continued energy; by none, therefore, are its best capacities so variously and intensely evolved?" We may say in the words of Prof. Bowen: "Why seek to estimate the loss or gain from an undertaking which at any rate is inevitable? Men have been engaged in the pursuit of speculative truth ever since they began to think, though voices have never been wanting to admonish them that the end was unattainable. But the warning was unheeded, for it is self-contradictory. Aristotle long ago remarked that we are compelled to philosophize in order to prove that philosophy itself is illusory and vain." Every thinking man has some system of philosophy; it is a duty, then, for any honest thinker to seek the best attainable philosophy, to have a system well-founded and well-reasoned—not caught up at hap-hazard, nor heaped together incongruously.

Or, finally, we may reply that error of every kind is usually entrenched in metaphysics, and we must conquer it there if at all. In theology, and in every science, all speculative questions have their origin or end in philosophy. "Even our physicists," says Prof. Bowen, "find themselves studying and teaching metaphysics unawares." So far as the views of our modern speculative scientific men are false and dangerous, they can only be exposed and refuted by men well trained in philosophy, accustomed to detect and handle philosophical error.

When we become convinced, after careful study, that the extreme form of modern Evolutionism is only Pantheism "writ large," we have gone far toward freeing ourselves from its fascination. And when we have satisfied ourselves that the empirical philosophy as taught by its ablest advocates, is equally with the other founded on metaphysical assumptions; and that, to say the least, it finds certain problems as insoluble as does the intuitionist philosophy,—we have certainly reached a result of vast practical importance for our moral and intellectual life.

ARTICLE VIII.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH BIBLE.*—Mr. Condit's book on the History of the English Bible bears evidence of a careful study of the various authorities accessible to him and of laudable pains to give credit to all the writers on whom he has relied. His volume is enriched by extended citations from the historic English versions, in which the antique orthography is preserved, and by a comparison of which it is easy to see what changes the English language itself has undergone from the era of Wycliffe till the present time. Much curious detail may also be found respecting the work of modern translators who are out of the historical succession, and whose studies have had no perceptible effect upon the version which has so long been in common use.

The work however is a compilation rather than an original history, and abounds with crude statements which a better judgment would have modified. When to these are added frequent misprints due to bad proof reading, and innumerable inaccuracies for which the copyist is probably responsible, the satisfaction we should otherwise have in referring to the book is greatly diminished.

Mr. Condit introduces the authorized version with the remark that "when this Bible first appeared there must have been some demand for it, as two editions in folio *are said* to have been printed during the first year," and then he goes on to cite Dr. Cotton's reasons, as given in 1852, for believing that there were really two issues in 1611. But it indicates a limited range of research to base this conclusion upon the facts cited by Dr. Cotton thirty years ago, and to pass by entirely the remarkably protracted and careful collations of the two editions in which the late Mr. Lenox, Mr. Francis Fry of Bristol, and Dr. Scrivener of Cambridge have taken part, as the result of which every sheet of either edition may be identified. No one now doubts that there were two issues in 1611; the open question is, which of two editions that differ on every page is to be called the first and which the second?

Again, with equal lack of perspective, Mr. Condit says, page

**The History of the English Bible:* extending from the earliest Saxon translations to the present Anglo-American Revision; with special reference to the Protestant religion and the English language. By BLACKFORD CONDIT. A. S. Barnes & Co., New York and Chicago. 12mo, pp. 469.

366, "It is believed that in 1665 Bill and Barker got possession of the manuscript copy of King James' Bible, and having 'thus secured themselves from instant detection, they published editions filled with egregious blasphemies and damnable errata.'" His quotation here also is from Dr. Cotton, who in turn quotes from an anonymous tract printed in 1660; but while Dr. Cotton merely refers to it in a foot note as a thing that has been "said," Mr. Condit accepts the statement and puts it into his text as a thing that is now "believed." The whole thing is exceedingly improbable.

We group together for the sake of comment several detached sentences in which Mr. Condit refers to the Genevan and Authorized versions.

Of the former he says (page 245), "though not printed in England for several years after it was first issued, yet it very soon became the Bible of the household; and for *more than a century and a half* it maintained its place as the Bible of the people." Again (page 252), "the Genevan version was in use full thirty years and more after the publication of King James' Bible, having enjoyed the preëminence for about *three-quarters of a century*."

"So general was the opposition to King James' Bible that it was slow in gaining public favor. As late as 1621, Dr. Andrews, in preaching before the King, took his text from the Bishops' Bible. But the Genevan Bible was its most serious rival, since it continued to be published as late as 1644, when two editions were printed at Amsterdam. In 1649 King James' Bible was printed with the Genevan annotations, by way of pushing it into public favor. But about this period it prevailed, and took the place it has ever since occupied." Pages 338, 339.

This also we judge to be false perspective, and Mr. Condit underates the evidence that the version which appeared in 1611 very rapidly won its way to favor with the people. No doubt the Genevan version, which had come down from a former generation, and had the attraction of marginal notes, was slow to yield its place, and publishers found it to their advantage to continue it in print for a third of a century longer. But of King James' versions two folio editions, beside a separate New Testament, were printed in 1611; in 1612 there were two quarto editions, and a Testament; in 1613 there seem to have been eight editions; and no less than 184 editions of either the Bible or the Testament had been published when the last Genevan was printed in 1644. The introduction of the Genevan notes in the edition of 1649 was hardly necessary "to push the version into public favor." The same course

had been pursued in an edition printed on the continent in 1642. Some years later, from 1662 onwards, editions were not uncommon which contained the authorized version with marginal notes prepared by John Canne. These "summaries and expositions" are drawn from Beza, and are entirely different from the marginal notes of the Genevan version, although in Cotton's & Loftie's lists they are described as "Genevan notes." So far as the writer knows, the editions of 1642 and 1649 are the only ones in which the notes of the Genevan translators are combined with King James' Bible.

Mr. Condit represents that the success finally gained by King James' Bible was "contrary to the expectations of the revisers," and fortifies his opinion by a quotation from Galloway, to the effect that the translation was "to be set out and printed without any marginal notes and only to be used in all Churches of England in time of divine service." (Pages 327 and 358.) He construes this language as meaning that the Conference at Hampton Court projected a version which was to be used nowhere but in the English churches, and there as a part of divine service. But the true construction we take to be that the new version was to *supersede* all others in public worship,—that it alone was to be used in the churches as a part of divine service. Moreover, it is plain that the publishers expected and found a popular demand for the version, for of forty editions which were issued in the first ten years, only seven were in folio size for pulpit use; the others being quartos, octavos, and duodecimos.

It is a pity that a work which has many excellences and many indications of painstaking, should also have many signs of carelessness. Speaking of the name, "King James' Bible," Mr. Condit says "it has lost its significance, since the Bible has outgrown the narrowness of the name both by *three and a half centuries* (!) as to time, and by a world-wide circulation as to place." (Page 339.) On page 354, he says, "Our modern Bibles uniformly follow the punctuation of the earliest editions," a statement which is far from accurate, as appears from a subsequent page where he refers to a certain collation of six copies, old and new, which revealed variations, chiefly in punctuation, to the number, as he says, of nearly 34,000. We suspect, however, that this is a misprint for 24,000.

Some exception may well be taken to Mr. Condit's opinion that "the intrinsic worth of our modern English Bibles consists in their substantial oneness with the first edition of 1611." He is clearly

wrong in spelling Blaney for Blayney, and lays himself open to a charge of affectation in printing *Matthewe* for *Matthew*. His citations, which aim to reproduce ancient orthography, are sometimes accurately printed, but they so often fail in this particular that one can never be confident of their correctness. Thus in the Lord's prayer from Tyndale's fragment of 1525 (page 121), we note two errors in punctuation and three in spelling, and there are other cases where the omission of words makes the matter still more embarrassing.

But with various demerits of this kind the volume will be interesting and serviceable, and will do a good work in exhibiting the relations of our authorized version to the Protestant religion and the English language.

THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS.*—Mr. Stephen describes this work "as an attempt to lay down an ethical doctrine in harmony with the doctrine of evolution." He was at first a Utilitarian of the school of J. S. Mill. By subsequent reading and thought he has discovered some of the many psychological and philosophical errors and inconsistencies of that system and has been compelled to modify it. But his premises compel him to develop the idea of right from the idea of happiness, and the results of his thinking as set forth in this treatise are substantially in accord with the ethics of Mr. Spencer, though differing in some respects. The book impresses us as lacking in clearness and precision of thought, and the progress of thought seems not sufficiently straight-forward, but somewhat involved and complicated. We have found it, however, interesting in the reading and quickening to thought. The product of protracted reading and thought on the part of a man of the author's culture and ability could hardly be otherwise.

As we understand it "the doctrine of evolution" held as declaring a scientific law of nature, is entirely consistent with theism, and consequently with intuitional ethics and Christian morality. There is no more need of an "attempt to lay down an ethical doctrine in harmony with" this law than with the law of gravitation. The difficulty of harmonizing ethics with evolution is not with evolution propounded as a scientific law of nature, but with the materialism or agnosticism of which it is made the vehicle. We do not commonly speak of "the *doctrine*" of gravitation; but Mr. Stephen speaks of the "*doctrine*" of evolution, and thus

* *The Science of Ethics*. By LESLIE STEPHEN. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 27 and 29 West 23d street. 1882. xxviii. and 462 pages.

unconsciously betrays the fact that to his mind its chief significance is as a theological doctrine and not as a scientific law. And this is true of some others of its most conspicuous defenders.

The law of the survival of the fittest in the theory of evolution is the law of all organic life. The materialist and agnostic recognize no God and no spirit or personal being above the sphere of organic life. The law of the survival of the fittest is then the law of the constitution of things. It gives no foundation for moral distinctions, but gives for the regulation of conduct the maxim, "Might makes right." Mr. Stephen and Mr. Spencer do not derive their ethics from materialistic evolution. They accept the morality which is recognized in Christian civilization and try to fit it into their agnostic or materialistic evolution. Accordingly Mr. Stephen says: "I have started from the old ethical theories, and am trying to bring them into harmony with the scientific principles which I take for granted." Whenever rules for the conduct of life are derived directly and legitimately from materialistic evolution they will deny all real distinction between right and wrong and will affirm the law of the strongest. Already among Nihilists and Socialists in Europe this denial and this affirmation are avowed and acted on as the basis of the reorganization of society. They have as yet had less currency in this country and in Great Britain. They are, however, gaining circulation. We have just read a book recently published in Chicago, which avows and defends the doctrine that the laws of property, chastity, and other moral laws are simply contrivances of the stronger to keep what they have got, and that whoever is strong enough to wrest from them their property or wives will have the same right to them. Col. Robert G. Ingersoll has prefixed an introduction to this book heartily commending it.

THE PRESENT RELIGIOUS CRISIS.*—The ten chapters of this volume are entitled: The Crisis, Dogmatic Theology, The Validity of the Biblical Canon, The Inspiration of the Bible, The Historical Character of the Gospels, The Religion of the Bible, Religion, The Religion of Jesus, Religious Repression, Religious Liberty. Its general drift is in the direction of skepticism. The author seems to have reached the conclusion that we have not evidence that any one of the gospels was written by the person whose name it bears, and that the "*Logia*" ascribed to Jesus in

* *The Present Religious Crisis*. By AUGUSTUS BLAUVELT. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 27 and 29 West 23d street. 1882. 196 pages.

the synoptical gospels and especially in Matthew are the most that we can know respecting him. A fault of the book is its subjectivity. The personality of the author is always obtrusive; he tells us what he has done and what he is going to do. The book is not so much a discussion of the topics as a presentation of the steps by which he has receded from his former orthodoxy. And after all he leaves the reader uncertain what are definitely his own positions. The work reminds us of Goethe's remark to Eckermann: "If you have convictions I shall gladly hear them. But if you have doubts, keep them to yourself, for I have enough of my own."

PRIMITIVE BELIEFS.*—In the first chapter Mr. Keary explains what he means by belief and religion. Religion is a primitive instinct, manifesting itself in the feelings of wonder and admiration, and in fear gradually softening into awe; in these feelings is the recognition in natural objects of something behind the material thing as presented to the senses; and thus comes worship. Belief he calls the capacity of worship. First it is the worship of particular natural objects—especially the tree, the mountain and the river; then the worship of the greater powers of nature, which is Polytheism; then the recognition of the something behind nature as rational and human; and lastly Monotheism. He criticises and rejects Spencer's theory of the origin of religion as the worship of ancestors, arising from man's attempts to form a theory of the universe.

In the remaining chapters he attempts to trace historically the origin and growth of the religions of the several Indo-European races, guided primarily by the study of the languages and their growth. The book is scholarly, instructive and suggestive.

TEMPTED TO UNBELIEF.†—Dr. Burr's writings have been widely read. The volume before us has their well-known characteristics. It is designed not to convince unbelievers, but to help those, and especially those young persons, who are tempted to unbelief. It presents in a popular style many strong reasons for Christian belief.

* *Outlines of Primitive Belief among the Indo-European Races.* By CHARLES FRANCIS KEARY, M.A., F.S.A., of the British Museum. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1882. xxi. and 534 pages. Price, \$2.50.

† *Tempted to Unbelief.* By Rev. E. F. BURR, D.D. Author of *Ecce Cœlum*, *Pater Mundi*, *Ad Fidem*. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York. 224 pages.

INTERNATIONAL REVISION COMMENTARY.*—One volume of this series has been already favorably noticed in the *New Englander*. This volume is prepared on the same plan. It is a compact and portable volume, with a map of Palestine, and is well adapted for instruction in the family and the Sunday-school. We hope the Commentary, as it goes on, will help to bring the revision into general use. Intelligent critics, who find fault with the new version, admit that it gives the words and meaning of the writers of the New Testament more accurately and fully than any other English translation. If so it ought to be brought into general use in families, Sunday schools, and churches. It is a withholding of God's word from the people to refrain from reading it in the version which expresses most exactly what Christ and his apostles taught.

THE BOOK OF JOSHUA.†—This is another volume of the same series of Handbooks, and is a concise but instructive commentary on the Book of Joshua, convenient in form, and well adapted to the use of Bible classes.

THE FAITHS OF THE WORLD.‡—These twelve lectures are as follows: Brahmanism, by Rev. Dr. Caird; Buddhism, by the same. Confucianism, by Rev. Dr. Matheson; Zoroaster and the Zendavesta, by Rev. John Milne; Religion of Ancient Egypt, by Rev. James Dodds, D.D.; Religion of Ancient Greece, by Rev. Dr. Macgregor; Teutonic and Scandinavian Religion, by Rev. Dr. Burns; Ancient Religions of Central America, by Rev. Dr. Lang; Judaism, by Rev. Dr. Taylor; Mahomedanism, by Rev. Dr. Lees; Christianity in relation to other Religions, by Rev. Prof. Flint. The plan of these lectures makes it necessary that the treatment of each subject should be brief and general. For the plan of the course to which they were confined, the lectures

* *The International Revision Commentary on the New Testament based on the revised version of 1881.* By English and American scholars and members of the Revision Committee. Edited by PHILIP SCHAFF, D.D., LL.D., Professor in the Union Theological Seminary of New York, President of the American Committee on Revision. Vol. I. *The Gospel according to Matthew.* By the Editor. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1882. xvi. and 416 pages.

† *The Book of Joshua.* By GEORGE C. M. DOUGLAS, D.D., Principal of the Free Church College, Glasgow. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1882. 122 pages.

‡ *The Faiths of the World.* St. Giles Lectures. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1882. vi. and 364 pages. Price, \$1.50.

are well conceived and present succinct views of the several religions treated, which the reader can readily compare.

THE DECAY OF MODERN PREACHING.*—This volume assumes the decay of modern preaching to be a fact. But the power of preaching has varied in different times and countries. It is vastly greater to-day than in some protracted periods; it may be less than in some ages. The assumption of the book of an absolute decay of preaching without regard to its varying power in different times and in different churches and countries at the same time, is wholly unhistorical. The book, if true of the Protestant churches of Ireland, is grossly incorrect as a representation of preaching in the United States. Thus the author says, "The preaching of modern days, so far as we know it, is purely an amateur performance, taken up without special talents or *special training*." Excepting by the Roman Catholics, "there is nothing whatever done to improve preaching by human means." He says that he once instructed a class of eight divinity students "in the Epistle to the Romans, and after laboring with them a whole term with all possible care, making them go over the argument and write it out and rehearse it, they confessed in a body at the end of the term that they had made no advance whatever, for that none of them was able to follow an argument." It was certainly either an extraordinary class or an extraordinary teacher. To one who judges from acquaintance with American theological schools, such a statement is simply incredible.

The defects of the book are fundamental. They are the lack of all conception of preaching the living Christ as the Redeemer of men from sin, and of the presence, witness, and power of the Holy Spirit. The author recommends as one of the remedies the celibacy of the clergy. He considers the personal piety of the preacher to be of very little account as an element of power in the pulpit. One of his conclusions is that as to intellectual and cultivated people, "the days for any average minister to lead and influence them *by his preaching* are gone by." There is little in the book either of inspiration, information, or wise counsel. Any chapter in Professor Hoppin's or Professor Phelps's Homiletics would be worth more to a young minister than this entire volume.

* *The Decay of Modern Preaching. An Essay* by J. P. MAHAFFY. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1882. 160 pages.

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THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CLXXI.

NOVEMBER, 1882.

ARTICLE I.—WHY DID THE PILGRIM FATHERS COME
TO NEW ENGLAND ?

BY EDWIN D. MEAD.

MR. FROTHINGHAM, in his "Rise of the Republic," represents the motives which actuated the various companies which founded the early American colonies, as follows: "The colonists were impelled by different motives,—the emigrants to New England, under the main impulse of a spirit of religion, by a desire to enjoy in peace their mode of worship, and to spread the gospel; the emigrants to Virginia and New York, chiefly under the influence of a spirit of commerce, by a love of adventure, or the hope of opening new paths of trade; and the founders of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Georgia, by the ambition to form new States; while all the colonists desired to better their condition." It would be hard to improve upon this statement. That the emigrants to New England especially came under the main impulse of a spirit of religion, has not

only been sung by the poets, who, with all their indifference to petty fact, have a divine instinct for essential truth, and can be pretty safely trusted to get at the real kernel of things; but it was the express and reiterated declaration of the colonists themselves,* and has been the concurrent testimony of the better historians. Of the New England colonists in general, Macaulay spoke, in a speech to the House of Commons, when, by a happy chance, the president of the Massachusetts Historical Society, a descendant of John Winthrop, sat in the gallery, as "those men of high spirit and unconquerable principles, who preferred leaving their native country and living in the savage solitudes of a wilderness, rather than to live in a land of prosperity and plenty where they could not enjoy the privilege of worshipping their Maker freely according to the dictates of their conscience." "The emigrants to Massachusetts," says Mr. Green, "were men driven forth from their fatherland, not

* The Rev. John White, in his famous "Planter's Plea," published in 1680, in explanation and justification of the emigration to Massachusetts Bay, speaks as follows of the motives of the colonists: "Necessity may press some; novelty draw on others; hopes of gain in time to come may prevail with a third sort: but that the most, and most sincere and godly part, have the advancement of the Gospel for their main scope, I am confident." The preamble of the confederacy between the four New England Colonies, in 1648, begins thus: "Whereas, we all came into these parts of America with one and the same end and aim, namely, to advance the Kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ, and to enjoy the liberties of the Gospell in puritie, with peace," etc.

The opinion among the common people in England as to the grounds of the Puritan exodus may be well inferred from the satirical songs of the time, one of which I quote in part from the admirable chapter upon the rise of English Independency, in Mr. Masson's work upon the Life and Times of Milton:

"Stay not among the wicked,
Lest that here with them you perish;
But let us to New England go,
And the Pagan people cherish.

Then for Truth's sake come along, come along;
Leave this place of superstition;
Wer't not for we that Brethren be,
You would sink into perdition.

There you may teach our hymns too
Without the law's controlment;
We need not fear the Bishops there,
Nor spiritual courts' enrolment.
The surplice shall not fright us,
Nay, nor superstition's blindness," etc.

by earthly want, or by the greed of gold, or by the lust of adventure, but by the fear of God, and the zeal for a godly worship." The grant of the Massachusetts charter was regarded by the English Puritans, in the strait in which they stood at the time, "as a Providential call. Out of the failure of their great constitutional struggle and the pressing danger to 'godliness' in England, rose the dream of a land in the West, where religion and liberty could find a safe and lasting home." Of the Plymouth settlement in particular, Palfrey says: "A religious impulse accomplished what commercial enterprise, commanding money and court favor, had attempted without success." And Bancroft: "The pilgrims were exiles for conscience."

Yet men have been by no means at one upon this subject. The question of the motives which impelled the Pilgrim Fathers and the Massachusetts colonists altogether is one, the controversial discussion of which began in their own day, and has been continued intermittently to the present.* The somewhat extraordinary revival of interest in the fathers which we

* Robert Baylie, a minister at Glasgow, in a work published in 1645, alleged that division or disagreement in the church of Leyden was the occasion of the first plantation of New England, one part of the church going to America because it could not get along with the other. This aspersion is noticed by Winslow, who shows that "nothing could be more untrue." John Cotton also wrote an answer to Baylie, whose work was inspired by a desire to show that Congregationalism led naturally to quarrels and confusion. Douglas, Chalmers, Robertson, and even Burke, have represented the motives of the Pilgrims in their removal to America in a very unjust manner.

The immediate occasion of the present Article is the paper by Professor Herbert C. Adams, of Johns Hopkins University, originally read before one of the learned societies of Baltimore, entitled "A Secular View of the Pilgrim Fathers." The controversy concerning this paper, begun in the Baltimore newspapers and noticed at the Forefathers' Celebration at Plymouth, in Dec., 1890, has excited considerable attention among students of colonial history. Professor Adams's discussion of the motives of the Pilgrims, although in many points it appears to me unjust, is inspired by the laudable desire of maintaining historical continuity, insisting warmly that New England was a natural development of old English ideas, and not a sudden growth. The strong way in which this point — certainly a quite unimpeachable one — is pressed, makes Professor Adams's false better than the true of his more violent critics. But some of his false appears to me very false, as I shall have occasion to point out.

are now witnessing, and to which we owe so many fresh and interesting discussions of their civil polity, their church polity, and their standing in the matter of toleration, has brought this question of motives to the front again also, and we have to consider again, with such new light as we have, the assertion, opposed to the traditional view, that the Plymouth colonists did not come as exiles or as martyrs to a religious cause, but simply or primarily out of a spirit of colonial enterprise, seeking to better their material condition. The motives and purposes of the founders of the Massachusetts Colony have been stated so completely by Dr. Ellis and Mr. Hale, in the invaluable volume of Lowell Lectures upon the Early History of Massachusetts, that little remains to be said upon that subject. The object of the present paper is to determine the motives of the founders of Plymouth, the Pilgrim Fathers. The materials for judgment, in the way of original authorities, are certainly ample enough; and it seems to me that if a confident conclusion is possible upon any question in history, then the correctness of the traditional view upon this subject is established beyond peradventure by the writings of Bradford and Winslow and Cushman.

It is proper to say, at the outset, that the fact that the Pilgrims resided for a time in Holland has very little to do with the real point at issue. The real point is whether they were exiles from *England* for conscience' sake, and whether, in 1620, they would not rather have returned to Scrooby and Austerfield, even to an humbler and poorer life than they ever knew there, if so be they could have enjoyed their religion in peace, than to have chartered the Mayflower to found a colony over the ocean. That they went to Holland first, as the most accessible refuge in their extremity, and found the life there distasteful, hard, and unsuited to their purpose, is important in some connections, but not in this. If Roger Williams had found the springs of Providence less sweet than he did, and the chances of getting a living at Providence harder than they were, and had pushed on to Newport, because there was good fishing there, or even, if we please, because he thought it worth while to pre-empt a watering-place, the real cause of this founding of Newport would still have been his banishment by the

Massachusetts Colony, and not the bad Providence water. And if Victor Hugo, in 1855, anxious to put in more stout strokes for equality and fraternity, but finding that he was losing his inspiration or growing asthmatic at Guernsey, had gone to join Mazzini in London, the dull people and the humid atmosphere of Guernsey (if it be humid and if the people be dull) would have been slight grounds for his settlement in London, compared with the fact that Napoleon *le Petit* would not let him live in Paris. In Guernsey or in London he were the same exile and martyr to a political principle.

That the Pilgrim congregation, while at Leyden, was a congregation of exiles, martyrs to a religious cause, nobody would ever question. The institution of the High Commission under Elizabeth, for the suppression of the Puritan movement in England, "stands out in high relief," says Bancroft, "as one of the great crimes against civilization, and admits of no extenuation or apology, except by recrimination. It has its like in the bull of Leo X. against Luther; in the advice of Calvin to the English reformers; in the blind zeal of the Puritans of that day, who, like Cartwright, taught that 'heretikes oughte to be put to deathe nowe, that uppon repentance ther oughte not to followe any pardon of deathe; that the magistrates which punish murther and are lose in punishing the breaches of the first table, begynne at the wronge end'; and, finally, in the act of the Presbyterian Long Parliament, inflicting the punishment of death upon various religious opinions." The Independents or "Brownists" were the special objects of the fury of the High Commission, and the persecution was so active that in 1692 Bacon could say, "The Brownists are now, thanks to God, by the good remedies that have been used, suppressed and worn out." We can gather enough of the nature of these "remedies" from the memorials which the sufferers addressed at different times to the lords of the council. "Their dealing with us is, and hath been a long time, most injurious, outrageous and unlawful; . . . persecuting, imprisoning, detaining at their pleasures our poor bodies, without any trial, release, or bail permitted yet; and, hitherto, without any cause either for error or crime directly objected!" "Their manner of pursuing and apprehending us

is with no less violence and outrage. Their pursuivants, with assistants, break into our houses at all hours of the night. . . . There they break up, ransack, rifle, and make havoc at their pleasure, under pretense of searching for seditious and unlawful books." "Some of us they have cast into their limbo at Newgate, laden with as many irons as they could bear; others into the dangerous and loathsome jail, among the most facinorous and vile persons—where it is lamentable to relate how many of these innocents have perished within these five years, and of these, some aged widows, aged men, and young maidens—and where so many as the infection hath spared shall lie in woful distress, like to follow their fellows if speedy redress be not had. Others of us have been grievously beaten with cudgels in the prison, as at Bridewell, and cast into a place called 'Little-ease' there, for refusing to come to their chapel service there." An earlier "supplication" alleged that "the prelates of this land and their complices"* were then "detaining in their hands within the prisons about London—not to speak of other jails throughout the land—about threescore and twelve persons, men and women, young and old, lying in cold, in hunger, in dungeons, in irons," for no other offence than that of going beyond other English Protestants "in the detestation of all popery, that most fearful antichristian religion," and "drawing nearer in some points of practice unto Christ's holy order and institution." In the conclusion of their principal petition, they said: "We crave for all of us but liberty either to die openly, or to live openly, in the land of our nativity. If we deserve death, it beseemeth the magistrates of justice not to see us closely murdered; if we be guiltless, we crave but the benefit of our innocency, that we may have

* The persecution was carried on in the name, not of the state, but of the church. The primary model of the High Commission, says Bancroft, "was the Inquisition itself, its English germ a commission granted by Mary to certain bishops and others to inquire after all heresies." Heresy was almost the worst crime known to the law. When John Cotton, almost forty years after the time of which we are speaking, found that process was issued to bring him before the infamous High Commission, he appealed to his friend, the Earl of Dorset, who replied that for "drunkenness or uncleanness or any such lesser fault, he could have obtained his pardon," but the "crime of non-conformity and Puritanism was unpardonable."

peace to serve God and our prince in the place and sepulchres of our fathers."

The truth will never down, and only a year after Bacon thanked God that the High Commission's good remedies had done their work, Raleigh believed that there were twenty thousand Brownists in England. It was then ordered that every person who should be absent from the services of the Established Church for a month should be examined, and obstinate non-conformists were threatened with exile or with death. Greenwood and Barrow were hanged at Tyburn for their adherence to the new doctrines. John Penry was hanged for "joining with the hypocritical and schismatical conventicles of Barrowe and Greenwood" and for "his justifying of Barrowe and Greenwood as holy martyrs."* To a company of the brethren in London, whose banishment he foresaw, Penry wrote from his prison: "I would wish you and the brethren in the west and north countries to be together, if you may, whithersoever you shall be banished; and, to this purpose, to bethink you beforehand where to be; yea, to send some who may be meet to prepare you some resting-place; and be all of you assured that he who is your God in England will be your God in any land under the whole heaven." It was on the seventh of June, 1593, that Penry suffered martyrdom. Six months before this, the following "humble petition of her highness' faithful subjects, falsely called Brownists" had been addressed to the privy council: "Whereas, we, her majesty's natural born subjects, true and loyal, now lying, many of us, in other countries, as men exiled her highness' dominions; and the rest, which remain within her grace's land, greatly distressed through imprisonment and other great troubles, sustained only for some matters of conscience, in which our most

* At least three others were publicly executed, besides such as died in prisons,—William Dennis, John Coping and Elias Thacker. "These two last mentioned," says Bradford, "were condemned by cruel Judge Popham, whose countenance and carriage was very rough and severe toward them, with many sharp menaces. But God gave them courage to bear it, and to make this answer:

'My Lord, your face we fear not,
And for your threats we care not,
And to come to your read service, we dare not,'"

lamentable estate we cannot in that measure perform the duty of subjects as we desire: and, also, whereas means is now offered for our being in a foreign and far country which lieth to the west from hence, in the province of Canada, where by the providence of the almighty and her majesty's most gracious favor, we may not only worship God as we are in conscience persuaded by his Word, but also do unto her majesty and our country great good service, and in time also greatly annoy that bloody and persecuting Spaniard about the Bay of Mexico,—our most humble suit is that it may please your honors to be a means unto her excellent majesty, that with her most gracious favor and protection we may peaceably depart thither, and there remaining, to be accounted her majesty's faithful and loving subjects, to whom we owe all duty and obedience in the Lord, promising hereby and taking God to record, who searcheth the hearts of all people, that, wheresoever we be come, we will by the grace of God live and die faithful to her highness and this land of our nativity."

This petition was rejected. The Independents were to have no protection or toleration, under English jurisdiction, on one side of the Atlantic or the other. But the petition is of great significance in this discussion. It shows that sixteen years before the flight of Robinson and Brewster and their little congregation from Scrooby to Holland, and twenty-four years before Captain John Smith published his glowing Description of New England, "with the prooffe of the present benefit this Countrey affords," the English Independents were looking to America, which Frobisher and Gilbert had found out something about, as a refuge from the distresses and cruel persecutions which they were sustaining "only for some matters of conscience." Had these petitioners sailed for Canada in 1592, as they prayed to do, I cannot well imagine anybody having the hardihood to deny that they were exiles or martyrs to a religious cause, or to assert that they were prompted simply by a spirit of colonial enterprise. The petition shows too the necessity which the Independents recognized—we have enough instances of this later on—of urging, along with their genuine and substantial motive, certain vague, half fictitious and trumped-up grounds, which, appealing to the selfishness, the cupidity, and

ambition of the government, might accomplish what the direct appeal for justice and a chance to breathe could not do. Nothing could be more pathetic in its way than the suggestion of this little lot of harried Brownists to the power that backed the High Commission, as an inducement to allowing them to plant a fishing settlement in Newfoundland or on the St. Lawrence, that they might in time greatly annoy the "bloody and persecuting Spaniard" about the Gulf of Mexico.

But the main thing which impresses us in this petition, as in the whole carriage of these men during the bitter experiences which made it so hard for them to perform the duty of subjects in that measure which they desired, is their intense love of country and their desire to live and die Englishmen. Under the gallows at Tyburn, with the ropes around their necks, Greenwood and Barrow prayed for England and the queen. "If my death," wrote Penry in prison, "can procure any quietness to the church of God, or the state, I shall rejoice. . . Many such subjects I wish my prince." He subscribes his name to his final protest "with that heart and that hand which never devised or wrote anything to the discredit or defamation of my sovereign, Queen Elizabeth." It was only when the last hope of rest in England was quenched, that the Scrooby congregation fled to Holland;*—and their hearts always remained behind. "They lived here but as men in exile," wrote Bradford of the life at Leyden. "We felt," wrote Winslow, "how grievous it was to live from under the protection of the State of England, how like we were to lose our language and our name of English." "My brethren," wrote Euring, in 1619, "would prefer to be members of a scriptural church in the meanest part of England, than either to continue where many of us yet live or

* "Being thus constrained to leave their native soyle and countrie, their lands & livings, and all their freinds & famillier acquaintance, it was much, and thought marvellous by many. But to goe into a countrie they knew not (but by hearsay), wher they must learne a new language, and get their livings they knew not how, it being a dear place, & subject to ye miseries of warr, it was by many thought an adventure almost desperate, a case intolerable, & a misserie worse than death. Espetially seeing they were not acquainted with trades nor traffique, (by which that countrie doth subsiste,) but had only been used to a plaine countrie life, & ye innocente trade of husbandrey."—*Bradford*.

to plant ourselves in Virginia." Yet even for Virginia "thus much" he said, among other things, "they might there live under the King's government."

It was impossible that such Englishmen should stay forever in Holland. The Pilgrims in Holland were ever waiting and longing for some change in the policy of the English government which would allow them to go home. When at last they fully realized that that could never be and "knew they were pilgrims" and must continue so, they were bound, however far away it took them and whatever hardships it involved, at least to live under the government of their native land. The Dutch offered to transport them freely "and furnish every family with cattle," if they would "go under them to Hudson's river" and become citizens of New Netherlands. Instead of accepting this offer, as at one time they were almost on the point of doing, they finally made bond-servants of themselves to the Merchant Adventurers, for seven years, in all which time no man of them was to labor, spend, or save for himself or for his wife and children, for the sake of planting themselves in New England.

From the persecution of the Independents in general, turn we to the Scrooby congregation in particular. It began to gather around Brewster not far from the time when Elizabeth was succeeded by James. The hopes that James's accession would introduce a milder system were very speedily dispelled. The mere crossing of the English border wrought an astonishing transformation in the prince who had praised the Church of Scotland as "the sincerest kirk of the world," and called the English service "an evil said mass." James took small stock in Whitgift's and Bancroft's notions of apostolic succession, but he did believe that bishops were the most useful instruments possible to help him get rid of Parliament and make himself an absolute monarch—and upon this his mind was fixed from the start. "No bishop, no king," he was forever saying, and it was a very sagacious saying too. "A Scot's presbytery agrees with monarchy as well as God and the devil," was the exclamation with which he interrupted the Puritans, in their petition for the right of free discussion. "I will have none of that liberty as to ceremonies," he said; "I will have one doctrine, one discipline." "I will make the Puritans conform, or I will

harry them out of the land, or else worse." "Only hang them," he said to the bishops; "that's all."

When, now, in the simple words of Bradford's Journal, "as by the travell & diligence of some godly & zealous preachers, & Gods blessing on their labours, as in other places of ye land, so in ye North parts, many became inlightened by ye word of God, and had their ignorance & sins discovered unto them, and begane by his grace to reforme their lives, and make conscience of their wayes, the worke of God was no sooner manifest in them, but presently they were both scoffed and scorned by ye prophane multitude, and ye ministers urged with ye yoak of subscription, or els must be silenced; and ye poore people were so vexed with apparators, & pursuants, & ye comissarie courts, as truly their affliction was not smale; which, notwithstanding, they bore sundrie years with much patience."—Such is Bradford's story of the beginning of the troubles of the people who established the two churches at Gainsborough and Scrooby. But it was only the beginning. As they came "to see further into things by the light of ye word of God,—how not only these base and beggerly ceremonies were unlawfull, but also that ye lordly & tiranous power of ye prelates ought not to be submitted unto," they were speedily made to understand that there was only one way in which they could be faithful to conscience and live, and that was by leaving England. They could scarcely have expected, as things were then, that their definite organization of churches renouncing all dependence on the bishops or the state, and their regular meetings for worship in a manuer forbidden by law, would be allowed to continue unnoticed and unpunished. We are quite prepared for what follows in Bradford's narrative. They were "hunted & persecuted on every side, so as their former afflictions were but as flea-bitings in comparison of these which now came upon them. For some were taken and clapt up in prison, others had their houses besett & watcht night and day, & hardly escaped their hands; and ye most were faine to flie & leave their howses & habitations, and the means of their livelihood."

This was the state of things from which Brewster's little flock fled into Holland, "wher they heard was freedome of Religion for all men." It was almost as hard for them to get out

of England as to stay in it. The ports were closely watched, to prevent Separatists escaping into Holland, for there was no security that they would not find their way from Holland to Virginia, and a royal proclamation had forbidden Englishmen to transport themselves to Virginia without a license. James was bound that the Nonconformists, "harried out of England," should not take refuge in America. In fact, he did not mean that they should get out of England at all, but that, somehow or other, they should be harried into conformity. The disastrous miscarriages at Boston and Hull will be well remembered. It was not till a year after the breaking up at Scrooby, and after all manner of desperate shifts and troubles, perils of land and perils of sea, perils of sickness and perils of prison, perils from ecclesiastical officers and perils from the *posse comitatus*, that the fugitives came together at Amsterdam. But at last, "some at one time and some at another, and some in one place and some in another," they did all get over. There is not very much doubt, I think, about their being, at this time, exiles and martyrs to a religious cause. And exiles and martyrs to a religious cause they remained, whether in Holland or in America, so long as they desired above all else, save only to be true to conscience, to return to their old homes, so long especially as they preferred to be members of a scriptural church "in the meanest part of England" rather than either to continue where they were or to plant themselves in Virginia.

How did they find themselves situated in Holland? What was there in their surroundings there corresponding to the bitter waters which, in our supposed case, might have impelled Roger Williams to move on from Providence to Newport? The main thing which they were after they certainly found—"freedom of religion for all men." Holland had already, under the Republic, adopted that large and generous policy of toleration which made the persecuted of all the nations of Europe turn toward her when they prayed, and which has given her a proud preëminence in the history of liberty. And they were treated by the Dutch magistrates and people with unvarying kindness and respect. "Though many of them weer poore, yet ther was none so poore, but if they were known to be of that congregation, the Dutch (either bakers or others) would

trust them in any reasonable matter when they wanted money. Because they had found by experience how carfull they were to keep their word, and saw them so painfull & dilligente in their calling; yea, they would strive to gett their custome, and to imploy them above others, in their worke, for their honestie & diligence." "These English," said the magistrates of Leyden, reproving the Walloons who belonged to the French church in that city, "have lived amongst us now these twelve years, and yet we never had any suit or accusation come against any of them."

But toleration and kindness were all the good things they found. The hardships they had to encounter were those of a company of poor men finding themselves in a foreign country, with cities crowded and civilization already old and complex, instead of in a great new land, with virgin soil, and rivers and forests free. They were in precisely the same condition in which two or three hundred Vermont farmers would find themselves, if banished to France and forced to get a living for themselves and their families at Havre or Rouen. "They heard a strange and uncouth language and beheld the different manners and customs of the people, with their strange fashions and attires; all so far differing from that of their plain country villages (wherein they were bred and had so long lived) as it seemed they were come into a new world. But these were not the things they much looked on, or that long took up their thoughts; for they had other work in hand and another kind of war to wage and maintain. For though they saw fair and beautiful cities, flowing with abundance of all sorts of wealth and riches, yet it was not long before they saw the grim and grizzly face of poverty coming upon them like an armed man, with whom they must buckle and encounter, and from whom they could not fly." In England they had been, most of them, simple husbandmen. Leyden was entirely a manufacturing city and they had to learn various trades, competing with skillful men who had been trained in such employments from their youth. "They fell to such trades and employments as they best could; valuing peace and their spiritual comfort above any other riches whatsoever. And at length they came to raise a competent and comfortable living, but with hard and

continual labor." One was a mason, one a carpenter, one a smith, and one a tailor; these may have brought their trades with them from England. A very few seem to have been able to engage in commerce. Others were silk-workers, wool-carders, and fustian-makers. Bradford is mentioned by one authority as a fustian-maker and by another as a silk-worker, and he seems to have been unfortunate in his business. Brewster, who "suffered much hardship after he had spent the most of his means, having a great charge and many children," supported himself at one time by teaching English to students in the university, having drawn up an English grammar in Latin. He finally established a printing-office, there being considerable occasion for printing English books in the Netherlands, some of them being such as could not be safely printed in England.

So things continued for ten years or more. The twelve-years' truce, signed on the 9th of April, 1609, which had interrupted the long and desperate war with Spain, was drawing to a close, and in Holland "ther was nothing but beating of drumes and preparing for warr." It was a religious war—Catholic against Protestant. The memories of Alva's bloody persecutions were still fresh in every Netherlandish household, and the English Pilgrims must have talked with hundreds of men in Leyden who had stood on the walls during the terrible siege, and who had heard the heroic burgomaster, Van der Werff, offer his body as food to those who implored him to capitulate the city, when for seven weeks they had had no bread to eat. When Bradford and Brewster answered the doubters and grumblers in their little company, in their fears of the ocean and of the American wilderness, that "ye Spaniard might prove as cruell as the salvages of America, and ye famine and pestelence as soar here as ther, & their libertie less to looke out for remedie," they were words which meant something. The internal affairs of Holland also were in the greatest disorder during the whole period of the Pilgrims' stay in Leyden. The strife between the Remonstrants and the Gomarists threatened almost every day to end in civil war; and it was while the Pilgrims were making their final arrangements with the London Adventurers that Barneveldt died on the scaffold.

But these things, serious as they were, were altogether secondary considerations with the Pilgrims. Bradford scarcely mentions them, in showing the reasons and causes of the removal to New England. Nor, in point of fact, do we find that those of the Leyden congregation who remained behind for a time suffered from the political troubles in Holland. The primary and real grounds of the removal would have been just as operative, had Holland been in the profoundest peace. They had not come to Holland with any settled intention of making it their permanent home, but simply because it was the only place where they could take refuge, in a terrible strait. It had been, with them, "any port in a storm." They had left England in a storm which they believed would by and by blow over, and they waited in Holland for a clearer western sky. They never cast anchor in Holland. It was one and the same impulse which carried them into Holland and carried them out of it. They gradually came to see that such hopes as they might have had of going back to England must be left out of the calculation, and that they were committed to a war in which there was no discharge. "The grave mistress Experience taught them many things," and "ye sagest members begane both deeply to apprehend their present dangers, & wisely to foresee ye future, & thinke of timely remedy."

Both Bradford and Winslow have left us plain statements of the considerations which finally determined their removal. The movers in the matter had no material advantages whatever to hope for, for themselves. Brewster and many of the men of the old Scrooby congregation now "begane to be well stricken in years." At this time too, albeit with hard and continual labor, these had at length come to raise a "competent and comfortable living." Of Brewster himself, Bradford says that "towards the latter part of those twelve years spent in Holland, his outward condition was mended, and he lived well and plentifully." "But now removing into this country," he adds, by way of contrast, "all these things were laid aside again, and a new course of living must be submitted to; in which he was no way unwilling to take his part and to bear his burden with the rest, living many times without bread or corn many months together, having many times nothing but

fish, and often wanting that also." A burden and a hardship it was felt to be by all from the outset, a choice of evils, adopted out of a solemn sense of duty, prompted by no "curiositie or hope of gain" and by none of the feelings which planted Roanoke or made men follow Captain John Smith. It was agreed, says Winslow—writing as of a venture recognized as desperate—that "they that went should freely offer themselves." The prime movers in the enterprise, the "prudent governors" and "sagest members," the real founders of New England, were impelled by no selfish motive whatever—by which I mean nothing that concerned their material advantage—but solely by considerations of moral and religious duty. It seems to me impossible for any one to read the simple and straightforward stories of Bradford and Winslow, so altogether childlike in their unaffectedness and truthfulness, and come to any other conclusion. These men did see, however, that, although the better ones among them had now attained comfortable circumstances, and although the people generally bore their difficulties "very cherfully & with a resolute courage," their chances were so hard that many of them were growing old before their time, and they feared that within a few years more these might sink under their burdens, and that the little congregation would be in danger to scatter. For this reason, therefore, they "thought it better to dislodge betimes to some place of better advantage and less danger, if any such could be found," "though in America."

But there were larger considerations. They were twofold—concerning their children, and concerning their brother Independents in England. The Pilgrims wanted freedom to worship God—but to worship God was much more important with them than the freedom. Religion and morality meant more to them than toleration, and what their strict and stern conceptions of morals and religion were we very well know. It were a pity if they had come into Holland for toleration, if so be their children were to lose the truth for the maintenance of which alone they sought toleration. The problem of taking proper care of their children and giving them a proper training was a problem quite hard enough, even if the question of religion were left out of the account. As necessity was a hard

taskmaster over them, so they were compelled to be hard taskmasters to their children; "the which, says Bradford, "as it did not a little wound ye tender harts of many a loving father & mother, so it produced likewise sundrie sad & sorrowful effects. For many of their children, that were of best dispositions and gracious inclinations, haveing lernde to bear ye yoake in their youth, and willing to beare part of their parents burden, were, often times, so oppressed with their hevie labours, that though their minds were free and willing, yet their bodies bowed under ye weight of ye same, and became decreped in their early youth; the vigor of nature being consumed in ye very budd, as it were." They perceived, too, says Winslow, "how unable they were there to give such education to their children as they themselves had received,"—and how important the office of education was in their eyes, their subsequent history in Massachusetts proves. But that which was "of all sorrowes most heavie to be borne," continued Bradford, "was that many of their children, by these occasions, and ye great licentiousness of youth in that countrie, and ye manifold temptations of the place, were drawne away by evill examples into extravagante & dangerous courses, getting ye raines off their neks, & departing from their parents. Some became souldiers, others took upon them farr viages by sea, and other some worse courses, tending to disolutness & the danger of their soules, to ye great greefe of their parents and dishonor of God. So that they saw their posteritie would be in danger to degenerate & be corrupted." One has only to reflect for a single moment upon the object for which these Puritans had come into Holland and upon the nature of the change from their simple life in one of the most retired agricultural districts of England to life in a great Dutch manufacturing city, the seat of one of the greatest universities of Europe, with its throngs of students, a city resounding with the controversies between Arminius and Gomar, resounding too with rumors of war, full of soldiers, to realize what grounds they had for anxiety concerning their children, and what obligations they must have felt themselves under, "out of the Christian care of the flock of Christ committed to them," to provide some place where temptations were less grievous, and where the truth of

which they were stewards would be more likely to perpetuate itself.

Then as to their brother Independents in England. There were large numbers in England who sympathized with their doctrines and polity, and longed for the liberty which the Pilgrims found in Holland, but were unwilling to endure the hardships which were the price the Pilgrims paid for their liberty. "The hardness of ye place and cuntrie was such, as few in comparison would come to them, and fewer would bide it out, and continew with them. For many that came to them, and many more that desired to be with them, could not endure that great labor and hard fare, with other inconveniences which they underwent & were contented with." "Yea, some preferred & chose ye prisons in England, rather than this libertie in Holland, with these afflictions." In a word, England and Holland were Scylla and Charybdis for the poor Independents. They were ground between the upper and nether millstones. It is not strange that the consciences of many could not hold out under the terrible pressure, and that they "admitted of bondage," compromised and conformed, or at any rate held their peace. The Pilgrims saw that the exodus from England to Holland was almost ceasing, and that the cause for which they had suffered so much was not growing. They knew that the fear of Holland or of exile to any place outside the jurisdiction of England was crushing the courage out of many who would else have faced the courts as stoutly as Coping and Thacker had faced Judge Popham. "Yea, their pastor would often say, that many of those who both wrote & preached now against them, if they were in a place wher they might have libertie and live comfortably, they would then practise as they did." They thought, therefore, "that if a better and easier place of living could be had, it would draw many." They wished to provide, in New England, a refuge for the persecuted Independents of Old England, some place where, to use the words of Winslow, "we might exemplarily show our tender countrymen by our example, no less burdened than ourselves, where they might live and comfortably subsist, and enjoy the like liberties with us, being freed from anti-christian bondage," and still "keep their names and nation."

That this desire to establish a refuge for the persecuted English Independents was a deep and genuine desire, and not something forgotten as soon as they were once across the ocean, is quite sufficiently proved, if any other proof than the general spirit of their communications with England were necessary, by the discourses of Cushman. That they were compelled by political considerations to make the least possible noise about the religious character of their enterprise, and that their hardships, during the first few years at Plymouth, were so terrible as to discourage any but the most resolute from joining them, and to prevent any large emigration, were certainly no faults of theirs. *It was their ultimate success in firmly establishing their colony, which, ten years afterwards, when, with Charles king of England and Laud king of Charles, men's hearts were "failing them for fear and for looking after those things that were coming," induced the great Puritan emigration to Massachusetts Bay. And the Massachusetts aristocrats quickly found that Plymouth democracy was the only thing suited to this side of the water, and whatever weaknesses they had for episcopacy and the ways of the Church of England gave way instantaneously to the power of Plymouth Congregationalism, in its superior fitness to the conditions of a free commonwealth.

Their desire to live, maintaining their faith, in English dominions, and to retain the language and the name of Englishmen, their desire to establish a refuge for their persecuted brother Independents, their anxiety for the education and general welfare of their children and the perpetuation of their principles, their hope to lessen the burdens which were crushing the weaker among them, and their apprehension of troublous times in Holland—these were the "weighty and solid reasons" which prompted their removal to New England. Two other things were considered by them, the one concerning their duties to the people they were leaving, the other concerning the heathen among whom they were going. They considered "how little good they did or were like to do to the Dutch in reforming the Sabbath," and they had a great hope "of laying some good foundation, or at least to make some way thereunto, for ye propagating & advancing ye gospell of ye kingdom of

Christ in those remote parts of ye world," "if the Lord have a people amongst the natives whither he should bring us."

The consideration of the good they might do the Dutch, by staying in Holland, was, I am sure, a comparatively trifling consideration with them, and they probably thought more of the harm the Dutch Sabbath might do their children than of the good which the example of the Puritan Sabbath might do the Dutch. And the consideration of missionary work among the Indians, certainly never a primary or controlling motive with them, was, I believe, altogether vague and substantially *ex post facto*. They cannot be much blamed for not taking their chances in staying to make Puritans or Sabbatarians of the Dutch. Free trade, whether in religious opinion or anything else, has not made headway enough among ourselves, to warrant us in being over-exacting in our demands upon the magnanimity of the good people of three hundred years ago. I am not sure that a protective system was not very necessary for the Pilgrims, if they wanted to keep on their feet and do some large good in the end; and they were undoubtedly quite right in supposing that they could make but a very slight impression upon Holland, while Holland would probably soon make an end of them and their Puritanism altogether. As to converting the Indians, an object which was made much of in writing by almost all the early colonists, and especially by the Massachusetts Bay people,* it was not a consideration so remote with the Pilgrims as the notion of annoying "that bloody and persecuting Spaniard about the Bay of Mexico" had been with their fathers and grandfathers, and certainly not a fictitious thing. When we find Captain John Smith, in his flowery Description of New England, having raked together every possible provocative to emigration, adding that "religion, above all things, should move us (especially the clergie) if we were religious, to shewe our faith by our workes in converting those poor salvages," we suspect it to be nothing but a part of the valiant captain's buncombe. Brewster and Rob-

* The Charter to the Massachusetts Colony declares "the principal end of this plantation" to be to "win and incite the natives of the country to the knowledge and obedience of the only true God and Saviour of mankind, and the Christian faith." I do not think that this was a lie, but it was not the truth.

inson never talked buncombe. If they profess a great hope of propagating the Gospel among the Indians, it is because they really felt that the enterprise they were undertaking might afford large opportunities in that direction; and if we do not find the colonists hurrying to establish Indian churches about Plymouth, we may remember that we do not find them doing very much besides that they fully meant to do, and that a sustained parched-corn diet does not greatly tend to excite the flames of missionary zeal. But sincere as their desire to convert the Indians unquestionably was, and uniformly kind and honorable as was their treatment of the Indians,* the desire to

* This point, along with the general question of the treatment of the Indians by the New England colonies, is deserving of thorough separate discussion—a discussion which might be of profit to the country at this time. The impression which Professor Adams conveys as to the attitude of the Pilgrims towards the Indians is altogether misleading. “The Pilgrims came,” he says, “as virtual invaders. The first Indians they saw, they chased; the first Indian corn they discovered they appropriated; in the first hostile encounter, they shot at the Indians, and Captain Standish bade his men reserve their fire till they ‘could take aim.’” This, I think, is a bad way of writing history. Let us see how these cavalier statements look beside the simple accounts in Bradford, upon which they are based. (1.) “Ye 15 of Novebr: When they had marched aboute ye space of a mile by ye sea side, they espied 5 or 6 persons with a dogg coming towards them, who were salvages; but they fled from them, & rane up into ye woods, and ye English followed them, *partly to see if they could speake with them, and partly to discover if ther might not be more of them lying in ambush.* But ye Indeans seeing them selves thus followed, they againe forsooke the woods, and rane away on ye sands as hard as they could.” It is manifest that they “chased” these Indians with no hostile intent. But the Indians were quite warranted in being afraid of them. Their idea of the English was based upon their experience with one of John Smith’s subordinates, Captain Hunt, a master of a ship, who, as Bradford says further on, “deceived the people and got them, under color of trucking with them, twenty out of this very place where we inhabit, and seven men from the Nausites, and carried them away, and sold them for slaves, like a wretched man that cares not what mischief he doth for his profit.” The rough greeting which the Pilgrims first got from the Indians was owing to their fresh recollection of these kidnappers. The friendly relations almost immediately established and so faithfully continued with Massasoit and all the Indians of the neighborhood show how quick the Indians were to respond to honorable treatment and to recognize the sort of men they had to deal with in the Pilgrims. (2.) The next day, proceeding further, they found, buried in the sand,

convert the Indians may not be set down among the substantial reasons why the Pilgrims came to New England. It was an accompaniment, not a cause. It was not as missionaries that they came.

Such seem to me the necessary results of an inquiry into the motives of the Pilgrim Fathers. I believe that no inquiry would ever have been necessary if they had had a little more money than they did have and had been able to come to New England on their own account, independent of English mercan-

"diverse faire Indian baskets filled with corne and some in eares, faire and good, of diverse colours, which seemed to them a very goodly sight, (haveing never seen any shuch before)." They "tooke with them parte of ye corne, and buried up ye rest." That which they took "they brought away, purposing to give them full satisfaction when they should meet with any of them (as about some 6 months afterward they did, to their good contente). And here is to be noted a spetiall providence of God and a great mercie to this poore people, that hear they gott seed to plant them corne ye next year, or els they might have starved." Toward the end of the next July, the Pilgrims found out, in one of their expeditions along the coast, who the Indians were to whom the corn had belonged; and Governor Bradford again makes it a matter of special record in his journal that "they gave full satisfaction to those whose corne they had found & taken when they were at Cape Codd." I venture to say that the whole proceeding, so far from reflecting in any way whatever upon the Pilgrim Fathers, seems peculiarly calculated to set in relief their honesty and almost painful scrupulousness. Imagine a company of hungry British in Zulu-land or the Transvaal having any scruples about appropriating anything that fell in their way, or our own explorers in the lands of the Poncas or the Utes making this ado about a bushel of corn,—worrying for six months until they had found the owners and paid for it! (8.) On the night of the 7th of December, camping near a place where they had seen a dozen Indians the night before, they made a barricade and posted a sentinel. About midnight "they heard a hideous & great crie." They fired a couple of musket shots and the noise ceased, and they concluded it was a company of wolves. But as they were ending breakfast the next morning, "all on ye sudain, they heard a great & strange crie, which they knew to be the same voyces they heard in ye night, & one of their company being abroad came runing in, & cried, 'Men, Indeans, Indeans;' and withall, their arrowes came flying amongst them." They got their guns as soon as they could " & let flye amongst them, and quickly stopped their violence, yet ther was a lustie man, and no less valiante, stood behind a tree within halfe a musket shot, and let his arrows flie at them. He was seen shoot 3 arrowes, which were all avoyded." Would our delicate humanitarians have had the fathers fire into the air while this was going on, or range themselves on the shore

tile adventurers, who found the Pilgrims' extremity their opportunity to turn a penny. Much of the confusion which has arisen has arisen from the fact that the Pilgrims, unable to manage their own case and too poor to fit out their expedition themselves, had to resort to the patronage of Mr. Thomas Weston and the Merchant Adventurers of London, who were wrought up with hopes of great profits from the fisheries on the New England coast and from the fur-trade with the Indians, and saw that these resolute Puritans, desperate in the determination to get out of Holland, were the best possible men to

for targets? Miles Standish knew a trick worth two of that. The lusty Indian behind the tree "stood 8 shot of a musket, till one taking full aime at him, and made ye barke or splinters of ye tree fly about his ears, after which he gave an extraordinary shrike, and away they wente all of them." Standish's men followed them for a quarter of a mile, shouted once or twice and gave them a parting shot and returned. "This they did, that they might conceive that they were not affraide of them or any way discouraged."

So much for the Pilgrims and the Indians. Another question of which much is made in Prof. Adams's paper is whether the Pilgrims came to Plymouth as a *church*. It is maintained that they did not, but that, as opposed to this, Plymouth was founded as a "civil body politick." The alleged fact that the first public meetings on shore were of a civil and not of a religious character goes with other things, it is said, to show that civic ideas were fundamental in the constitution of the colony. To which it is to be answered that the Pilgrims coming as a church and their constituting themselves a civil body politic are not at all things exclusive of each other. The facts are very simple. It was the intention of the whole Leyden congregation to remove to Plymouth if things prospered. If the major part went at first, so it was agreed in the preliminary consultations, the pastor should go with them; if only a minority went, as was the case, the elder should go. If the enterprise miscarried and the colonists were forced to return, those who remained in Leyden were to help them until they could get upon their own feet again; if the enterprise succeeded, the colonists at Plymouth were to endeavor to help over the poor from Leyden. It was also agreed, says Bradford, who discusses the point, "that those that went should be an absolute church of themselves, as well as those that staid, yet with this proviso, that as any of the rest came over to them or any of themselves returned upon an occasion, they should be reputed as members without any further dismission or testimonial." Thus Brewster, going at first, was ruling elder at Plymouth, and Robinson, whenever he might follow, would at once resume his duties as pastor there without any ceremony. The points involved are only the same which would come up if the congregation of Plymouth Church should emigrate to Timbuctoo, Mr. Beecher and the majority staying

hire for the business. The Adventurers were for the most part, indeed, altogether friendly to the Pilgrims, although there were enough among them whose thoughts, as Dr. Bacon well puts it, were entirely "of codfish and beaver, and who, under a show of sympathizing zeal, cared more for large profits on their investment than for the Gospel and the Kingdom of Christ." These latter really had the controlling influence in the company, and it was the hope of profits on fish and fur and not the hope to spread the Kingdom of Christ, which furnished the Pilgrims with the *Mayflower*. The Adventurers had the Pilgrims in their power and the conditions which were the only ones that Cushman could make with them were such as the poor Leyden people were justified in calling "conditions fitter for thieves and bond-slaves than honest men." The whole intercourse of the London Company with the Pilgrims after their arrival in America, intercourse managed on the part of the Company by Weston, shows the Company's strong mercenary spirit. They sent over men of the most questionable sort to join the colony, men who gave the Pilgrims much trouble and threatened to change the whole complexion of things at Plymouth. And their letters were one unbroken clamor for more fish and fur. The *Fortune*, which sailed from London after the arrival of the *Mayflower* with intelligence of the terrible hardships of that first winter and of the death of

behind in Brooklyn while the first detachment was "prospecting" and getting the ground ready. This illustration too shows perfectly how the Pilgrims at Plymouth were at once both church and state. Any company of men, churchmen or not, thrown into a wilderness alone, out of a large society of which it had been a very small constituent, and forced to manage its own matters, at once becomes, simply by virtue of its position, a new state. We may be very sure that Mr. Beecher's people, nearing Timbuctoo, would not be found busying themselves in revising their creed or discussing the functions of deacons, but in appointing surveyors and constables and settling questions of property and protection. There would be less talk of the scheme of salvation than of schemes of taxation and government. Carver's people were no more given to holding synods and prayer-meetings, when more urgent business was on hand. As to their first public meeting on shore, we do not know what it was. As a matter of fact, I should myself be inclined to believe that it was of a religious character. But whether a church service or a "town-meeting" is of no earthly consequence, the matter being quite accidental.

half of the heroic little band, brought a letter from Weston, which was monstrous in its selfishness and hard-heartedness. "That you sent no lading in the ship is wonderful, and worthily distasted. I know your weakness was the cause of it, and, I believe, more weakness of judgment than weakness of bands." The fact that any man in London should have thought it possible for the colonists to have sent the *Mayflower* home full of beaver and codfish, in the spring of 1621, shows that the company had no conception whatever of the real situation. It is not strange that Bradford loses his temper a little in replying to such a letter as this of Weston's. "They which tould you we spent so much time in discoursing & consulting, &c., their harts can tell their touns, they lye. They cared not, so they might salve their owne sores, how they wounded others. Indeed, it is our callamitie that we are (beyound expectation) yoked with some ill-conditioned people, who will never doe good, but corrupte and abuse others."

These were the people under whose auspices and as whose agents and servants the Pilgrims came to New England. The London Merchants were the head and voice of the enterprise for England, and to Cheapside and the Strand the people at Plymouth were only a set of men moved by a spirit of colonial enterprise, seeking to better their material condition by vigorously pushing the fish and fur trade.* But Whitehall knew better than that,—and we certainly ought to find no trouble in

* The Company was indeed compelled to be as silent as possible about the character of the colony, for if it had become notorious too soon that it was a colony of "separatists and schismatics," it was not too far away to be reached by episcopal power and would very likely have been made an end of. It was on this account that the company persisted in refusing to let Robinson go over; for Robinson's name had already become famous in the theological world, and his presence in the colony would have attracted much attention thitherward. But this persistent refusal on the part of the Company was prompted less by a regard for the welfare of the colonists than by a regard for its own interests, which depended upon keeping the colonists out of trouble. This, at least, was Robinson's own conviction. "I persuade myself," he says in his last letter to the church at Plymouth, "that for me they of all others are unwilling I should be transported; especially such as have an eye that way themselves, as thinking if I come there, their market will be marred in many regards."

distinguishing between the Adventurers and the Planters and between the motives which actuated the two parties.

Whitehall, I say, knew the difference very well. King James's memory was much more than twelve years long, and the Privy Council was not in the dark as to who these men were whom the Merchant Adventurers were hiring to catch codfish. To advance the dominions of England James was quick enough to pronounce a most laudable thing, "a good and honest motion; and fishing," he said, "was an honest trade, the apostles' own calling." These, however, were no ordinary fishermen, but would bear a little catechizing by my lords of Canterbury and London. And so the inquisition was reopened, and it was only the shrewdest diplomacy that saved the Pilgrims' whole project from shipwreck at the last moment. Lord Bacon had given more attention to colonial matters than anybody else in the government of that day, and his maxims governed the council. And Bacon had said: "For the discipline of the church in the colonies, it will be necessary that it agree with that which is settled in England; and, to that purpose, it will be fit that all the colonies be subordinate under some bishop of this realm. If any transplant themselves into plantations abroad, who are known schismatics, outlaws or criminal persons, they shall be sent for back upon the first notice. The tenets of separatists and sectaries are full of schism, and inconsistent with monarchy. Discipline by bishops is fittest for monarchy." Robinson and Brewster had drawn up a statement in "seven articles," for Cushman and Carver to lay before the Privy Council, putting their principles in the most temperate form possible, and meant to allay irritation and invite confidence. But the Council did not need much wit to see that the articles were very shaky on the sacraments and on "the ecclesiastical ministry." "Who shall make your ministers?" asked Sir John Wolstenholme, who had undertaken to submit their "further explanation" to the Council. "The power of making them is in the church," they answered—and it came near winding up their business. Sir John saw that the more they explained the worse it got for them, and he was kind enough and shrewd enough to keep their "further explanation" away from the council-board. But they had made

some powerful friends in court circles, and these "labored with the King" and "wrought with the archbishop," and finally the King promised that he "would connive at them and not molest them, provided they carried themselves peaceably; although he refused to confirm this indefinite promise by any public act. This was the best that the Pilgrims could get, and at last they had to smuggle themselves into the Mayflower, as they had had to smuggle themselves into Holland, relying simply upon a wink from so arrant a liar and cheat as King James I., who might take a notion any day to give another wink to Bancroft, that should completely upset them. They fully realized what a "sandy foundation" this was, but there was no help for it, and they determined to take the risk, and "to rest herein on God's providence, as they had done in other things." In refusing to give them an official pledge or make some express engagement with them, James was doubtless doing deference to the "hobgoblin of consistency," which haunts little minds and stiffens them against going back on their record, good or bad. But he was chiefly doing deference to the bishops. It was the bishops who drove the Pilgrims into Holland; it was the bishops who hung the sword of Damocles above them as they sailed to Plymouth; it was the bishops who compelled the founding of New England, and the great Puritan exodus. When, fifty years afterwards, Archbishop Tillotson and other bishops of England expressed with such energy, to Increase Mather, their just resentment to the injury which had been done to the first planters of New England, the old Puritan exclaimed, "If such had been the bishops, there had never been a New England."

It was as exiles and martyrs to a religious cause that the Pilgrims came to New England. The difference between them and men inspired primarily by a desire to better their material condition, is shown sufficiently by a comparison of Plymouth with Roanoke or Jamestown, or with Weston's plantation at Weymouth. Why was it that other colonies in New England languished or came to nothing, while the starving plantation at Plymouth struggled vigorously on? The idea of great mercantile ambitions or pecuniary advantages in the case of the Pilgrims is preposterous. If they had any such ideas, they were

certainly doomed to bitter disappointment; but they had none. It would have been absurd for them to expect an easier time or many good things in their lifetime; but they did not expect it. "We do not look ever," they said, as they were leaving Holland, "to attain, for ourselves, in any other place, the like of our present helps and comforts, during our lives, which are now drawing toward their periods." If material advantage was the primary consideration, why not Virginia or New Netherlands? John Smith's fish stories were but a poor offset to what was known of those kinder soils and climates. Why seven years' work for ten pounds sterling? There was little to induce emigration to America at all for men who were not in hard circumstances or adventurers by profession. The fate of previous attempts at colonization offered no favorable auguries. Roanoke was only the worst of the colonial tragedies. Jamestown had been one long chapter of disasters; Yeardley's reforms had hardly begun, and no news of them had come over the Atlantic before the Mayflower sailed. The news of the miserable miscarriage of Blackwell's enterprise came to the Pilgrims as they were completing their preparations to leave Leyden. No wonder that the weaker-hearted feared to leave Leyden at all, and that every stout word of Robinson and Cushman was necessary to overcome objections and push the movement on. The enterprise would never have succeeded and would never have been undertaken, had material advantage been the only inducement or the primary one. When Bradford, in his story, arrives with the Mayflower in sight of the New England coast, he says, "Hear I cannot but stay and make a pause, and stand half amased at this poore peoples presente condition." He recounts, with a dignified and naive pathos little less than Homeric, the hardships behind and the hardships before, and exclaims, "What could now sustaine them but ye spirite of God & his grace? May not & ought not the children of these fathers rightly say: *Our fathers were Englishmen which came over this great ocean, and were ready to perish in this willdernes?*" The Pilgrims realized as truly, if not as completely, at this point, and before they sailed, what the desperate nature of their undertaking was, as the survivors did three years later, when their brother Pilgrims of the *Anne*

found them "little better than half naked," their best dish "a lobster, or a piece of fish, without bread," their only comfort the assurance that "man liveth not by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of the Lord."

Why did they not go back, if material advantage was what they were after? For "truly, if they had been mindful of that country from whence they came out, they might have had opportunity to have returned." How many remained at Roanoke, that "paradise of the world," with "the goodliest soil under the cope of heaven," its "climate so wholesome that we have not one sick," when Drake's ships sailed for England? How many conspiracies did the Wingfields and Ratcliffes form to desert the Jamestown settlement? But when the *Mayflower*, in the early springtime, after that first dreadful winter, sailed for England, how many of the Plymouth Pilgrims went back or spoke of going back? I venture to say that since Luther, at Worms, spoke his protest in the face of emperor and Rome and exclaimed, "Here I stand: God help me," earth has seen no such instance of heroic fortitude and lofty devotion as that of this little band of exiles standing on the Plymouth hillside, Carver and half their number sleeping beneath their feet, watching the white sails of the *Mayflower* fading in the eastern sky.

The Pilgrims were not laboring for themselves. "Enduring every hardship themselves," says Bancroft, "they were the servants of posterity, the benefactors of succeeding generations." It is true that some of them managed to keep alive and that a few of them struggled at last into comfortable circumstances. But the profits of their enterprise have come almost entirely to the generations since, most largely to ourselves. One satisfaction they did have: they foresaw the oak which should grow from the acorn they were planting and they were confident that their successors would recognize their virtues and their motives. "Out of small beginnings," wrote Bradford, "great things have been produced; and as one small candle may light a thousand, so the light here kindled hath shone to many, yea, in some sort to our whole nation." "Let it not be grievous to you," wrote their friends in England in their darkest time, "that you have been instruments to break

the ice for others. The honor shall be yours to the world's end. . . . Yea, the memory of the adventurers to this plantation shall never die."

Enterprising colonists the Pilgrims certainly were. Never was such stuff for a colony as these stern, shrewd Englishmen. The Merchant Adventurers knew something of the sort of men required in their business and they well divined what sort of men they had struck a bargain with. If a spirit of colonial enterprise was not what chiefly impelled the Pilgrims, never was a colonial enterprise undertaken and carried through with such courage and common-sense and *shiftiness* as theirs. "The truth is," says James Russell Lowell, "that men anxious about their souls have not been by any means the least skillful in providing for the wants of the body;" and these hard-handed men of Plymouth knew that "they must show a balance on the right side of the counting-house ledger, as well as in their private accounts with their own souls. The liberty of praying when and how they would must be balanced with an ability of paying when and as they ought." "The most perfect incarnation of an idea which the world has ever seen," as Lowell says again,—this colony of Pilgrims most perfectly solved that most difficult problem of bringing fine ideals into healthy contact with the hard, prosaic things of common life. They were not the sort of men who dream, like Coleridge and Wordsworth, of some "Pantisocracy" upon the banks of Susquehannah, where, amidst the murmur of bumble-bees in the clover, the golden age should come back to men. They did not call Plymouth Arcadia or Utopia or Eldorado, but let it stay plain Plymouth, as it was on John Smith's map,—and stripped for work. That faith and work go hand in hand,—that is the Plymouth gospel; and the fittest device for the title-page of the history of the planting of New England would be a cross, *gules*, upon a codfish, *argent*.

That the Pilgrim Fathers were exiles from England and martyrs to a religious cause cannot reasonably disturb anybody who is anxious about the continuity of history and likes to think of them as bearers of the *English idea*. The English idea has been pretty thoroughly eclipsed a good many times by the ruling powers at Westminster, and it was never more

thoroughly eclipsed than when James and Charles and Bancroft and Laud stood for the government. It was not in those who found England easy under these men, but in those who found it hard, that the genius of Alfred and Langton and Montfort and Wyclif perpetuated itself. The continuity of history is a continuity preserved through as many shocks and convulsions as the continuity of natural development. Goethe lugged old Thales all the way from Greek twilight, to help him pout at earthquakes and volcanoes, in *Faust*, and to swear that all the mountains and valleys upon earth's page were writ by water; but all the same, the fires had done their share of the work. He saw no good in the French Revolution and shuddered for the fate of the princes. Kant, hanging the portrait of the wild Rosseau above his desk and writing that eternal peace can come only with the universal republic, divined the true trend of reason and the true continuity through the shocks, and was the wiser man. Chatham and Burke did not find it hard to see that it was the farmers behind the redoubt on Bunker Hill, and not King George's soldiers, who were the champions of the English constitution. And the Pilgrim Fathers, "harried out of England," were as truly the representatives of the English idea as was Sam Adams, when England set a price upon his head, or George Washington, bombarding the English army out of Boston.

ARTICLE II.—EMERSON'S RELATION TO CHRIST AND CHRISTIANITY.

I. EMERSON'S VIEWS OF CHRISTIANITY.

EMERSON was interested in Jesus believing him to be "a true man" "who has appreciated the worth of man," "whose name is not so much written as ploughed into the history of the world." He was interested in Christianity as an element that has affected civilization. He never openly attacked either Christ or Christianity. Nevertheless the influence of Emerson has done more to unsettle the faith of this generation in the religion of Jesus than that of any other one man. A careful and candid examination of his published works gives this view of Christ and Christianity :

Christ is a mere man whose worth and dignity have been exaggerated. He was no more divine than Plato, or Shakespeare, or any other genius. When he said I am divine, he was only talking poetry. Having disposed of the deity of Christ by calling it a myth and attributing it to the fanaticism of Christians, he does not scruple to divest Jesus of moral perfection. The virtues of Jesus are largely the creation of man's imagination. Jesus like other men of genius is not without fault. He fails utterly in some one or many parts to satisfy our idea, fails to excite spontaneous interest and leaves us hopeless of realizing our ideal of perfect manhood. There is no such Jesus as men fable. His perfection is all in our eye, a mere illusion.

Emerson's views of Christianity as taught, practiced and embodied in institutions, correspond with his estimate of the worth of Jesus. He rejects Christ's doctrine of sin. Sin according to Emerson is only good in the making; it is the mud out of which the spotless lily grows. Every man is a lover of truth. There is no pure lie, no pure malignity in nature. Falsehood cannot work harm. Evil is merely privative, not absolute; it is like cold which is the privation of heat. The religious sentiment reveals to man that the fountain of all

good is in himself. Hence Emerson rejects Christ's doctrine of man's insufficiency and the corresponding duty of humility. With one dogmatic assertion Emerson annuls all authority of the Scriptures, of Christ, as well as of all other books and all other men. He ignores all miracles save the wonders wrought by nature according to the fixed laws of matter and mind. He has no faith in the necessity or possibility of prayer. Since man is self-sufficient, what need is there of prayer? Since there are no miracles, how could prayer be answered? "Men's prayers," he says, "are a disease of the will." "That which they call a holy office is not so much as brave and manly." "Prayer as a means to effect a private end is meanness and theft." The only prayer that Emerson allows "is the soliloquy of a beholding and jubilant soul." He makes sport of the doctrine of a day of judgment, substituting therefor the retributions which a man's own soul inflicts upon itself. As to a future life after death all questioning is vain. Jesus "never uttered a syllable concerning the duration of the soul. The questions which we lust to ask about the future are confession of sin. God has no answer for them." "Of immortality the soul when well employed is not curious."

Having thus disposed of the doctrines of Christianity and removed not only the Saviour from the world, but denied that man has any need of salvation, he attains a point whence he gives us his view of the church, the clergy, and Christian institutions. He satirizes the Anglican Church without mercy. Its gospel is, "By taste are ye saved." Its master spirits have forsaken it. Its clergy are "apes and players rustling in old garments." But all the while it is the church of Christ that is the real mark for his wit. He says just as severe things of the churches of America. The religions of men are "either childish and insignificant, or unmanly and effeminate." The causes of this wasting unbelief and decaying church are that Christians make too much of the person of Christ and neglect to make enough of the worth of man's moral perfection. The trouble is, he says, "Christianity has dwelt, it dwells with noxious exaggeration about the person of Jesus;" and the soul is not preached; hence the church seems to totter to its fall, almost all life extinct."

Such are Emerson's views of Christ and Christianity as set forth in his brilliant essays, views that have influenced the religious thought of the age both in the church and out of it, to a remarkable degree. Prof. Tyndall, who has so boldly attacked the doctrine of prayer and so persistently denied the immortality of the soul, says: "If any one can be said to have given the impulse to my mind, it is Emerson; whatever I have done the world owes to him." Speaking of the revolt against orthodox Christianity, Bishop Huntington says of Emerson's part in the movement: "Personally and visibly the enchanter was not much on the scene with his wand; but he was never far absent, and though to most observers he might seem to be only a reserved, careless or smiling spectator, his potent spirit was always silently at work creating or energizing these changes, and the incisive strokes of his genius were felt everywhere smiting the old fabric." Says James Freeman Clarke: "If to-day traditions have lost their despotic power; if even those who hold an orthodox creed are able to treat it as a dead letter, respectable for its past uses, but by no means binding on us now, this is largely owing to the manly position taken by Emerson."

Such testimonies might be multiplied; but there is no need of more. Emerson has had the ear of every learned and independent thinker for a generation. He has been a hero to young men. Especially has he influenced men of the pulpit and the press, and through them the masses. These recent denials of the endless duration of future punishment, the unbelief in prayer, the revolt against the authority of the Bible and of Christ, the ignoring of miracles and the supernatural, the declaration that Christianity is only one among other human religions and is already passing away, may all be traced to the germinal thoughts that Emerson's genius has been scattering broadcast in the minds of thinking men.

I judge not the man, Emerson. With his evil he has wrought much good; perhaps on the whole the good may outweigh the evil. I believe his motives were pure and that he was moved by a love of truth. I have no doubt that he described accurately what he saw from his point of view; but before I accept his visions as my guide I must be assured of

the propriety of his point of view and that his eyes were not askew.

One lovely day in my student life I chanced to meet Emerson on the top of Mount Mansfield in company with a college professor. We walked together for an hour along the ridge of this highest peak of the Green Mountains, a mile above the sea. Below us lay a magnificent landscape of lake and stream, of charming valleys and distant mountains, stretching all the way from the Adirondacks to the White Hills. Resting at length on the very summit, Emerson for the sake of getting an unique view of earth and sky stooped down and put the top of his head on the ground, that with eyes upside down he might scan the scenery; and thus with inverted retina and a brain gorged with blood, he described for us in vivid phrase the things he saw.

This incident characterizes Emerson. "Turn the eyes upside down," he says in his essay on Idealism, "by looking at the landscape through your legs and how agreeable the picture, though you have seen it any time these twenty years." Ralph Waldo Emerson is the man who climbed the loftiest heights, that from his own point of view with inverted retina he might gaze upon wonderful and beautiful things in the universe, and then in brilliant phrases sketch his unique vision for the inspiration of the learned on the one hand and the inquisitive on the other. His descriptions are no doubt agreeable and inspiring; but before we accept his visions as real and true, we must be sure that he stands on his feet as God made men to stand, and not on his head as fancy grotesquely places him.

II. EMERSON'S INDEBTEDNESS TO CHRIST AND CHRISTIANITY.

Acknowledging as we must that Emerson formally rejected Christ and Christianity, how shall we account for the purity and worth of his moral character and for his potent spiritual influence over his fellow men? Passing by much that may be said, let us emphasize this one fact which stands out prominently in his remarkable career. Emerson was indebted to the Christ and Christianity for the elements of his power as a thinker and for the traits of goodness in his character.

Speaking of the Christian Church, he says: "In that all of us have had our birth and nurture." True is it of Emerson especially that he had his birth and education in the Christian Church. Himself at one time a Christian minister, his father, grandfather, and great-grandfather, were Christian ministers: indeed for eight generations were his ancestors on one side or the other ministers of the gospel. Where did Emerson get this lovely character which moves on instinctively in the paths of virtue after motives necessary to other men have been cut off? Christian birth, and Christian culture for eight generations gave it to him. His virtuous life is at once the proof of the law of heredity of which science tells us so much, and also of the truth of the Old Testament which assures us that God who visits the iniquity of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation, also sheweth mercy to thousands of generations of them that love him and keep his commandments.

All that there is of value in Emerson's life and doctrines, and there is much of great value, is due to Christ and Christianity. Let us analyze this value. In what does this worth consist? Evidently in his faith. George H. Hepworth says, "Emerson had such intense faith in something, though he might have found it difficult to tell us what it was exactly, that our doubts grew silent and lost half their power." Hepworth is right. Emerson himself was no skeptic. It seems to me that he never had so much as a doubt in all his life. He is always positive. He never vacillates between two opinions. He never guesses. He knows everything that is knowable, and what is unknowable he knows that he don't know. He does not doubt the infallibility of the Scriptures; he knows them to be fallible. He does not doubt the deity of Christ; he knows that Jesus is only a man. No man ever found Emerson in doubt. It was this intense positive faith of Emerson that gave such vividness to all his words and gave him such influence over men.

Now where did Emerson get this faith? What man in history is there that had such strong faith? Before you can find one whose faith surpassed that of Emerson you must go back eighteen hundred years to Jesus of Nazareth. Emerson's faith

was inspired of Jesus. This faith was bred in the blood of his six grandfathers and transfused through the veins of his father into his own heart and brain. Emerson read the New Testament, you may be sure; and Christ's sublime faith in himself, in his own intuitions, and in the truth and stability of moral law, Emerson absorbed into his very being. Hepworth did not tell in what Emerson believed; but the object of his faith is not difficult to see.

Emerson believed first of all in himself. Adopting Socrates' motto, "Know thyself," he studied his own soul. He found there an inherited love of truth, intuitions of reason, the soul made for the truth. He studied his own soul as Agassiz, a fish. Thanks to his Christian birth and nurture he chanced on a good specimen. Had he studied the soul of Goethe, or Napoleon, or Tom Paine, or of some pagan he would not have found much upon which to found an ethical system. The result of his introspection was perfect faith in himself. But that which led him to such faith in himself was the example of Jesus. He saw that Jesus had perfect faith in himself: so he said I also will have faith in myself. What Jesus has done, I also may do. "The whole value of biography," says Emerson, "is to increase my self-trust by demonstrating what man can be and do." Such was the value of the biography of Christ to him.

Being convinced thus of his own worth, his next step was to grasp the great idea of the worth of the individual as contrasted with institutions and society. He makes the worth of the individual the corner stone of his philosophy. Take out this truth and Emerson's system falls to pieces, its power eliminated. But where did Emerson get this mighty truth? Did he discover it for himself? Nay, he acknowledges that he got it from Jesus, of whom he says: "Thus is he, as I think, the only soul in history who has appreciated the worth of a man." "He saw with open eye the mystery of the soul."

In studying his own soul Emerson saw that it as well as the globe on which he stood was subject to law. As matter is regulated by gravitation, chemical affinity and the like: so he found are there laws of emotion, and thought and choice, great moral laws obedience to which bring life, and health, and

happiness to the soul; disobedience to which bring misery, and disease, and death to the soul; he found these laws to be eternal, unchangeable, and self-executing. In the reality and power of these moral laws Emerson had a profound faith. Never a doubt concerning them crossed his serene soul.

In this faith of his in moral law was the hiding of Emerson's power. It gave him the victory over his own soul, and master of self he became king of men. With his feet planted upon the unyielding basis of moral law, he could in patience wait until the huge world rolled round up to his commanding position. Hence in the midst of gross materialism men bowed before Emerson's spiritual might.

But who turned Emerson's eye to behold the glory of the moral law? who lifted him up to the heights of the spiritual realm and placed him at the point of view whence he could see these things? He did not attain his exaltation by chance nor by his own endeavor. Was it Plato, or Confucius, or Buddha? None of these tyros in moral science were Emerson's masters. It was Jesus of Nazareth who taught Emerson moral science. Emerson declares that the ethics of the New Testament are scientifically perfect. Jesus announced the glory of the moral law: Emerson found it true in his own soul and thenceforth accepted it as his own. Faith and obedience in the moral law was the living source of Emerson's clear vision and matchless eloquence. Thus moved he wrote these effulgent words: "I think that the last lesson of life, the choral song which rises from all elements and all angels is a voluntary obedience, a necessitated freedom." "There will be a new church founded on moral science, at first cold and naked, a babe in the manger again, the algebra and mathematics of ethical law, the church of men to come without shawms or psaltery or sackbut; but it will have heaven and earth for its beams and rafters; science for symbol and illustration; it will fast enough gather beauty, music, picture, poetry. Was never stoicism so stern and exigent as this shall be. It shall send man home to his central solitude, . . . The laws are his consolers, the good laws themselves are alive, they know if he have kept them, they animate him with the leading of great duty."

Emerson received from Jesus three ideas: first, the worth of the soul; second, the grandeur of the moral law; third, the value of faith. With these three Emerson became enraptured. They took full possession of his brain, heart, and will. These truths Emerson embodied. He saw them, believed them, obeyed them, made them his own. Out of them the warp and woof of his character was wrought. So perfectly absorbed was he in this trinity of truths that he looked no farther. "It is a necessity of the human mind," he says, "that he who looks at one object should look away from all other objects." So completely did these three truths satisfy his hunger that he never thought of going deeper into the exhaustless stores of truth embodied in Jesus, the way, the truth, and the life. Emerson became so engrossed in the study of his own soul, that he had no time to study the soul of Jesus. "Man does not live by bread alone," he says, "but by faith, by admiration, by sympathy." Emerson lived by faith in the unseen, by reverence for the moral law, by sympathy with the human soul.

So filled was he with these three realities and his heart so burned within him that, like the disciples on the way to Emmaus, his eyes were holden and he knew not his Lord! O that those eyes of his had been opened! O that he could have recognized his forgotten Lord! If the recognition of the man Jesus and the comprehension and embodiment of only three of his ideas could do so much for Ralph Waldo Emerson, what glorious things would have been wrought could Emerson have attained to Paul's point of view and beheld Jesus not only as a brother man, but also as the embodiment of all truth, the divine Son, the brightness of God's glory and the express image of his person! If love for abstract moral law could move Emerson to such profound thoughts and such a pure life, what might not Emerson have achieved had he seen the ideal soul realized in the Christ and the glory of the moral law embodied in the perfect obedience and matchless power of the Lord of Glory, the only supreme object of abiding faith!

But this much can we say: Emerson had a few things and was faithful with what he had. What of Christ he saw he honored; what of truth he saw, he honored. And so does he put to shame those of us who see Christ in his glory and the

whole system of Christian truth and yet are faithless to our trust.

"I look for a new teacher," said Emerson, "that shall follow so far those shining laws, that he shall see them come full circle; shall see their rounding complete grace; shall see the world to be the mirror of the soul; shall see the identity of the law of gravitation with purity of heart; and shall show that Ought, that duty is one with Science, with Beauty and Joy."

We cannot but hope that, finally having attained the true point of view, Emerson now sees that this new teacher whom he blindly sought so earnestly is none other than Jesus of old who is yet eternally new.*

* Those wishing to consult Emerson's own words on the points presented in this paper will look at the following citations: *The Prose Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. In two volumes. Boston: Fields, Osgood & Co. 1870. Vol. I, pp. 29, 35, 41, 61, 69, 86, 87, 246, 250, 257, 266, 279, 360, 365, 367, 370, 452, 536, 559, 562, 563. Vol. II, 265, 266, 267, 269, 271, 426, 427, 441 and 442.

ARTICLE III.—PROVISION AND METHOD OF SALVATION.

It is the teaching of the New Testament that there is but one provision for man's salvation. Peter taught this notably in one of his earliest apostolic speeches (Acts iv. 12). His words are remarkable at once for their tone of authority and definiteness of statement. It is necessary to be saved. One may not beg the whole question at the outset by denying his moral need. The salvation, too, must come from without. The problem finds an objective solution. One may not assume airs of personal sufficiency and propose to do for himself whatever saving there is to be done. Christ is a necessary Saviour not for a few but for all men, not in one but in every period of human history. "Under heaven" lies the whole sphere of earth and the whole course of history, and within these bounds there is "none other name." The provision is universal in its scope. One may not undertake to put a limit to it. Nor may there be some second saviour. There is not only no "different name" in sort but "no other one." One may not assume the possibility of a redemption twice undertaken, nor look for another till he who claimed to be the one and only Redeemer has been not merely superseded but hopelessly dishonored and cast aside. One may put all alleged revelation behind his back and deny all objective authority. He may ignore and defy what seems a pretense so vast, and stake his all upon some other venture. But let him know that his scheme has no endorsement. No other provision is "given among men." Nor will it avail to attempt to impeach the authority in particular of our apostle. We may "marvel," with the crowd, at his "boldness." But we know him, as they did, to be an "unlearned and ignorant" man, with no conceit of personal wisdom, who claimed only guidance from and fidelity to a higher source, and we "take knowledge" of him that he "had been with" one who was responsible for this sort of "boldness." For this, too, is the teaching of Christ himself, and to

impeach the servant is to impeach the master. The words are strong, but it will not be made to appear that the facts are proportionately weak. The so-called redemption is not a failure, nor is it reserved for the age of science and culture to disclose any other want of man or to bring another Gospel. It is the ancient folly intensified by the contradictions of history and experience to assume that ignorance is the only sin and knowledge the only redemption, and with Christendom behind and about us we are not so much impressed with the boldness of the apostle of redemption as by the arrogance of the apostle of culture.

But although the provision of redemption must, by this and every other New Testament authority, be one, the method of its realization may be, must be, various. Be it that the grounds, the agencies, and the conditions of redemption are always essentially the same, it is still a fact, which cannot be controverted, that no two souls are saved alike. The method is modified not only by the varying relations of the objective revelation, but by the subjective conditions of the subjects of redemption, and it is a perversion of fact, as well as stultification of intelligence, to assume the possibility of a redemption that may be applied in invariable method or realized under invariable conditions. It is as impossible that the whole race, in every period of its history, should stand in the same invariable relation with redemption as it is that the revelation of that redemption should stand in the same full and complete relation with the race. Probation has an unchangeable unity of ethical significance, but it has many variable factors. One man's testing as such means ethically what every other man's means, and here all stand on the same footing. But the testing is made under such varying conditions that it becomes a varying problem. The divine act of justification is ethically always the same, its ground the same, its conditions essentially the same, but its relation to objective revelation is so various and the conditions of the consciousness of its recipients in different periods are so various, that historically the application and realization of justification are various. Reconciliation always means essentially the same thing, the objective provision is always ideally if not historically the same, but the agencies by

which the reconciliation is subjectively realized and the method of their operation in different periods of revelation are widely different. Regeneration always appears in like results, although greatly varying in completeness, but the agencies of regeneration are modified by the conditions of revelation, and the varying states of the human consciousness, and so in fact the very method itself of regeneration is modified. A justifying faith has not always the same full contents nor the same objects to which it attaches itself. Even repentance varies with the knowledge of God and law, of sin and redemption. This variety in the method of realizing redemption in fact reveals itself with respect to those who are the recipients of its full revelation, and this presupposes a still greater variety as conditioned by the incompleteness or total lack of revelation. To postulate but one redemption and that for a race involves most important issues, which must be faced. By as much as we must insist on the unity and integrity of redemption, by so much must we insist on diversity in the method of its application. One redemption for all time necessitates the assumption of a pre-advent and post-advent method of application. Abraham and Moses were saved as Paul and Luther were. But the elements of that redemption were variously applied historically and were present variously in their consciousness. One redemption for all nations necessitates the assumption of an extra-Christian and an intra-Christian method of realization. My redemption is that of Buddha and Socrates, and yet it reaches them, if at all, by a different path.

We may recognize this unity of provision with diversity of method in the antecedent probability of the case. It lies in the conditions of the problem, viz: in the constitution of man, in the nature of redemption, in the unity of revelation, that there should be but one redemptive provision. One redemption is the rational presupposition of any redemption. One redeemer is the hidden want of a sinful race. Towards him move the blind longings and leadings of men. And when he comes men are made to see, as Paul was, his centrality and supremacy. To assume this henceforth is the test of Christian loyalty. All men need redemption, and that means that God must move in the matter. What He does will fit itself to the

universal want. It is a race-want. In effect, at least, the race is one. Souls are fashioned alike. There is no psychology that divides the race. Sin is the same, its result the same. The want of one is the want of all, and so we may infer that the gift of one will be the gift of all. The nature of man and of sin suggests that the provision of redemption will be one. It will at last emerge into supremacy. It may demand ages of preparation, but at last it will come and take its place toweringly above all subordinate or preparative agency. Every thing will look and lead up to it. It will somehow put itself in connection with the whole race and disclose its scope from the first. And this only will contain redemption. There may be many schemes for the training of men but only one redemption. By its very conception redemption involves unity and supremacy, and to speak of a second redemption is a contradiction. Redemption is the crown of all revelation, the completion of history. Revelation and redemption are identified. The unity of the one is the unity of the other. We may read all this out of the case, and out of the history of revelation so clearly that it may be assumed as belonging necessarily to the case. If, then, Jesus Christ is in any sort an agency of redemption, he is sole, sufficient, and supreme. He, the invisible or visible Lord of souls, out of the flesh or in it, will stand alone in his redemptive potency and will lead all souls back to God, who ever come to Him.

But it is equally involved in the conditions of history that this redemption shall be variously applied. To say that it discloses itself progressively is also to say that it realizes itself variously. The same argument that would support its historic unity must support also its historic diversity. It is the necessity of the very conception of a race-redemption that it relates itself somehow with the race. But it is equally the necessity that it relate itself according to the varying conditions of that race. The certainty that heathen, Jew, and Christian, have the same redemption, is precisely the certainty that they each have it in a different way.

If now we consult the history of redemption, this view of the case will be confirmed. This unity of provision and diversity of method lie on the surface of the record. The key to Hebrew

history is the Christ. This grand but shadowy personage hovers everywhere. The race seems to center in him, and in him alone get explanation. Its aspirations, longings, hopes, are towards him, its institutions prophetic of him. In themselves incomplete and unsufficing. All is promise and expectation. The Christ of their hopes holds a world-wide relation. He is more than a national Saviour. He is the Desire of all nations. His kingdom shall be not only supreme but universal. In a more or less adequate sense he is the world's redeemer. In a word the pith and marrow of Hebrew history, religion, life, literature, are in their Christology. Turn to the Christian Scriptures. Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ of promise. The Christian documents rest on this assumption. One document gives itself wholly to the demonstration that Judaism has no adequate significance or validity apart from Jesus Christ. This Jesus realizes God's redemption. In Him is the "mystery hid for ages." Redemption runs far back beyond time. It was in God's purpose. He brings out and executes that purpose. He is also a race-redeemer. History has its unity and its significance in him. The world has been variously preparing for Him. He meets the universal want. He has a complete redemption. He is changeless, "the same yesterday, to-day, forever," cannot be supplanted nor superseded. He assumed his own redemptive sufficiency. His disciples only echo his assumption and make the very song of heaven a proclamation of His supremacy. But although the record thus interprets itself, there are manifest no false assumptions nor crude anachronisms from beginning to end. There is no complete statement of Christ's redemptive relations with the race as a whole. We get only fragmentary intimations. There are central facts and inclusive and determinative principles which we can safely apply. But it is no part of the task of the scripture writers to solve all the problems of God's method of salvation. They seem to have no conscious vocation to discuss these questions. They rather avoid them. Nothing is more noteworthy than the moral integrity and balance of judgment exhibited by them in this matter. The centrality of Christ in the Hebrew Scriptures involves no theory of the particular relation either of the Hebrew or Gentile with him. The world's redemption

is in Him, and yet there is manifest in the Hebrew Scriptures an almost complete unconsciousness of His necessary redemptive relations with the individual soul, whether Jew or Gentile. The Messianic salvation was rather conceived in its national and political aspects, and an anticipatory, ideal redemption through which the individual receives reconciliation with God, was unknown. Nor is there a fragment of evidence that the Hebrew understood that the Gentile wins salvation only through his Christ and loses it without Him. The Gentile would win salvation upon the same terms with himself, and that should be not through some particular relation with a prospective redeemer, but through a particular relation with Jehovah, the covenant God. Whatever the patriarch's interpretation of the promises of Jehovah—and it may have assumed various forms—there is no evidence that he interpreted it as the promise of One through whom alone he could secure salvation. Such anachronism is wholly unjustified by the facts of the record. And yet, according to our Christian Scriptures, even their redemption was in Christ. Whatever the prophet's interpretation of the Hebrew ritual, there is no evidence that even he had clear insight into its typical relation with the redeemer who was to come, or that he expected to be saved by faith in its typical significance. And as for the average Hebrew there is no evidence that he at all understood the significance of his ritual. The phenomena of Hebrew prophetism demonstrate a signal failure to apprehend the full significance of the redemption of Christ.

In the Christian Scriptures we find various recognitions of the prophetic spirit in the Old Testament. Some of the Christian writers indeed seem to bear the knowledge of the later over into the earlier revelation and, as in the case of the writer of the first gospel, gives it a too subjective interpretation. But no where do we find the assumption that the Hebrew prophets clearly understood the relation of redemption to themselves or to the Gentile world at large. Rather is it acknowledged that they groped in the dark and sought eagerly to know what only those of a later day could know. There is explicit recognition by Christ himself of the prophets' conscious reference to the Messianic king. But such recognized references are only very

few, and most of the New Testament citations from the Old Testament are either literary adaptations of greater or less pertinence, or typical prophecies whose historic significance only was present in the mind of the prophet or writer, and whose typical sense, although real, was wholly below his consciousness. This variety in the apprehension of redemption, as thus disclosed by the record, involves the fact of a variety in its application to the pre-advent and post-advent as well as to the Gentile and Christian sections of the race.

If we come now to the specific aspects of the question we shall find this unity of provision with diversity of method involved in the fact, that Christ is the personal revelation of God. He only is the complete revelation. He crowns all partial revelation and displaces and supercedes it. Hitherto the personal factor in the medium of revelation has been either wholly wanting or wholly inadequate. The revelation has not come in the form of a personal revealer or the revealer has been in himself no adequate revelation. God has disclosed somewhat from the contents of his knowledge and plan, but never before his person, so that men should see and know Him in a many-sided complete unity of personal revelation, moving in the fulness of a divine life before them. Christ cautiously, progressively, as it was necessary that he should, and yet sufficiently distinctly assumed for himself a relation with God so unique that his disciples could never be left in doubt as to the position he was destined to occupy as the revealer of God. Whatever the form of their conception, whether more or less definite, the apostles after Pentecost did not fail to proclaim him as a supernatural personage. A new self-disclosure of Christ as the Son of God marks the conversion of Paul and the beginning of his apostleship. He had known Him only as a human being, whose audacious pretenses had been utterly discredited by His ignominious death. He now knows Him as a being of super-worldly origin, who is present here on earth only by an act of unspeakable self-denial and humiliation, whose work involves the restoration of the broken harmony of the moral world, who is exalted to the central place of power, is supreme above all rational and moral and material dominion, in whom all things have their unity, towards whom all things

tend as their goal, as they also proceed from Him, the organ of their creation. With appropriate reserve, as was necessary for the apostle to the Polytheistic Gentiles, and yet with sufficient definiteness Paul announces this as the gospel committed to his charge. But it is reserved for John, who lingered to the age of bolder and broader speculation, to complete the Apostolic Christology. He presents Him as in His very nature the revealer of God. This is not only his function here on earth, it is his very significance in the universe. He not only came out from God to communicate his life and to unite us to Him, He was Himself the out-coming God, was with Him in the beginning and yet was God. He was unseen in the world ages before he took our form, "the light that lighteth every man." In ways unknown he was at work here "in the world" although "the world knew Him not." He always was and is the revealer of God, and we may not limit his work among men by his advent and post-advent presence and method. This New Testament teaching is behind the decisions of the early ecclesiastical councils, which have determined the Christology of the Church. In the light of this Christology we may not assume that Christ, the only adequate revealer of God, has no practical relation with those who have never heard of Him. Assume that none but those who have personally accepted Christ here on earth are saved and this doctrine that Christ is the revealer of God, is shorn of half its scriptural import, and we are forced to acknowledge that redemption fails with respect to by far the larger section of the race. Assume that God has some other provisions for disclosing himself redemptively and drawing souls to Him, and the unity of His provision is denied. Assume that Christ may have practical relations, as the revealer of God with those who have never heard of Him, and it is conceded that He has more than one method of communicating Himself redemptively to the soul. We cannot admit that so great a blessing as redemption can be made wholly dependent on the fact that men have never heard that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh. Invisibly he may put Himself in contact with souls that have never heard of Him and draw them to God. If in Him alone is redemption, these souls are shut up to Him. He must have some way of reaching them by His

redemptive drawings and unconscious inward redemptive revealings.

Still other contents of the doctrine of redemption confirm this view of its application. It is contained in the fact that Christ, as redeemer, is head of the race. Christ's headship can not be an insignificant and fruitless thing, because it is no arbitrary assumption or investiture. God put him as the race-head to represent the race in the practical interest of its redemption because of what he was in himself. What Christ is determines his place and function with respect to man. That he bore not only a perfect humanity, which no sin has dishonored or defiled or disorganized, but a divine humanity, determines it that he may accomplish our redemption in his own person. And the centrality and supremacy of Christ which this race-headship involves, necessitate the assumption that his practical relations with the individual members of the race can be limited neither by his historic manifestation in the race, nor by the circumstance that men have not heard of that manifestation. It is an ideal headship, as it is an ideal sacrifice, "the lamb slain from the foundation of the world," that may avail for the pre-advent section of the race. And it is this historic headship, and the work wrought in it, that assures us of his relation with the entire post-advent section of it. Out from him, the head, run the race lines that touch every darkest member of the fallen race. So far as its intent and scope are concerned the redemption wrought by Christ, as the race-head, must be in the interest of all sections of the race. No doctrine of redemption that denies this will stand. We are not obliged to choose between the doctrine that God has made provision for only a few select souls, who become the actual and conscious recipients of redemption, and that He has left the larger part of the race wholly beyond the scope of his benevolent interest, and the doctrine that He has left this unblessed section to be provided for in some other way. The one is as unscriptural as the other. We may rather reasonably assume that he who represents his race in the interest of redemption, will secure to it some advantages from that relation. And we do not hereby beg the question of the final actual realization of redemption by all men, for this has no necessary bearing on

that question, if we hold any tenable theory of human freedom. That God's redemption is complete and is honestly in our interest, does not make our salvation a necessity or certainty. It constitutes at best but a possibility. That the same redemption is honestly in the interest of the heathen world does not determine that the heathen world must be saved. It only determines the possibility that some may be saved independently of their knowledge of Christ. It is contained also in the sacrifice of Christ. It is the ethical element in sacrifice that determines its validity. It is its ethical perfection that determines the unconditional validity of Christ's sacrifice, and constitutes it objectively a race-sacrifice.

The tenacity with which the principle of sacrifice in some form has held its ground in different religions is noteworthy. It is the ethical factor that gives the principle its vitality. Redemption is identified with some form of the idea of atonement. An offering is demanded as the price of favor. But it is the ethical quality of the offering that determines its worth. And here we see how far astray the early church went in conceiving the offering of Christ as a price paid the devil to secure man from his control. We may see too that any conception of redemption which lays its emphasis upon the price itself paid God as condition of man's restoration to favor rather than upon the ethical worth of the sacrifice, is a perversion of the principle. But it is precisely the inadequacy of the ethical factor that has hopelessly vitiated every sacrifice but that of Christ. It is for this reason that it could only be expressed symbolically. It should seem as though the whole system of sacrifice were in effect, if not half consciously, a confession, in outward symbolic act, of the inadequacy of any human suffering or sacrifice to compensate for wrong done, or to win favor, and that because precisely of its ethical defect. Why does one lay a spotless lamb upon the altar and take its life? We have not the whole history of that act. We may fail in our analysis for lack of historic data. But it should seem as though there were involved here the recognition of the necessity of suffering, and that this suffering has some sort of connection with guilt, else why is the victim made to suffer death? It should seem too that there is practical confession of its per-

sonal inutility, a confession that no amount of personal suffering will be ethically availing, else why is the lamb and not the person made to suffer? It should also seem a practical confession that there is an ethical demand for a goodness which no amount of personal suffering can either express or produce, else why take a spotless offering, the type of purity? Whatever our explanation of the phenomena of blood sacrifice, it should seem at least that there lies behind it the recognition of ethical defect, an ethical defect that demands it, and yet an ethical defect that renders it invalid. What is it but a plea for forgiveness and peace, by symbolic confession of wrong and of inability to discharge the wrong? In its grosser form it may involve the idea of a barter for favor. But this will not adequately explain the facts. Men have tortured themselves in the belief that by suffering they may be delivered from the corruption of sin. They have believed also that suffering is demanded in the way of satisfaction for wrong. But the expectation of purchasing remittal of penalty by rendering an exact equivalent of suffering does not seem to be suggested by the phenomena. It seems rather a plea for forgiveness by effort to move compassion and by outward testimony of repentance. And all this seems to involve a practical acknowledgment of an ethical defect in every effort to adjust one's damaged relations with a higher power. It is this ethical quality, wanting elsewhere, that realizes itself in the sacrifice of Christ. Because he brings to his self-offering the complete, the sinless, and the freely surrendered humanity is he able to present a perfect sacrifice to God for man. Because of this ethical perfection it has validity with God and removes all barriers that stand in the way of his free approach to man. And because of this perfection it becomes a race-sacrifice. Christ is mediator, and the only one, between God and man, and not between God and a few select individuals. In Christ's self-offering the race is presented as reconciled to God. Any effort to break down the Pauline doctrine of an objective reconciliation in the person of Christ of the race as such must be based on a complete perversion of the Pauline Christology. This contains the very heart of his Gentile Gospel. Here then as elsewhere we perceive that the provision of redemption is

one and that it centers in Christ. But it is equally evident that the method by which the sacrifice of Christ avails for one man or one section of the race, is not the same by which it avails for another. That the reconciliation of man to God through Christ is of no practical avail to any soul, independently of its knowledge and acceptance of Christ here on earth, we cannot accept as a conclusion legitimate to the teaching of the New Testament. An atonement that is universal in its intent and scope and yet is limited as to its application and practical effect to only the few who have known of it, is no better than a limited atonement. But it is a gratuitous and arrogant assumption that would undertake to limit the effect of Christ's work of reconciliation by its application in the proclamation of the Gospel. And if it be of avail beyond the word of the Gospel in the ear or before the eye then it must avail by a method that only more signally magnifies the divine side of our redemption, and assures us that there is more in it than our narrow philosophy dreams of.

If now we advance from the objective grounds to the subjective conditions of salvation, we shall discover this same unity and diversity. As there is but one inclusive objective basis, so there is but one inclusive subjective condition. We are saved according to some regulative provision. It is not random work. Redemption is not empiricism. The intelligence and character of God are in it. So too are our wants. There is unity here as elsewhere in God's provisions. If God were dealing with fragments of a race his conditions might vary. But He deals with a race in all its sections and individuals essentially the same. His condition is simple. It hits the common want. It is good for the weakest as well as the strongest. It is at the level of the moral capacity of the most degraded. Men are capable of more or less; some of very little. Most have a badly damaged and weakened moral capacity. But every one is capable of faith. The blindest and weakest and wickedest who have lost all self-confidence and all hope can trust some one else. God begins therefore at the level of the worst and weakest. He can not begin at the level of the best and strongest. But even those who have a relative goodness and strength need to be approached in the same way. Faith is a

human and not class necessity. God is dealing with the common want. The mature not less than the immature age needs faith; the manhood not less than the childhood of the race. Christianity demands it not less than Hebraism. If Christianity demands it, for a stronger reason must Hebraism. If God demands faith of a man much more will he of a child, if of maturity; much more of immaturity. Faith, then, is the subjective condition of salvation. It includes much else. It is condition of the growth and development of all Christian virtues. But faith in some more or less definite relation with the source of redemption will be central. It may emerge with varying degrees of distinctness; it may drop out of sight and be forgotten. But it will emerge when religion revives; and what is simplest and most primitive in the soul will begin to assert itself. A revival of religion is always a revival of the simplicities of faith. Christianity may be conceived as a revival of true Judaism. It brought back to recognition what the primitive Hebraism emphasized. It contains also in its faith-principle the primitive elements of universal religion. Faith is religion because it involves a recognized relation of dependence, subjection, and fellowship. Redemption could not fail to insist on this primitive attitude and act of the soul. Historically this is the fact. Faith has always been the central and inclusive condition of salvation. Nothing else can have this preëminence. Men always have been, are, and will be saved by faith. The two great questions before the apostolic church were the universality of grace and justification by faith. Salvation is for Gentile as well as Jew, and faith is condition for both alike. The two questions developed together, belonged together, and were preached together. Paul preached the universality of grace and the simplicity of its condition. No one can preach the one without preaching the other. The corruptest pagan may be saved as well as the most respectable Jew. But they must be saved on the same condition. Now all this involves another question: What about those who lived before Christ came? No doubt the orthodox Jews thought they had a strong point against Paul's lax doctrine of universal grace and justifying faith. They ask with triumph what about Father Abraham and Moses, the Founder? What

about the law? That question was answered in Paul's letters to the Romans and Galatians. Paul and Abraham are saved on the same terms. There is not one provision for the Christian and another for the Patriarch. The unity of God's kingdom is not disturbed. This is the primitive provision. It antedates the founding of the Hebrew race and religion. The law did not set it aside. In fact the law was exceptional; it was only a "schoolmaster with reference to Christ." But there has always been more or less difficulty in adjusting the relations of the pre-advent and extra-Christian sections of the race with Christ and his redemption. One who denies the universality of grace will of course have no difficulty. A very snug theology may be developed from the basis of a limited grace. The only difficulty is with the basis. One who denies that a grace that is universal in its intent and scope must necessarily be of some practical advantage to those who know nothing of it, and maintains that its practical efficacy is limited wholly to those who consciously accept it, may persuade himself that he has escaped all difficulty. On the other hand, he who denies that Christ is necessary to every man's salvation will have no difficulty. But to hold these two characteristically Christian doctrines, the universality of grace and the redemptive centrality of Christ involves difficulty. It appeared, no doubt, in the early history of the Church. It does not come up for discussion as grace and justification do, but there are traces of it. Peter could have no trouble with it so long as he held his Jewish Gospel. But when he got a glimpse of Christ as a race-redeemer he must have found himself, if he followed his thought to any length, in some perplexity. There is, however, no evidence that he followed the lead of his thought, although it is evident that the question occupied his mind for a time. But he settled it, in his characteristic way, and did not perplex himself about it. He simply says, "I perceive that God is no respecter of persons; but in every nation he that feareth Him and worketh righteousness is accepted of Him." How such an one attains to this fear of God and to this acceptable righteousness, what the relation of Christ is to such an one, is not discussed. It may be that he recognized all such in every age or nation as fear God and

work righteousness as led by him who is "light that lighteth every man." But this appears only in brief, and obscure intimations at best. The difficulty seems to be recognized and an effort seems to be made to meet it in the later church doctrine of the "Descensus ad Inferos," whose exegetical groundwork is significantly found in words attributed to Peter himself. But of this let us postpone more specific reference. The difficulty again appears in the make-shift doctrine of an anticipatory justification by an anticipatory faith in the redemption that was to be. But we have seen that there is no scriptural basis for this. The prophets no doubt anticipated the messianic king, and through them the people. The messianic hope was, in a certain broad and general sense, the hope of redemption. But there is no evidence that they believed in the coming Christ as the sole ground of their personal salvation, or that they recognized such faith in him as the sole and sufficient condition of their salvation. Christ indeed said that Abraham saw his day and was glad. But it is not implied that he saw in him his only redeemer. Paul says that Abraham was justified by faith; but it is evident enough that his faith is faith in the covenant God, and not in Christ. There is not a trace of any such anticipatory faith in the Scriptures from beginning to end. The Old Testament object of saving faith is God, not the Christ. That the Hebrew did not know the Christ of his salvation does not disprove his unseen and unconscious efficacy. That the heathen world does not in its darkness comprehend the "light that lighteth every man," does not disprove the possible efficacy of that light even in the midst of its darkness. We may put aside all such baseless theories and formulate the intimations of our Christian books into a more definite Christian doctrine, and make confession of our belief that the invisible Christ draws to himself by his redemptive leadings all such souls as are receptive to his gracious influence; that he presents himself to them when they are summoned into the invisible realm, and that through him they are led back to God.

And now in conclusion the testimony of the Christian consciousness confirms the view here presented. This testimony is fully secured in the theology of the church, and when theology has obscured or ignored it, Christian feeling has re-

asserted it and won theology back from its provincialism into closer sympathy with Christian experience and into more careful recognition of these obscured contents of the Christian consciousness. The so-called New England theology has not borne faithful witness here. And just as little have the sources from which it sprang. It has not fairly represented the orthodox theology of the church. It has failed to develop, it has even repressed and perverted vital elements of the Christian consciousness. In doing this it has also dealt perversely with the Christian Scriptures. Christian feeling and life have brought about a reaction. They have broken the iron hardness of a false logical system. They have forced recognition of some primitive facts of the Christian conscience and heart. They have turned our attention to the fuller theology of the Catholic church. They have attached themselves to a more candid and thorough Biblical theology. The result is that theology has been modified in spite of itself. It is the outcome of a vital process and so is the more trustworthy and reliable. The theology, whose center-point is an arbitrary personal will, has no doubt faithfully emphasized the necessity, the centrality, and the supremacy of Christ's redemption. It has found no salvation out of Christ. But it has not made sufficient provision for variety in the application of that redemption. The theology which is found in the older creeds of Christendom is in this respect far more rational, and Scriptural, and Christian. It is not legitimate to an anthropology that recognizes all the descendants of Adam, the mature and the immature, the strong and the weak, the wise and the ignorant, as "constituted sinners" by the fiction of a "Federal Headship," to find standing-ground for children and heathen or even imbeciles within the provision of redemption. But Christian feeling has asserted itself against logic and forced a modification of doctrine. It is not a depraved instinct, but an instinct trained in the school of Christ, that reacts against the assumption that a child's Christian probation is bounded by the brief period of its earthly life or that it has no Christian probation at all. We must assume that even the child needs redemption and that the redemption of Christ is for it. But we must also assume that the redemption is applied to it ac-

cording to a method different from that in which it is applied to one of mature years. But it is impossible to stop here. If we may assume a post-mortem application of redeeming grace to the child, so also may we assume it for the heathen whose earthly probation, with respect to the possibilities of redemption, is not different from that of a child. Indeed it is a far more reasonable assumption that the adult heathen, whose character and life present evidence that he would have accepted his redemption here on earth had he known of it, may accept it in the life beyond, than that every child, of whose moral and spiritual possibilities we can know but little or nothing, will as of course accept it. We have far stronger ground of assurance of the moral survival of a portion of the adult heathen world than of the entire infant-section of the race. We have reasonable assurance that one, who here on earth has shown a capacity for moral and religious life, will become the recipient of the redemption of Christ when it is presented to him. But what may we know of the moral and religious aptitudes and possibilities of the children who have been gendered and nurtured in the midst of the most loathsome moral corruption here in Christendom? For such we can only "trust the larger hope." But of the heathen, who has proved himself superior to his moral and spiritual environment, we may have a rational assurance. And yet we have come to dogmatize about infant salvation and only venture to speculate as to the possibilities of a salvation for those whose moral probation is but little in advance of that of children and whose Christian probation or lack of probation is the same. But the consciousness of the church has claimed the right to testify with respect to even much more than these limited possibilities of redemption. And in this it claims the support of Scripture testimony. No doubt in this it has often gone wildly astray. It has falsified itself and perverted sacred testimony.

But some forms at least of this testimony must come into court. It must contain elements of Christian truth. It must be a necessity of Christian thought. It stands in the orthodox creeds of Christendom and demands respectful investigation, if not cordial assent. It is certainly creditable to the heart of the

church that it should have some interest in the unblest section of the race that has passed into the invisible world without a knowledge of Christ. And it is no less creditable to its Christian thought that it should recognize the possibility of a practical relation between the Redeemer and every section of the race he has redeemed, so that none for whom this redemption was intended shall be without the privilege of accepting or the responsibility of rejecting it. And this has seemed a necessity just in proportion to the intensity with which the church has conceived man's need of redemption, Christ's sole redemptive sufficiency and his redemption as in its scope and intent a race-redemption. Turning to the Scriptures we may see that the thought of the church has some standing-ground for itself. We find here a final consummation, beyond which the conditions of existence are fixed. Death is not an immediate introduction thereto. Here lies an intermediate state. The Hebrew conceives it as the under-world or realm of the dead. According to the ethical immaturity or maturity of the conception it appears as the common gathering place for all the dead, without discrimination or a place of moral distinctions and separations. This Hebrew conception reappears with such changes as might be expected from such transition, in the Christian Scriptures. It is but dimly outlined. There is great diversity of opinion as to the sort of this intermediate state, as it is disclosed by the New Testament. But it is tolerably evident that it is a conscious state and a state of moral separation. It is not the highest heaven nor the lowest hell, yet it is a state of moral discrimination. It is to this intermediate state, which our English Scriptures have greatly obscured and our provincial theology has nearly extinguished, but which a candid Biblical theology has more clearly brought to light, that the thought of the church has turned. Convinced of the universal need of redemption, convinced that Christ is the only redeemer, convinced that he is the redeemer of the race, and not merely of a fragment thereof, and yet remembering to how small a number of that race the redemption is ever made known here on earth, it has asked what possibilities of redemptive revelation lie here, and what possibilities of recovery. It has not ventured with these questionings beyond the judgment issues. He who

would carry hope behind the judgment scene parts company with the historic thought of the church. But it has boldly raised the question. Is this intermediate state hopelessly and universally irremediable? Is there no possibility, in any case, that sin there may cease and holiness begin? Is it true that the destiny that lies beyond the judgment scene is for every mortal fixed here on earth? Is it the sole meaning of this state that God gives sin and holiness a chance here to develop what the judgment is simply to disclose? Is it only an intermediateness between destiny irrevocably fixed and destiny finally disclosed? In its search and speculation it has eagerly seized upon the few fragmentary scriptures that bear or have been supposed to bear upon the subject, and wrought them into its service. Out of this complex material has sprung the doctrine of the *Descensus ad Inferos*, whose perversion is the purgatory of a corrupt church and a corrupt theology. And now, whatever one's judgment of the form in which this thought of the church has appeared, he can not fail to recognize an effort to formulate an important Christian truth. We may reject the notion of a local tarrying place of the dead as gross. We may reject as irrational the notion that the disembodied Christ appeared there and sought to reveal himself in his redemptive word to its sinful inhabitants. We may discredit every Scripture passage that would seem to favor the idea that there is a gospel for the dead, and may expunge every recognition of it from our creed, and yet there remains the fact—fact alike of Christian consciousness and Scripture—that the God who has redeemed us and who can and does apply that redemption variously, will suffer no soul to fail of that redemption simply for lack of the knowledge of it.

ARTICLE IV.—HICKOK'S MENTAL SCIENCE.

Empirical Psychology. By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D.D., LL.D.
Revised with the coöperation of JULIUS H. SEELYE, D.D.,
LL.D. (Boston : Ginn & Heath.)

THE fundamental position of this work remains unchanged, but the point of view is quite different. Strict scientific experiment is made the test to which every alleged fact is subjected. This form of presentation cannot fail to commend it to modern scientific thought. The work is a marvel of condensation: much new matter has been added, yet it occupies less space than the former edition. Students will find patient study required; he who runs may read little of its meaning. Metaphysical treatises are often criticised for their conciseness and technical terms and no doubt this will not escape. However, a mountain considered as an æsthetic object is one thing, the view it affords quite another. Perhaps Moses, once on the top of Mt. Pisgah, absorbed in the vision of the Promised Land there disclosed, forgot the ruggedness of the path up, so will the honest critic of this book when he fully comprehends the truth it reveals; for it offers him nothing less than a commanding view of the whole field of Mental Science. From the standpoint of Reason it discloses the consistent System of Philosophy in which the union of Mind and Matter—the unity and trustworthiness of all science are clearly seen. It is impossible in this brief space to give any adequate idea of such a book; indeed we could hope to do so only by transcribing the entire volume. The following, however, may serve as a table of contents.

The work is most naturally considered in three parts. (1) Introductory, including "Liabilities to Error," Outline of Anthropology, and General Method of Science. (2) Psychology Proper. (3) A closing chapter, showing how a complete Empirical Psychology gives an open door for an universal Philosophy. We will notice a few leading topics.

(1) *General Method*.—Science, the author shows, differs from common experience only in being more accurate and complete. The scientific mind possesses no faculties not common to every mind. To experience is to make trial of, to use. A scientific experiment is a re-trial, carefully made, and the results accurately noted. Such results are undoubted facts; but these must be classified and systematized to give science. Hence the General Method of all Science. (1) Attainment of facts exactly. (2) The assortment of facts in classes correctly. (3) The arrangement of classes in a system consistently. In attaining Science two orders of proceeding are conceivable; (1) beginning at the center and working out, i. e. from the inherent nature of the causes at work one might determine *a priori* what must be their products, or (2) beginning with experience and going backward one might unravel the web of Nature to ascertain how as a matter of fact it has been woven. The first is the order of Reason = Science as known by the Creator. The second is Empirical Science = Science as known by the creature. One makes it, the other learns it. We can only be learners. So far as Nature is in our reach we may investigate, but may never supply the place of investigation by speculation.

Applying this Method to Psychology, the author seeks by repeated experiment to discover the faculties of Mind and the laws of their operation as revealed in the facts of a conscious experience. Evidently such a Psychology is no hypothesis, craving our acceptance, but true science demanding universal assent.

Relation of Psychology to all Science and to Philosophy.—Mind is for the present defined as the agent that makes and takes note of a scientific experiment. The author shows (1) that there can be no question as to the existence of mind, (2) that it is a spontaneous agent, (3) that it is self-conscious, (4) that it is competent to apply its scientific experiments not merely to objects about it but also to its own being and acts, thereby attaining a valid Psychology, (5) that all objects of experience may be distinguished into two classes. Human mind as given in scientific experiment will stand as one class, over against which all other being—animal, plant, mineral—

stands as the other. The first-class can be elevated to scientific spontaneity, the second cannot. The higher orders of animals do indeed perceive, remember, exercise thought and judgment, but no sentient brute has ever originated and executed a scientific experiment. From this it follows that there can be no science—either Physical or Psychical—except as attained by Human Mind. Therefore at the basis of all Science as well as of all Philosophy is Empirical Psychology. We can be sure of nothing till we know the laws of mind and their trustworthiness.

Problem of Psychology.—Common experience thus discloses two classes of facts and therefore two divisions of Science, Physical and Psychical; but the human mind demands unity. Psychology must therefore (1) test by accurate experiment the whole human knowing in experience, (2) it must in so doing put me in a position to determine correctly whether this scientific superiority in man is because he has a greater degree of the spontaneous faculty than the animal, or because he possesses something different in kind. (3) It must discover whether man has not a faculty higher than that of scientific experiment, under the inspiration of which experiments are made, which faculty when recognized shall clearly be seen to have the power to bring the Physical and Psychical together in one system and thus open the door to a universal Philosophy. Such are the problems the author now proceeds to investigate.

PSYCHOLOGY.

Careful experiment demonstrates (1) that no mental activity ever takes place save as some condition has first been given, and that to this condition the action corresponds, (2) that the invariable order of mental activity is (1) sensation, (2) consciousness, (3) knowing, (4) feeling, (5) willing. These are primitive facts of mental science; together they constitute the whole psychological process.

(1) Sensation is shown to be the effect in a living organism of an outer invading agency. It is wholly without consciousness, but conditional for the mind to awake to activity. (2) This waking state is the dawn of consciousness. In it subject

and object are all together and indiscriminate like the unfocused light in a camera, out of which proper adjustment will bring definite objects. (3) Within consciousness as one state, with its three stages, are (1) knowing, (2) feeling, (3) willing, each conditional for its successor. These indicate the three capabilities of mind, viz: intellect, susceptibility, will. Each of these capabilities the author now makes the subject of extended investigation.

Intellect.—This is found to comprise three faculties—sense, understanding, reason. Sense is the constructive faculty. It takes the content in consciousness and by a three-fold act of attention, viz: defining, distinguishing, observing, gives a complete phenomenal object.—The faculty that abidingly stands under objects of sense, holding these in reflex order for farther deliberation, is the understanding. It involves memory and reflective thought. The field of memory is sense, and in it objects occupy the same relative position save that they are arranged in inverse order. Events that occurred first in sense stand farthest from us as we recall them in orderly succession: as if memory were a mirror reflecting the past.—Reflective thought. So far as man has communion with his fellows must he have an experience in common with them; but on the basis of sense and its reflex in memory, only the most limited fellowship could exist, for only such facts as day and night, change of season, etc., could be the same to all. But our communion is not thus limited. There is an experience higher than that of sense common to all. What is it? The answer is that of conception. Individual objects are distinct and local but their attributes are common and universal. The taking of essential attributes together is a conception (*con-capio*). This is the work of reflective thought. Here is the source of language and universal intercourse. This endowment is the touch of nature that makes all the world kin. Thinking is the act of combining conceptions, i. e., the shutting one conception within another. Syllogism the universal form of thought, i. e., the shutting of one conclusion within another by the aid of a third. Logic is the exposition of the process of thought. This leads to the outline of empirical logic. Logic has a two-fold division conforming to the two classes of objects

of experience. I. Logic of mechanical forces, including logic of permanent and changing conceptions. II. Logic of living spontaneities. Under permanent conceptions a brief outline is given of the ordinary logic of the schools.—Changing conceptions. Permanent conceptions are an iron frame holding its judgments in immutability. A shrub is not a tree and the law of excluded middle will not allow the one to pass into the other; yet in experience such changes are constantly occurring. We need, therefore, conceptions that do not merely abstract common attributes, but, instead, retain the concrete object through all its changes and determine for it all possible relations. These are changing conceptions; they lead us through the categories of Hegelian logic so far as these categories may be tested by scientific experiment.—Logic of living spontaneities. Here the author discusses problems of life and mind. The first step is to attain an adequate conception of spontaneous agency. The highest manifestation of such agency is mind itself in the act of making a scientific experiment. In its operation two facts are clearly disclosed. (1) No mental act ever takes place save as some condition has first been given, i. e., material object and spontaneous subject never manifest themselves separately, but are even complementary. (2) The uniform order of mental activity is (1) attainment of particulars in their manifoldness, (2) classification, (3) arranging these classes in systematic unity. Illustrations of both these laws are found in all sense-perception and understanding-recollection, as well as in the general method of all science. Such, then, is our conception of spontaneity. It is an agent (1) acting only as occasion is given, and (2) acting in this three-fold order.—Life. This is never manifested save in connection with material elements as its condition. Its work is (1) taking the needed elements as they lie promiscuously about, (2) assimilating, (3) organizing them there by building up a physical system. Life may be defined as the capability to give spontaneity to matter through the medium of heat.—Difference between vital and material forces. (1) The former is spontaneous, the latter inert; acting only as acted upon. (2) Material force produces effects in an ever progressing series, Life, effects in a recurring series; that is, the circumstances that cause a crystal to form

will perpetuate it, but the very same circumstances that cause a seed to germinate, cause it to mature and reproduce itself in endless succession. As to questions of spontaneous generation. The author calls attention to the fact that every scientific experiment thus far only emphasizes the doctrine of "omne vivum ex vivo."

There are three forms of life. (1) Instinct. The earliest manifestation of life is in spontaneous movement of matter, matter instinct (thrust-into) with life. This is the highest endowment of vegetable kingdom. (2) Sentiency. In animal kingdom we find that the instinct of vegetables has been super-endowed with sense consciousness. The organism is built up by instinct aided and guided by conscious-perception. As no experiment has found the mineral begetting the vegetable, so no experiment has found the vegetable begetting the animal. The three kingdoms cannot be said, scientifically, to be evolved the one from the other, but they have been proved to stand in vital connection. (3) Psyche. This is the endowment of understanding by which the whole field of sense is recollected and made the object of reflective thought. "It is the faculty of scientific experiment. The Psyche is the reflex second life of sentiency. The chrysalis form of the old earthward observation, floating with a lighter body and a finer movement in a purer and thinner atmosphere."

The Reason.—The understanding is the sphere of Empirical Science. Of it we may truly say: "Nihil in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu." Reflective thought may accurately determine what experience is and what experience has been, but the whence and the whither are beyond its ken. The author shows that we do possess another and a higher faculty, for not only are these questions persistently asked but also answered; answered often with even greater confidence than is given to the results of any experiment. This higher faculty is the Reason. Farther incontrovertible evidence is given under these three heads. (1) Reason is the only faculty that can "induce" an efficient cause as standing under every event of experience. (2) Reason is the only faculty that can affirm pure space and time as the necessary condition for all place

and period. (3) Reason is the only faculty to which pure mathematics are possible.

Thus the reality of such a faculty is put beyond question,—without it man could never attain necessary and universal truth, would never ask nor answer the question why. Man may doubt his senses—may demand re-trial for conclusions of reflective thought, but distrust his Reason he cannot.

Philosophy.—This higher faculty lays the foundation of universal Philosophy—for Human Reason in knowing itself to be finite and dependent knows a Reason higher than human, in whom it lives and moves and has its being. (1) Knows this Higher Reason as the sufficient and ultimate ground for the cause Human Reason has induced as standing back of events. (2) Knows that only such Higher Reason can account for the Space and Time of Human Reason. (3) Knows that in this Higher Reason alone is the complete system of common experience; for in no other way can laws of thought be laws of things save as things are divine thoughts to which reality has been given by divine will.

Having thus established the reality of this faculty and its trustworthiness, the author notices briefly the three spheres of its activity. These are the Beautiful, the True, and the Good. These are defined as so many ways in which Reason can be revealed. Reason manifested in form = Beauty, in principle = Truth, in personality = the Good. In all the standard of criticism as the idea. An idea literally (*εἶδος, ἰδέα, οἶδα*, wit, wise, wisdom, vision) is that whose vision makes us wise. It is a capability of Reason. Wisdom is thus the vision of ideas, or the insight of Reason into its own capabilities. The idea is not made, nor can it be possessed by an individual, i. e. in so far as an idea is ours and not equally another's it ceases to be an idea. The idea is all perfect and universal. The proof that men everywhere recognize it as such is seen whenever they criticise or dispute. This shows that they consciously or unconsciously assume the same standard of appeal for all. There is no absurdity greater than that of denying such a common standard, for to justify such denial one must appeal to the very standard he denies.

Genius.—In another part of the book it has been shown

that Fancy belongs to the faculty of Sense, and Imagination to Understanding; it is here proved that Genius differs from these in being a large endowment of Reason. The varieties of Genius will correspond to the threefold way in which Reason is manifested, i. e., Genius is either Artist or Sage, or in the literal sense a Hero. The Sage may be either an Inductive, Productive, or Speculative Genius.

But space forbids us to say more. No part of the whole work is more instructive or fascinating than these closing pages of the Intellect. We will attempt no analysis of the Susceptibility and Will. These sections have been greatly enriched in this edition, and in them as firm a foundation is laid for Morality and Religion as is laid in the Intellect for Philosophy.

We most heartily commend this book to the public believing that it will throw great light on all subjects of Modern Philosophic discussion. What to us seems one of its chief attractions is that its spirit is so thoroughly candid. It carefully avoids all dogmatism, and strives to be only a guide, like the manuals we use in Chemistry. It is the *Manual of Mental Analysis*; forcing the student to make investigations for himself. It simply teaches him how to listen to, and to voice the testimony of his own consciousness. We believe many a student will rise from the study of these pages, feeling that he is no longer in danger of being driven from his convictions by new theories no longer a "tenant of truth at will," but that he now possesses a lease of truth that will hold so long as Reason rules.

ARTICLE V.—A CHAPTER IN THE RELIGIOUS
HISTORY OF ITALY.

THE letter by which Henri Di Campello, late canon of St. Peter's church, at Rome, recently announced to Cardinal Borromeo, the highest ecclesiastic of the Basilica, his departure from the Romish Communion, has been copied into so many of our secular journals that it is well known to the Christian public. It may not be as well known that Campello's reasons for this step, founded on his despair of ever inaugurating an honest reform in the Romish church, are based upon the results of long, patient but fruitless endeavors in the same direction by many honest workers for many years. The autobiography which Campello issued directly after his announcement of the step which he had taken, and which has been published in both German and English, was not quite satisfactory to many readers, in that it failed to give anything like a general *résumé* of the efforts which had been going on before his time to make a general reformation in the Romish church. Count Campello's step only assumes its true light and full meaning when we have followed his movements preceding this last step, and call to mind the reforms which his sound judgment attempted to introduce into the church. We shall limit ourselves to-day to this last subject, and condense for our readers the substance of a very full editorial by the editor of the "German Evangelical Journal," of Bremen, who, as he says, has been watching intently for a whole generation all these Italian movements.

Among the Italian people infidelity is very wide-spread, and the suspicion and even hate which they cherish toward the Italian priesthood has extended to the very church itself. This has come to pass, largely, from the uncompromising attitude which Pius IX. and his successor have assumed toward the constitution of the United Kingdom of Italy. The higher and middle classes are universally irreligious. They have an interest in questions pertaining to the church only so far as they relate to politics. They feel no personal interest in the

church whatever. The great bulk of the people in the lower walks of life understand very little of religious or political discussions and care still less for them. From the force of habit, strengthened by superstition, they keep up religious observances. But they would turn in a minute against the papacy, if such a leader as Garibaldi would lift up the standard. In the priesthood, the Jesuits and their adherents carry on a double and determined warfare (1st) against political liberalism, (2d) against free thinking in religious matters, since the two go hand in hand.

Most of the Italian priests spring from the lower classes, are trained in little seminaries under supervision of the bishops, without receiving any course of study worth mentioning. They have only one thing that they can do to earn their daily bread. They can say mass in the churches. They are conscious of only one article of faith. They are sure that if they do not obey the bishop he can stop their saying mass, and so by one stroke of his pen take away their bread. Besides this crowd of incompetent priests and the swarms of Jesuits there is another and smaller class of the clergy, who are at once religious and patriotic. They believe that the church should bring her religious interests into harmony with the national interests of Italy, and that she should show some such respect for the Italian people as christendom generally demands. And they believe *that this must be done*, if Italy is to be saved from infidelity, and the church from absolute collapse. However much these men may disagree on other topics their united conviction is briefly expressed in the words which more than ten years ago an illustrious magnate of the Church used as the closing words of a sermon on the relationship of the Church to Italy:

"In fine, Signori, O reforma, O rovina!" (In a word, gentlemen, reform or ruin!) Just as in these latest days at the hands of Curci and Campello, so for a generation have the ideas of reform, among this class of which I speak, been associated, not with a scientific study of the old institutions, but with the living questions of to-day. They are occupied with practical topics, such as regulating the relationship of Church and State—the renunciation of temporal government by the

Pope—the controlling of the reactionary tendency of the spiritual courts as formulated in the syllabus, at least so far as political matters are concerned.

In 1860, after the first great consolidation, societies were organized among the priests in middle Italy “for the mutual protection from the persecution of pope and bishop” of such as favor Italy, the king, and the constitution. At first these societies were shielded by the government. Soon, however, they were left without support, and the Romish cry began to resound, “You are violating Cavour’s maxim—‘A free Church for a free State,’ if you protect these rebels against the Church.”

So by threats of churchly censure these societies were compelled to dissolve. In Naples, in 1861, a like association took place under the name “Union of Liberal Italian Clergy.” The original programme contained a reconciliation of the Church with Italy on the basis of renunciation of the temporal power by the pope, and there was talk of several reforms within the pale of the church. The society’s organ was “*La Colonna di Fuoco*”—(The Pillar of Fire), the name of which called to mind the leading of the children of Israel through the desert. In it the following demands were advocated:

I. The Church should be restored to its early Christian form.

II. Bible reading should be freely permitted.

III. Enforced celibacy should be done away.

Some other demands of like character were also suggested.

The arch-bishop of Naples interdicted the members of this society from preaching. The bishop, Caputo Von Arriano, who was the honored president of the Union, opened to them the churches which he had under his own special jurisdiction as “Chaplain of the two Sicilies.” These churches were only seven in number. The services held in these churches, and especially such as were held by the young Dominican Luigi Prota, were largely attended. In the summer of 1862 the Union forwarded to the pope a petition with many signatures, in which the demand was made not only that he should resign his temporal power, but also his spiritual autocracy, and that he should prepare the way for a general reform in the church. The death of Bishop Caputo took place on the 6th of Septem-

ber following. By order of Pius IX. three bishops visited him while he was lying on his death-bed, to induce him to recant. He remained steadfast, although they threatened to withhold from him the sacrament for the dying. At the very last, however, one of the popish envoys relented and administered the final consolation of the Church. This was Bishop Mucedalo, of Conveosano, who also died in a short time. The Union soon came to an end through the energetic action of the spiritual courts at the hands of the bishops. But the deliberate opposition which was developed by the conflict before the court naturally developed a wider and sharper antagonism. The active portion of the Union became thoroughly radical.

The Dominican, Luigi Prota, with whose name and character we are already acquainted, in the "*Emancipatore Catholico*," a journal established by him at Naples, took sides in December, 1869, with an "opposing convention" of free-thinkers which met in Naples, and his paper ceased to be an organ of churchly reform.

In the same year in which the Neapolitans sent their petition to the pope, the then famous ex-jesuit, Passaglia, secured 9,000 signatures to another petition of like import. But in consequence of a threat of suspension and excommunication, most of the subscribers to this document withdrew their signatures and the movement fell to the ground. In the year 1864 Passaglia put forth three well-written volumes in support of the doctrine of the "Immaculate Conception." Three years after he was compelled to flee from Rome to Turin to escape punishment for writing a pamphlet against the temporal power of the pope. Passaglia was appointed Professor of Moral Philosophy, at Turin, and also Member of Parliament. He continued his opposition to the exercise of temporal power by the spiritual courts in his journal, the "*Mediatore*," until 1866. Since that time he has passed out of sight, except that in 1867 he espoused the cause of Cardinal Girolamo, an advocate of the same good reform, but who was persecuted until death came to his relief. To-day the ex-Jesuit Curci is a "*Passaglia redivivus*," notwithstanding his temporary submission.

The idea of reformation produced in northern and middle

Italy several noteworthy publications at an early date. In 1861, Dr. Pietro Emilio Tiboni published a pamphlet on the "Secularization of the Bible," demanding that the restriction on bible-reading be taken away. He made the same demand at Breschia, in 1870, in a widely-published discourse entitled, "The relation of Italy to the Bible."

In consequence of his first article he was removed from his position as head of the seminary which he had superintended for twenty years. His office as canon was graciously spared him. Tiboni was sprung from an honored family and was recognized as one of the most highly gifted and thoroughly educated among the clergy.

In the year 1861, Eusebio Reali, the clerical professor of legal philosophy at Siena, in connection with Cardinal d' Andrea and the Hon. Francesco Liverani, published a pamphlet on "The Papal Courts and the Jesuits," and in 1867 another on "Reform in the School System," and one on "Church and State." Reali had formerly been canon of the Lateron Basilica, but had been obliged to leave Rome some time previous to this, on account of a spirited conflict with the Jesuits. Liverani had been, like Campello, a pupil of the Ecclesiastical Academy, at Nobili, the training school for diplomatic prelates; and he had also been canon at Maria Maggiore. As such he wrote a book on "The Papacy, the Empire, and the Kingdom of Italy." On account of this book he was deposed and excommunicated. On the whole it is a bad book. For example, he speaks of the Ecclesiastical Academy, above mentioned, which was mostly patronized by the nobility:

"You can hear from the lips of these young lords, who are designed to occupy the highest places in Church and State, such oaths and blasphemies as are current in a grog-shop. Whole nights are spent in gambling and the playing is only interrupted by rough speeches and shameless stories."

Still more repulsive is what he has to say about his brother canons; their hatred and quarreling, the frauds practiced by them, their behavior in church, their cursing and blasphemy even while they are conducting divine service; their ridiculous performances with the host (the consecrated bread), and

things like these. Coming out of the church, and even in the choir seats, they would dispute loudly about the lucky numbers of lottery tickets, found in their dream-books and cabalistic tables, which they not infrequently took with them in their prayer books. Where Liverani, the popish house-prelate, and apostolical prothonotary, has finally pitched his tent, we cannot say. Some say that he has become so thoroughly embittered that he pays no more attention to churchly questions. Others say that through the influence of the ecclesiastical courts he has crawled back into the fold. Perhaps they are both true.

Filippo Parfetti is another man who has efficiently propagated ideas of reform among Italian scholars. He was formerly secretary to one of the Cardinals, then university librarian at Rome, and finally professor at Perugia. He is the author of several pamphlets—"The New Attitude of the Papacy," "Recollections of Rome," "The Clergy and the State," etc., etc.

Peter Mangini has less learning than those I have mentioned, but is more popular and more vehement. He has written several pamphlets against the Ultramontanes. He was for thirty-five years pastor at Oggebbio, on the Lake Maggiore. He refused to obey a citation to appear at Rome, where his books had been condemned and placed on the Index Expurgatorius. For this refusal he was excommunicated. The Italian government refused to concur in this sentence, and Mangini remained pastor for two years longer. He was afterwards promoted to a government office, but still kept his pastorate, discharging his duties there through an assistant.

Among the laity, Terenzio Mamiani deserves special mention. Between 1850 and 1860 he was a representative of the papal government. He then became a leader in the Italian school system under Cavour. He published a pamphlet on "Italian Regeneration," in which he indicated the best results as likely to come from the separation of Church and State. "Romanism," so he wrote to an American clergyman, residing at Florence, "has accomplished three deplorable results in Italy. It has produced superstition among the lower classes, indifference among the middle classes, and infidelity among the greater portion of the thinkers and writers. The first thing which is necessary to make a reform possible in the

Roman Catholic Church is the overthrow of the political power of the pope. And Providence indicates to us that this great blessing is happily on the way."

The friends of reform in Italy have found since 1864 an organ of expression, and a center of development in "The Examiner," a magazine published at Florence. The publication of this was undertaken by a very accomplished and honored layman, Professor Stanislaus Bianciardi, the author of a history of the papacy. The magazine found many readers and contributors among the clergy. Reali, Mangini, and Cardinal d'Andrea contributed to its columns. Most of the writers, however, were anonymous. An article, which appeared in June, 1865, went to the extreme limit in demands for reform. It could only be satisfied with the following concessions:

I. The laity shall have power to choose their own pastors and provide for the current expenses of each individual church.

II. The pastors and laity shall elect their own bishops, subject to the approval of the crown.

III. The bishops and metropolitans shall have their old rights restored, and their present servile dependence upon the pope, and their oath of allegiance to him shall be abolished.

IV. The requirement of celibacy among the clergy shall be abolished.

V. The Holy Scriptures shall be put in the hands of the laity without any restriction.

VI. Religious services shall be held in the mother-tongue.

VII. Auricular confession shall be permissible but not obligatory.

VIII. The sacrament shall be administered in both forms.

Little by little, however, during these later years, the supporters of "The Examiner" have retreated from their position as advocates of reform, and it is now the organ of the most conservative objectors to the papacy. The paper, "Christian Unity," established by Mangini as an opponent to Magotti's "Catholic Unity," at Turin, was not very long lived. "The Examiner" had about 1200 subscribers, mostly in Lombardy and Naples. Venetia and Lombardy ranked next. It had almost no support in the old "States of the Church."

The bishops of Brescia and Treviso, in consequence of orders from Rome, had forbidden the reading of "The Exam-

iner." The journal had played quite a part in Cardinal d'Andrea's "History of Christ's Sufferings," a curious polemic which many still remember. Through his previous efforts after church reform, and through his present attitude in questions bearing on the relation of the church to politics, and religion to science, the Cardinal was to the Jesuits a constant thorn in the side. In 1864 he went back to Naples. He refused to obey the order to return until in 1866 he was dismissed from his diocese Sabina, and his primacy over the Abbey at Subiaco, and in 1867 his Cardinal's hat was taken away from him. He came back and tendered his submission to the pope in 1868, and died some four months afterward. He was compelled to sign his name to the statement that he was sorry for the wrong he had done through his coöperation with "The Examiner." Damaging as this enforced declaration was to the magazine, it suffered further loss by the death, in 1868, in speedy succession, of its earnest publisher, Professor Bianciardi, and his efficient coadjutors, Prior Bruno Bianchi, and Canon Reali.

The publication was assumed by one of Bianciardi's sons, on the thorough guaranty of ten or fifteen of the clergy. So the "Examiner" has held on its way, outliving other reform journals such as the "Fra Paoli Sarpi," at Venice, and the "Catholic Emancipator," at Naples. The reason why these journals failed to survive is because nobody outside of the most thoroughly educated clergy were really interested in reform. Exception might be made in favor of a handful of the most thoroughly faithful among the laity, who believed that reform was the ultimate hope to prevent all the thinking class from falling into remediless infidelity. Among this number are Marquis Carlo Guerieri, Gonzaga of Mantua; Senator Alfieri, of Rome; Count Ottavio Tasco, of Bergamo; Senators Scitto Piuto, of Turin, and Dr. Pantaleoni, and the former Deputy Andrea Moretti, of Brembana, etc., etc.

Since the great majority of the middle classes, as represented by the public press, look upon all these efforts with simple scorn, judging by the experience of past reformers in the Catholic Church, Campello must expect a bitter experience.

We can only read in the public prints what is openly printed : but Ex-father Curci and Ex-canon Campello have given us in their books published in 1881, interesting glimpses of their supporters. Curci speaks of four "distinguished ecclesiastics" who secretly welcome his book into their homes. (The book has been condemned by the papal authorities, and so cannot lawfully be read or kept.) And he adds that he knows where to find more than forty of them, although not one was held openly. As to what Campello has to say in the matter, we quote his own words, taken from chapters xviii., xix., and xx. :

"Nothing can be more destructive to the strongest faith, than when one revelation after another contradicts what has been given before, under pretense of disabusing the minds of the people. Through just such deliverances has my faith in the divine character of the Papacy been undermined and broken down. To the high church dignitaries I have never paid court ; but I have cherished the friendship of some few learned, pious priests, who were looked down upon by the proud theocracy, and treated almost like scabby sheep. In the companionship of their beloved books, they lived truly like Eremites. God be praised, the number of such noble souls in Italy is not few, and even Rome itself has little attraction for them. Armed with resignation to the will of God, they hope undismayed for better times, and also for a wholesome reformation in the church at the hands of the authority which God has established there. The fact that corruption has long existed in the papacy by no means weakens their hope. It is mostly old and sorrow-burdened folk who spend their strength in sighing : 'Would to God I were twenty years younger.'

"When the event of the 20th of September, 1870, the incoming of the Italians was imminent, then the aspirations in the hearts of these men and their companions breathed forth with greater fullness. Then for sake of kingship over these clods, for the preservation of this robbery perpetrated on Christendom, religion and fatherland, the holiest of all things, were put in peril. . . . "Since the 20th of September, 1870, the national government has done everything to be at peace with the dispossessed papacy, and live harmoniously with them ; but thus far in vain.

"It was the middle of the year '70, when I visited many of my Eremite friends. They as well as myself felt the need of interchange of thought. They still believed that the reformation of the papacy would come to pass. But when ? 'At the time,' said one of them, 'when the waves of the politico-religious flood threaten to break above the top of the popish tiara.'

"The memory of the things which took place behind the scenes at the time of the Council, moved our anchorites very deeply, for they were more or less in sympathy with the intrigues devised to help forward the longed-for results. There has been a thick volume of indisputable doc-

uments collected on this subject. In these the good anchorites gave forth utterances upon the beauty and good desert of Catholicism in the romantic style of a Chateaubriand. They spoke of the Roman bishop's Primacy in love and honor, in the honeyed accents of a Rosmini. They gloried over the apostolic chair as the center of unity and the glory of Italy in the patriotic style of Gioberti. But to me it kept constantly becoming clearer that in the papacy we had before us a gigantic human creation; very serviceable, indeed, for the preservation of a priestly caste; and not without value for a half popish Rome, at once the seat of royalty and the center of the Catholic world. But more than this it was not. By their discourses, without noticing or comprehending the fact, my recluses made me an 'old-catholic,' or what Pope Pius IX. was pleased to call a 'new heretic.'

"Now came interchanges of thought among the Eremites. Day by day I went about among them and urged them to action. They listened to me with pale, wry faces and wrinkled brows. 'But, my friend,' said one of them to me, 'you are mad! How can you advise us old folks to do any such thing? We have no longer the strength to provoke the thunderbolts of the Vatican. We stand close in front of the tomb, and ought to go down in peace with God and man.' The final refrain of all was: 'We are Catholics and ought to remain so. The most earnest wish of our hearts is that the needed reforms in church life should take place: but they should come through the pope, the man chosen for that very purpose.'

"These words stood in direct contradiction to all their previous theories. But their final decision, as I readily understood, was not the expression of a ripper conviction, but rather the offspring of senile fear. 'Very well,' said I to them, 'if you believe that the pope must execute these reforms we must make the right kind of a pope.' I remembered how the clergy and people of Rome had elected their own bishop for 1200 years, until by a stroke of his pen Alexander III. took this right away from them and gave it to his cardinals—his creatures—a class of prelates that has no foundation in the Apostolic hierarchy. The Eremites wanted me to put my plan, and the steps by which it might be accomplished, into their hands in black and white, so that they could carefully review it. With great circumspection I had the programme printed, under the title: 'The Catholic Italian Union, for Regaining the Old Rights of Christianity, especially by the Roman People.' Although its consideration awakened many scruples, and many serious difficulties were foreseen in the way of attaining the ends desired, still the project found many ecclesiastics who favored it. Among these were four who were specially illustrious for their learning, for their holy lives, and their high positions in the church.

"The society had only been in existence a few months when one morning one of the Liberal newspapers in Rome advertised the world of its existence, adding to their notice some derogatory and contemptuous remarks. 'We have,' said the journal, 'already, without the permission of a double vote, in the "prisoner of the Vatican," pope enough for Rome and Italy: and, indeed, he is one too many,' etc., etc. The

other liberal papers followed in the same tone. Not one of them had a kindly word for the undertaking. The pope and Vicar-general were straightway on hand with their excommunication. Within two days from that time the members of the society could read in all good church papers the pope's bull, counseling them to come repentant and receive absolution. I must say, however, to the praise of my stout-hearted Eremites, that not one of them—I do not know of a single one—was induced to recant. They probably received at the hands of each other such absolution as they deemed necessary.

"I learned from the reception which my proposition received at the hands of the liberal press, that a pope, even though he were chosen in the old time Christian way by the vote of the clergy and people, would be received by the greater portion of the thoughtful Italian people like an antediluvian magnate thrust up into the light of day from the bottom of a troubled sea, and not as a creation, suited to the needs of the present day."

We must here break off Campello's interesting narrative. Although about the time his book was printed a change was made in the occupant of the papal chair, "the director of the orchestra was changed, the music continued the same." Leo XIII. proved himself more bitter in persecution than Pius IX. had been. Pius had been content with excommunicating in a lump the members of Campello's society; Leo "let loose his hounds to follow up their trail." Campello found no rest from the persecutions of the Vicar-general, and the cardinal arch-priesthood of St. Peter's, until he threatened them with civil prosecution.

In view of the secret machinations constantly going on in the Roman camp to favor the restoration of the pope's temporal power, it is interesting to read Campello's opinion of the night of the 13th of July, at the time of the removal of the remains of Pope Pius IX. from the Vatican to his final resting place. "This tumult," he writes, "was planned long before and gotten up intentionally by the 'Zealots' of the 'Society for Advancing Catholic Interests.' It was an intentional, deliberate fraud. The spiritual authorities were duly informed that the body might be transported with all peace and quietness. But they expected that the 4000 torches in the hands of 4000 fanatics would be considered as a political demonstration, and met by the government of Rome as such. They pretended that an insult to the Pope's body was the cause of what was only a part of the plan. The Allocution delivered by the

Pope Leo on the occurrence, and also the diplomatic circular letter issued by Cardinal Jacobini, the Secretary of State, were composed of falsehoods, designed to stir up the European powers to interference with the Italian government. Because that government has wiped off of the map the spot once representing the Papal States, it was planned that it should at least be bombarded by diplomatic scribbling. More than this the imbeciles did not really expect."

The following letter from Rome, dated April 22, 1882, gives the latest advices as to Campello's relationship to the evangelical faith:

"You desire to know what evangelical circles here think about Campello and his newspaper '*Il Labaro*.' I can tell you in a few words. Outwardly, Campello is in our eyes an old-Catholic. He is a man, who, since his entrance into the Methodist church, has not been able to divest himself of the false ecclesiastical idea of the '*una sancta*:' an idea that has been ingrained into his very being from his early youth. He has therefore gradually separated himself from the Methodists, and come into affiliation with Père Hyacinth and his theories.

"Campello like Hyacinth wants to be a Catholic: without papacy, to be sure, and without the hierarchical system; without heartless ceremonies, and without hostility to the modern State, or modern society:—in fine a Catholic after the approved form. He takes this course (Campello admits it in so many words), that he may not through membership in a *Sect* (as he calls Protestantism, and the several Protestant communions) lose membership in the '*one*' church. It is plain to be seen that Count Campello's idea of the '*Christian Church*' is very indistinct. He declares himself free from the '*one*' church, but still wants to belong to it: for he surely ought to know as much as this that the Papal church styles itself both the Romish church, and the Catholic church. Indeed he says himself, in his Biography, that in 1870 a Jesuit told him that it was the intention, if the Council had not adjourned, to add, in the third Article of the Apostles' Creed, to '*unam, sanctam, catholicam*,' the word '*Romanam*.' Campello has never yet gotten the fundamental idea of evangelical truth. He has been so constantly engaged in open discussion that he has had no time to rest down upon the deep verities of his new position, and learn the central thought of all Bible truth. The papers report that he has now sent a letter to Père Hyacinth (published by the French journal '*Le Temps*'), in which he squarely denies—and this, if true, casts a baleful light upon the moral character of the Ex-canon of '*the first church in the world*'—that he has never gone over to the Methodists. The letter has of course stirred up very painful feelings among the Evangelicals here, which have by no means subsided since Professor Sanna, the pastor of the Methodist church in Piazza Poli, has printed an open letter in the '*Italia Evan-*

gelica,' in which he frankly and openly declares that the professed statement of Campello in that letter is an untruth:—that he cannot believe that the former priest and Count would ever have written such a thing:—that he is inclined to believe the whole thing apocryphal. What answer will Campello make to it?

"The contents of the journal '*Il Labaro*' (The Banner of the Cross) which he has published for the last four weeks have been rather political and social than religious or churchly. The articles which Campello himself writes must be characterized as mediocre and rather superficial. One article has a clear ring, where he declares that the terms of peace between the Quirinal and the Vatican must be in the interest of the Fatherland else this last cannot prosper. 'We are persuaded through and through,' writes Campello in '*Labaro*,' 'that faith in the pure catholic religion ['why not say christian?'] says our correspondent can go hand in hand with love for Fatherland. Yes, without religion (Roman Catholic?) there can not exist such a thing as a good citizen.'

"Rumor says that Campello is now a fast friend with the American Anglicans here, and may be ere long a communicant in that church. A little while ago it was supposed that Catholic magnates in Rome, who did not belong to the 'Irreconcilables' had furnished Campello the means to sustain his high priced (because daily) newspaper; in the expectation that through this literary enterprise he would stir up the clergy, and the indifferent multitude, against the intolerable rule of the Jesuits. But now it is known as a fact that Dr. Nevin, the Episcopal Rector here, brought the funds from America.

"Campellini's mission among the soldiers deserves all praise and support even from foreign lands. We are personally acquainted with the conductor of this mission and know his work and its results and commend it gladly and with assurance."

The above letter speaks for itself, and only repeats the pages of history showing how hard it is for reformation to come at the hands of those who have been educated under old superstitions. The hope for Italy lies in the young. It is to be hoped that the work of the Evangelical Bible Schools may be so fully and heartily sustained in this generation, that the fundamental questions of our Christianity may not be unknown problems to the next generation.

ARTICLE VI.—LES BASQUES: BY J. WENTWORTH
WEBSTER. SAAR. BASSES PYRÉNÉES.

[Translated by JNO. DAVENPORT WHEELER, New Haven.]

II.

THE BASQUES.

THE French Basque Country, and "las Provincias Vascongadas" do not possess the grand beauty of the Alps, or of the eastern and central Pyrénées. In winter their climate cannot rival that of the south of Spain, of Italy, of Algiers, or of Egypt, and during the brief summer season the tourist prefers the high plateaux of Switzerland, the Northern Seas, the Highlands of Scotland, or of Norway; but where shall we find a country in which during all the year one may live as comfortably and agreeably? The cold of winter is never to be feared, and the summer heat never becomes insupportable, while on the coast the sea breeze always brings a delicious freshness. In the country the greatly varied surface serves to temper the sun's ardor, while the massive mountains afford shelter against the icy winds which sweep the plains of Castile during the winter season.

So much for the climate and the country. We need not ask for the snows or the sparkling glaciers of the Alps, with their giddy precipices from which plunge vapory waterfalls, or for mirroring lakes, for these are almost entirely wanting; but the mountains are of just sufficient altitude to form a frame of most charming proportions for the valleys that lie at their feet. The sea, whose waves break along its shore, is one of the most beautiful in the world. In color it is not dark and sombre like the Channel or the North Sea, but is as clear and blue as the sky which is reflected in its depths. The streams of the Basque country, small, and of little use for navigation, yield to none of other lands in their picturesque beauty. The traveler who will follow their borders, sometimes lost at the bottom of

a valley, far from highway or village, sees them, now with their waters sleeping in the deep gorges, at the foot of vertical cliffs, and now bursting forth in pearly foam against the rocks that oppose their passage, rushing like an arrow through a narrow cleft, to spread out gently over laughing meadows, and among thickets of young oaks, to seek there the repose they will no longer know when once they are lost in the ebb and flow of the restless ocean. It is a land for the artist to revel in, abounding in picturesque situations; the architecture of its old farm houses and rustic "châteaux" is of a style more original than can be found any where else in France. The houses resemble, at a distance, Swiss chalets, but less conventional in design. The walls are supported by immensely solid buttresses, over which hang the far projecting roofs, almost always of unequal slope. Around the upper story is a broad gallery always open to the sun. What a contrast to the hamlets and villages of the north! A Basque commune is generally made up of isolated habitations dotted along the hillside, and one is often obliged to ask where to find the village, the center of so many thinly scattered houses. There are few countries more truly sylvan than the interior of the "Pays Basque," and it would be hard to find sea-side resorts more charming than those which are scattered along its shore from Biarritz to Bilbao, rivaling each other in grace and beauty.

The French and Spanish Basques are but the remains of a nation, "un peuple qui s'en va."* The ancient writers speak of the Vascons and the Vaccœi as extending to the east and south much farther than they do at the present day. Their latest descendants occupy in France but the arrondissements of Bayonne, Mauleon, and Oloron. In Spain they form the population of several cantons of Navarre, all of Guipuzcoa, the greater part of la Viscaya, and the north of Alava; these last three provinces, "las provincias Vascongadas," have been for many years united to the Spanish monarchy; but with a language, internal administration, and manners entirely different. In France the line of demarcation between those who speak the Euskara and the Béarnais is still clearly defined, and the house is pointed out which has been considered for centu-

* Élisée Reclus. *Revue de Deux Mondes.*

ries to mark the limit at which the Escualdun ceases to be spoken. There scarcely exists any intermediate zone in which the two languages are used indifferently, or by one part only of the people of the country. It is no longer so in Spain, where along a broad frontier band both tongues are equally in use. At certain advanced points where fifty years ago the Basque reigned alone, no one understands it at the present day. On this side the Pyrénées the present generation will witness the accomplishment of a similar change: all the children are learning French in the schools, and it is now very rarely that in passing through a village, even the most remote, you cannot find some one to answer your questions. Here, where political passion is not interested to preserve the Euskarian language, it will disappear from the soil more quickly even than beyond the mountains. The inhabitants of la Soule, and of Labourd, love the Basque as their mother tongue, and find in it shades of meaning which cannot be rendered by the French. Every where that it prevails the people feel themselves as it were "en famille," with a language of their own which the stranger does not understand. But these sentimental considerations will hardly hold their ground before the exigencies of administration, the necessity of rendering more easy their commerce with the neighboring peoples, and the material needs of daily life.

It is estimated that the number of persons in Europe speaking the Escuara is about six hundred thousand; of this number one hundred and twenty to one hundred and forty thousand inhabit France, and four hundred and fifty thousand, Spain; while thousands of Basque emigrants are established in South America, divided for the most part between the Argentine and Oriental Republics. But the language, like the nation itself, is only the remnant of what it once was; and even this remnant is divided into eight principal dialects: the Labourdin, the Souletin, the Bas-Navarraï Oriental, and the Bas-Navarraï Occidental in France; in Spain the Bas-Navarraï of the North, the Bas Navarraï of the South, the Guipuzcoan, and the Viscayan. Most admirable geographical charts have been prepared by Prince L. L. Bonaparte, where he has indicated by divisions even the sub-dialects.

The population of the Basque country is one of the finest in

Europe, and though its language indicates an origin probably non-Aryan, it yields in no way in nobility of bearing and regularity of features, to the finest types of the Indo-European race. I have already spoken of the physical characteristics of the Basque skulls. The Escualdunes are in general of medium height, tall rather than short, graceful, slender, vigorous, and of astonishing agility. In foot races, and in the dance, they have no rivals, and it would be hard to find better walkers. They are much given to athletic exercises, and the muscular strength of the women is often far beyond what would be expected from the delicate elegance of their figures. The favorite amusement of the Basques is the "jeu de paume," or tennis, of which three distinct varieties are known; the ball used is far heavier than that used in other countries, and requires no less of vigor than of suppleness to drive it the required distance. They should be seen at one of their grand games of "pelote à la longue;" especially when the game has an international character, and takes place between the French and Spanish Basques. They amuse themselves also with throwing the iron bar (*la palenka*), with leaping, and in fencing bouts with an iron shod cudgel (*le mokila*.)

As with the ancient Greeks, the dance is held in high esteem, and carried out with a singular seriousness, especially by the men. It is no simple distraction, or youthful amusement, but a manly exercise, a just occasion for pride on the part of those who excel in it. Each step is regulated, each gesture determined in advance, while villages and cantons dispute the glory of possessing the most accomplished dancers. At the end of one of their "pastorales,"—a word I will explain directly—the actors put up at auction, and sell for good hard money to representatives of the neighboring communes, the right to appear first on the platform, in order to begin there the Basque leap, the favorite dance of the French Escualdunes, with that of the "Satans," and a variety of the Aragonese jota. The Spanish Basques prefer the *Ezpata Danza*, or the sword dance, the *Aurreescu* or *Zorzico*, and other solemn measures in usage at local fêtes. The most ancient dances, the Saut Basque and the *Ezpata Danza* for example, are executed by men. Women figure only in those of which the origin is more recent.

But even while so passionately attached to all bodily exercises, the Basque, though he may be able neither to read nor write, and is confined to his mother tongue, is by no means abandoned to complete ignorance. He possesses both literary and artistic tastes, and though for him printed verse is a closed book, he is at the same time a poet and a rhapsodist; he improvises in verse, he knows by heart songs without end, and his memory is charged with tales and legends. Still more, the Pays Basque is one of the rare countries where the popular theater of the middle ages has been continued without interruption even to our own day. In Brittany it is almost unknown. Every ten years the "Passionspiel" is represented in Bavaria before an immense audience of foreigners, but the drama of Oberammergau is rather a work of devotion, a religious ceremony, than a popular diversion. On the contrary, in the villages of la Soule the theater may be considered as the most popular of amusements; while the "pastorales," and above all the "Tragédies" are played each year at the great fêtes of spring and summer. Nothing can be more primitive than the stage. Built in the open air, on the public square, it is composed simply of plank placed on rows of casks; at the further end a linen curtain; on the right, the entrance of the "good" (the blues); on the left that of the "wicked" (the reds); an image of wood represents "the heathen idol," while two or three native musicians form the orchestra. The scenes, drawn from the Bible or the Lives of the Saints, or may be from tale or legend of popular French literature, have been put into verse by the school teacher or poet of the neighborhood. But—and in this often consists all the originality of the Euskarian drama,—care has always been taken to introduce a chorus of "Satans," as well as a "King of the Turks," with his confederates. The whole piece, recited in monotone, accompanied by slow and solemn music for the good, and by a more and more accelerated measure for the wicked, is ended invariably by an air and dance of Satans, who maintain the principal part in every Basque pastorale. The tragedy numbers from three to seven thousand verses in rhyme, and sometimes requires not less than nine hours for its complete representation; but in these degenerate times it must be said that a considerable

"cutting" takes place. The parts are numerous, rarely less than twelve, and may reach as high as sixty. But how shall we describe the anomalous mixture of different elements which enter into the costume of the actors? Faded uniforms, borrowed from some customs officer or retired gendarme, the cast-off clothing of some lyceum student, or the official dress of the sub-Prefect, contrast with velvet breeches, and skirts of a past Paris fashion; while the crown of red tinsel, surmounted by plumes and artificial flowers, the handy work of the village dressmaker, sparkles beside the crush hat. The costume of the Satans, made according to the ancient tradition of the country, is always very handsome. At the corners of the platform four improvised constables armed with old flint lock muskets, maintain order among the audience, and fire a volley whenever a hero falls, or a battle takes place. The swords, or rather the canes which take their place, strike one another in the combats in time to an air played by the orchestra. A white cloth, rolled up at one corner of the stage, and hastily spread out on the floor at the moment of the frequent catastrophes of a tragedy, serves to receive the dead, and to preserve from dust the handsome uniforms loaned for the occasion.

Each part is learned by heart, often by persons who do not know how to read, and the task of fixing it securely in the brain occupies the long winter evenings of the farm. At the representations the sexes are never mixed, and generally the tragedy is played by men only, occasionally by young girls. As everywhere before the seventeenth century, the female parts are admirably filled by young boys, while the girls succeed by no means so well when armed with the sabre of the hero.

The Basques celebrate the carnival by masquerades or charivaris, a sort of pantomime, or dramatic procession in which the men represent different animals, or typical characters of the country. In these are preserved with their proper music, the traditional dances, dances which call forth the strength and agility of ankles for which the Canton is renowned. The most famous are the horse dance (*zabalçain*), and the bear dance (*hartz*); the first of which is well worth being seen.

After the pastorales and the masquerades come the poetic

contests, where not only are prizes awarded to the best poems composed in advance by the rivals, but where the improvisators or *coplaçari* strive as to who shall the best or most quickly produce a series of verses on a given subject. Their language lends itself marvelously to all sorts of rhymes, of which they will pile up twenty or thirty on the same termination. With this we have all, that with a few books of devotion, and the sermons of the church, formerly constituted the literary life of the Basques, and satisfied their intellectual tastes.

At the present day regular instruction is being more and more extended, and the Escualdunes are entering into the great current of European science. The Basque children have quick and receptive minds, and they learn with a surprising facility, but they rarely go beyond a certain limit. Many Vizcayan names are found among the poets and dramatists of Spain, but excepting Ercilla, author of "*Araucanie*," no one stands at the head of his contemporaries; and it is the same for the various branches of science, and especially for navigation. They make active, intelligent, and intrepid sailors; a Basque, El Cano being the only survivor of the officers of Magellan, the first to circumnavigate the globe: "*primus me circumdedisti*" on a globe, are the arms of his family. Conspicuously brave, excellent soldiers, they rarely possess military genius; furnishing admirable officers to the fleets of France and Spain, and to the armies good brigade commanders; no one of them has yet arrived at the supreme command. Marshall Harispe, Zumalacarreguy in the first Carlist war, and Admiral Jauréguiberry in the campaign of 1870-71, are almost the only ones who have acquired any European reputation.

There are, however, two great facts, or more properly speaking institutions to be laid to the credit of the Basques: by the first they are bound to the general activity of the world, and have exercised, and still exercise a powerful influence; in the second they have shown a practical genius worthy of universal commendation;—I refer to Jesuitism, and the local administration of their "*fueros*."

In whatever light we may view it, Jesuitism will always remain an essential product of the Basque mind and character,

of which Ignatius Loyola and François Xavier were types *par excellence*. The second possessed in the highest degree the personal charm which is so often found among the young men of the country; while the mysticism of the first, his power of absorption in an idea, are still common among them. The only characteristic of their poetry at all distinctive is the frequent use of allegory, a great tendency to present abstract ideas under concrete forms; a principal feature of the "Exercices spirituels" of Loyola. "Qui dit Basque, dit Catholique," is already an old proverb among them. Although the most precious jewel of their literature is the translation of the New Testament made by the Protestant Liçarrague, and printed in 1571 at La Rochelle under the auspices of Jeanne d'Albret, it is none the less true that they cling to the Catholic faith with the same tenacity that they once did to their Pagan worship. To them, through Loyola and François Xavier reverts the honor of having conceived and organized the counter-reformation in Europe, and thereby prolonging for some centuries the existence of the Papacy. But though devoted as they are to what they believe to be religious truth, the Basques are rarely bigots; ultramontanism has no attractions for them, and in the domain of politics they have never bowed their necks under the yoke of the clergy. Not less interesting to study is the development of their "fueros," or special laws; the civil and municipal *régime* which they have been able to preserve from the middle ages even to our own day. And let us remark in the first place that the superiority of the Basques is much less in the excellence of their laws, than in their manner of administering them.

The general character of the "fueros,"—the "fors," as they are called on this side of the mountains, is by no means peculiar to the Escualdun. In secondary details only, do the Basque fueros differ from those of Béarn, the "libertés et privilèges" of the Valley d'Aspe, the "concelleres y consejos" of Catalonia, the "comunidades de Aragon," and some of the fueros of Castile.

On either side of the Pyrénées we find these liberties proceeding from entirely different sources: one, that of the "fueros generales," and of the "fuero de albedrio," had its birth among

the mountaineers in the necessities of pastoral life, and the rights of pasture; while the municipal liberties, the special *fueros*, are unquestionably copied from the ancient privileges of the Latin municipalities. From these have been taken the methods and traditions which the Basques and Navarrais have so successfully developed during so many centuries. One of our friends, deceased within the year, the learned M. Châteauneuf has expressed himself as warranted in the belief that the municipality of Bayonne in the number of its officers and the mode of their nomination reproduces exactly the "municipium" recently discovered of the Roman cities of the south of Spain.

I do not pretend that the Basques and other populations of the two slopes of the chain had any consciousness of this genealogy of their rights; in following up to the farthest point possible all the known sources, we are constantly arrested by the appeal to "*us et coutumes*," on which are based the written laws, and to which they conform, at least in principle. These *us et coutumes*, like the common law of England, are of a time long anterior to the written and codified law.

The Basque *fueros* affirm in all cases the freedom of pasturage, of passage, and of commerce, in all the territory belonging to the general community. They insist with emphasis upon personal independence; the right of self-defence against every one, lord or seigneur, laic or ecclesiastic, pope or emperor, who should infringe upon these rights or liberties. A fundamental principle common in its origin to almost all the *fueros* of these countries, but which the Basques have been able to preserve even to the middle of the nineteenth century.

In order to resist successfully the repeated attacks of the Spanish monarchy, and of absolutism in all its forms, they have always maintained that they owed no military service in time of peace; and in time of war they would yield it only within their own province. Beyond certain designated positions on the frontier, for example, *El Arbol Malato plantado en Luyando*, in Vizcaya, they could not be led under arms without the consent of the junta, and without receiving in advance their pay for the whole term of service required.* No royal

*The title XXIV. of the *Fuero of Guipuzcoa* is as follows: "Que de esta provincia ni de los limites de ella, para ninguna parte ni por neces-

troops were permitted to enter the country; the Basque recruits must be commanded by Basques. Similar safeguards are to be found, though on a much smaller scale, in the *privièges* of the Vallée d'Aspe.

The Basques have never recognized the right of the central government of Spain to levy from them tax or impost. The "Provincias Vascongadas" were independent States with whom the neighboring kingdoms formed a union by concordat or "convenio," but were never subjugated and submitting provinces; the money voted by the juntas for the King of Spain was presented to him as a free and gracious gift, never as an obligatory tribute. To better guarantee this character of a gift, the vote fixing the amount was always the last taken into consideration in the sessions of the supreme junta: grievances heard and discussed, all private affairs of the provinces finished, deliberation held on all that concerned the general and municipal administration, they proceeded to the debate upon the present to be offered to the King of Spain. It is enough to have studied the history of parliamentary liberties to recognize the wisdom of such an arrangement, and the guarantees it presents against the attempts of arbitrary power.

It is not only by means of their juntas and their deliberations, or by their written customs that the Basques were able to maintain their independence. One of their fundamental laws assures to each individual the right to resist any officer of the King, or any other person who made any attempt against the fueros, and even to kill him if necessary. The three provinces were bound to make common cause with the defender or slayer, and the supreme junta nominated a special delegation to watch over this clause. With the same object they rejected from parliament the two classes of individuals whom experience had shown them were the most dangerous enemies of their national liberties, the priests and the lawyers. No ecclesiastic could be chosen as deputy, while as to the lawyers, they were forbidden during all the session, even to enter the city or village where the junta was being held. For the discussion of

sidad ninguna que se ofrezca, no salga ni pueda salir gente ninguna por mar ni por tierra, por mandado del rey ni di otro ninguno, sin que primero le sea pagado el sueldo que hubiera de haber y fuere necesario por la tal jornada."

legal matters only, one "letrado" was summoned each time in quality of "asesor," but without the right to vote. Parliamentary inviolability sheltered each deputy from the time he left his home until his return, but a fine of ten thousand ducats was laid upon any representative who should propose a measure contrary to the fundamental constitution of the fueros. The sessions were always held with closed doors, and their reports were never published. The votes were counted, not by number of deputies, but from the number of houses or hearths comprised in each district. The decisions of one assembly could not be annulled by subsequent juntas; while out of respect to minorities, and when there was not a virtual unanimity, three votes were taken on three different days on the same proposition, which did not acquire the force of law until on these three occasions it obtained a majority. The Basque provinces possessed also many other privileges. Commerce was always absolutely free. Centuries before the days of Cobden and the Anti-Corn-Law League, before the evangel of free trade had been preached by our modern economists, the Basques were practicing it in its most literal sense. No line of custom houses skirted the coast or lay in wait in the passes of the Pyrénées; along the Ebro was the only line where Spain had the right to search for contrabands, and even these regulations were always the subject of special "convenios" with the provinces. All internal traffic, and for several centuries that with Labourd in France, was carried on without any restriction whatever. From time to time, one and another Spanish monarch would endeavor to lay hands upon these privileges, but the Basques always showed themselves intractable, and corruption had no hold upon them. Letters and royal edicts remained without effect so long as they had not been passed upon by the supreme junta. When Ferdinand VII., aided by the Bourbons of France, violated the Constitution with impunity, and bowed under the yoke of absolutism all the rest of the Peninsula, he did not dare to touch the privileges of the Basques. It is true that in the course of centuries these rights had undergone certain modifications. The three provinces could no longer, as did Guipuzcoa in 1482, or Vizcaya, and even certain cities, make treaties with England, or with other

powers; but their essential liberties, and the most complete autonomy were still maintained, always freedom of commerce, always exemption from all obligatory tax,—save in Guipuzcoa the *aloabala* or tax on sales made by strangers,—always, except for the navy, exemption from military service in time of peace. In the midst of an absolute monarchy the Provincias Vascongadas formed a sort of republic. It is curious to observe that the Basques never pronounced the word; their good sense, their modesty, their contempt for the term, led them rather to attach themselves to realities. They demanded and insisted upon the observance of their *fueros*, to which they obliged every new sovereign of Castile to swear. On the other hand in 1692 and 1693 the mountaineers of the Vallée d'Aspe boasted "qu' anciennement ladite vallée était une petite République, independante de toute souveraineté; elle se conduyroit par (*sic*) ses lois et ses coutumes qu'on n'a jamais enfreintes."* The valley of Andorre also, which has never known similar liberties, plumes itself on the title of Republic. But the general *fueros*, so absolute, so firm against any attack from without, are found to be circumscribed and limited in the interior of the country by a very labyrinth of franchises, privileges, charters, and local *fueros*. Each city, each valley, each little confederation of obscure market towns, like "les cinco villas," had its special *fuero*, its own particular method of administering its budget, of assessing its taxes, of electing its municipal officers. The exercise of this last right often gave occasion to procedures the most different, and often the most bizarre. For elective representation of one or two grades, from the most extended universal suffrage, to the most complicated secondary election, there is scarce a theory which the Basques have not put in practice. In one city a chief elector is drawn by lot, who chooses all the municipal officers and employes; in another the retiring councillors name their successors; again they place in a bag as

* The title of this work, of great importance to such as would study the laws of the Pyrénées, is too long to be quoted entire. It begins as follows: "Seguense lous Priviledges, Franqueses et Libertats donnats et autreiats aux Vesins, Manans et Habitans de la Montaigne et Val d'Aspe per lous Seigneurs de Béarn; et primo per Mosseu Archambaut, etc., etc." Pau, Jérôme Depoux, MDCXIV, 4to. An authentic copy of the charter of Archambaud can be seen in the library of the city of Oloron.

many tickets or beans as there are persons eligible ; from these a child draws three, four, five, or six, which serve to designate the persons charged with the choice of the complete municipality. But in spite of the apparent disorder of all these minute details, sometimes comical and even ridiculous, it is not to be denied that the Pays Basque has been one of the best governed countries in the world. All these diversities, all these complications constituted the education of the people ; each citizen was interested to inform himself as to his public duties, since perhaps the coming year the lot might assign him to some municipal function. This practical acquaintance with, this continued usage of self government, is worth, in our opinion, all the vaunted advantages of the most advanced civilization. The Pays Basque has never suffered from the plague which devours the rest of the peninsula, and which a Spanish publicist has so well described, the huge evil of office-hunting ; a vice social, political, administrative, the consequences of which would terrify us if we could follow them step by step in their development.* The Basque administration has twice come out victoriously from the severest trial to which it could be submitted, that of civil war ; twice during the century the "provinces" have been the theater of desperate strife, and in these perilous circumstances, the municipal authorities to whom had been confided the commissariat of the armies of the region, have always been able to meet the demands upon them. At the end of each of these campaigns, and notwithstanding the disasters inseparable from such strife, not only have the soldiers never suffered from want of provisions, but the country possessed as many casks of wine, as many head of cattle as at the beginning of the war. The happy consequences of the Basque institutions are to be read in plainest characters on the face of the country. For centuries the traveler has remarked

* Witness the ceremony of the "*Machete Vitoriano*." In a small niche in a wall behind the church of St. Michel, was placed a wooden knife, before which the newly chosen came to take oath in the presence of the whole population and the other municipal councillors. The formula recited that if the candidate did not fulfill his obligations, his head should be cut off with a similar "machete ;" then the new procurator, preceded by officers, drums, and trumpets, kissed devoutly the object in question. *Historia de la Legislacion de España*, vol. vii., p. 522, by MARICHALAY MANRIQUE. (Madrid, 1868.)

the good condition of the roads, the cleanliness of the inns, and the general well being in the *provincias Vascongadas*. Notwithstanding a considerable emigration to the States of South America, notwithstanding the natural sterility of a great part of the soil, the population of Guipuzcoa, the only division entirely Basque, is the third in density of all Spain, and numbers 88 persons per square kilometer; Vizcaya, inhabited almost throughout by the Euskarian race, contains 87. They are only exceeded by Barcelona (108) and Pontevedra in Galicia (100). The province of Madrid, in spite of the 400,000 souls of the metropolis has but 77. In the Basque provinces, mendicancy, that plague of Spain, does not assail you at every step; everywhere is an air of comfort, at least an absence of poverty. Hospitality is dispensed with a generous hand, and at the evening meal on the highland farms it is not customary to count the guests. The Basque peasant does not like to show himself in rags, and if, as in all mountainous countries the children and young people go barefoot, they are sure to don for Sunday the "spartingues," adorned with "ligas" at the waist, with red or blue b  ret, and velvet trousers. Statistics, it is true, show that education is still very defective among the Basques; reading and writing are yet unknown to the great number, while their ignorance of other countries is astonishing. But the illiterate man who keeps in good cultivation his bit of ground, is a very different being from the blind brute lost in the purlieus of a great city. He knows his country as well as a geographer; he can tell its natural history, its products, its traditions, its legends; in the Basque provinces he retains in his memory the principal articles of the charters of his liberties; he knows, often by experience the practical details of administration. "Never," said to me one of the most learned men in France, "do I talk with a peasant without learning something from him; from a teacher, persuaded that he knows everything, I often bring away nothing at all." It is not to be thought that the Basques neglect or disdain instruction for their children; they seize with avidity every occasion which offers for them to acquire it of those in whom they have confidence. The little Euskarians are good pupils, neither dull nor rebellious; but as I have already said, maturer years

do not always fulfill the promises of childhood ; at least they are never below the average.

One is amused with the pretensions of the Basques to be all "hidalgos." The nobility of the Escualdunac is indeed affirmed by a great number of general fueros, of which the benefits were real and substantial. In their mutual relations as citizens the question had but little importance ; if certain of their families possessed great influence and received special consideration, all Basques before the law were recognized equal. Every Euskarian had the right to hunt and fish. He was a free man, exempt from tax, "gabelle," or "corvée." Owing nothing to a Seigneur, he contributed nothing to the resources of the country save in such measure as he imposed it upon himself through his representatives. How was such an individual to be designated by Spanish jurists ? In what words could he be described without manifest contradiction to all the principles of law, not only of the peninsula, but of the greater part of Europe ? The Basque was a freeman in fact, and in law ; it was impossible to apply to him any other designation. But the only man thus free was the baron, the noble ; hence the Basque was baron, was noble, with privileges greater, and of more worth than the egotistical privileges of the superior caste of feudal times ; for they conferred upon him political, administrative, municipal duties. The universal nobility of the Basques was in no way an appanage of family, it was a nobility of nation and of race. To prove his position, to confirm his rights, he had no need of a genealogy extending back to some semi-fabulous ancestor ; no charter was demanded, nor parchment bearing royal seal. The Basque needed not to possess a foot of land, he only needed to show that Basque, he was born on Basque soil, from a Basque parentage of two generations. This proved, under the Spanish law he was hidalgo. Among his fellow citizens, simple Basque ; free like them all, he ever held himself ready to do his duty with his brethren, to give his life for the constitution of his country, for those fueros which made him a free man.

How has it happened, that the most extreme partisans of pure absolutism, the defenders of a policy the most retrograde, should have been recruited among a people in possession of

institutions so strongly liberal? It is difficult to answer in a few words; but the phenomenon appears to come from two causes; one, slow and inevitable, in harmony with the progress of liberty in the rest of the peninsula; the other, the history of a series of deceptions and mistakes.

Never has a people striven so gallantly for an object more miserably illusory. After careful examination of their institutions, and of the question at stake, a distinguished correspondent of a North American journal calls them, "Republicans fighting for Divine Right." These men who possessed the largest measure of liberty ever accorded, formed the following of Don Carlos, and served as support to the most tyrannical of absolutisms, to the most violent of reactions.

Every Basque was noble, freeman before the law. So long as anywhere else in Spain existed a privileged class, this privilege of the Basques must exist. The Basque was right in fighting to the death for the maintenance of his magnificent birthright. But when, throughout the entire peninsula, there no longer existed a servile class, when every Spaniard was declared free, when the taxes voted by the national representatives were assessed among all the citizens, these rights and privileges had no longer a ground of existence, they must come to an end with the Basques of the three provinces, as they had already on this side the Pyrénées. From this moment the Vascongados could no longer play the part of freemen, but that of members of a favored class; they became adversaries of general liberty, an irritating exception to the laws of their country.

The Basques had, and still have the right to insist upon all the guarantees possible against the violation of their ancient liberties; to act with all reserve, to take all precautions that the honest, economical, essentially practical character of their internal administration should not be overwhelmed in the corrupt, negligent, costly system of the Spanish government. Unfortunately upon this question has been grafted that of religion, and of dynasty. Rightly or wrongly, the Basques have become persuaded that the existence of their *fueros* is bound up with the maintenance of the crown in the male line, with the supremacy of the Roman Catholic dogma, and with the

unity of worship in Spain. The Basque is a fervent Catholic; the Liberals, he is told, have pillaged the churches, driven out the monks, sold the convents, persecuted the clergy. . . . Enemies of the religious beliefs of the Basques, how could they be other than hostile to their political and communal institutions!

One of the greatest faults of the constitutional liberals in Spain, and they have committed a great number, was not to have guaranteed the Basque *fueros* immediately after the death of Ferdinand VII. At that epoch, as during the first period of the French Revolution, the greater part of the industrial towns in the Basque provinces, as well as a majority of the higher classes, would have readily accepted the new ideas;* but the liberals hesitated, and Charles V., perhaps for the only time in his life, exhibited energy and foresight: he pronounced himself strongly for the preservation of the *fueros*. The clergy, it is needless to say, sided with the absolute monarchy; which was enough to determine the Basques to an uprising against a government which seemed disposed to undermine institutions so dear to them. Notwithstanding, the large towns of the provinces, Bilbao, Vittoria, San Sebastian, Pampeluna, have never been thoroughly devoted to the maintainers of Divine Right. "Fuerists" they are, all of them, but not Carlists. Their inhabitants are as much attached to their ancient privileges as the other Basques, but they will not declare themselves the allies of the adversaries of equal rights in Spain; they are not willing to impose the despotism which they themselves reject.

The *fueros* are passing away. If, in a theoretical point of view this is not to be regretted, it seems to us deplorable in every way, both practically, and in the actual condition of civil life in Spain. The provincial and municipal administration of the Basques has been excellent; even at the time when Spain was most rapidly accelerating her own decadence, the Basque provinces formed an exception to the rest of the Peninsula. Brigandage did not exist, the country was in security, the people contented. The Spanish administration, one of

* See pp. 32-37 of the introduction of M. Canovas del Castillo to *los Vascongados*, by Rodriguez Ferrer. Madrid, 1878.

the most neglected, and most extravagant in Europe, is going on to recover itself from its debasement, and no one can witness without sorrow the swallowing up of the probity and practical wisdom of the Euskarians. What body of rules, however well digested, can take the place of that administrative education, the fruit of so many centuries of honesty and prudence! The difference is world-wide between the illy paid government clerk, who thinks but of the means to augment his meagre salary, or of intrigues for his advancement; and municipalities freely chosen, who are responsible to free men, their brothers, for what they have done for the common good, in accordance with the traditions of their ancestors! The present government desires the prosperity of the provinces; it has even appointed a commission to study the Basque institutions, to discover which of them may be usefully employed in other parts of Spain. Our hope is that they may go on in this direction, and that instead of introducing among the Basques the errors of Castilian bureaucracy, the administration of the Peninsula may henceforth be inspired by the wisdom, the probity, the economy practiced for so long a time by one of the most insignificant peoples of all beautiful Spain.

ARTICLE VII.—PROFESSOR BOWNE'S METAPHYSICS.

A Study in First Principles. By BORDEN P. BOWNE.

THE philosophies of Hume and Berkeley may be regarded as types of the two great and antithetical philosophical methods. Nothing can be more erroneous than the opinion that Hume was the successor of Berkeley in philosophy. Their philosophic achievements were made from totally different points of view: the theses they maintained were totally different. Hume's question was, "Can a philosophic system be erected on a basis of absolute certainty?" Berkeley's was, "Can the assumptions of common sense be made intelligible and consistent?" Every one knows their respective answers. Hume's answer was an emphatic negative. He saw, as few philosophers of any age have seen, that the attempt to build a philosophic system on a basis of absolute certainty, is an impossibility. Rid yourself, he said in substance, of all impulses to belief that cannot be defended at the bar of pure intelligence; disregard all tendencies to believe what you cannot *prove* to be either true or probable, try to obtain for your conclusions *metaphysical certitude* or metaphysical probability, and you will find yourself absolutely unable to take a step beyond the facts of present consciousness. That there has been a past, that there will be a future, that there is an outward, that we live in a world surrounded by other people, are matters lacking not only *proof*, but the smallest vestige of philosophical probability. Most people are willing to take the first step. They are ready to admit that our beliefs have no absolute certainty, that they have instead only a high degree of probability. They claim that this probability is so high, however, as to be to all intents and purposes practically certain. Such unphilosophical compromises are very popular, but we need to bear in mind that they are no concession of the validity of Hume's reasoning. Hume never stated his thesis in so many words, but I conceive it to have been this: The beliefs of science, of religion, of

every day life, are incapable of the slightest justification in the estimation of pure intellect. They are not only incapable of proof, they cannot be shown to have the slightest vestige of philosophical probability. Speculative certainty and speculative probability are equally unattainable, whatever be the subject-matter of our reasoning.

Now Hume's question and Hume's answer, Berkeley entirely ignored. The philosophical movement, which began with Descartes and culminated in Hume, the attempt to establish all our beliefs on a basis of absolute certainty, was entirely foreign to his point of view. Hume's conclusions were as irrelevant to his question as the proof that you cannot hear a color or see a sound. It is well known that Berkeley paid no attention to Hume's speculations, and I think we can see the reason even if we suppose him to have been acquainted with them.

"Suppose you are right," we can imagine him saying to Hume, "Suppose it to be true that such evidence as we can get would have no weight in the estimation of beings bereft of their practical and non-rational impulses: what of it? We are not that kind of beings. The inquiry for us is, what is evidence to *us having those practical and non-rational impulses*. We need to know how we with our nature ought to think of this world in which we live. The question for us is, How shall we, accepting the impulses and tendencies of our non-rational nature, and the beliefs to which they lead us, how shall we think of the great questions of our origin and destiny? I, for one, propose to stand by the convictions of the practical man. I am not troubled about making assumptions. You may be right in your opinion that no basis can be obtained either for speculative proof or probability. I neither know nor care whether that is true or not. I propose to accept the non-rational impulses of common sense without asking the sanction of the pure intellect. I only make this proviso: that the principles of common sense be made intelligible and consistent. I am ready enough to believe what I cannot prove, but I am not ready to believe what is unintelligible and contradictory. I do not intend to seek intellectual justification for my first principles. I shall only insist that they be thinkable and consistent. Common sense asserts the existence of space, time, and the external

world; the reality of causation and the uniformity of nature. So do I. Common sense does not ask for proof of them. Neither do I. But since I have a rational as well as a non-rational nature, I insist that these beliefs be intelligible and consistent. I defer to common sense in accepting my first principles without proof. I defer to reason in insisting upon the necessity of making them intelligible and consistent."* I do not mean to intimate that Berkeley ever characterized his own position as definitely as this. I doubt if either he or Hume ever appreciated the true character of their work. They addressed themselves to the solution of entirely different problems and succeeded admirably. Hume made it impossible for any philosopher to attempt to build a philosophic system on a basis of absolute certainty without being guilty of the grossest anachronism. Berkeley pursued substantially what I conceive to be the only philosophical method open to us, and reached conclusions, the substantial accuracy of which, succeeding investigations have more and more fully confirmed. But I doubt that either of them sufficiently reflected upon the work he had accomplished as to understand its true significance.

More than a year and a half ago I wrote these words: "When Berkeley assumed the hypotheses of common sense with the proviso that he be allowed to put a meaning in them, he was unconsciously pursuing the true philosophical method. If a man should assume the hypotheses of common sense in astronomy, he would be a fool. Common sense forms hypotheses to explain such facts as it knows, but in astronomy it does not know the facts. But he who accepts its hypotheses respecting the familiar and obvious facts of every day life, who rids them of their inconsistencies, and makes them intelligible to the attentive mind, has the highest possible guarantee that he will not go astray. The hypotheses of common sense are made in the interests of no sect or system, are made under the influence of no bias or prejudice, and therefore are not to be despised." And this is the method of Prof. Bowne, following Herbart as he says. He states it as follows: "What then is our method? It is plain that every philosophical inquiry assumes a certain

* See Ferrier's "Philosophical Remains," Article on Berkeley and Idealism; also "Philosophy of Berkeley" in Frazer's *Life of Berkeley*.

trust of reason in itself. This is a universal fact of mind, and hence a fact of the system of which we form a part. This self-confidence of reason is not to be groundlessly distrusted, both because such distrust would be irrational, and because it would forestall all investigation. In discussing our theory of things, we propose, therefore, to take everything as it seems to be, and to make only such changes as are necessary to bring our views into harmony with themselves. The reasons for doubt and modification are to be sought entirely in the nature of the object, and not in the possibility of verbal doubt. Such a method does no violence to the natural sense of probability, which can never be needlessly violated with impunity. Such a method, too, allows reason its full rights. It is an act of faith and not scepticism; for it makes no changes unless reason calls for them.

If we distinguish between appearance and reality, it is because reason can be harmonized with itself in no other way. We take, therefore, the theory of things which is formed by spontaneous thought, and make it the text for a critical exegesis, in the hope of making it adequate and consistent. We take the notions of common-sense as they exist, and the functions ascribed to them, and change them only as reason itself prescribes. Our only assumption is a provisional trust in reason; but we by no means assume that inquiry will leave our general views unchanged. Nor is our problem any more speculative than are the theoretical problems of physical science, while the method is the same in both cases. Physics, going out from phenomena, asks how we must conceive of the unseen agent, or agents, which produce them. Accordingly, it posits atoms, ethers, etc., of various kinds and powers. Indeed, theoretical physics is metaphysics as far as it goes. And the physicist carries himself beyond the phenomena by the sole force of reason. He has no other criterion of truth in this unseen realm than the mind itself. He enters it only by thought, and thought is the only warrant for its existence. We go to work in the same way, and appeal to the same standard. We use, therefore, no new methods and appeal to no occult authority."* Professor Bowne, it will be noted,

*Page 18.

bases his philosophy on common-sense, but in a way altogether different from that in vogue in the Scotch philosophy. Reid and his school went to common-sense to learn principles and matters of fact; Herbart and Berkeley to get a method of investigation. The Scotch philosophers established their first principles by a method, which, if logically followed out, would have resulted in philosophic scepticism. For common-sense asserts principles as well as matters of fact, and the logical development of its principles has led to conclusions in every age of the world, diametrically opposed to its matters of fact. One may say that the whole advance of science and philosophy, has consisted in the substitution of reasoned facts obtained through the principles of common-sense for the unreasoned facts of common-sense. The only logical thing, therefore, is to give up the facts or the principles. To give up the facts is to abandon the Scottish philosophy. To give up the principles, is to give up the victories of science and philosophy, and to go back to the pre-scientific age. What the Scottish philosophers have really done is this: They have made a kind of compromise. They have retained certain facts in spite of the principles, and given up others because of the principles. The facts which they have retained, they have said we must accept or pronounce our nature a lie. The facts which they have rejected, are susceptible of the same kind of proof in spite of their rejection. Of course there is logically but one method to adopt and that is the method of our author: attach to the facts of common-sense only a provisional value and make its method supreme. If the so-called facts of unreasoning common-sense come in conflict with the principles of common-sense—abandon them. *Until* then, retain them.

But the method plainly requires extreme care and delicacy for its proper use. We are to attach to the facts of common-sense only a provisional value, but what are they? However provisional their value, it is necessary to determine what they are for they constitute the matter of all our reasoning. They may undergo wonderful transformations in this process of philosophical alchemy, but however transformed they are the sole content of our thinking, they are the sole constituents of reality. And these facts are to be tested by the principles of com

mon-sense. But what are the principles? Our author remarks that they are commonly conceived with great looseness and lack of precision. And that is undoubtedly true, but it is all-important, nevertheless to learn what they are. They are for us, Professor Bowne thinks, the test and standard of all truth. They constitute the Supreme Court of reason. What the Bible is to the believer in verbal inspiration, and the Pope to the devout Catholic, they are to be to the philosopher. Certainly, therefore, no pains should be spared to learn what they are. Professor Bowne says that the fundamental notions of being, change, space, time, and cause do enter into our thinking such as it is, and we are justified in asking what meaning they have for reflective thought. Three of these notions, being, space, and time are among the so-called facts of common-sense. The fifth, cause, is one of the principles, one of the canons by means of which we are to judge of the validity of the so-called facts. It is apparent, therefore, that if Professor Bowne proposes to make any use of this particular principle he ought to have stated explicitly what he understands it to mean and how he would justify it. This he fails to do in the case of all his first principles. We are told in general that every philosophical inquiry assumes a certain trust of reason in itself, that a belief has no value in a philosophical system unless based on rational grounds. But we have no detailed and explicit statement of the rational grounds of his first principles, or of what we are directed to trust in when we are told we must trust in reason. We are told, indeed, that the test of knowledge must be found in knowledge itself, that this will consist in the self-evidence or necessity of the conception, and in the inner harmony of our conceptions with one another. But what is the meaning of this? Professor Bowne well knows the oft reiterated charge that beliefs apparently self-evident and necessary have ceased even to be believed. Was it not self-evident to the ancients that the earth was flat, and that the sun revolved around it once in twenty-four hours? Was it not self-evident to everybody before the time of Berkeley, and has it not been to most people since, that we directly see distance? No, Professor Bowne would undoubtedly say, these things never were self-evident because they are

not true. They were only apparently self-evident. But the question is, can we distinguish between apparent self-evidence and actual self-evidence? It will be noted, of course, that actual self-evidence is self-evidence to consciousness and apparent self-evidence is that which appears to be self-evident to consciousness. The question which Professor Bowne ought to have answered is this: What are the marks by which actual self-evidence is to be discriminated from apparent self-evidence? Until this question is answered, his assertion that the test of knowledge is to be found in self-evidence is absolutely valueless. Not knowing how to find actual self-evidence we are unable to apply the test. We cannot tell, therefore, whether our philosophy is based on arbitrary assumptions, or whether it rests on rational grounds. Further, what does Professor Bowne mean by saying that the test of knowledge is to be found in self-evidence *and* the inner harmony of our conceptions? Does he mean that the inner harmony of our conceptions, consistency, in a word, is, by itself a test of truth? Hardly, since he well knows that utterly false systems may be consistent. Does he mean that self-evidence by itself is not a sufficient test of knowledge, requires to be bolstered up by consistency? That would seem to be a strange sort of self-evidence—that is not sure of its object until it has gone through a process of reasoning to test the consistency of its conceptions. But we are not only left with a test of knowledge so vaguely stated as to be utterly valueless; we are not told what principles they guarantee, nor what the principles mean which we find him assuming as guaranteed, from time to time.

The consequences of this neglect appear very early in the author's reasoning. The whole of the ontology is based on the assumption of efficient causation. Deny that and it falls to the ground. But what does it mean? It is indisputable that philosophers have shown over and over again that cause must mean one of two things; either an invariable, unconditional antecedent, or the conscious exercise of the will. Professor Bowne himself affirms this without qualification. "How can a thing act? How can a thing be? Both questions stand on the same plane; and both facts, that of action and that of being, have to be admitted as ultimate facts, which we can never

rationally hope to comprehend. Here, again, experience solves for us the problem which reflection cannot master. Every one knows himself as active. We control and direct our own mental states, to a certain extent, at least, and, in so doing, we are conscious of ourselves as controlling. And this is our only experience of action. In the outer world we see sequence in phenomena or mutual change, but no agency. That there is an agent producing these changes is no fact of experience, but a necessary assumption of the mind. Even in the case of our neighbors, we see only a succession of changes. That there is a controlling self, is not a perception, but an inference. Only in the case of our own mental action can we get behind the appearance to the source of action; and how we ourselves can act, we do not know. But all external action must be assimilated to our own, or remain utterly mysterious. Conception, volition, and a sense of effort condition the only action of which we have any knowledge; but it is not clear that we are justified in viewing them as conditions of all action. At the same time, it is not clear that we are justified in excluding them from any action. Many philosophers have insisted that there can be no action without conscious volition. Berkeley urged this view as one reason for denying agency to matter. And it must be allowed that when we try to conceive impersonal activity, it vanishes into sequence, and the notion of action perishes. Kant made antecedence and sequence the schema of cause and effect, as the only form under which causation can be represented to the mind, and the empiricists declare that causation is nothing more. Conscious action is the only action of which we can form any conception. If A is to react on B, in certain conditions, it must in some way become aware of those conditions, and if not consciously, how then? All is darkness in this direction. Action is a fact, and hence is possible. We know nothing more. We may add, however, that though we hold that an activity is personal, we are not content to get the conclusion, from the simple fact that we cannot picture impersonal activity. The argument from impotence warrants no positive conclusion."*

This passage contains three statements, all of which are worthy of very careful attention: (1) The only action which

* Page 109.

we have experienced or can conceive is conscious action ; (2) when we try to conceive impersonal activity it vanishes into sequence and the notion of action perishes ; (3) our inability to conceive unconscious causation does not warrant us in denying that it exists. Each of these statements is made twice over in this paragraph and occurs again and again in different parts of the book. We may, therefore, regard them as an authoritative statement of some of the author's opinions on the subject of causation. We learn from this passage that efficient causation may be either conscious or unconscious, so far as we can tell on *a priori* grounds, but when it is unconscious, if ever, it is inconceivable. And the author's way of putting it helps us to realize how utterly inconceivable it is. "If it is to react on B in certain conditions, it must in some way become aware of those conditions, and if not consciously, how then?" Try to realize the opposing alternative, "unconsciously aware," and you will accept the more readily the author's statement that unconscious causation is inconceivable. But this is to admit that unconscious causation is a formula into which we can put no meaning. Not being conceivable, it is incapable of being translated into thought. Hence efficient causation is either conscious causation or a meaningless x , and we have no way in any case of deciding between these two interpretations. That being true, efficient causation is utterly useless as a premise in philosophical reasoning. Any syllogism in which it occurs has four terms and is therefore invalid. Further, the absurdity of pronouncing it self-evident becomes manifest from this point of view. If efficient causation is self-evident, we must be able to conceive it. Conversely, if we cannot conceive it, it cannot be self-evident. To pronounce an unconceived proposition self-evident is a contradiction in terms.

If these criticisms are just, the foundation of this system of metaphysics crumbles into dust, and the elaborate superstructure tumbles down with a crash. I have said that the whole of the ontology is based on the assumption of efficient causation. To make the ontology valid two conditions must be fulfilled : The use of efficient causation as a premise must be justified, and the inferences from it must be sound. Professsr Bowne meets neither of these conditions. In admitting that efficient

causation *may* be utterly inconceivable, his attempt to justify it becomes a palpable failure, and the reasonings from it unsound. Perhaps it will be said that we need only to correct him on a single point—that we need only assume that efficient causation is necessary and *conscious*, to make his ontology sound. But Professor Bowne cannot be so defended, without denying all originality to his system. His ontology derives the whole of its individuality from the attempt to reach substantially Berkeley's conclusions by a different course of reasoning. Substitute efficient causation as Berkeley understood it, for the causation of Professor Bowne, and the ontology becomes a re-statement of Berkeley's arguments and Berkeley's conclusions, and all individuality and originality disappears.

But let us waive these difficulties; let us suppose that efficient causation has a perfectly definite meaning. What conclusions does the author base upon it? His method is, it will be remembered, to start from the facts of common sense, and modify them only as we are required by the principles of common sense. Bearing this in mind, let us see how he answers his first question: "In what does the reality or being of things consist?" Now I think it is plain that common sense makes no answer to this question, because it never asks it. Being, in its first intention, to use Hodgson's phrase, being in its relation to consciousness, common sense does not consider. Being, in its second intention, in its relation to other beings, is a matter of practical importance, and therefore comes within the scope of common sense. It means a factor in the system of things which must be taken into account in our estimation of the condition of other things. In spite of the notion of passive being, I do not believe that common sense ever affirms existence of pure passivity, or what it conceives to be such. Let us then remember this as the provisional answer to the first question: Beings act. Note carefully, however, that our sole reason for giving this provisional answer is that common sense says so. If common sense had said the contrary, that the nature of being is not to act, we should have been equally required to return that answer provisionally. Our method requires us to go to common sense with no theory of what it ought to say, save that its utterances ought to be intelligible and consistent.

That condition being complied with, we are to take its utterances in simple, child-like faith. To ask for reasons for them is to forget "our only assumption," "a provisional trust in reason." Professor Bowne does not always remember this. In speaking of passive being he says: "Allowing however that the notion itself is possible, we have still to ask what help we get in explaining the universe from this assumption of passive being. What does it do, found, or explain? The reply will be that no matter whether it explains anything or not, it is given in experience as a fact, and that we are in constant contact with it through the senses. We ask again: How do we know that? The bare existence of a thing is never a sufficient ground for its perception; if it were we ought to be percipient of all existence. Hence in order to the perception of a thing there must be some corresponding action upon us, if not by the thing itself, then by something else. But by hypothesis, this passive being does not affect us and therefore we can perceive it only as some other being acts upon us. The passive being not only explains nothing but its existence can never be known except as a revelation. Now whoever will reflect that this being does and explains nothing, and that all the effects upon him by which he becomes aware of its existence, are the activities of something else, will see that there is and can be no warrant for introducing such a factor into a philosophical system."* He appears to forget that everything we know, we learn in the last analysis through a revelation. How do we know that nature is uniform, that memory is trustworthy, that phenomena have efficient causes? Only through a revelation made to the whole world. How do we know that there are any facts, save those of present consciousness, to be interpreted and made consistent with one another? Only through this same revelation. He forgets that the only reason in the last analysis for introducing any factor in a philosophical system is the bare, unsupported assertion of common sense. He seems to think it fatal to admit that passive being explains nothing. He forgets that the same common sense which affirms the necessity of explanation, might conceivably assert the existence of passive being.† He says: "In order to the perception of a thing there must be some cor-

* I mean of course as far as this argument is concerned. † Page 42.

responding action upon us, if not by the thing itself then by something else." Instead of discussing the perception of a passive thing, let us take the case of the perception of a past experience in memory. "Hence in order to the perception of a thing" (recollection of the past) "there must be some corresponding action upon us, if not by the thing itself" (past itself) "then by something else." "But by hypothesis this passive being" (past experience) "does not affect us and therefore we can perceive it only as some other being acts upon us. The passive being" (past recollected) "not only explains nothing but its existence can never be made known except as a revelation. Now whoever reflects that this being" (past recollected), "does and explains nothing, and that all the effects upon him by which he becomes aware of its existence, are the activities of something else, will see that there is and can be no warrant for introducing such a factor in a philosophical system." If therefore this argument is good against passive being, it is good against every fact of memory, and we have nothing left but states of present consciousness. Conversely if not good against the facts of memory, it is not good against passive being.* The whole argument, it will be noted, rests on the unproved and unjustified assertion that being can be assumed only as it explains phenomena. Another caution is needed. Common sense says that action is the mark of the being of things, but we ought not to understand this as an affirmation that action is the mark of all being. On the contrary it is the undoubted opinion of common sense that space and time exist and do *not* act. Things existing in space and time act, but space and time do not. Such, I conceive, is the opinion of common sense. With these suggestions of caution let us note that the net result reached thus far is that beings act. Now in the opinion of common sense being is one thing and action, its attribute, another. The author very easily shows a flat contradiction between an entirely passive being as substance and action as attribute. The relation posited by common sense between

* The reader will note carefully that I am not disagreeing with the author in his conclusion that there is no passive being. I am only criticising what I conceive to be a poor argument in behalf of a true conclusion.

passive things and their inactive attributes is inconceivable, incapable of rational affirmation. The result of this criticism is that the sole content of being is action. There is no hard lump or kernel of inactive reality. The sole reality is action. A question naturally arises here: what kind of action? Mental action or non-mental action, or both? This question is left unanswered. There is the same ambiguity here that we have noticed already in the case of efficient causation. We must content ourselves with this answer: the being of things consists in activity, though what activity means we do not know.

This conclusion, it will be noted, determines the nature of things as distinguished from non-existence only. Every thing in the universe exists: what do we mean by that, is the question we have been trying to answer up to this point. The author next endeavors to answer a different question: What is the explanation of the nature of things considered as individuals? In the preceding discussion we abstracted from their individual character and considered them only as existing. Now we restore their individual character and inquire into their nature as individuals. Why is a tree different from a stone, or a stone from a block of wood, or a block of wood from a piece of gold? What, in short, is the distinguishing essence of different things? The answer is easy: if the nature of being in general is activity, the nature of particular cases of being, must consist in particular laws or forms of activity. The crude ideas of common sense, that the nature of things is an ultimate unanalyzable fact; that a thing passively exists with all its sense qualities is clearly inconsistent with what we have learned of the nature of being in general. If existence is action, a particular kind of existence must be a particular kind of action. To say that existence in general is action, and a particular kind of existence is the passive possession of sense-qualities is a contradiction. Herbart's opinion is equally contradictory. Herbart thought that the essence of a thing consists in the possession of some unknown quality from which all its known qualities might be deduced. As Descartes thought that all of the qualities of matter could be deduced from extension and those of mind from consciousness, so Herbart thought

there is some unknown quality, which, if known would furnish the explanation of every individual thing. Now, as Professor Bowne says, if quality means only kind he is entirely right. He seems, however, to have meant something which can be intuited, and in the nature of the case such a thing cannot unite within itself both activity and permanence. If a quality change it must cease to be that quality and become another. "Red may give place to black, but red cannot change to black." Or red may give place to another shade of red but cannot change to it. If then the nature of being in general is action, the nature of any particular thing must consist in a particular law of activity.—"Our conclusion is that a thing must be viewed as a concrete and definite principle of action."

Thus far our author has been occupied with the attempt to answer two questions: (1) What is the nature of being, in general, and (2) What is the nature of individual things? He now attempts to answer a third question: Can changing things remain the same? Is this another of the so-called facts of common sense that criticism is to transform into something else, or can we incorporate it in our philosophical system? This is the question we now proceed to answer. We need first to understand the meaning of change. It is not mere diversity. It is a sequence obeying law, a sequence in which every term of the series is causally related to the preceding, and in which it in turn becomes a cause. With this conception of change our question can be easily answered. If the nature of a thing is action, if its entire being *is*, not *has*, action, and if the nature of a particular thing is found in a special law of activity, it is self-evident that the only sameness in the changing thing is found in its law. Rid yourself of the notion that there is any hard kernel of reality which is not action, but has it; understand that its entire nature and essence is action, and you will see, beyond a doubt, that the continuity of a thing is simply the continuity of activities obeying the same law. Nothing is. Everything becomes. Just as a body "moving with a variable motion, never has a fixed velocity for any two consecutive instants, but is constantly acquiring one;" so a thing never is, but is constantly becoming. "What we call a thing is really a process. The process alone is permanent.

The forms of the process, which we call things, are forever coming and going." In our conscious experience we have an illustration of a different kind of identity. We have an experience of a permanent thing with changing states. In nature we have only a series of changes obeying the same law. The law abides. The series changes constantly.

Thus far we have considered being as if each particular thing were absolutely independent of every other. But this is not the opinion of common sense. Common sense affirms that they interact, and by their interaction form a system. It affirms their community along with their individuality and independence. Our next question is, Can we reconcile the independence and community of being? Can we reconcile the opinions that the sun, for instance, is an independent body while it exerts an influence upon every body in the solar system and is the recipient of similar influences in return? This is the passage which contains the pith of the author's answer. "The interaction must be declared impossible so long as the things are viewed as independent. By definition the independent must contain the ground of all its determinations in itself, and by analysis, that which is subject to the necessity of interaction must have the ground of its determinations in others, as well as in itself. The two conceptions will not combine. Every attempt to bridge the chasm between independent things by some passage of forces, influences, etc., results in a purely verbal explanation which it is impossible to think through." Let us test this reasoning. Is there any contradiction in supposing that our universe contains within itself the ground of all its determinations, while each of its parts has the ground of all its determinations in other parts? The independent, Professor Bowne defines as that which must contain the ground of all its determinations in itself. Give to determination any meaning you please, save conscious determination,* and I see no reason why the universe as a whole cannot have its determinations in itself. Take determination in the sense in which physical science uses it, and there is certainly no contradiction. Take it in the author's sense, as indicating some-

* Objective conscious determination, of course, implies essentially the Berkeleyan hypothesis.

thing of which we have no conception, and I think it is equally clear that there is no contradiction. The proposition in that case has no content, no significance. It cannot, therefore, contradict anything save simple sequence, from which it is differentiated by hypothesis. The author anticipates our objection: "But if we deny their independence what need is there for going outside of them for something else on which they depend? Why not make them mutually dependent, so that the series of things, A, B, C, etc., shall not depend on Alpha but on one another? In this way each member of the system would exist only in connection with the other members, but the system itself might be independent. The several things would constitute an arch, or rather, a self-supporting circle, and thus A, B, C, etc., would be the only realities, although they would mutually condition and imply one another. This objection is a very old one. It was current in Aristotle's time and is considered at length by him. One manifest objection is that it seeks to make an independent out of a sum of dependents. A, B, C, etc., are severally dependent, but $A+B+C$, etc., is independent. But if A, B, C, etc., are distinct, ontological units, this is absurd. There is nothing in the sign of addition which is able to transform a dependent thing into an independent."* This argument does not touch the point. It is not the addition of dependents which makes an independent, but the relation of dependent parts which constitutes an independent whole. Make the necessary changes in the last sentence quoted and it will read thus: "There is nothing in relation which is able to transform related and dependent parts into an independent whole." The question is, how does Professor Bowne know that? Has he grasped all the various kinds and modes of relation so as to see that *none* can exist between dependent parts of such a sort as to constitute an independent whole? Those who differ with Professor Bowne do not affirm that such dependent parts do actually constitute an independent whole. Arguing from his premise that possibilities of conception do not determine possibilities of existence,† they say we know nothing about it. On *a priori* grounds the question is unanswerable, and of course we have no experience to enable us to

* Page 126.

† See quotation on pages 815 and 816.

decide it. It seems to Prof. Bowne self-evident that they cannot together constitute a whole modified by nothing beyond itself. Those who differ with him can only reply that they do not see the grounds of the impossibility, and point out, as I have endeavored to do, the insufficiency of his arguments. That is the only method by which a purely negative position can be maintained.

A remark of the author in the following chapter enables me to state my objection to his argument from another point of view. "Only in selfhood do we find any proper activity and individuality in the finite. It avails nothing against this conclusion to say that the infinite may posit impersonal agents as well as personal ones; for the notion of an impersonal finite agent vanishes on analysis. As impersonal it would have no subjective activity; and as dependent it has no objective activity. Thus the notion vanishes into zero. We must say then that only self-hood suffices to mark off the finite from the infinite; and that only the finite spirit attains to substantial otherness to the infinite." Is it self-evident that finite *persons* can have proper activity while finite *things* cannot? He argues that finite things as impersonal have no subjective activity, and as dependent no objective activity. The argument we are considering is that finite things as objectively active must be dependent. My question is why may we not have objective independent action as well as subjective independent action? The all-pervading fallacy again appears; the author assumes to know what objective action is, assumes that it differs from subjective action—the only conceivable action—to such a degree that it cannot be independent though subjective action can. *If* objective action be different from subjective action, *if* in consequence we are obliged to pronounce it inconceivable, my argument is that it is utterly impossible for us to say whether objective action (*x*) be dependent or not.

My objection to the author's argument is seen from still another point of view. We are finite, and at the same time free individuals. We are centres of independent action. Ontologically we do not know whether we exist as parts of Infinite or not. We know that we *are*. *How* we are, and *what* we are

we know not. Our own nature is a profound mystery to us. For all we know then, we are independent of the Infinite not as being able to exist in opposition to his power, but as not being a part of it. Now this possibility must be taken into account in our speculations about interaction. Supposing it to be true, we must ask how interaction is possible between the finite person and the Infinite. Hear Professor Bowne's answer. "But the independent may freely posit the dependent, and may also posit a continuous interaction between itself and the dependent. But such interaction is throughout a self-determination and is not forced upon it from without." Here is another passage in which the same kind of reasoning is applied to the solution of another problem. "If the finite be anything real, it must be viewed as substantially distinct from the infinite, not as produced from it, but as created by it. Only creation can reconcile the reality of the finite with the unity of the infinite. For the finite, if real, is an agent; and as such, cannot be made out of anything but is posited by the infinite. How this can be we do not pretend to know; but any other view is wrecked by its own contradictions." Here we see the author's answer to two great questions: (1) How is interaction possible between the Infinite and the finite? Answer: The Infinite posits it. (2) How is the reality of the finite possible? Answer: The Infinite posits it. That is, the power of the Infinite is such as to make possible the "positing" of a finite, and a continuous interaction between that finite and itself. The problem we have been trying to solve is the interaction of independent things and in the case of finite *things* the author declares it impossible. We have the same problem in the case of finite *persons* and the Infinite. The problem here is, how can independent things interact? The difference between those independent things and those whose interaction has been declared impossible, is that the latter are finite and impersonal, while the former are finite and personal on the one hand, and an Infinite whose nature is undetermined on the other. Why is not the same result reached in both cases? The answer is worthy of attention. The Infinite "posits" interaction between itself and the finite. The point to be noted is that the author *cuts* his knot in the same way his opponents have done theirs. His answer amounts to this: the

possibilities of the universe are such, that we are independent, free, moral agents, while yet we are related to the Infinite as cause. Their answer is that the possibilities of the universe are such that independent things, or at any rate things not known to be dependent, do interact. Professor Bowne says the Infinite posits us and we know we are independent. They say the infinite posits matter and for all we know it may be independent. In short the interaction of finite, independent persons with an Infinite has the same difficulties for thought as the interaction of independent things with one another. Be consistent, and say with Spinoza that there is but one independent being, or admit the possible independence of all so far as appears on *a priori* grounds.

Perhaps we have misinterpreted Professor Bowne on this point. He tells us in his preface that his conclusions are "essentially those of Lotze." In the April number of the *Methodist Quarterly*, 1881,* we find this paragraph: "This immanence of all things in God is a necessary outcome of Lotze's first principles. As we have seen, no one thing can act upon another in so far as they are parts of the same organic whole; and, consequently, if there is to be communication between the finite mind and the infinite . . . it must be by means of the immanence of the finite in the infinite. Mediating between realism and idealism, Lotze can be called an ideal-realist. Pantheism and ideal realism agree in this, that all finite things are states of the infinite: they differ in this, that the one denies, the other assigns them an individuality." In other words, in Lotze's opinion, a person is, in relation to the Infinite, a state, and in relation to himself, a person. To express the same idea from another point of view: a certain state of the Infinite is in relation to the Infinite a state, and in relation to itself a person. Perhaps this is Professor Bowne's view. If so there is no force in the objection last stated. The interaction between the finite and Infinite as well as between dependent things is in the last analysis in that case only the activity of the one basal unity.

Waiving these objections, let us suppose the author's reasoning sound. Let us suppose that he has shown that all things

* Article on Hermann Lotze by W. L. Gooding.

depend in some way upon one basal being which is self-existent. It should be carefully noted that we know nothing about it, so far as his reasoning goes, save that it is the self-existent independent cause of all things existing in space and time. The author calls it the Infinite, and there is no objection to it provided he considers what he has learned of it, a good definition of the Infinite. His readers ought to know however that the Infinite, which his reasonings entitle him to assume, is not that which usually figures in metaphysical discussions. The metaphysical Infinite is only a name for the unconditioned cause of everything that is. Professor Bowne's Infinite is merely the cause of everything which exists in space and time. It may appear eventually that space and time have no objective existence, that they are simply modes in which we apprehend phenomena. But at this stage of the discussion we must not allow that possibility to warp our conclusions. Here we must simply note that the Infinite of Professor Bowne is the independent self-existent cause of things existing in space and time.

In the light of these considerations, it will appear from the following passage that Professor Bowne does not keep in mind the proper limits of his conclusions: "The conclusion, then, is that there is one basal being in action as the source of the system and of all its laws, principles, and realities. And this monism extends not only to things, but to principles also. It has been very common in English speculation to assume any number of principles, alike independent of one another and of reality. Space and time, especially, have been posited in mutual independence, and also as independent of all reality, finite and infinite alike. A common way of putting it is, that space and time would continue to exist, if God and the world were both away. A few years ago an English philosopher of note proposed to increase this number of independent principles by adding matter as "an original datum objective to God." He proposed to regard space, time, and matter as original existences, mutually independent and existing as conditioning data, with which God must get along as best he could. This return to the paleontological period of thought needs no additional criticism. The view violates the necessary unity of fundamental being. If space, time, and matter were independent of God,

they could never come into interaction; and to bring them into interaction, some one would have to be made independent, or all would be degraded into dependence on something truly fundamental. Views like these presented are the scandal of philosophy, and are possible only to the utmost superficiality. Whatever space and time may be, they cannot be independent and original existences, but all alike must be viewed as consequences in some way of fundamental being."*

The "English philosopher of note" is James Martineau, at whom it is hardly becoming in Professor Bowne to sneer. He is one of the acutest thinkers of this generation, and in the opinion of most competent critics has done very little to "scandalize philosophy" or to warrant the charge of having promulgated doctrines of the "utmost superficiality." It is especially unfortunate that the only logical basis of Professor Bowne's sneers is (1) the illogical deduction of a self-existent basal being from the fact of interaction; and (2) the confusion of this basal being with the metaphysical infinite. "The view violates the necessary unity of fundamental being." Where has he shown that fundamental being must have unity? He has attempted to show the unity of the being on whom things existing in space and time depend. Where has he shown that this basal being must be identical with other basal being? "If space and time and matter were independent of God, they could never come into interaction." What is the warrant for asserting interaction of space and time?† Surely Professor Bowne is singularly unfortunate in choosing this as an occasion for sneering at Mr. Martineau.

But what is the nature of this basal reality upon which we have seen all finite things depend? Is it blind, unintelligent, unconscious, or is it conscious, intelligent and free? The pre-ëminent practical importance of this question, as well as its speculative bearings, demands our utmost efforts to decide it as definitely as possible. Professor Bowne supports the conclusion that the Infinite is conscious, intelligent and free by three classes of arguments: (1.) Ontological; (2.) Reasons found in the order of nature; (3.) The sceptical consequences of denying it. Let me remark parenthetically that I hold Professor

* Page 145.

† See page 820.

Bowne's opinion as firmly as he does. But nothing is gained either to religion or philosophy by supporting a true conclusion by false arguments. In this faith, I propose to examine the author's reasoning as impartially as though the subject-matter were one of no human interest whatever. The author's ontological arguments are stated in the following paragraph: "Now this notion of interacting states in the one absolute being must be declared untenable. That which makes it seem possible is the false reference of each state to a part of the being, so that they can enter into a kind of spatial interaction. Of course we cannot regard the states as things, or as states of parts of the infinite, for that would cancel its unity at once. We can only mean that the plurality of states flows necessarily from the nature of the infinite, and that the succession of states is determined by the antecedent states. But in that case the principle of unity disappears, and we lose ourselves in the labyrinth of the infinite regress. We are indeed told that there is a unity, but the plurality is all we reach. Likewise the infinite itself is made subject to the law of time, and its present is referred to its past. Thus we chase the horizon; we reach no proper unity, but are lost among a plurality of states. We also reach no proper ground of anything, owing to the impassable gulf of the infinite regress. Thus reason finds no rest in the assumption that the infinite is determined by its states. We must, then, assume that the infinite determines its states, and that it is always and at every point, what it determines itself to be. There is nothing dynamically deeper than this self-determination. It is first, not second. It grounds everything without itself being grounded. Thus we escape the endless regress of necessity. But on the other hand the abyss of arbitrariness yawns to engulf us. To escape this, we must assume that this self-determination is not in the dark of chance but in the light of intelligence, and hence that the self-determiner is personal and intelligent. Only in this conception of the free person can thought be reconciled with itself, and a true explanation reached. This is the only unity which can be manifold, and the only manifold which can be a unity. This too is the only escape from the impossible and disintegrating notion of interacting metaphysical states. Again, only in this

notion of absolute personality can we attain to the proper independence and absoluteness of the infinite. As long as we remain on the ontological plane the infinite is subject to the law of time and without any possession of itself. . . . Finally, only in free thought, do we attain to any true explanation. . . . No system which founds cosmology in anything but an act of free will can retain the unity of the infinite."* This long extract contains a number of arguments, which I can only examine cursorily for lack of space. "We reach no proper unity" (in an impersonal infinite), "but are lost among a plurality of states." What wonder that we cannot conceive the impersonal infinite as unity, when we cannot conceive it at all? But the author has told us again and again that our inability to conceive a thing is no warrant for denying its existence. "We also reach no proper ground of anything, owing to the impassable gulf of the infinite regress." Suppose we do not? What of it? What right has the author to assume that we can reach the proper ground of anything? His principle of causation reveals to him the fact that things *have* proper grounds. Does it say that our minds can invariably grasp them? "To escape this" ("the abyss of arbitrariness") "we must assume that this self-determination is not in the dark of chance, but in the light of intelligence, and hence that the self-determiner is personal and intelligent." Where has he proved that we must escape the "gulf of arbitrariness?" Is that among his first principles? And has he escaped it? If so, perhaps Professor Bowne will favor the world with a statement of the reasons for creation. Until we know them, we cannot decide that we have escaped arbitrariness in discovering that the infinite is personal and intelligent. "Again only in this notion of absolute personality can we attain to the proper independence and absoluteness of the infinite." Where has he proved that the infinite must have proper independence and absoluteness? He has attempted to prove that we need an independent basal unity to explain the interaction of dependent things. But there is no trace of an argument to prove that this basal being cannot perform this function unless it is personal. If an impersonal being can explain the interaction of dependent things, what matter whether

* Page 162.

it have proper "independence and absoluteness" or not? "As long as we remain on the ontological plane, the infinite is subject to the law of time." Where has he shown that it cannot be subject to the law of time? "Indeed it is in perpetual flow and without any possession of itself." Where has he shown that it must have possession of itself? If Professor Bowne had not hopelessly confused the Infinite of his conclusions with the metaphysical Infinite, he would never have exposed himself to his own sneers at Mr. Martineau, by indulging in this parody on reasoning.

His second class of arguments for the personality of the Infinite—reasons found in the order of nature—can be briefly stated. One of them is the argument from design, an argument which I consider valid if the doctrine of evolution be assumed to be erroneous, valueless if that doctrine be accepted as a complete *scientific* explanation of the universe as it is.* The second argument of this class is, that our freedom proves that the basal power is not necessary. "For if the basal power is necessary, all that depends upon it is also necessary." How does he know that? How would he prove that an unconscious Infinite might not "posit" a free being? Here again I can only wonder at the vast multitude of assertions which do service in this system as self-evident truths, but which bear that character to Professor Bowne alone. If Professor Bowne, like Schelling, lays claim to an intellectual intuition, revealing truths concealed from the multitudes to the philosophic few, he ought to say so frankly. Disclaiming that, his readers would be grateful for a little less omniscience, and a little more argument.

I have no space to discuss the third class of arguments which the author advances to prove the personality of the Infinite, the arguments based on the consequences of denying it. I will only say that the consequences of non-theism seem to me to make theism the only logical conclusion. Theism or philosophical scepticism seem to me the only logical alternatives. Recall the well established fact that all knowledge rests on faith, see how utterly a life of trust ours must be, and it

*In an Article in the March number of the *New Englander* I have stated the grounds of this opinion at some length.

will be apparent that unless we believe in a being at the back of things who is worthy of trust, we have no right to believe anything.

Here ends the ontology of Professor Bowne. At this point, perhaps, I may profitably restate the fundamental fallacy of this part of our author's system. His aim was, I have said, to reach substantially Berkeley's conclusion by a different and more rigidly logical course of reasoning. Berkeley assumed, illogically, in Professor Bowne's opinion, that the inconceivable is the impossible, and hence easily reached the Supreme Conscious Will as the explanation of everything that is, since unconscious causes are inconceivable. The author avoids Berkeley's illogical assumption in the case of causation, but makes it at every critical stage in the development of his philosophy. Can independent things interact? No, says Professor Bowne. The interaction of independent things cannot be conceived, therefore we must deny it, forgetting that, in attempting to make an advance upon Berkeley, he had denied that the inconceivable is the impossible. Can an impersonal infinite have unity? No, is his answer. It cannot be conceived. It is plain, then, that this system cannot claim the merit of reaching substantially Berkeley's conclusion, without Berkeley's illogical assumption. Nor can it like Berkeley's lay claim to the merit of consistency.

I had reached this point in my Article when there came into my hands a summary of Lotze's lectures on his *Metaphysik* dictated by himself. A careful examination of it so far as it deals with his *Ontologie* constrains me to say that one of the paragraphs in Professor Bowne's Preface is exceedingly ambiguous, more so, I think, than any other in his book. The following is the passage to which I refer. "Whether in the views herewith presented I have grasped any truth; or whether by long brooding in solitude, I have fallen a prey to some idol of the speculative den, must be left to the reader to decide. I am encouraged, however, to hope that I have not gone wholly astray by the fact that there is nothing unheard-of in the results reached. Leibnitz furnishes the starting-point, Herbart supplies the method, and the conclusions reached are essentially those of Lotze. I have reached them, for the most part,

by strictly independent reflection, but, so far as their character is concerned, there would be no great misrepresentation in calling them Lotzian. So much concerning pedigree." I had supposed from this that Professor Bowne had reached "essentially the conclusions of Lotze" by lines of argument peculiar to himself, and not that his system is substantially an exposition of Lotze's. Collier, and Berkeley, for instance, reached substantially the same conclusions, and published them about the same time, though each was ignorant of the results of the other. Ferrier reached essentially the conclusions of Berkeley though by lines of argument entirely peculiar to himself. Mansel, building on Hamilton's foundation, erected a philosophic system differing from Hamilton's in so many and such important details as to make him rightfully the author of it. Mathematicians frequently demonstrate the same theorem by totally different methods, and there are many instances of entirely different scientific proofs of the same thesis discovered by different men. Something like this, I supposed Professor Bowne had done. When he said that Leibnitz furnished the starting-point and Herbart the method, I supposed he meant to have his readers understand that, from a starting-point, and by the use of a method, peculiar to himself, so far as Lotze is concerned, he had reached by his own lines of argument essentially the conclusions of the great German. But an examination of this summary makes it difficult for me to believe that I interpreted Professor Bowne's preface correctly. His starting-point, his method, his line of argument, his conclusions not only in general but in detail, are essentially Lotze's. I will briefly state some of the facts upon which this opinion is based.

I have attempted in this Article to expound the leading ideas of Professor Bowne's Ontology. On page 818 I have said that Professor Bowne's first question is, "In what does the being of things consist?" and that the answer is, being acts. That is Lotze's first question, and that is Lotze's answer. On page 820 we have seen that Professor Bowne points out the contradiction between pure being as passive substance, and action as its attribute. So does Lotze. Professor Bowne's next question (p. 821) is: What is the nature of things considered as individuals? and his answer is, the nature of things is found

in a concrete law or principle of activity. That is Lotze's next question and that is Lotze's answer. Professor Bowne criticized Herbart (p. 821) for holding that the nature of a thing is found in a supersensible quality. So does Lotze. Professor Bowne then asks (p. 821): Can changing things remain the same? After determining the meaning of change, his answer is the only sameness to a changing thing is the sameness of law. Lotze asks the same question, and after determining the meaning of change returns the same answer. Professor Bowne then asks, Can independent things interact? and decides that they cannot because interaction and independence are contradictory. What appears to be the interaction of independent things is really the interaction of modes of one self-existent, basal reality. Lotze asks the same question, and returns the same answer. I have called attention to the fact that Professor Bowne confuses the Infinite of his conclusions with the metaphysical Infinite. So does Lotze. Professor Bowne then discusses the relation of the finite to the Infinite, and decides that the finite has only a phenomenal existence, and is what it is because of the Infinite. Lotze discusses the same subject and reaches the same conclusions, except that he explicitly affirms what is left ambiguous in Professor Bowne's exposition, that finite persons, though free are yet but manifestations of the infinite. The only real divergence of Professor Bowne from Lotze, so far as appears from this summary, occurs in his discussion of the nature of the infinite. Of Professor Bowne's three classes of argument, only one, the ontological, appears in this summary. These are some of the facts which compel me to believe that when Professor Bowne said "Leibnitz furnished the starting point, Herbart supplies the method and the conclusions reached are essentially those of Lotze," he meant to disclaim all originality, and to avow that his system is substantially an exposition of Lotze's. With these facts before him, the reader can decide whether it would not have been more creditable to him to have stated his relations to Lotze more clearly and unequivocally.

However this may be, the book ought to add to the deservedly high reputation of its author as a thinker and writer. Its publication is a great service to English-speaking philosophical

students. Professor Bowne has ably expounded, in his own clear, epigrammatic English a great system of metaphysics. He has given to English and American students easy access to one of the greatest systems of this century. It has great defects, as I have tried to show, but whoever remembers the greatness of the attempt, and the multitude of previous failures will not be surprised at that. At any rate it is a *system* of metaphysics, and not a discussion of some metaphysical question. Excepting Spencer and Hodgson, and Ferrier, and Mansel, I recall no English-speaking philosophers who have attempted anything more than a discussion of some metaphysical question or questions, unless Hume's purely destructive arguments can be called such. Professor Bowne has conferred upon our American students the opportunity of mastering a great metaphysical system, and, in doing this, he has accomplished a work for which all who have the interests of philosophy at heart should be grateful.

My review has been confined to his Ontology. In a future Article I propose to give some account of the remainder of the book—the Cosmology and Psychology.

ARTICLE VIII.—NON-COMPETITIVE ECONOMICS.

It is the merit of a recent attack on political economy* that it calls attention to the inadequacy of the principle of competition to account for certain modern economic phenomena. What was assumed as a universal law is shown to be, at present, but partial in its operation. Without endorsing the sweeping accusations brought by this article against economic science as a whole, we may admit that it needs modernizing. It was a half-century after the publication of the *Wealth of Nations* that the earlier railroads were built; and it was a century after its publication that the great railway and telegraph monopolies were effected. During that century the economic activities of the world have gained, in intensity, more than they had done during the entire antecedent period of recorded history. Diversity of products, rapidity of exchanges and industrial organization are the criteria; and if we compare the condition, in these respects, of early Oriental monarchies with the condition of the world in 1776, and that, again, with its present state, we shall find the second difference greater than the first. Steam, electricity, and American lands have brought this about. Economic theories adapted to a civilization midway in its development cannot apply equally well to a civilization at its present maximum. We need an economic science adapted to steam, or, more accurately, to an intensified social activity. The system of Adam Smith has advanced, but not sufficiently; and what is lacking is more than the adaptations called for in the article referred to; it is undetected fundamental principles.

There is something deeper than competition in the economic life of men; and the relation of competition to the underlying law has not been analyzed. The principle whereby the struggle of many men, each for himself, to secure wealth is made to work out the general good of all, has all the beauty that is claimed for it. We have endeavored, however, in an earlier

* An article by Mr. H. D. Lloyd, in *The Atlantic Monthly* for July of the present year.

Article, to point out the moral limitations that hedge about this struggle. The contest is never unrestricted. A Spirit of Justice is ever standing over the contestants, and bidding them compete only thus and thus. This they may do; that they may not do; and the prohibitions increase with time. Competition at best exists by sufferance, and the power that tolerates and controls it is moral.

We have now to indicate a still more decisive manner in which the moral sovereignty asserts itself. It not only regulates competition in its modes, but, at will, it thrusts the whole process aside. It is because there have long been departments of practical economy not left to competition, that there has always been, in science, some need of a province of non-competitive economics. It is because these activities are increasing apace with the rapid developments of the past century, that the need is pressing.

When the theory of social teleology shall come to be written, it will be seen that the ultimate end of political economy is not, as is generally assumed, the mere quantitative increase of wealth. Society, as an organic unit, has a higher economic end. That end is the attainment of the greatest quantity, the highest quality, and the most just distribution of wealth. It is the true subjection of matter, the placing of it in the most rational condition, absolute and relative. The matter and force of external nature are to be brought into that state which, in itself, is best, and they are to be brought into that relation of ownership which best promotes the general happiness. Matter modified by labor in accordance with enlightened reason may be termed rational wealth; it is this that society is pursuing, and partially realizing.

The actual wealth of society varies more or less from the ideal standard, and is but partly rational. Much of it is not of high quality, and much that is so is not well distributed; it is but partly beneficent, in itself, and in its relation to owners. Immoral books, poisonous beverages, and adulterated articles of food are wealth of an actual but irrational sort; so also are all things that minister to vice. These are real commodities, because, somewhere in society, are men whose impulses crave them; they are irrational, because the reason that is inherent

in society as a whole, does not want them, and would cast them out if it could.

The want of a true teleology, the failure to discover the *τέλος*, or ultimate goal of social tendencies, and the consequent failure to discriminate between actual and rational wealth, does not, indeed, deprive current political economy of its practical value; but it lessens that value, and throws the system more and more out of harmony with the modern spirit. A little while hence, and the omission will be disastrous.

The competitive mode of production and distribution has been adopted by society because it gives the nearest practical approximation to the standard of rational wealth. Imperfect as are its results, those of any other system would be more imperfect; they would render the wealth of society less, worse, or worse distributed. As compared with them, the principle of competition increases, improves and with rude equity divides the products of industry; and for this reason only it is tolerated. Inherently it has no vitality; it needs and possesses a *raison d'être*, and, in the absence of it, would cease to exist. It rests on moral law. In the department of distribution its working may be less perfect than in that of production. It may be but a spontaneous and imperfect agent for dividing wealth, with approximate justice, among the members of society; yet it is only because it serves this purpose, and so long as it does so, that it is tolerated; and there never was a time when it would not have been thrust aside, could society have seen its way to the adoption of another method which would more nearly have realized the rational end in view. Powerful as the competitive principle appears in practice, it is not supreme, still less, self-existent; it is the creature of an exigency, created as the rude servant of a higher power, and continuing by sufferance. It is perpetually on trial, and its minutest acts are subject to the scrutiny of that supreme moral court to whose verdict all system, economic as well as civil and legal, must submit.

Society does not and will not abandon the competitive principle; but, if what we have claimed be true, it should hold it in abeyance within limited fields of industry, whenever, within those limits, a better system is available. This it actually does.

Sometimes, as in railroad operations, competition works sluggishly, interruptedly, or not at all; sometimes, as in the transactions of labor and capital, it works one-sidedly and cruelly. It may happen that, in exactly that field in which competition operates unusually ill, another method may operate especially well, and the comparison of results may be in favor of the latter. If once society becomes conscious that this is the fact, farewell to one particular form of competition. In the department of public transportation this result appears to have been realized in some countries, and to be approaching, though still distant, in our own.

That the future field of non-competitive economics will be vast is less surprising than that its present field is considerable. Coöperation is the antithesis of competition: wherever it exists the competitive struggle is held, to some extent, in abeyance. In practice coöperation is most frequently of an incomplete kind, and a greater or less residuum of competition remains; but any realization of the one principle means the elimination of somewhat of the other; and, moreover, whatever is done by a public or governmental agency is done coöperatively.

It is the misfortune of the narrow and illogical definitions of wealth formerly current, and not yet entirely abandoned, to exclude from their classification much that is really wealth; and the excluded portion is, to a great extent, of the highest and most rational quality. It embodies itself often in tenuous and unsubstantial matter, as in the vibrating particles that constitute light and sound; but it ministers to the highest wants of human nature, and is tributary to true and permanent happiness. As we formerly endeavored to show, these finer commodities are to the soul what those of the grosser sort are to the body; and if man is dependent on literal bread for life, he is dependent on loaves of a more spiritual sort for a life that is worth the living.

Now these most rational forms of wealth have regularly been distributed on more or less completely coöperative principles. Beauty and truth have never been monopolized and sold to the highest bidder. Public agencies have embodied them in the delicate material forms that come within our definition of wealth, and have distributed them freely to all, as the Roman

emperors distributed the corn of Egypt. Not that all such commodities have been so distributed; the competitions of the market have determined the ownership of some of the costliest of them. There has been an interesting intermingling of coöperative and competitive action in this department, and it will be instructive to ascertain the limits where the one process ceases and the other begins.

From the days of Athens until now the best products of art have been, under one or another form of procedure, purchased by the public and assigned to the general use. Statues by the Greek masters were in temples or on the street. The greatest architectural works of the Romans were public theatres, baths, basilicas, fora, and temples. The early Christian community, a state within a state, expended its best efforts in the adornment of churches; and the triumphs of the Renaissance were in works of this kind. Most of the works of the great masters are now free for the enjoyment of all.

Yet, from the first, also, many products of art have been sold in the open market and purchased for private use. Wealthy men have always, whether from taste, vanity, or both, been consumers of artistic products. The amount of this consumption was small in Greece, larger in Rome, small again in the early Christian state, and even at the period of the Renaissance, but is increasingly large in recent times. The accumulation of vast fortunes in our own country may be expected to increase this tendency; while the frequent gift or bequest of private fortunes for purposes of public benefit may be expected to proportionately increase the amount of such products placed at the free disposal of the people. This is one regal function of the money king. Rational wealth in æsthetic form is, in great part, owned and enjoyed non-competitively.

Commodities which minister to the desire for knowledge come next in order, in the extent to which they have been distributed by the coöperative method. Oral instruction has not always been free, and books have been so still less frequently. In the later ages of the world, however, schools of some sort have been cheap enough for all but the very destitute, and this cheapness has been the result of some form of public action.

Commodities embodying knowledge have been either given to consumers or sold to them for less than their cost. The mediæval church assumed this governmental function among others. The modern public school is either entirely free or so nearly so as to throw its chief cost upon the State, and open it to universal use.

Endowments may be regarded as being, originally, gifts to the public, though administered without official intervention; and schools established on this basis are not, as far as the enjoyment of their products is concerned, to be separated, in principle, from other public agencies for producing and disbursing those commodities which are food for the intellect. The endowed colleges of England and America are, in their effect on students, public institutions. While these agencies are distributing oral instruction in a manner more or less independent of competition, free libraries, endowed or otherwise, are doing the same for the more substantial instruments of education. Rational wealth in the forms that nourish the intellect is, to a great extent, distributed non-competitively.

There are times when the church is to be regarded as one of the departments of the State; the material appliances of religion then fall in the same category as those of education and artistic culture. The State for ages nourished the heart as well as the taste and the intellect. The peculiarity of modern times and of our own country is the discontinuance of this process. In America, State and Church have separated; and, while the State retains the instruments of instruction, and, to a great extent, those of æsthetic culture, it has thrown the distribution of religious nutriment back into the market. It feeds the intellect and the taste, but leaves the heart, like the body, to be nourished by each man for himself. Yet the necessities of the case have not admitted of free individual action in this department. Men cannot obtain the needed sustenance separately, and voluntary coöperation has at once assumed the function abandoned by the State. Churches are the best established of coöperative societies, and their economic functions are a fascinating subject of the non-competitive division of political economy.

Ordinary coöperative societies are established, not to produce

commodities better in kind from those which the market can furnish, but to ensure a better distribution of the ordinary products of industry. Rational wealth is still the end. Though commodities remain unchanged in quality, they are to be brought into a better relation with men; those who produce them are to enjoy them. While coöperative societies have, as yet, but a tentative existence in our own country, they are so firmly established elsewhere that, in alluding to them as a subject of non-competitive economics, we do not pass beyond the range of things which have an actual and permanent existence. The same is true of national coöperation, or the management of industries by the general government. All civilized governments maintain post-offices, and, in most European countries, this is made to include telegraphs. In our own as well as foreign countries it effects the rapid conveyance of small parcels of merchandise and of small sums of money.

In a few countries governmental coöperation is extended over the field of railway transportation; and, no doubt, the same will, ultimately, be the case in America. The incentive to this transcendently important form of non-competitive industry is different from that which prompts to the forms already noticed, and the analysis of it will reveal an important and, as yet, unanalyzed economic principle, which we may term that of inappropriable utilities.

Labor imparts utilities to matter, and the impulse to it is that these may be enjoyed by the laborer. To be enjoyed they must be owned; the fruits that the laborer raises or the implements that he fashions must belong to him, and to no other. It is the nature of some utilities to be taken completely into the possession of him who produces them. Others, however, elude him. It is the nature of certain utilities to flee from him who creates them, and diffuse themselves among the members of the community. The builder of a house is able to appropriate the greater portion of the utility created. The roof shelters and the walls enclose that which makes his life enjoyable. If the house be comely in form and attractive in surroundings, he has the most constant enjoyment of its beauty. Yet this enjoyment cannot be monopolized; the tasteful exterior of the dwelling, with the beauty of its shade-trees and

lawn, create an inappropriable utility, which distributes itself among neighboring proprietors. Its presence is indicated and its measure expressed by the increased price of adjoining property.

In the case of railroads the inappropriable utilities are so great as almost to overbalance those which can be retained by the owners. The railroad creates a value far in excess of that which its projectors can realize; and this distributes itself among the adjacent population, and appears in the enhanced value of lands and the increased rewards of general industry. It has often happened that a railroad which enriched the population of the section which it traversed, rendered its projectors bankrupt.

The granting of public aid to railroad companies is a recognition of the principle of inappropriable utilities; it is a payment, by the public, for a value which the company is compelled to transfer to it from sheer inability to retain it for itself. The land grant is a natural mode of effecting this payment. The values created attach in part to the lands granted to the company, and in part to the alternate sections which, by the customary practice of our government, are reserved for itself. The public and the company thus share equally in this particular benefit.

Much of the utility created by the building and operation of the railroad remains inappropriable. The important fact is that this portion becomes a matter of indifference to the corporation. Benefits which the railroad company confers, but for which it can secure no reward, are of no consequence to it; they may, therefore, be sacrificed with impunity. Through the working of this principle of inappropriable utilities, much of the welfare of large populations is entrusted to corporations having no interest in maintaining it. It will be subserved as long as the company has nothing to gain by sacrificing it, not longer.

Recently, in our country, the company or its managers have often had much to gain by thus sacrificing the welfare of the inhabitants of the districts through which they pass. Discriminating rates for transportation, as well as other abuses, have recklessly made or marred the welfare of sections of the country, and are tending to hasten the time when only the assumption of railroads by the State can prevent evils too serious to

be tolerated. The State only can secure to itself all the utilities which these agencies create, and ensure their impartial distribution among those who are dependent on them.

It is evident that the principle of inappropriable utilities is applicable to every form of industry in which the community has an independent interest, and, in especial, to those of an educational and religious character. The exemption of institutions of this kind from taxation is a partial refunding of the value diffused by them through the community.

To the forms of non-competitive economies lying entirely within the department of distribution, there should be added one which is very partial, as yet, in its operation, but which promises to attain an overshadowing importance. In its nature it is a very direct, though as yet incomplete assertion of the sovereignty of moral law. It is the adjustment of wages by arbitration. Thus far there has been no attempt to set aside the general competitive principle in the determining of wages; yet, as we have seen, that principle continues solely by virtue of the general justice of its results; and if arbitration has only endeavored to soften the exceptionally harsh effects of the competitive law, it is because still worse effects would come from an indiscriminating interference. Justice sustains as well as restrains the wage law, though in the latter function its hand is more obvious and is more fully and gratefully recognized. It would be well if this system of determining the rewards of labor had a more than rudimentary existence in America.

There is, then, a province of economics not ordinarily recognized, because wholly or partially outside of the range of competition. The province has long been a considerable one, and will ultimately be vast. A portion of it has failed to receive attention from economists in consequence of illogical conceptions of wealth, which excluded its highest forms, and thus restricted the scope of economic science by ruling out entire provinces of industry. Reinstate these departments of economic life, recognize the true wealth-producing function of such agents as the church and the school, and the extent and importance of the non-competitive division of political economy becomes apparent. We have hastily outlined the boundaries of this division; it lies more within the general department of distribution than in that of production. The ground of the

radical difference between the two economic methods is a matter of both scientific and general interest, and we have found it in a teleologic principle in society, a quest for a wealth that, in quantity, quality, and distribution, shall conform to the requirements of enlightened reason. Within the limits which we have indicated, society has better attained its end by abandoning its usual competitive mode of action.

We have aimed, incidentally, to bring into view the sovereignty of moral law in the economic practice of the world. If competition were supreme, it would be supremely immoral; if it existed otherwise than by sufferance, it would be a demon. Nothing could be wilder or fiercer than an unrestricted struggle of millions of men for gain, and nothing more irrational than to present such a struggle as a scientific ideal. If it be pruned of its greater enormities, as, in actual life, is done, it still requires discernment to see the agency of moral law amid the abuses that remain. If, however, the sole end for which the process is tolerated is the suppression of greater and more general injustice, and if a superior power is ready to abolish it wherever it fails to fulfill this end, it may be classed, not as an ideal, but as an available means of approaching an ideal. In this view only are we secure from the blank confusion of supposing that the comprehensive field of economic life is alone outside of the controlling influence of morality. The insight that can detect providential design in the uglier forms of external nature, should detect it, also, in the repulsive phenomena of organized industry, in the "higgling of the market," the altercations of the civil law, and the ignoble scramble for personal profit.

As thus apprehended, there is no apotheosis of selfishness in the theory of political economy, and there is no necessarily corrupting effect from the practical outworking of its principles. Recognizing the competitive struggle as the imperfect agent of moral law, a man may participate in it without taint. The bad effects of the contest he does not need to suffer; and to the lower levels, where the golden calf worship is unhindered and blighting, he does not need to descend. It is his privilege to live on the mountainous slope at the summit of which moral law reigns. He may buy, sell, and get gain, as well as give thanks and worship, with his eyes uplifted to the hills whence cometh his help.

ARTICLE IX.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

ROBERTSON SMITH'S *THE PROPHETS OF ISRAEL*.*—In the volume on "The Old Testament in the Jewish Church, Dr. Smith advocated opinions at variance with the traditional views respecting the origin of the Pentateuch and the legal system of Israel. In the present series of lectures, there is not so much to clash with the commonly received opinions as the former series contained. Yet, there are not wanting propositions that will strike the reader, who knows little of the speculations of Kuenen, Wellhausen, and other critics of the day, with some amazement. This every one must allow, that Dr. Smith is master of a perspicuous, terse, and eloquent style. He leaves one in no doubt as to his meaning. At times he rises to a strain of genuine and stirring eloquence. The following extract will indicate the general tone and spirit of the discussion.

"If the vindication of the divine mission of the prophets of Israel must be sought in the precision of detail with which they related beforehand the course of coming events, the hope which Isaiah continued to preach during the victorious advance of Sennacherib must be reckoned as vain imaginations. The great decision which shall call back the earth to the service of the true God is still an object of faith, and not an accomplished reality. The Assyrians passed away and new powers rose upon the ruins of their greatness to repeat in other forms the battle of earthly empire against the Kingdom of God. As Babylonia and Persia, Greece and Rome, successively rose and fell, the sphere of the great movements of history continually enlarged, till at length a new world went forth from the dissolution of ancient society, the center of human history was shifted to lands unknown to the Hebrews, and its fortunes were committed to nations still unborn when Isaiah preached. Not only have Isaiah's predictions received no literal fulfillment, but it is impossible that the evolution of the divine purpose can ever again be narrowed within the limits of the petty world of which Judah was the center and

* *The Prophets of Israel and their Place in History*, to the close of the eighth century B. C. Eight Lectures. By W. ROBERTSON SMITH, LL.D. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1882.

Egypt and Assyria the extremes. Fanciful theorists who use the Old Testament as a book of curious mysteries, and profane its grandeur by adapting it to their idle visions at the sacrifice of every law of sound hermeneutics and sober historical judgment, may still dream of future political conjunctions which shall restore to Palestine the position of central importance which it once held as the meeting-place of the lands of ancient civilization; but no sane thinker can seriously imagine for a moment that Tyre will again become the emporium of the world's commerce or Jerusalem the seat of universal sovereignty. The forms in which Isaiah enshrined his spiritual hopes are broken, and cannot be restored; they belong to an epoch of history that can never return, and the same line of argument which leads us reverently to admire the divine wisdom that chose the mountains of Palestine as the cradle of true religion at a time when Palestine was, in a very real sense, the physical center of those movements of history from which the modern world has grown, refutes the idea that the Kingdom of the living God can again in any special sense be identified with the nation of the Jews and the land of Canaan. These indeed are considerations which have long been obvious to all but a few fantastic Millenarians, whose visions deserve no elaborate refutation. But even serious students of Scripture do not always clearly realize the full import of the failure of the literalistic view of prophecy; and the doctrine of literal fulfilment, rejected in principle, is still apt to exercise a fatal influence on the details of prophetic exegesis."

PROFESSOR GREEN'S *MOSES AND THE PROPHETS*.*—The aim and contents of this volume are thus described in the Preface:—

"This volume does not pretend to discuss all questions pertaining to the book of Moses and the prophets. It is simply a reprint, with additions, of Articles in review of the works named in the title, which appeared in the 'Presbyterian Review,' for October, 1881, and for January, 1882, and in the 'Princeton Review,' for July, 1878. The last is published as originally written, a few pages having been restored which were dropped to bring it within smaller compass. The Preliminary Remarks were delivered in September, 1881, as the opening lecture of the session in Princeton Theological Seminary. A few paragraphs

* *Moses and the Prophets*, etc., etc. By WILLIAM HENRY GREEN, D.D., Professor in Princeton Theological Seminary. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1883.

have been added, to the Article entitled 'Professor Robertson Smith on the Pentateuch,' for the sake of greater fulness or clearness in the argument. Thus attention is drawn to the fact that the alleged diversity of writers in the Pentateuch, if it could be proved, would not affect its antiquity or authority (p. 46); that the Levitical Law must have been written as well as enacted in the wilderness (p. 61); that Moses could have spoken of his own meekness with no disparagement to his modesty (p. 61 *note*); that the variant phraseology of Leviticus and of Deuteronomy, in relation to the priests, involves no diversity of authorship or of age (p. 80, *note* 2); and that there is no discrepancy, as is alleged, between Deuteronomy and the Levitical Law in relation to the Passover (p. 118, *note*). A separate chapter has also been devoted to the Worship in High Places, about which the critics hold most extravagant opinions, and upon which they found their principal arguments against the antiquity of the Laws of Pentateuch. The review of Dr. Robertson Smith's recent Lectures on the Prophets of Israel is here published for the first time."

Professor Green is an eminent scholar. His studies in the Old Testament have been pursued for many years. He is a conscientious writer who would not knowingly do injustice to an adversary, warp any passage of Scripture from its true meaning, or fail to represent fairly an opponent's position or arguments. He is a thorough conservative in his theological bent, though not in the least deficient in a kindly Christian temper. The reader will find in his volume an able and full presentation of the views of those who adhere in the main to the ordinarily received views in regard to the Mosaic history and literature, and the Old Testament Scriptures generally.

OUR LIBERAL MOVEMENT IN THEOLOGY.*—The first five of these lectures give a very readable and interesting sketch and criticism of the history of Unitarianism in New England. These are followed by three lectures, the subjects of which are: A Scientific Theology; The Religion of Humanity; and The Gospel of Liberalism. The book is a valuable and instructive study of what Unitarianism is and how it came to be what it is.

**Our Liberal Movement in Theology*, chiefly as shown in Recollections of the History of Unitarianism in New England; being a closing course of lectures given in the Harvard Divinity School. By JOSEPH HENRY ALLEN, Lecturer on Ecclesiastical History in Harvard University. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1882. v. and 220 pages. Price, \$1.25.

PRAYER AND ITS ANSWER.*—At the close of the first year of the Fulton street prayer-meeting Dr. Prime published a volume entitled "The Power of Prayer," and giving the history of the meeting through the year. It had an immense circulation; it reached its sixty-fifth thousand in London, and was translated into various languages. At the end of five years he published a second volume and at the end of fifteen years a third, continuing the record of the meeting and its results. The volume before us is a selection of striking incidents and results of the meeting during the twenty-five years of its history. The meeting has been a remarkable center of religious influence which has extended to the four quarters of the world and to the islands of the sea.

CHRISTIANITY'S CHALLENGE.†—This volume consists of eleven Sunday afternoon lectures given in Chicago under the auspices of the Young Men's Christian Association. They are designed to meet popular skepticism by presenting the claims of Christianity, what it is and what it has done as reasons for believing it and complying with its requirements and invitations. The subjects of the discourses are Christianity's Challenge, Book, Christ, a Gospel of Definiteness, View of Man, Not a Failure, Endless Death, Endless Life, Pleasure, Business, Woman. The lectures are well fitted for the purpose for which they were designed.

CRUMMEL'S SERMONS.‡—Mr. Crummel's grandfather was king of Timanee in West Africa. His father was taken in boyhood and brought to this country as a slave. He was well educated in various schools, though encountering many difficulties from the violent prejudice prevalent in those days against the colored people. In 1835 an Academy for colored youth was opened in Canaan, N. H., at which he was a student. But after three months the farmers in the neighborhood came with some ninety yoke of cattle, hauled the academy building into a swamp and

* *Prayer and its Answer illustrated in the first twenty-five years of the Fulton street Prayer Meeting.* By S. IRENEUS PRIME, D.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1882. vii. and 171 pages. Price \$1.00.

† *Christianity's Challenge and Some Phases of Christianity submitted for consideration.* By Rev. HERRICK JOHNSON, D.D. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York. 269 pages.

‡ *The Greatness of Christ, and other Sermons.* By ALEX. CRUMMEL, Rector of St. Luke's Church, Washington, D. C., author of the *Future of Africa*. New York: Thomas Whittaker, 2 and 3 Bible House, 1882. x. and 352 pages.

forced the scholars to quit the town. In 1839 he applied for admission to the General Theological Seminary of the Episcopal Church and was refused on account of his color. He pursued his studies privately and was admitted to Priest's orders in Philadelphia by Bishop Lee of Delaware. He afterwards pursued his studies at Cambridge University, England. He then went to Liberia where he became rector of a parish and professor in the college. He remained there many years. Since his return to this country he has been laboring among the people of his own color in Washington. The sermons are well-written and are creditable to the culture, ability and piety of the author. Bishop Clarke of Rhode Island has written an introduction to the volume in which he says: "The reader will find something in these discourses that is fresh and original. The topics considered are varied and interesting, the counsel which the preacher gives is sound and practical, and the sermons are pervaded with the life and light and unction of the gospel. I hope that they will meet with a cordial reception from the public, and that their extensive sale may bring comfort and relief to our good brother, who has been called to suffer many things in the course of his earthly pilgrimage." Fronting the title page is a portrait of the author.

SCHAFF'S CHURCH HISTORY.*—It is thirty years since Dr. Schaff published his history of the Apostolic Age, and twenty-five years since the issue of the first volume of his "General History of the Church." The adoption of a somewhat more expanded design for this work, in connection with the progress of research in the last decades, has led the author to recompose the opening volume of the series. He has addressed himself to the task with his wonted alacrity and diligence, and now presents to the public the first portion of the results of his diligent labor. The volume before us spreads before the student of theology and of history the ripest fruits of modern investigation on this most interesting, formative period in the annals of the Church. It is founded on a candid and thorough examination of the original sources. But it exhibits, likewise, a complete familiarity with the productions of our own day, bearing on the problems which the historian is called upon to consider. The

* *History of the Christian Church.* By PHILIP SCHAFF. A new edition thoroughly revised and enlarged. Vol. I., Apostolic Christianity, 1-100. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1882.

style is lucid and unaffected. The tone is marked by religious sincerity, void of all cant, and imbued with genuine catholicity. The last three hundred pages are occupied with the New Testament,—the origin, authorship, and character of the books which compose it. Here the student will find a clear, learned and discriminating treatment of the “living questions” of the day. The entire volume is a noble contribution to literature. Its veteran author is entitled to the congratulations of all lovers of good learning.

FARRAR'S *THE EARLY DAYS OF CHRISTIANITY*.*—In continuation of the series of which the “Life of Jesus” and the “Life of St. Paul” are the beginning, Canon Farrar has prepared this work, descriptive of the condition of the world at the advent of Christianity, and of the types of doctrinal belief embodied in the writings of the New Testament. It is characterized by the same signs of careful scholarly research, the same fervor, rising occasionally into vehemence of style and expression, and the same theological tone and spirit, which belong to the earlier volumes. Canon Farrar is never dry or tame; he seems almost to have a dread of being uninteresting. He aims to take notice of everything in the literature pertaining to the subject which modern scholarship has sent out. On his vivid and instructive pages the reader will find much to enlighten him respecting the teachings of the Apostles and the times in which they lived. Not unfrequently there is a confidence which falls little short of dogmatism. For example, he sanctions the old conjecture that Apollos wrote the Epistle to the Hebrews. This is not unreasonable as a conjecture. But our author adopts it as a certified conclusion, and refers, here and there, when he quotes from the Epistle, to Apollos as if he were known to be its author.

THE CHURCH; BY PROF. BINNIE.†—This volume is one of the series of Hand-books for Bible classes, edited by Rev. Marcus Dods, D.D., and Rev. Alexander White, D.D. It presents concisely and clearly the Presbyterian doctrine of the constitution, ordinances, and polity of the church. Questions for examination are appended to each chapter. It is a valuable book for its purpose.

* *The Early Days of Christianity*. By F. W. FARRAR, D.D., F.R.S., etc. New York and Paris: Cassell, Petter, Galpin & Co. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.

† *The Church*. By WILLIAM BINNIE, D.D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1882. 152 pages.

SCOTTISH CHURCH HISTORY.*—This is one of Messrs. Dod and Whyte's Series of Handbooks for Bible Classes, several of which we have noticed in previous numbers. It is a series of great excellence. This volume presents briefly but clearly the church history of Scotland—a history of great interest and value. The history is divided into chapters with questions annexed. It appears to have been carefully prepared and the narrative is in a clear and agreeable style.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY.†—This is a philosophical history of the development of civil liberty in the English Colonies in America. It is divided into three parts:—The Era of Constitutional Development in England; The Era of State Development in America; and the Era of Constitutional Development in America. The historical events are clearly narrated, and the progress of the development through successive changes traced to its causes. The author shows breadth of view, keen insight, and a clear and firm grasp of his subjects. He also presents life-like and interesting pictures of the manners and customs of the early colonial life. He discusses with discrimination the varying religious, political, commercial, and social influences in the different American colonies.

Of Harvard college and Yale the author says: "That has been preëminent in elegance of culture; the flame of this has steadily shed a light which has illuminated the path trodden by six generations of seekers after useful and solid learning. They have not sought it in vain, and perhaps no institution in the world has, in the same duration of time and from the same number of students, given to society so many useful citizens, and certainly none in America has exerted so great an influence on the fortunes of the country as Yale. The effect of both these universities on the character and manners of the Americans is incalculable. Harvard has probably exerted its greatest influence on literature; Yale on public affairs, particularly law, the administration of justice, and the administration of government." (Page 171.)

* *Scottish Church History*. By Rev. NORMAN L. WALKER, Dysart. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1882. 161 pages.

† *The Development of Constitutional Liberty in the English Colonies of America*. By EBEN GREENOUGH SCOTT. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 27 and 29 West 23d street, 1882. xv. and 334 pages.

STERNE'S CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY.*—Mr. Sterne proposes in this volume to give a sketch and interpretation of the Constitution, as it is interpreted by the Supreme Court, with a history of the political controversies which resulted in the formation and changes of the instrument, together with the presentation of the actual situation of political parties and questions. Notwithstanding the multiplicity of books on the Constitution, this volume fills a peculiar place and has its own distinctive value. The author seems to have done his proposed work well.

MALLOCK ON SOCIAL EQUALITY.†—Mr. Mallock exposes the erroneous principles of the socialism which demands social equality as the cure for the existing evils of poverty and wealth. He aims to prove that wealth is not created by labor alone; that it is not the division of labor but the gradation of labor which advances civilization, the engineer who directs the building of a railroad accomplishing immeasurably more than the laborer who shovels dirt; that if wealth were equally distributed it would issue in a diminution of the aggregate of wealth, a leveling down towards poverty rather than a leveling up towards wealth, and a general degeneracy towards savagery. His missing science is "the science of human character," investigating the motives which actuate men with reference to the questions pertaining to the creation and distribution of wealth. He refutes the theory of Spencer, Macaulay and others that great men are factors of little account in the progress of civilization. The volume contains a considerable number of unwarranted generalizations and sophistical arguments. But it is suggestive and quickening to thought, exposes some wide spread errors, and its trend of thought is healthy and right.

THE ART AMATEUR for October is rich in practical hints and directions for art work and home decoration. The supplement of designs contains, besides those for flower and figure painting, one for an embroidered panel of "Birds and Wild Roses," the first of a series from the Royal School of Art Needlework at South Kensington. The frontispiece is a fine drawing by Piton of a

**Constitutional History and Political Development of the United States.* By SIMON STERNE, of the New York Bar. New York, London and Paris: Cassell, Petter, Galpin & Co. x. and 323 pages.

†Social Equality: a short study in a missing science. By WILLIAM HURRELL MALLOCK. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 27 and 29 West 23d street, 1882. 212 pages.

portrait plaque from the Deck factory. A sketch of the "Genius of Music" by the French decorator Galland forms another full page illustration; a decorative ceiling by Faivre, and two of the Vanderbilt painted windows, are also given. The recent Hamilton sale receives attention, and many of the paintings and other objects sold are illustrated. There is an Article on the artists Courbet and Baudry, and an account of the new art of "Lustra Painting," lately taken up by the British "upper ten." If any of our readers are still unacquainted with *The Art Amateur* let them send for the October issue. Price, \$4 a year; single numbers, 35 cents. Montague Marks, publisher, 23 Union Square, New York.

THE MAGAZINE OF ART, for November, contains three full page steel engravings; one of a picture of Millet, *the Shepherdess and her flock*; another of the "*Jolly Companions*," by Ed. Grützner; and a third—*Abandoned*—by Rasch. The leading Article is upon "*a representative American*"—Eastman Johnson—with four illustrations, taken from his pictures. An account is given of "Pottery among the Kabyles of Algiers," with ample illustrations. In the Article on the "Harbingers of the Renaissance" there are illustrations from the works of Donatello, Lippi, Fra Angelico, and others. "Greek Myths in Greek Art" is an Article beautifully illustrated. Among the other Articles are "Studio life in Paris;" "the Cathedral of Orvieto;" "Ceramics in Japan." With this number, the fifth volume closes, and in December a new volume commences.

Cassell, Petter, Galpin, & Co., New York. Yearly subscriptions, \$3.50. Single numbers, 35 cents.

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